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IForeword
The 5th International Meeting on Thermal Nuclear Reactor Safety was held
in Karlsruhe on September 9-13, 1984; it was attended by some 500
scientists and engineers from 25 countries. The conference was jointly
sponsored by the European Nuclear Society (ENS), the American Nuclear
Society (ANS), the Canadian Nuclear Soc!ety (CNS) and the Japan Atomic
Energy Society (JAES). The meeting was further endorsed by, and
organized in cooperation with, the Nuclear Energy Agency (NEA) of the
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, the International
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and the Commission of the European
Communities (CEC). Host organizations were the Kerntechnische
Gesellschaft (KTG) and the Kernforschungszentrum Karlsruhe (KfK). The
meeting was the fifth in aseries of international meetings in the same
subject areas with ANS and ENS as primary sponsors.
The Karlsruhe reactor safety meeting was held to reflect on the present
status of engineered safety systems in nuclear power plants and to
represent the findings of international safety research.
Seven invited experts of international reputation outlined the present
state of the art in survey lectures. Moreover, more than 200 technical
and scientific papers selected from 280 submitted papers, dealt with
recent findings in reactor safety technology and research in the
following areas: safety systems and functions optimization; man machine
interface and emergency response; code development and verification;
system and component behavior; fuel behavior during severe accidents;
core debris and core concrete interaction; fission product behavior;
containment response; probabilistic risk assessment. We wish to thank
all speakers for their valuable contributions.
The meeting was concluded by a panel discussion on "Progress and Trends
in Reactor Safety Technology and Research - What Has Been Achieved to
Date? - What Remains to Be Done?"
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It is not possible to acknowledge individually all persons who
contributed to the meeting. We are greatly indebted to H.H. Hennies,
President of the German Kerntechnische Gesellschaft (KTG), and J.M.
Hendrie, President of the Amerlcan Nuclear Society (ANS) who served as
General Chairmen, and to A. Birkhofer as Chairman of the Technical
Program Committee. Many thanks are due to the members of the Steering
Committee, the Technical Program Committee, the Review Committee and the
Organizing Committee.
The 6th International Meeting on Thermal Nuclear Reactor Safety was
announced to take place in February 1986 at San Oiego, California.
!Ir
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SAINT-PAUL-LEZ-DURANCE
00101 HELSINKl
KöLN 1
GEESTHACHT
STOCKHOLH
FONTENAY-AUX-ROSES
UPTON NY, 11973
KARLSRUHE
VÄLLINGBY
KARLSRUHE
OFFENBACH
STOCKHOLH
BERLIN 30
ALBUQUERQUE, ~l 87111
BONN 7
NYKÖPING
ISPRA (VARESE)
STUTTGART 80
STUTTGART 80
TORONTO, ONT. M5G IX6
KARLSRUHE
ALBUQUERQUE, NH 87112
NYKÖPING
STUTTGART 80
IDAHO FALLS ID, 83415
ALBUQUERQUE NH, 87185
KARLSRUHE 1
KARLSRUHE
HANNHEIH 1
FONTENAY-AUX-ROSES
DORSET DT2 8DH
KÖLN 90
TORONTO, ONT. M5G IX6
KARLSRUHE
LAUSANNE
STUTENSEE 5
BURGER, BERND
BURKE, RICHARD P.
BURSON, DR. S. BRADLEY
BÜNE~urnN, DIETRICH
BÜRGER, MANFRED
BÜTTNER, WOLF-E.
CACCIABUE, CARLO PIETRO
CAHUZAC, ANTOINE
CAMBIEN, ISABELL
CARACHALIOS, CONSTANTIN
CARDElRA, F.
CARNINO, ANNICK
CARTER, JAMES C.
CASSETTE, PHILIPPE
CAVE, L.
CENERINO, GERARD
CHADHA, J.A.
CIGARINI, ~1ARCO
CLARK, J.M.
CLOUGH, DR. P.N.
COLE, RANDALL K.
CONTE, DR. ~~ELEINE
COSTAZ, JEAN-LOUIS
CURCA-TIVIG, FLORIN
CURTIS, ROBERT
DALLE DONNE, PROF. M.
DE BOECK, BENOIT
DELJA, ALEKSANDAR
DENNING, DR. RICHARD S.
DEUBER, DR. H.
DIENST, DR. WOLFGANG
DILLMANN, HANS-GEORG
DOBBE, CHARLES
DREDEMIS, GEOFFROY
DROLSHAMMER, o.
DROUIN, M.T.
DUCO, JEAN
DUNCKER, PETER
ECKERED, THOMAS
EDWARDS, A.R.
EGLIN, WOLFGANG
EHRHARDT, DR. JOACHIM
EIFLER, WALTER
EL-GENK, MOHMIED S.
EL-SHANAWANY, DR. M.
ENERHOLM, ANDERS
ERBACHER, F.J.
ERVEN, ULRICH
ESPEFÄLT, RALF
FABIAN, DR. HERMANN
FABREGA,
FAIRCLOTH, REGINALD L.
FARELLO, ELVIO
FASOLI-STELLA, PAOLA
FEHRENBACH, DR. P.J.
FE~urnDJIAN, JEAN
FERRELL, W. L.
FERRERO, CLAUDIO
FEUERSTEIN, DR. H.
FlEGE, A.
FINZI, S.
FlORENZA, JOSEF
XXXIV
UNIV. STUTTG.
SANDIA N.L.
US NRC
GKSS
UNIV. STUTTG.
GRS
CEC ISPRA
ELECTR. FRANCE
KFK GMBH
UNIV. STUTTG.
PORT.NUCL. SOC.
ELECTR. FRANCE
T.E.C.
CEA
RISK ASSESSMT.
CEA
ONTARIO HYDRO
KFK GMBH
SCOTL.EL.BOARD
UKAEA
SANDIA N.L.
CEA
EDF (SEPTEN)
UNIV. STUTTG.
US NRC
KFK GMBH
ASS. VINCOTTE
FAC. MECH.ENG.
BATTELLE
KFK GMBH
KFK GMBH
KFK GMBH
EG&G IDAHO INC
CEA
KFK GMBH
SCIENCE APPL.
CEA
KWU KARLSTEIN
RAADET F. KKA
UKAEA
BADE NWERK
KFK GMBH
CEC ISPRA
mnv. N.MEXICO
NNC
ROY.INST.TECH.
KFK GMBH
GRS
SWED.ST.POWER
KWU ERLANGEN
CEA
UKAEA
ENEA
CEC ISPRA
AECL
CEA
SCIENCE APPL.
KFK GMBH
KFK GMBH
KFK GMBH
CEC BRUSSELS
KWU ERLANGEN
D -7000
USA -
USA -
D -2054
D -7000
D -8046
1-21020
F-75006
D -7513
D -7000
P -
F-75008
USA -
F-92260
GB -
F-92260
CDN -
D -7500
GB -
GB -
D -7500
F-92260
F-69628
D -7000
USA -
D -7500
B -1180
YU -
USA -
D -7500
D -7500
D -7500
USA -
F-92260
D -7500
USA -
F-92260
D -8757
S-10248
GB -
D -7500
D -7500
1-21020
USA -
GB -
S-10044
D -7500
D -5100
S-16287
D -8520
F-13115
GB -
I -
1-21020
CDN -
F-92260
USA -
D -7500
D -7500
D -7500
B -
D -8520
STUTTGART 80
ALBUQUERQUE NM, 87185
20555 WASHINGTON D.C.
GEESTHACHT-TESPERHUDE
STUTTGART 80
GARCHING
ISPRA (VARESE)
PARIS
STUTENSEE 1
STUTTGART 80
LISSABON
PARIS
KNOXVILLE, TENNES SEE
FONTENAY-AUX-ROSES
TUNBRIDGE WELLS, KCNT
FONTENAY-AUX-ROSES
TORONTO, ONT. M8Z 5S4
KARLSRUHE
GLASGOW, G44 4BE
WARRINGTON, WA3 4NE
KARLSRUHE 1
FONTENAY-AUX-ROSES
VILLEURBANNE
STUTTGART 80
GAlTHERSBURG ~ID 20878
KARLSRUHE
~RUSSELS
BEOGRAD
COLill1BUS, OHIO 43201
KARLSRUHE
KARLSRUHE
KARLSRUHE
IDAHO FALLS ID, 83415
FONTENAY-AUX-ROSES
KARLSRUHE
87102 ALBUQ~ERQUE N.MEX
FONTENAY-AUX-ROSES
KARLSTEIN
STOCKHOLM
WARRINGTON WA3 5QU
KARLSRUHE 1
KARLSRUHE
ISPRA (VARESE)
ALBUQUERQUE, NM 87131
LEICESTER, LE8 3LH
STOCKHOLM
KARLSRUHE
AACHEN
VÄLLINGBY
ERLANGEN
SAINT-PAUL-LEZ-DURANCE
OXON
ROMA
ISPRA (VARESE)
CHALK RIVER, ONTARIO
FONTENAY~AUX-ROSES
87102 ALBUQUERQUE N.MEX
KARLSRUHE
KARLSRUHE
KARLSRUHE
BRUSSELS
ERLANGEN
FISCHER, DR. KARSTEN
FISCHER, DR. P.-H.
FOUREST, BERNARD
FRESCURA, G.H.
FRISCHENGRUBER, KURT
FROHENTIN,
FRÖHLICH, DR. REIHAR
FUCHS, HANS
FURRER, DR. l1AX
FYNBO, PETER B.
GABALLAH, DR. IBRAHIH
GARDNER, RICIDlOND
GARLAND , J. A.
GAUDENZIO; MARIOTTI
GAUVENET, ANDRE
GEIGER, DR. WERNER
GIESEKE, DR. JAHES
GILBY, ERNEST V.
GILL, RALPH
GINSBERG, DR. THEODORE
GIROUX, CHRISTIAN
GITTUS, DR. J.H.
GOUFFON, ALAIN
GOVAERTS, PAUL
GOVAERTS, PIERRE
GREEF, DR. C.P.
GREHH, DR. OTTO
GRIFFITH, JERRY D.
GRIHH, PETER
GROOS, DR. EKKEHARD
GROS, G.
GRÄSLUND, CHRISTIAN
GUARRO, SERGIO
GUESNON, HENRI
GULDEN, DR. WERNER
HADALLER, G. I.
HAGEN, DR. S.
HALL, PETER
HARPER, FREDERICK T.
HASCHKE, DR. DIETER
HASSANIEN, DR. S.
HAUSSERHANN,
HEDGRAN, ARNE
HELLSTRAND, ERIC
HENDRIE, DR. JOSEPH H.
HENNIES, DR. H.H.
HENNINGS, DR. WILFRIED
HERBOLD, G.
HERTTRICH, DR. HICHAEL
HEUSER, DR. F.W.
HICKEN, PROF.DR. E.
HILL, DR. T.F.
HINDLE, EDWARD D.
HIRMER, FRANZ
HIRSCHBERG, STEFAN
HOCKE, KLAUS-DIETER
HOERTNER, DR. HELHUT
HOFHANN, DR. PETER
HOFHANN, G.
HOHIANN, WOLFlfARD
HOID~NN, HERMANN
HOLTBECKER, HELHUT
xxxv
BATTELLE
KFK GHBH
CEA
ONTARIO HYDRO
KWU ERLANGEN
EIR
KFK GHBH
HOTOR-COLUHBUS
EIR
RISO NAT.LAB.
HRB GHBH
STONE& WEBSTER
AERE HARWELL
ENEL-CRTN
ELECTR. FRANCE
BATTELLE
BATTELLE
GILBY ASS.
GRS
BROOKHAVEN N.L
CEA
UKAEA
CEA
S.C.K.jC.E.N.
ASS. VINCOTTE
C.E.E.B.
KWU ERLANGEN
US ENERGY DEP.
EIR
KFA JÜLICH
CEA
SWEDISH NPI
LLNL
FRAHATOHE
KFK GHBH
WESTINGHOUSE
KFK GHBH
CEGB
SANDIA N.L.
EIR
ONTARIO HYDRO
NUCL.EN.AGENCY
ROY.INST.TECH.
STUDSVIK
AHERICAN NUCL.
KFK GHBH
KFA JÜLICH
GRS
BHI
GRS
GRS
ATOHIC EN. CORP
UKAEA
KWU ERLANGEN
AB ASEA-ATOH
UNIV. STUTTG.
GRS
KFK GHBH
KFK GHBH
KWU OFFENBACH
CEC ISPRA
CEC ISPRA
D -6000
D -7500
F-92260
CDN -
D -8520
CH-5303
D -7500
CH-5401
CH-5303
DK-4000
D -6800
USA -
GB -
1-56100
F-75008
D -6000
USA -
GB -
D -8046
USA -
F-92260
GB -
F-92260
B -2400
B -1180
GB -
D -8520
USA -
CH-5303
D -5170
F-92260
S-10252
USA -
F-92084
D -7500
CDN -
D -7500
GB -
USA -
CH-5303
CDN -
F-75016
S-10044
8-61182
USA -
D -7500
D -5170
D -8046
D -5300
D -5000
D -8046
ZA-OOOl
GB -
D -8520
S-72104
D -7000
D -8046
D -7500
D -7500
D -6050
Ir21020
1-21020
FRANKFURT 90
KARLSRUHE
FONTENAY-AUX-ROSES
TORONTO ONT. HSG IX6
ERLANGEN
WÜRENLINGEN
KARLSRUHE
BADEN
WÜRENLINGEN
ROSKILDE
HANNHEIH 1
BOSTON, 02107
OXFORDSHlRE OXII ORA
PISA
PARIS
FRANKFURT
COLUHBUS OHIO 43201
KNUTSFORD, CHE. WA169DZ
GARCHING
UPTON, NY 11973
FONTENAY-AUX-ROSES
CULCHETH, WARR. WA3 4NE
FONTENAY-AUX-ROSES
HOL
BRUSSELS
GLOUCESTERSHIRE GLB 9PB
ERLANGEN
WASHINGTON DC, 20545
WÜRENLINGEN
JÜLICH
FONTENAY-AUX-ROSES
STOCKHOLH
LIVERHORE, CA 94550
PARIS LA DEFENSE
KARLSRUHE
HAHILTON ONT. L8N 3K2
KARLSRUHE
GLOUCESTER
ALBUQUERQUE, NH 87185
WÜRENLINGEN
TIVERTON ONT. NOG 2TO
PARIS
STOCJUlOLH
NYKöPING
UPTON NY, 11973
KARLSRUHE
JÜLICH
GARCHING!
BONN 1
KöLN 1
GARCHING
PRETORIA, SOUTH AFRICA
PRESTON, PR4 ORR
ERLANGEN
VÄSTERAS
STUTTGART 80
GARCHING
KARLSRUHE
KARLSRUHE
OFFENBACH
ISPRA (VARESE)
ISPRA (VARESE)
HOLZER, ROBERT
HOSEMANN, DR. J.P.
HOWIESON, J. Q.
HÖGBERG, LARS
HÄFNER, H.
HÄFNER, WOLFGANG
IHLE, P.
ILBERG, DR. DAN
ISRAEL, MATHIEU
JACOBS, GÜNTER
JAHNS, ARMIN
JAPAVAIRE, ROBERT
JASS IM, MOHA}lliD WIDAD
JESCHKI, WOLFGANG
JOHANSSON, KJELL O.
KALLENBACH, ULRICH
KALLI, HAIKLEI
KALVERBOER, C.
KANZLEITER, T.F.
KAPULLA, DR. H.
KARB, E.
KARWAT, PROF.DR. HELHUT
KASTENBERG, WILLIA}!
KATO, MASA}!I
KATZENMEIER, GUSTAV
KELLY, JOHN E.
KERSTING, E.
KESSLER, PROF. G.
KllI, BYONG-JOO
KINSMAN, DR. PETER R.
KISSEL, HEUIUT
KLEWE-NEBENIUS, DR. H.
KNOBEL, RONALD C.
KOBUSSEN, J.
KODAlRA, HIDEKI
KOENIG, JAN
KOHLI, RAJIV
KOHN, DR. E.
KOLEV, DR.-ING. NIKOLAY
KOLLAS, JOHN G.
KOLLATH, DR. KLAUS
KOMORIYA, DR. H.
KOMSI, MATTI
KOSTER, A.
KOTAKE, SHOJI
KOUTSOUVELIS, G.
KRAFT, ROLF
KRESS, DR. TOM S.
KREWER, KARL HEINZ
KRIEG, R.
KROEGER, P.G.
KRUGER, DR. P.J.
KRÖSING, GERD
KUCZERA, DR. B.
KUHUlANN, DR. MICHAEL
K~!MERER, PROF. K.
KURZAWE, MICHAEL
KUTTRUF, HELMUT
KÜSTERS, DR. HEINZ
KÖBERLEIN, DR. KLAUS
KÖNIG, DR. L.
KÖRBER, DR H.
XXXVI
NIS
KFK GMBH
AECL
NUCL. P. INSP.
KFK GMBH
BATTELLE
KFK GMBH
BROOKHAVEN N.L
ELECTR. FRANCE
KFK GMBH
GRS
CEA
IAEC
HSK
STUDSVIK
UNIV. STUTTG.
UNIV. LAPPEEN.
N.V. PZEM
BATTELLE
KFK GMBH
KFK GHBH
TU MÜNCHEN
UCLA
NIPPON ATOmC
KFK GMBH
SANDIA N.L.
GRS
KFK GMBH
UNIV. IHSCONS.
UKAEA
KFK GMBH
KFK GMBH
KNOBEL & ASS.
EIR
UNIV. TOKYO
LOS ALAMOS N.L
BATTELLE
AECL
KFK GMBH
GREEK AEC
GRS MBH
ARGONNE N.L.
IMATRAH VOll1A
NUCOR
MITSUBISHI RES
KFK G~lBH
KFK GMBH
OAR RInGE N.L.
BMFT
KFK GMBH
BROOKHAVEN N.L
NUCOR
BVV-SV
KFK GMBH
BATTELLE
KFK GMBH
KWU KARLSTEIN
DR. LEDEilllANN
KFK GMBH
GRS
KFK GHBH
AP (ANG.PHYS.)
D -6450
D -7500
CDN -
S-10252
D -7500
D -6000
D -7500
USA -
F-92141
D -7500
D -5000
F-92260
IRQ -
CH-5303
S-61182
D -7000
SF -
NL-4430
D -6000
D -7500
D -7500
D -8046
USA -
J -
D -7500
USA -
D -8046
D -7500
USA -
GB -
D -7500
D -7500
USA -
CH-5303
J - 113
USA -
USA -
CDN -
D -7500
GR -
D -5000
USA -
SF -
ZA-0001
J - 100
D -7500
D -7500
USA -
D -5300
D -7500
USA -
D -5300
D -8000
D -7500
USA -
D -7500
D -8757
D -6834
D -7500
D -8046
D -7500
D -7261
HANAU 1
KARLSRUHE
MISSISSAUGA ONT L5K 1B2
STOCKHOLM
KARLSRUHE
FRANKFURT 90
KARLSRUHE
UPTON NY, 11973
CLA}IART CEDEX
KARLSRUHE
KöLN 1
FONTENAY-AUX-ROSES
BAGHDAD
WÜRENLINGEN
NYKöPING
STUTTGART 80
53851 LAPPEENRANTA 85
AA MIDDELBURG
FRANKFURT 90
KARLSRUHE
KARLSRUHE
GARCHING
LOS ANGELES CA, 90024
KAWASARI-CITY
KARLSRUHE 1
ALBUQUERQUE NM, 87185
GARCHING
KARLSRUHE 1
~IADISON WI, 53705
WARRINGTON
YJ\RLSRUHE
KARLSRUHE
LYONS GA, 30436
WÜRENLINGEN
TOKYO
LOS ALA}!OS, NM
COLill1BUS OHIO 43201
HISSISSAUGA ONT L5K 1B2
KARLSRUHE
AGHIA PARASKEVI
KöLN
ARGONNE IL, 60540
00101 HELSINKIlO
PRETORIA, SOUTH AFRICA
TOKYO, CHIYODA-KU
KARLSRUHE
KARLSRUHE
37831 OAR RIDGE, TENN.
BONN
KARLSRUHE
UPTON, NY 11973
BONN 2
MÜNCHEN 70
KARLSRUHE
COLUMBUS OHIO 43201
KARLSRUHE
KARLSTEIN
KETSCH
KARLSRUHE
GARCHING
KARLSRUHE
GECHINGEN
L'HERITEAU, JEAN-PIERRE
LAHROTH, HARRY
LANG, ULRICH
LANORE, JEANNE-MARIE
LAPPA, DAVID ALLAN
LARKINS, DR. JOHN T.
LAURIDSEN, KURT
LEE, H.
LEIMEISTER, HANS-R.
LEISTIKOH, DR. S.
LEMANSKA, HIRIAM
LEUSCHNER, DR. A.H.
LEUTHROTH, CLAUDE
LEVEN, DR. DIETRICH
LEVINE, SAUL
LEWINS, DR. JEFFERY
LEIns, PROF.H.W.
LIEBER, KARL
LIENART, P.
LILLINGTON, J.N.
LITAI, DR. DAN
LOEWENSTEIN, WALTER
LOMAZZI, FRANCO
LONG, STEWART W.
LONGWORTH, J.P.
LOOMIS, GUY G.
LUMMERZHE IM , DR. DIETHARD
LUXAT, J.C.
MAGDALINSKI, JAN
MAILLAT, A.
MALAUSCHEK, HANS
MALCOLM, ERNST L.
l1ALHERBE, J.
MANDL, RAFAEL
~IANIORI, DAVIDE
MANSOOR, SYED HASAN
MARCILLE, R.
MARTIN, IVAN C.
MARTIN, ROGER
MARTTILA, JOUKO
MATSUMOTO, ~lASAKI
MAURER, H.A.
~lAYR, PETER
~lAZZINI, M.
HC CAULEY, EDWARD W.
MEIER, DR. SIGURD
MERCIER, DR. OLIVER
MERCIER, PIERRE
ME RKLE IN , WALTER
HESLIN,
HESNAGE, JOSETTE
METZIG, DR. GUNTHARD
METZINGER, DR. J.
MEYER, DR. LEONHARD
HICHAEL, HORST
MICHEELSEN, B.
HIETTINEN, JAAKKO
MILHELM, JEAN-LUC
MITCHELL, KEITH
MOBERG, LARS
HORELL, DR. WILFRED
HORISON, W.G.
XXXVII
CEA
IMATRAN VOlllA
UNIV. STUTTG.
CEA
LLNL
US NRC
RISO NAT.LAB.
ONTARIO HYDRO
GRS
KFK GMBH
SOREG NRC
NUCOR
CEA
GRS HBH
US NRC
UNIV. CAMBRIDG
UNIV. CALIF.
EIR
EDF/SPT
UKAEA
ISR. ATOMIC EC
EPRI
NlRA
COMBUSTION ENG
CEGB
EG&G IDAHO INC
GRS HBH
ONTARIO HYDRO
AB ASEA-ATOH
CEA
KFK GMBH
US NRC
C.E.N.
]{WU ERLANGEN
ENEA-DISP
KFK GHBH
EDF/SPT
AECL
EDF (SEPTEN)
SÄTELLYTUR.
HITACHI LTD
CEC BRUSSELS
UNIV. STUTTG.
UNIV. PISA
LLNL
GRS
EIR
HYDRO-QUEBEC
KWU ERLANGEN
EDF/SPT
F~lATOME
KFK GMBH
MPI
KFK GMBH
STONE& WEBSTER
RISO NAT.LAB.
TECH.RES.CENTR
CEA
NNC
SCANDPOWER
KWU ERLANGEN
ONTARIO HYDRO
F-92260
SF -
D -7000
F-92260
USA -
USA -
DK-4000
CDN -
D -5000
D -7500
IL-
ZA-0001
F-13115
D -5000
USA -
GB -
USA -
CH-5303
F-75384
GB -
IL -
USA -
1-16100
USA -
GB -
USA -
D -5000
CDN -
S-72104
F-13115
D -7500
USA -
F-91191
D -8520
I -
D -7500
F-75384
CDN -
F-69626
SF -
J -
B -1049
D -7000
1-56100
USA -
D -5000
CH-5303
CDN -
D -8520
F-75384
F-92084
D -7500
D -6900
D -7500
USA -
DK-4000
SF -
F-92260
GB -
N -2007
D -8520
CDN -
FONTENAY-AUX-ROSES
00101 HELSINKIlO
STUTTGART 80
FONTENAY-AUX-ROSES
LlVERMORE, CA 94550
WASHINGTON DC, 20555
ROSKILDE
TORONTO ONT. M5G IX6
KöLN 1
KARLSRUHE 1
70600 YERNE
PRETORIA, SOUTH AFRICA
SAINT-PAUL-LEZ-DURANCE
KöLN
GAlTHERSBURG MD, 20878
CAMBRIDGE
SANTA BARBARA CA, 93106
WÜRENLINGEN
PARIS CEDEX 08
DORCHESTER, DOR.DT2 8DH
TEL-AVIV 61070
PALO ALTO, CA.
GENOVA
SPRINGFIELD VA, 22152
BERKELEY, GLOS.
IDAHO FALLS, ID. 93401
KöLN
TORONTO ONT. M5G IX6
VÄSTERAS
SAINT-PAUL-LEZ-DURANCE
KARLSRUHE
20555 WASHINGTON D.C.
GIF-SUR-YVETTE
ERLANGEN
ROMA
KARLSRUHE
PARIS CEDEX 08
CHALK RIVER ONT, KOJIJO
VILLEURBANNE CEDEX
00101 HELSINKI
IBARAKI-KEN
BRUSSELS
STUTTGART 80
PISA
LIVERMORE CA, 94550
KöLN 1
WÜRENLINGEN
GENTILLY, QUEBEC
ERLANGEN
PARIS CEDEX 08
PARIS LA DEFENSE
KARLSRUHE
HEIDELBERG
KARLSRUHE
BOSTON MA
ROSKILDE
HELSINKI
FONTENAY-AUX-ROSES
LEICESTER, LE8 3LH
KJELLER
ERLANGEN
TORONTO ONTARIO
HORLOCK, GÜNTER
HUNZ, PROF.DR. D.
HURATA, KENNETH K.
HÜLLER, KLAUS
HÜLLER, PROF.DR. U.
HÜLLER-DIETSCHE, W.
1'1.1'1.
NAGEL, DR. KLAUS
NASCHI, GIOVANNI
NEITZEL, H.J.
NEWBIGGING, A.
NICHOLS, ALAN L.
NISHIO, ~lASAHlDE
NISSEN, KLAUS L.
NORWOOD, KEITH S.
O'DONNELL, E.P.
OBATA, HlDEO
OHUIEYER, HE~lANN
OKAZAKI, HOTOAKI
OLLIKKALA, HANNU
ORTH, KARLHEINZ
OSBORNE, H.F.
OSETEK, DANIEL J.
PANITZ, DR. HANS-JÜRGEN
PASLER, HORST
PEEHS, DR. ~lARTIN
PELCE,
PENN, W.J.
PERINIC, D.
PERNECZKY, DR. LASZLO
PERRAULT, D.
PERSSON, AKE H.
PERSSON, LEIF
PETERSEN, DR. C.
PETIT, GERARD
PETRANGELl, GIANNI
PFRANG, W.
PFÖRTNER, DR. HE~NN
PICKARD, PAUL S.
PICKHAN, D.O.
PLATTEN, JAMES L.
PODOWSKI, DR. HICHAEL Z.
POINTER, W.
PON, DR. G. A.
PREISCHL, WOLFGANG
PROHASKA, DR. GÜNTER
RASHUSSEN, INGVARD
RASTAS, AHl
REDDY, DR. DEVUNI GANESH
REHHE, PROF.DR.-ING KLAUS
RE UlANN , DR. H.
REISER, H.
RENARD, ALFRED
REOCREUX, DR. HICHEL
RHODES, N.
RICKETTS, CRAIG
RIEBOLD, W.L.
RININSLAND, DR. H.
RIVIERE, JOEL
ROCHE, HENRI
ROGERS, J. T.
ROHAIGI, U.S.
XXXVIII
GRS
KFK GHBH
SANDIA N.L.
KFK GHBH
KFK GHBH
KFK GHBH
UH\o/ELT-MIN.
KFK GHBH
ENEA-DISP
KFK GMBH
UKAEA
UKAEA
TOSHIBA
KFK GMBH
UKAEA
EBASCO SERVICE
CENTURY RES.C.
HEW
JINS
SÄTELLYTUR.
K\o/U ERLANGEN
OAK RIDGE N.L.
EG&G lDAHO INC
KFK GHBH
KFK GI1BH
Klo/U ERLANGEN
CEA
ONTARIO HYDRO
KFK GMBH
INST.F.PHYSICS
CEA
SYDKRAFT AB
SYDKRAFT AB
KFK GMBH
EDF (SEPTEN)
ENEA-DISP
KFK GMBH
ICT-BERGHAUSEN
SANDIA N.L.
UKAEA
AECL
RENSSEL.POLYT.
GRS
AECL
GRS
HSK
RISO NAT. LAB.
INDUSTR. POWER
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3Opening Address by Dr. H. H. Hennies
Ladies and gentlemen:
At this opening of the 5th International Conference on Thermal
Reactor Safety I would like to welcome you all in Karlsruhe.
I am particularly happy to see so many friends and guests from
all over the world and I hope that we will be able to continue
successfully the tradition of this series of meetings. A special
word of welcome gqes to Minister Weiser of the State Government
of this State of Baden-Württemberg and to Dr. Narjes of the
Commission of the European Communities, who will be here in
a couple of minutes. I also have pleasure in welcoming the
Rector of the University of Karlsruhe, Prof. Kuhnle, who will
attend this morning's session, and among our foreign guests I
would like to welcome in particular the President of the
American Nuclear Society, Dr. Joe Hendrie.
The German Kerntechnische Gesellschaft as the sponsor and the
Karlsruhe Nuclear Research Center as the organizer of this
conference have been, and are, grateful for the support they
have received from many sides. I would like to mention espe-
cially the European Nuclear Society, the American Nuclear
Society, the Canadian Nuclear Society, the Ja?an Atomic Energy
Society, fue Nuclear Energy Agency of OECD, the International
Atomic Energy Agency, the Commission of the European Communities,
and the Badenwerk utility.
This meeting will deal with findings of research into the
safety of reactors, and most of the contributions will be
devoted to the safety of light water reactors, which is the
reactor line supplying most of the nuclear electricity today.
This very mature reactor system makes an increasing contri-
4bution to our electricity supply. Especially in Europe, nuclear
power in many countries has already reached a level of 40 to
50% of the electricity supply.
This applies to Finland, Sweden, Belgium, France, and Switzer-
land. In the Federal Republic of Germany, at present about 25%
of the public electricity supply comes from nuclear reactors.
This percentage is likely to increase very soon, as a number
of large nuclear power plants will be going on stream.
Several hundred large power reactors in all parts of the world
are proof of the fact that nuclear power has now outgrown its
development years and has become an established technology.
The reliability of reactors has improved continuously and the
accident record is still extremely positive in the sense that
neither the persons working in these facilities nor the public
in their environments have suffered damage due to radioactivity.
The hazard potential undoubtedly associated with handling radio-
active materials is the reason for the intensive worldwide
research in the field of reactor safety. Especially after the
accident which occurred some five years aga at the Three Mile
Island plant in the Uni ted States, many theoretical and ex-
perimental studies have been conducted on the accident behavior
of light water reactors. Although their results have not led
to any major changes in reactor facilities, they have improved
some details of the systems in specific cases. Especially our
knowledge about the possible production of hydro~en has been
enhanced and measures have been initiated to prevent ignition
or explosions. This process has now largely been completed and
I think it is safe to say that we now understand weIl enough
the behavior of reactors in normal operation and under all
kinds of credible accident conditions and that the existing
5safety systems in accidents react in such a way that there
will be no detriment to the public.
Of course, this quest ion can never be answered for good; it
is therefore only natural in research and development to
inquire again and again whether our assertions continue to
be valid also in the light of more recent findings. We will
try to do so over the next few days and, on Thursday at the
panel discussion, will attempt to strike a balance by asking
what remains to be done in the field of reactor safety research.
The sixties and seventies were mainly devoted to investigating
the sequences and the consequences of the so-called design
basis accidents; especially the loss-of-coolant accident and
the behavior of the emergency core cooling systems were given
much attention. In recent years, more effort has been con-
centrated on the highly improbable but, as far as consequences
are concerned, much more dangerous core disruptive accidents.
These accidents, including the core meltdown accident, are
so improbable, to the best of our knowledge, that formally
they are not even taken into account in the licensing
procedure on the construction and operation of nuclear power
plants. Yet, they do playa considerable role in the public
debate about the risks of nuclear energy. For this reason,
reactor safety research has been trying for years to find
an answer to the question of the extent of damage likely
to be associated with these accidents. These studies have
been conducted in many places all over the world. In the
Federal Republic of Germany, where some initial work was
started more than ten years ago, they have been intensified
recently, the Karlsruhe Nuclear Research Center having made
a major contribution. The results of these activities are
6very important and should have a considerable impact on the
future assessment of the risks of nuclear power, for it is
seen that all former statements on the consequences of core
disruptive accidents were wrong, inasmuch as most of the
consequences indicated were much too severe.
This was due to the conservative treatment in the absence
of detailed theoretical and experimental studies. Today,
we are on much more solid ground in this sector. Even in
case of a total core meltdown there would be no national
disaster. The so-called China syndrome, i.e., the core
melting through the building foundations, will not occur
and ~he reactor containment can be expected to fail at
such a late point in time that the release potential for
radioactive particles by then will have decreased by many
orders of magnitude.
We feel that these studies can be concluded very soon and
that the results will then be available in a quantitative
format. In the Federal Republic of Germany, the consequence
will certainly be that the new version of the German Risk
Study, which is to be available by late 1985, will show
much slighter consequences for these types of accident.
At our Karlsruhe Nuclear Resea~ch Center, tests are at
present going on about the interaction between metal melts
and concrete, which are quite impressive. I would like to
encourage you to have a look at this facility; we call
it BETA. This can be arranged within our program of tours
today and tomorrow.
7Of course, the general statement I just made holds true world-
wide; it alos applies to all variants of light water reactors.
However, since these facilities do differ from type to type,
even from plant to plant, one must be careful in comparing
specific, individual results and must not conclude from the
differences in findings to the bandwidt~ of error inherent
in these statements.
I hope that this meeting will bring us a step closer to our
goal: to understand better the behavior of reactors in normal
operation and, especially, under accident conditions.
When defining the work still to be done we should also examine
very carefully what degree of accuracy is needed. It is neither
possible nor necessary, for an accident as improbable as the
melting of the whole reactor core, to calculate within a
factor of 2 or 3 the consequences of activity releases. One
order of magnitude or perhaps more is certainly sufficient.
At the Karlsruhe Nuclear Research Center we fee I that, for
German light water reactors, this goal will have been reached
in two years' time at the latest; we will then considerably
cut down on research expenditures in this field.
Ladies and gentlemen, I would not want to conclude without
expressing my sincere gratitude to all those who, for more
than one year, have been instrumental in preparing this
conference: the members of the Steering Committee, the members
of the Program Committee headed by Prof. Birkhofer, and the
members of the Selection Committee. My special thanks go to
the staff members of the Karlsruhe Nuclear Research Center
who actively participated in the preparation: Dr. Rininsland
8together with Mr. Bork, Mrs. Schröder and Mrs. Pleli have
worked very hard to make this conference, hopefully, a
success.
Nuclear technology, especially problems of reactor safety,
are part and parcel of the political environment, and for
this reason it is my special pleasure to welcome Minister
Weiser and Dr. Narjes, who has arrived in the meantime.
They will present the views of the Baden-Württemberg State
Government and of the Commission of the European Communities
on the problems we are addressing.
Minister Weiser, the floor is yours.
9Address by the Baden-Württemberg State Minister
of the Interior, G. Weiser
Ladies and gentlemen:
mt is a pleasure and also a great honor for me to
be able to welcome at this 5th International Meeting
on Reactor Safety such a large number of experts
in the field of nuclear technology who have come
to Karlsruhe from so many countries. I would like
to convey to you the best wishes of the State
Government of Baden-Württemberg, particularly of
the Minister President, Mr. Späth, and again I would
like to welcome you very cordially in this State.
The State Government of Baden-Württemberg, and in
particular myself as the Minister responsible for
the safety of nuclear technology in this State,
appreciate very much that this conference is being
held in Karlsruhe, the city where, more than 27
years ago, the Kernreaktor Bau- und Betriebsge-
sellschaft mbH was founded by the Federal Republic
of Germany and the State of Baden-Württemberg to
build the FR2 research reactor and some additional
institutes, which then developed into the Karlsruhe
Nuclear Research Center, one of the major research
establishments in the field of nuclear technology.
The openness to new technological developments and
to international exchanges of experience has since
the beginning of the use of nuclear energy in this
country been a natural prerequisite to successful
scientific work. Many events with international
participation at the Karlsruhe Nuclear Research
Center in the past have been evidence of that
important function.
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Today's meeting is in line with this tradition, which
has been cultivated at the Karlsruhe Nuclear Research
Center for almost as long as the State of Baden-
Württemberg has existed. When the Nuclear Research
Center was founded, the State of Baden-Württemberg
was just four years old.
I hope you will bear with me if, as a representative
of the State Government, I mention with a certain
amount of pride a number of examples to indicate that,
here in Baden-Württemberg, major contributions are
being made or have been made towards the development
of nuclear technology and towards the solution of
related safety questions.
In addition to the FR2 research reactor, which I
have mentioned before, the first German designed and
built reactor after 1945, I would like to mention
as a further example in the Federal Republic of
Germany a reactor developed in this country, the
multipurpose research reactor at Karlsruhe, which
in its eightenn years of operation proved the tech-
nical maturity of the underlying concept of a heavy
water moderated and heavy water cooled pressurized
water reactor.
In the field of advanced reactor technology, the
compact sodium cooled nuclear reactor at Karlsruhe
should be mentioned, whose operation for many years
has contributed important know-how in the field of
the technology of fast breeders and which, within
the framework of the fast breeder research project,
will continue to play an important role in the future.
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Also one of the larger nuclear power plants
in West Germany was built in Baden-Württemberg,
i.e., the Obrigheim Nuclear Power Station, which
is a demonstration plant of the PWR type that
has been in successful operation for more than
110,000 hours and which, like the plant at
Neckarwestheim commissioned eight years later,
holds a good position in terms of availability
worldwide. Three other major nuclear power plants
in Baden-Württemberg are being commissioned
or under construction. In WAK, a small pilot
reprocessing plant in Karlsruhe, which has been
in operation since 1971, a major contribution
is made towards research and technological
testing of reprocessing spent nuclear fuels.
In addition to the many practical experiences
the operation of these plants has yielded,
thorough research in the field of nuclear
technology is being undertaken also at the
universities of this State and at the Karls-
ruhe Nuclear Research Center. Some of that
research specifically deals with questions of
reactor safety.
One prominent example in that context is the
comprehensive Nuclear Safety Project of the
Kernforschungszentrum Karlsruhe, whose extensive
line of research, e.g., on the behavior of fuel
elements and other reactor components during
accidents, tests on the developments of hypo-
thetical core meltdown accidents, and activities
to improve fission product retention and reduce
12
radiation exposure, has found recognition and
acceptance internationally.
Another important research project of the Karls-
ruhe Nuclear Research Center in the field of
reactor safety are the large scale tests carried
out under realistic co~ditions on full scale
reactor components of the decommissioned Super-
heated Steam Reactor of Großwelzheim in Bavaria.
I would like to mention, by way of example,
particularly the thermal shock tests of the
reactor pressure vessel, experiments on the
effects of loss-of-coolant accidents on pressure
vessel internals and on safety valves as weIl
as the seismic experiments carried out there.
In addition, the Center also runs a number of
major projects with safety and environmental
implications in the field of fast breeders,
uranium enrichment, reprocessing of spent fuel
elements and treatment of radioactive wastes,
nuclear fusion and, recently, also in the field
of environmental research within the framework
of the "European Research Center for Air Pollution
Control" Project.
Another major center of reactor safety research
in Baden-Württemberg is the Materials Testing
Institute (MPA) of the University of Stuttgart
headed by Prof. Kußmaul, which works on questions
of materials and strength of materials. Although
this is not the main topic of this meeting,
the important contributions to reactor safety
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coming from that Institute, which will celebrate
its 100th anniversary this year, should be em-
phasized. MPA's work on the safety of pressurized
components and systems has contributed greatly
and has won international acclaim. Broad research
and development programs have been carried out
with the most modern, sometimes unique, testing
equipment to assess materials and component
behavior under extreme conditions. The so-called
basic safety concept for pressurized components
has been established theoretically and backed
experimentallY to exclude reliably the occurrence
of large breaks. This "leak-before-break" prin-
ciple is now being applied not only in this
country, but also abroad.
Another research activity conducted in the State
of Baden-Württemberg, which I would like to
mention, is the comprehensive emergency core
cooling project, UPTF, which is being prepared
on behalf of the Federal Ministry for Research
and Technology as part of an international large
scale research project involving the Uni ted
States and Japan. The test rig which, apart
from the absence of nuclear heating, simulates
the primary system of a large PWR on a 1:1
scale, was built at the Mannheim power plant
headed by Dr. Schoch. Another major project
of reactor safety research is thus being sup-
ported by the technical facilities of that
power plant. The tests, which are to be started
in the second half of 1985, will supplement
many earlier emergency core cooling
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tests carried out elsewhere.
Ladies and gentlemen, the topic of this meeting,
reactor safety, has always been one of the most
vital and most widely discussed subjects in
the public with respect to the peaceful use
of nuclear energy. Nuclear power plants contain
large amounts of radioactive substances whose
handling must be managed safely and which must
be kept from the environment reliably by a
system of multiple barriers. It is not for
nothing that licensing and supervisory procedures
for nuclear power plants include stringent safety
requirements to guarantee the protection of
the workforce and the population in the vicinity
of these plants, some of which requirements
go far beyond the standard in other technical
fields. The Government of the State of Baden-
Württemberg has never left any doubt about the
fact that it assigns the greatest importance
to the safety of nuclear power plants and thus
the protection üf people.
The strictness of the licensing procedures and
the thorough control exercised by the regulatory
authority, as weIl as the efforts made by vendors
and operators of nuclear power plants, have
been successful. The operating experience accumu-
lated with the technical safety systems of
nuclear power plants in this country has been
very positive. Major incidents with radiological
consequences to the environment have been avoided
so far.
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Monitoring the emissions of radioaetive sub-
stanees from nuelear power plants and additional
pollution eontrol in the environment of plants,
the results of whieh exereises are published
annually, show that the exposure levels to
persons arising from nuelear power plants in
this eountry, ineluding the ineidents that
have oeeurred so far, are not only within the
framework of the dose limits for normal operation
under the German Radiation Proteetion Ordinanee,
but as a rule have been underrun by a sizable
margin.
My Ministry will ensure that eonditions remain
like this by its safety related eooperation
in the lieensing proeedures and its intensive
supervisory a~tivities. This supervision is
further intensified by the startup, in the near
future,of the Nuelear Reaetor Remote
Surveillanee System in Baden-Württemberg. The
operation of this automatie system is also an
expression of the State Government's dedieation
to the justified safety requirements of our
publie.
In eomparing nuelear power plants and eon
ventional thermal power plants we should not
overlook that also eoal fired power plants
emit radioaetive substanees due to the natural
radioaetive eomponents eontained in the fuel.
The resultant environmental radiation exposure,
as yOU know, is quite eomparable to that
resulting from normal operation of nuelear
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power plants. However, coal fired power plants
produce other types of emissions in addition.
Even if the required 85% desulfurization is
achieved down to 270 milligrams of sulfur dioxide
per cubic meter of offgas, and even if nitrogen
oxides are reduced to 200 milligrams per cubic
meter of offgas, electricity generation in coal
fired power plants, equivalent to 1300 MWe
nuclear power plants, is still associated with
emissions annually of some 8000 tonnes of
sulfur dioxide and 6000 tonnes of nitrogen
oxides. In addition, the problem of waste
disposal in connection with desulfurization
and reduction of nitrogen oxides must also
be solved.
Being responsible in this State for the
solution of these problems, I ofen say that
I do not hope that one day the same innocents
who carry those fliers saying that one should
stop talking and instead do something for
desulfurization, when they find that there is
no more sulfur and no more fly ash in power
plant emissions, will come along and demand
that there should be no sulfur and no fly ash
on our waste disposal sites. We have to solve
these problems in a holistic approach. It is
still easier to describe problems than to find
appropriate solutions.
In addition, ladies and gentlemen, I think that
environmental problems should not be discussed
by people who are not very knowledgeable in
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the field, use only slogans and thus add to
the doubts in the minds of the public. If I
look at some of those rallies, the people
attending them and the people who deal with
these problems in a very emotional way, and
others who make very emotional speeches and
thus increase their uncertainty, I sometimes
wonder whether those who use slogans and think
this will solve problems will at all realize
whether they can shoulder this responsibility.
I think that so far we have jointly ensured
that safety is guaranteed, and this is some-
thing to which the public has avested right.
We will continue to make efforts in this field.
I am very grateful to everybody who makes his
contribution in his particular sec tor in the
scientific field.
Ladies and gentlemen, in coal fired power plants,
the total amount of carbon burnt is released
into the atmosphere as carbon dioxide.
According to the operating experience accumulated
so far, nuclear power plants have been found
to be acceptable not only with respect to their
risk, compared to other risks of life, but they
justifiably can be regarded as a particularly
non-polluting technology of electricity genera-
tion. It is therefore regrettable that the
resistance of concerned environmentalists in
the past has been, and still is, directed
especially against nuclear power plants. Let
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me only remind you of the thesis argued partic-
ularly in this state, and coming always from
the same source, about the connection between
the emissions of radioactive substances from
nuclear power plants or, more generally, ionizing
radiation, and the widespread diseases of our
forests. I think that those who were against
building the Wyhl Nuclear Power Plant in the
Black Forest and at the same time wanted to
build a new coal fired power plant in the same
region should take a look at their own positions
with respect to environmental protection. They
should seek further education before voicing
theses in the public which cannot be supported.
In the State of Baden-Württemberg, we have a
great interest in reducing the resistance
against nuclear power plants, for electricity
from nuclear power will be particularly important
in this State with its high population density.
The use of nuclear power, to my mind, will be
indispensable also in the future, not only
because of the less polluting electricity
generation compared with the emissions from
fossil fired power plants. The State Government
therefore, both for environmental and economic
reasons, in the long run wants to cover a major
portion of the base load requirement of electric-
ity from nuclear power plants.
Ladies and gentlemen, although nuclear power
plants have already achieved a very high safety
standard, further improvements in the safety
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and reliability of these plants will remain
our constant concern. We are all called upon
to contribute to the best of our knowledge and
ability. Particularly, in the field of nuclear
energy, the evaluation of operating experience,
the results of safety research, and the exchange
of knowledge and experience are of particular
importance.
Let me therefore wish you a very fruitful ex-
change of experiences and views and the best
of success for this conference and, last but
not least, a very pleasant stay in this State,
which is still beautiful despite the many en-
vironmental problems we have.
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Address by Mr. Narjes, Member of the Commission of the
European Communities
Chairmen, Mr. Minister, Mr. Rector, Ladies and Gentlemen:
On behalf of the Commission of European Communities which,
besides IAEA and NEA, is one of the international organ-
izations sponsoring this meeting, I would like to welcome
you very cordially at the 5th International Conference on
the Safety of Light Water Reactors, a meeting wich is
being attended by a large number of leading experts from
all parts of the world as members of the nuclear community.
The joint organizers of this meeting are the European
Nuclear Energy Society, the American Nuclear Society, the
Canadian Nuclear Society and also, last but not least,
the Japan Atomic Energy Society.
The international character of the event is not only proof
of the importance attached to the problems of nuclear safety
worldwide, but is also a good example of the present effec-
tive international cooperation and successful joint actions
in the field of nuclear safety extending also to inter-
national projectsin safety research.
Irrespective of a number of continuing problems, nuclear
power in many European countries is contributing more and
more to the generation of electricity. Unfortunately, this
is not true of all European countries. I would like to
draw your attention especially to the situation in France
and Belgium, two countries in which the use of nuclear
power is far advanced and the share of nuclear power in
electricity generation is above 50%.
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As a consequence of the oil crisis in the seventies, France
decided on its ambitious, far reaching program of nuclear
power plant construction and continues it, irrespective of
the decline in the energy requirement in recent years.
France thus has an excess now of nuclear generating capacity,
can make more economic use of energy and export electricity
to almost all European countries, such as Italy, the Nether-
lands, Germany, especially to Baden-Württemberg, the host
state of this meeting.
Baden-Württemberg can benefit directly from the French nuclear
power program, I hope at satisfactory prices, and can align
its own nuclear power plant program with these services.
I am very much in favor of exchanging goods of all kinds and
also services across the European frontiers, including the
transmission of energy, for this is an excellent instrument
of cooperation.
Irrespective of the many efforts taken in public information
programs and other public relations activities, the public
acceptance of nuclear power is still a major problem in
some European countries; this is also true of the Federal
Republic of Germany.
The debate about nuclear power is almost a classical example
of the problems of guidance and orientation arising in
legitimate democratic disputes in a highly industrialized
environment. We cannot solve these problems without the
assistance of the media. They playa key role. We cannot
simply stand by and accuse the media of having opened their
pages to a tide of irrationalism. Also the media participate
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in the gradual learning processes about technical and
scientific subjects and can arrive at definitive solutions
only step by step.
I think we all should try to seek an unbiased discussion
of the pros and cons. We should clearly separate opinion
and information and we should also refrain from agitation.
We should not suppress or promote fears and apprehensions.
We should also point out what the risks are with which we
must live and can live, and it is under this aspect that
the successful work in the field of reactor safety and its
representation to the public plays such an important role.
Not every procedure trying to convince the public of the
need for nuclear power will work equally weIl in all member
countries of the CommunitYi each country will have to seek
its own solutions.
In some countries of the Community, e.g., many programs are
restricted to an outline of facts and data in order to
convince the public in the hope that this provides an
adequate amount of information to the public. In other
member countries, arguments are used which are more emo-
tional, thus causing psychological barriers to be built up
against the accpetance of unbiased information.
At this conference, safety problems will be discussed at
a high technical level, but I hope that this meeting will
also contribute to informing the public about the present
state of safety of nuclear installations.
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Nuclear power is a feasible solution helping us to solve
our energy supply problems through sufficient ways and
means of safety utilizing this source of energy. In the
nuclear power plants all over the world we have accumulated
arecord of safe and economic operation for 3000 reactor
years. With respect to their availability, nuclear power
plants compared to conventional power plants show an
excellent record, availability,after all, being one of the
main criteria by which to assess plants of this type. In
view of the high capital costs of nuclear power plants,
availability indeed is a factor of great importance, for
unforeseen outages can be very expensive. An unplanned
outage of a 1000 MWe nuclear power plant may cost more
than DM 1 million a day, and this sum does not include the
costs of the replacement electricity to be purchased.
Reports about power failures and plant outages and plants
to be decommissioned should also be regarded as sufficient
proöf of the absolute priority of reactor safety.
Data published at the 1983 World Energy Conference, covering
a number of years, incidentally show that the reliability
of nuclear power plants is equivalent to the reliability
of conventiohal facilities. Some member countries of the
European Communities in recent years have been able to demon-
strate in a striking way what competent management can do
to improve reliability and output.
In this connection, I would like to mention the 1300 MWe
pressurized water reactor of Grafenrheinfeld in Germany,
which started commercial operation in mid-1982 and which,
according to information from the plant vendor, has supplied
more electricity in 1983 than any other reactor in the
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world. That plant has a load factor of 87.6% and produced
some 10,000 GWh, which is arecord for a single reactor.
Even higher load factors of about 92% were reported from
some smaller plants, and the older facility of Stade was
operated at a load factor of more than 86% as recently as
in 1983. These are recent data documenting the high avail-
ability and the excellent performance of nuclear power
plants in Europe.
After these rather general remarks I would like to enter
into the details of the subject of ·this conference, which
is reactor safety, especially the contribution the European
Communities can make to the solution of at least some of
the problems still open.
The Commission has always stressed very much the harmonization
of criteria, rules and guidelines within the Community. In
a number of working parties it prornotes opportunities for
discussions and dialogs and for mutual exchanges of in-
formation about safety methods, legal provisions, standards,
and specific safety programs. The Commission feels that the
harmonization of existing national rules and guidelines in
nuclear safety should emerge naturally from aseries of
continuing discussions throughout the Community and should
not be the result of some policy handed down from somewhere
in the Community.
In these activities, the Commission is based on a Council
decision of JUly 22, 1975 about the technological problems
of safety in nuclear power in which the Council of Ministers
agreed "that in stepwise harmonization of safety requirements
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and criteria a step-by-step procedure is adopted in order
to ensure uniform and suff~cient protection of the public
and the environment against radiation hazards from nuclear
activities and, at the same time, the development of com-
mercial interaction is promoted. However, this harmonization
should not result in a safety level lower than what has
already been achieved."
Some modest progress has so far been made in this field, on
the basis of which the Commission has planned to continue
this effort, also in the interest of industrial policy.
In another field, radiation protection, there is more progress.
The duty of the Community to set up uniform safety standards
for'the protection of the health of the public and the work-
force and to ensure that these rules are implemented, is
laid down in the Euratom Agreement.
In Article 33 of the Euratom Agreement, the duties of the
member countries, on the one hand, and the rights of the
Commission, on the other hand, have created more positive
conditions for a high degree of harmonization within the
European framework. This also implies international cooper-
ation in the broad field of labor hygiene and health protec-
tion.
A relatively complete catalog of legislation has now been
drafted in the community countries, which takes into account
obligations within Euratom.
As radiation protection is a permanent duty, this radiation
protection policy must now be expanded and updated. Whenever
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an amendment is made, all recent findings in the fields
of radiobiology, medicine and physics should be taken
into account and the experience made in applying the
basic standards in the past should be considered.
These attempts to adapt safety criteria and standards are
supported by a number of research efforts, to which also
the Community contributes.
Within the framework of reactor safety research, we have
also learned more about the origins, the sequences and
the consequences of potential accidents and broadened our
bases for the definition of safety related requirements
and criteria. Moreover, new possibilities have been created
to ensure safe reactor operation.
The development of nuclear power, from the early days, has
been accompanied by extensive safety research programs.
Although the power plants now existing are being operated
with a sufficient degree of safety, there are several
/
reasons to advocate the continuation of reactor safety
research programs: 1
1. Designers and power plant operators/need the findings of
this research in order to improve tHe protection of their
"workforce, the public and the environment and the plants
themselves. The research programs, through better knowl-
edge of potential accident sequences, are to allow the
safety margins to be quantified in the designs of com-
mercial nuclear power plants.
2. The results of safety research are indispensable to the
improvement of licensing procedures, for in the light
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of those research findings, acceptable design bases and
the limits of plant operation can be cast into more
definitive frameworks and the measures to be taken in
incidents can be defined more effectively.
3. Much attention must be devoted also to continuous feed-
back of information from licensing authorities and super-
visory institutions to research institutions so that
research efforts can be reconsidered regularly and can
be better aligned to technical requirements, for these
authorities and institutions in their day-to-day work
must apply rules and guidelines and also test and inspec-
tion procedures.
Joint research and development work has contributed im-
portantly to the safety concepts. The following areas
should be mentioned in particular: the safety of pressure
vessels and pipes, non-destructive tests, studies of thermal
stresses and mechanical stresses acting on the reactor core
under major accident conditions, and the stresses acting on
the containment as a result of internal accidents, and the
loads to which nuclear power plants may be exposed as a
result of external impacts.
Nuclear technology is one of our modern high technologies,
to use a journalese term. We should therefore try, in the
safety assessment of all advanced technical facilities,
to apply uniform technical rules to ensure that the oper-
ation of these plants will not entail major hazards to the
public and to the workforce employed in those plants.
In the present political and social context, as I said, the
research conducted about safety also makes an important and
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indispensable contribution towards promoting the acceptance
of nuclear power in the public. Potentialhazards associated
with nuclear power generation are now assessed in a more
realistic way and are compared with those risks, which must
exist in a highly developed society as a result of indus-
trialized technical processes. Research and development work
in the field of risk analysis has developed new instruments
for a systematic assessment of safety problems. Comprehensive
analyses of the risks of power reactors have helped to establish
an important framework within which to assess safety related
criteria.
The present research programs of the Community and the in-
dustrialized countries continuing to advance light water
power reactors, especially the United States, have grown
considerably in recent years. The accident in Three Mile
Island in 1979 has shown the importance of the role and the
behavior of the operator under accident conditions and
also for the consequences of accidents. In the case of TMI,
serious fuel damage occurred.
We have learned more about the problems associated with
typical incidents to be borne in mind in designing reactorsi
we therefore now study anomalous events which, even if they
occur on a very small scale, can negatively affect the normal
operation of a plant, and we are also studying much more
severe accidents, even though their occurrence may be very
improbable indeed.
For many years, most of the research activities of the
Community in the field of technical problems of nuclear
safety have been carried out within the framework of
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programs of the Community Research Center. Since 1973,
reactor safety has been the main topic of those programs.
They comprise theoretical and experimental activities on
accident analysis and the analysis of accident consequences
and on the improvement of methods and instruments of accident
prevention. Special efforts are made with respect to the
development and application of new, advanced methods in order
to minimize the uncertainties inherent in probabilistic risk
assessment.
Major analytical and experimental topics are the investigation
of physics phenomena, which playa decisive role in loss-of-
coolant accidents, and also of the transients associated with
serious damage to the reactor core. These studies are being
conducted to improve .or validate the safety codes and, if
possible, generate new information to allow more efficient
procedures to be set up for operation and for emergency
conditions.
One example of research devoted to hypothetical major acci-
dents with very low probability of occurrence was the SUPER-
SARA Project which, within the framework of an in-pile ex-
periment, was to study the behavior of light water reactor
fuel in case of a loss-of-coolant accident. However, in the
very planning stage of the ambitious project it was found
that the expected benefit to reactor development and accident
research would not justify the tremendous costs of these
series of tests. Financial considerations caused the project
to be abandoned.
A more positive example to be mentioned is research conducted
at the Ispra Community Research Center, which has meanwhile
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been widely accepted in the nuclear community; I am referring
to the LOBI Project, which simulates a loss-of-coolant acci-
dent in a four-loop pressurized water reactor of 1300 MWe.
The experiments were also supported by the German Federal
Ministry for Research and Technology and the findings are
being discussed in an ad hoc working group in cooperation
with national experts and are exploited for the benefit of
all those involved.
One example of cooperation in the field of safety research
throughout the countries of the Community and beyond is
the PISC Program devoted to the Inspection of Steel Compo-
nents. It was initiated by a joint working group of OECD
and the Commission for Safety Problems of Reactor Components
Made of Steel. The program serves to test the methods and
techniques presently applied in non-destructive testing and,
if possible, improve them. The LOBI and PISC programs are
also major parts of the 1984-1987 program of the Ispra
Community Research Center about the technological problems
of nuclear safety.
Besides the work conducted in the laboratories of the
Community Research Center, the Commission in order to main-
tain its key role in nuclear safety, has also created the
possibility to run research in the laboratories of the
member countries by bearing part of the costs.
As far as this type of research projects is concerned, the
Commission has proposed another four-year program between
1984 and 1987, which will continue the research started
within the first program, but will cover a broader range
of technical subjects.
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This program will either supplement or support the research
conducted at Ispra and will be integrated into the national
programs.
In the form proposed at present, research efforts break down
into three categories: research on accident prevention, improve-
ment of our knowledge about accident phenomena so that accident
consequences can be limited and, finally, research about prob-
abilitistc assessment techniques. These three categories are
closely interrelated. It should be added that some of the
topics mentioned are not restricted to the narrow field of
light water reactor power plants and include also human factors
and man-machine interaction.
The high costs of the programs of safety research, which use
test facilities of a very large scale, need result in
international research efforts. Within the proposal presented
about cost sharing, participation in international research
projects or programs carried out outside the Community coun-
tries has been envisaged.
It is regrettable, therefore, that the European Council of
Ministers so far, for budgetary reasons, has not been able
to adopt this program. The continuation of our cooperation
within the Community in this important field of reactor
safety right now is being jeopardized, which is even more
regrettable, as the efforts of the Commission have had, and
still have, the supportof most of the members of the European
Parliament. 8everal resolutions in the European Parliament
have pointed to the urgency of this work. The Commission
nevertheless will do everything within its powers in the
future to support reactor safety and reactor safety research
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and to remove obstacles to exchange of knowledge and services.
Nuclear nationalism is not a solution for the future, let
alone for safety engineering and radiation protection.
This conference, too, will help to communicate the right
solutions.
I wish you a very successful meeting.
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NUCLEAR-REACTOR OPERATION
ACROSS THE WORLD
Andre Gauvenet
Electricite de France
Paris, France
Abstract
For a number of years, and especially since the accident to TMI-2, a
great deal of world attention has been given to the problems of operating
nuclear power stations.
With the help of numerous data banks, both national and international,
it has been possible to exchange information on_resuLts and to pass
on to all interested parties the reports on incidents and their ana-
lysis. These exchanges have certainly been very beneficial.
In view of the widediversity of presentation, it is difficult to
out the most significant parameters, apart from overall results.
in what follows an attempt is made to do this, in an essentially
qualitative form.
1 - INTRODUCTION
pick
However
1.1 The accident at Three Mile Island (with regard to which it should
be remembered that despite its apparent gravity it caused no human
injury) marked an important stage in the development of safety concepts
and devices in nuclear power stations. The findings concernin par-
ticular the amount of radioactivity released in the Reactor Building
during the accident at TMI, and the appearance of a hydrogen bubble
caused a great deal of rethinking internationally. Certain conclusions
on these problems, which will be very important for the f~ture, will
no doubt come to the surface in the next two or three years.
1.2 Since 1979, there has been no serious accident to a nuclear reactor.
None has been shut down for a very long period (except the TMI
reactors). These good results are probably partly due to the renewed
attention that has been given since 1979 to a number of essential prob-
lems. The old reactors have been modified where possible. In the
design of the units at present' under construction, the changes have
been even more considerable.
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I shall mention here the operational factors, such as the greater
attention paid to the human element (and consequently to training and
the internal organization of power plants), and in this context to
the relationship between man and machines, to automation (how far should
it go?), and to the new arrangements in control rooms, including the
safety boards.
I also note the considerable effort made, often of an original nature, in the
area of the planning and drafting of procedures (especially for ac-
cident situations), as weIl as the introduction of specialists (Shift
Technical Advisors in the Uni ted States, Ingenieurs de Surete et Radio-
protection in France) who can make a progressive analysis of incidents
and consequently give invaluable advice in the event of a serious
accident, as this analysis method offers diversified redundance com-
pared with the conventional codified method used by operators.
Lastly, I shall mention the development of measures taken in the event
of an accident, which have once more been partially inspired by the
shortcomings found at the time of the TMI accident.
1.3 In practice, the results of the operation of nuclear power stations
are given in the reports and statistics in the form of an evaluation
of the load or availability factors, to whose definition I shall come
back later. It is relatively easy to publish these statistics on a
monthly or annual basis, and to establish a classification featuring
"successes" and llfailures".
I would not go as far as to say that these presentations, which some-
times remindone of a championship league, have no meaning; but I would
like to try to pick out the parameters that seem to me particularly
significant in the trends in power-plant load (or availability) factors,'
assessing these trends not only at short, but above.all at medium or
long term. The ideal for the future will be to draw up an evaluation
of a large part of the working life of each plant, and finally of its
whole life.
Certain questions come up immediately; we shall complete them later.
For example:
1.3.1 - Do p1ants in which fuel is renewed during operation have a
better load factor that those in which fue1 is renewed during
shutdown?
1.3.2 - Does the load factor change more or less systematically with
the increasing age of the plant? (Number cf fue1 cycles for
water-cooled power plants.)
1.3.3 - Considerable change can follow the initial period of a plant's
working life. If, in a given country, the shutdown periods
are de1iberately extended for systematic inspections and tests,
does this have a measurable effect:
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- on availability during operational periods?
- on availability during the mature period, when outage
durations can be reduced?
This shows, amongst other things, that one must assess both
overall availability (including shutdowns) and availability
outside shutdown periods.
1.3.4 - Plants are of different types; they are built differently and
have different ratings; they operate in countries with different
technological habits, probably linked to what may be called
national cultures. What is the influence of these various
parameters?
1.3.5 - In studying the parameters, account must be taken of special
cases, some of which will not be the same in the future:
- the influ~ of series construction, which facilitates
commissioning and operation, but which may cause problems,
sometimes difficult ones, in exploiting experience, since
when a modification is decided on it has to be applied to
all the reactors in the series, in operation or under con-
struction. Even in the absence of series construction, some
important components may be standardized, and this may
already pose generic problems.
- for countries in which the share of nuclear energy in total
energy production is becoming large (above 30-50% perhaps)
i t is essential to plan and apply a "load follow ing" procedure.
This naturally affect the significance (and the representa-
tive nature) of the load and availability factors.
- Studies are in progress for the use of new fuels in water-
cooled reactors. It is obviously premature to discuss these
today. These new fuels should, when they are ready, enable
availability to be increased systematically, provided they
do not cause incidents in themselves, and above all, perhaps,
provided extended operating periods do not have an incidence
on the general problems of maintenance and tests.
1.4 Although, as I have already said, nuclear power plants are at present
working satisfactorily in terms of safety and availability (these are
partially linked), incidents occur, as in any industrial installation;
some are of small importance, and only affect individual components,
but others have complex effects. The action taken prevents these .. in-
cidents from degenerating, but they are considered as possible pre-
cursors of more serious ones. Lastly, some may be considered as
particularly important.
In all countries, incidents are classified in fairly simi1ar ways, and
when they exceed a certain degree of seriousness must be reported to
the safety authorities. Data banks have appeared for plant safety and/or
reliability, and here again the thinking that followed the TMI accident
has given new impetus to a trend that would probably have occurred
anyway, but which was strongly encouraged by it.
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Certain data banks are international. They enable valuable exchanges
of information to take place - for example, the lessons of experience
from serious incidents ,on certain power plants can be used preven-
tively on others.
These are some of the international data banks existing now:
- The International Atomic Energy Agency (PRIS)
- OECD - NEA (IRS)
- Euratom (JRC-ISPRA)
- IN PO
- UNIPEDE (in project).
These systems are additional and adapted to the national systems,
some of which are now highly developed.
I have made wide use of the results and comments of the IAEA, NEA
and INPO, as weIl as certain data from Euratom. I am very grateful
to these organizations.
2 - PLANT AVAILABILITY - SIGNIFICANT PARAMETERS
I shall first give a few statistics, mostly from IAEA, which cover a
large proportion (80%) of the world's nuclear power stations.
2.1 Let us recall a few definitions:
- The load factor (LF) is given by the relation (in French CP)
LF E
Pn x H
in which E is the net energy produced (MWhe)
Pn is net maximum capacity (MWe)
H is the number of hours in the period in question.
- The availability factor (or coefficient) AF is (in French CD)
AF En
Pn x H
in which En is the net energy corresponding to the net power available
and Pn and H are as defined above.
The load factor (or production coefficient) is used unive.rsally.
The availability factor is useful when the unit in question is being
operated below the energy available (load following).
Here, for example, are the load and availability factors for French
power plants in 1983:
LF (Load Factor)
AF (Availability Factor)
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64.5%
67.8%
Cumulative results since each plant was first coupled up:
LF (Load Factor)
AF (Availability Factor)
58.6%
61.7%
1.2.2 Figures 1, 2 and 3 give some overall results for nuclear-power-
plant operation throughout the world.
Comments:
The curves for PWR reactors (below 600 MWe and 600 MWe and above)
are traced on each graph for reference.
- Broadly speaking, it can be said that plants that are recharged
while operating (GCR and PHWR) have a slightly higher load factor
on average than that of the reference PWRs.
- For each type of reactor, there appears to be a characteristic
pattern for the first years of service (varying for different para-
meters, and in particular in length when it has been possible to use
experience with the first reactors for subsequent similar or identical
ones). The load factor then rises, falling again when the plant
is 10 to 15 years old.
It would therefore seem that after an optimum adult age (5 to 10
years), most nuclear units follow a more or less general aging pattern.
In my opinion this is only partly true. It is certain that systematic
faul ts ·~ppear on plants of different types after a number of years.
This i s the case for example for:
- faults due to structural corrosion or deformation of the graphite
in GCRs,
faults due to corrosion of the steam circuits in BWRs,
- faults leading through corrosion to the breakage of pins in the
structures carrying the control rods of PWRs,
- faults in steam generators for most types of reactor except BWRs.
On this subject it should be noted:
- that some of these faults may appear quite early (5 to 7 years),
as for example for the pins,
and that many of them lead to shutdowns for varying periods, and
in any case of significant duration,
- and that some of these faults are fairly generic, even when the
reactors have not been constructed as aseries,
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- and that it is possible that, with some of these faults eorreeted,
the plants ean start off again on another period of maturity.
(But this remains to be proved in the next few years.) ~Je are ap-
parently in a transition zone for different types of reaetor.
Note finally that the number of reaetors that have reaehed an age of
more than 10 years (or 15 years, depending on the ease) is very small.
Only one has reaehed the maximum age.
Consequently, while it is true that for this small number of reaetors
there is a tendeney to age and to outages, sometimes prolonged, for
maintenanee, repairs or even just for detailed inspeetions, the load-
faetor values are hardly signifieant as the numbers they eover are
tao small.
2.3 Another way to look at the trend in load faetors against time is
to make overall averages from one year to the next for eaeh eountry.
The IAEA has ealeulated general averages for the whole lives of the
plants in a given eountry. It looks as if these averages mean something.
One ean also ealeulate sliding averages over eertain years, and aver-
ages for the period after the time of teething troubles (for the
eountries with signifieant programmes, this does not differ from
the previous ease).
The results for all the operating times of different types of reaetor
(up to and ineluding 1983) are given in table 1.
The averages for the whole period of eaeh nuelear programme vary very
little if we exeept the teethtng years, whose effeet ineidentally
is different in the different eountries.
These averages range from 59% to 81.5% for the PWRs of 600 MWe and
above that have been taken as examples.
The spreads around the averages vary little; their sizes are as follows:
PWR
PWR
BWR
BWR
600 MWe
600 MWe
600 MWe
60 MWe
10 to 12"10
10 to 14%
13 to 18%
5 to 12%
(20% for the 8th year)
(19% for the 9th year)
These tables show a fairly high degree of diversity. Too many faetors
are involved for lessons to be learned, espeeially in eases where the
load faetor is growing eompared with the general average.
We should note, for example:
the effeet of the tee thing years, when the programme is not growing
rapidly.
the temporary influenee of TMI sinee:
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in that year, some reactors were shut down temporarily,
special inspections and maintenance were ordered.
- the "bad years", generally few in number, correspond to a more or
less generic fault, which when found was corrected fairly quickly.
The trend in annual outages is also interesting (see table 2).
This table gives, as an example, the statistics for annual outages in 1982.
If we except the special case, of the heavy-water reactors (recharged
during operation), all the other types, including AGR and GCR, had in
1982 annual outages of around 2,500 hours (i.e. 28% of total time in
the year). In fact, these times range between 2,100 and 2,860 hours, i.e.
within 16% of 2,500. Secondly, the proportion of planned and unplanned
outages is not very different for these reactors (75 and 25% res-
pectively) .
3 - THE MOST IMPORTANT INCIDENTS
I have so far been concerned with what may be called fundamental faults,
such as those caused byphys~-chemical phenomena, sometimes aggravated
by mechanical phenomena, which are among the essential causes of aging.
These are not, properly speaking, occasional faults, even though tech-
nological progress may enable them to be overcome. They are often
faults that existed in classical energy technologies, where they were
tolerated because they were relatively easy and cheap to repair, while
in nuclear reactors this type of repair has to be done unde~ radiation:
it is sometimes impossible, short of replacing a 1arge proportion
of the equipment (e.g. steam generators).
I would now like to consider, in more general terms, the most important
incidents that occur in power plants, whose analysis leads in principle
to improvements for the present (in plants in service), and even more
for the future (plants at the design or construction stages).
These incidents are examined very closely, and more and more on an
international basis.
3.1 What can be called a significant incident?
To a 1arge extent, the definition varies between countries, as it is
the safety authorities who decide. There are of course contacts and
exchanges between these authorities, and they tend towards homogeneity in
the definitions; The international bodies, and espec1ally IAEA (PRIS
system) have created a standard procedure for incident r~porting which is
tending to become general; we however have here definitions and comments
that concern both'safety and reliability, and their scope is wider than
that of the official government definitions.
OECD-NEA, though it does not collect complete statistics, gives a
detailed analysis of incidents.
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In what follows I shall comment on the most important incidents, without
confining myself to "significant" incidents in the strict sense.
3.2 How many important incidents are there per unit, and what is the trend?
The number of incidents varies from one country to another, and also with
the type and age of the plant. It is weIl known, for example, that the
number of emergency shutdowns varies widely from one country to another:
for example, among those for which I have the most information, the
U.S.A., Sweden, France and Japan for water-cooled reactors.
But I am talking here about the most important incidents, which only
include certain emergency shutdowns; their number appears more consistent.
I have noted, depending on the country and with the reservations mentioned
above, between 0.5 and 4 important incidents per unit per year, the
term "important" meaning that such incidents can be considered as possible
precursors, or that at least they require lessons to be learned from
them in technical and/or human terms.
If we consider emergency shutdowns (rarely considered important), we find
that their number varies considerably, between 0.4 and 15 per unit per
year, and this variation is very interesting. But the very definition of
emergency shutdowns varies between countries:(whether they are automatie
or not; classification varying with the length of the shutdownl.
The trend in the annual number of incidents is slow. In general, there
are more in the first year of operation; the number then falls at varying
rates, usually rather irregularly. The same applies to emergency
shutdowns.
3.3 How can these incidents be classified?
Their importance depends more on their consequences than their causes.
Causes and consequences are however two essential elements in their analysis.
The different countries concerned, the IAEA and OECD~NEA have developed
such classifications. It can also be said that the consequences, if we
go beyond considerations strictly confined to safety, can be examined
from a practical point of view:
- the length of the resulting shutdown,
- whether or not electricity production is interrupted,
- the amount of energy production lost.
OECD-NEA, with its IRS system, goes much further, examining the con-
clusions,to'be drawn:fro[J1 incidents.
The shutdown resulting from the incident may be either immediate and due
to the incident itself, or later for additional maintenance or replace-
ment of a component. In the latter case, the shutdown may be at the
time of the annual outage, and its duration more or less masked; it may
be classified as planned or unplanned, depending on the case.
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This type of classification is interesting, but it is difficult to
interpret all its aspects. One can however deduce from it a certain
priority in the analysis of cases.
Taking into account this first classification, it is interesting to
examine the causes of incidents on a triple reference system:
- What type of component has failed (valvegear, pumps, water or elect-
ricity supply, etc.)?
- What system (in the widest sense) has been affected by the incident?
For example, the primary or secondary cooling system, the control
rod system, the reactor vessel, turbine, etc.,
- What "technology", in the widest sense, is concerned? For example,
mechanical, electrical, electronic, or human factors.
Here are a few results of these analyses. I shall only mention those
I consider the main ones, since detailed technical presentations in this
conference will surely give more detailed results. (Figures 4 and 5,
table 3)
Just as I dwelt above on generic (or one might say supergeneric)
problems arising from corrosion, I shall note here the importance of
certain components among others, which break down often. For example:
- valvegear:
- pumps:
- certain circuits:
11 to 14% of incidents
9 to 11%
9 to 11%
In general, component failures are responsible for 20 to 25% of unavail-
ability, or 50 to 70% of the hours of unplanned outage.
Curiously enough, the unavailability percentages arising from equip-
ment failures are fairly constant for the different types of water-
cooled reactor.
With regard to systems, the following come up particularly often:
incidents on turbines and generators 20 to 25% of cases
incidents in the reactor proper 8 to 12%
the primary cooling circuit 13 to 27%
the monitoring system 18 to 22%
water supply 10 to 13%
These are rough figures, which show the importance of the secondary
circuit and the non-nuclear part in incidents (up to 70% of cases).
For the third reference system, the results of the analyses, expressed
as percentages, vary widely from one electricity company to another,
especially for the share of human error in incidents.
This percentage varies not only for the reason indicated, but also be-
cause the human environment can vary considerably (in the training of
people and teams, of course, but also more directly in the drafting of
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proeedures, referenees to equipment elements and plaees, possible ambig-
uities, different degrees of automation, the way data and results are
presented, ete.}. This point is so important that I will eome back to it.
The reports on human faetors are ineidentally still few and far between,
exeept for speeifie analyses.
In any ease, I shall mention here, rather than result averages whieh do
not mean mueh, varied or even extreme situations that give pereentages
of 20 to 33% of human failure (as a pereentage of eauses of ineidents).
3.4 How do these faetors vary from ease to ease? What are the sig-
nifieant parameters?
Sinee the measuring yardsticks for ineidents vary enormously and are
diffieult to eompare. one ean therefore only eonjeeture.
As I said above, the first years of operation are of partieular impor-
tanee, with multiple ineidents (and extended annual outages).
It is eertain that this is less notieeable some time after the very first
power plants were brought into service, espeeially for the later plants
built as aseries or those for whieh there has just been some stan-
darization (for example in their essential eomponents).
It would seem that at present we are more or less everywhere in a phase
of improvement and maturity, mueh more than in one of aging. To explain
this very qualitative eonelusion, I tend to eliminate eertain ~t.atistieal aber-
rations and ·not ·to take too mueh aeeount of the "important but eurable
faults", whieh though they have a eonsiderable influenee on the load
faetor in terms of outage time are only transitory, as eorreetion takes
plaee relatively quiekly. These are eomplaints of maturity, after those
of youth, but they preeede those of age whieh have yet to appear.
Other explanatory parameters may be the "personality" of the eonstrue-
tor, of the operating eompany and the.eountry in question.
The eonstruetor may inelude the lieensor, but at the· present advaneed
stage of nuelear teehnology eonstruetion quality (in varying degrees by
loeal eontraetors), and that of materials and eomponents, and above all
the quality insuranee methods used in the eonstruetion and operation, are proba-
bly more important.
Dur different eountries and eleetrieity eompanies have their own traditions
of teehnique and human relations whieh situate them to varying extents
in these fields.
3.5 I would like to add a few words on two'partieularly .important
problems, whieh are linked to operation.
- What are the eonsequenees, for the present and future, of the analyses
of ineidents that are earried out systematieally .in our different
countries at INPO, OECD-NEA, ete.?
They are no doubt beneficial, but the fall-out of these analyses is not
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perceived immediately. Their exploit~tion in operation and a fortiori
in the design of various parts of a nuclear plant demands a great deal
of time and care, especially if the constructor is itself involved in it.
I would add that, except in cases of force majeure for which immediate
action is necessary, it is often desirable to wait and reflect before
making the modifications that seem appropriate. A modification that
seemed obviously right has sometimes proved to create many disadvantages
for reliability and operation. Reviews of consistency are particularly
important here.
Preliminary tests, sometimes of long duration, and good liaison between
the constructor and operator are essential conditions for the technical
improvements that result in particular from the lessons of experience.
- It is weIl known that while many systematic tests are essential, some
may prove risky at long term:
either because the reliability of a component (a Diesel engine for
instance) may diminish for its planned operational use if it is tested
too often,
- or because too frequent application of a complicated test, especially
when it is manual, may create a risk of systematic incidents.
There is no doubt a balance has to be struck here.
4. HUMAN AND TECHNICAL PROBLEMS
While human problems (the so-called human factor) were not discovered
for the first time with the TMI accident, it must be admitted that with
some exceptions they had not been given enough attention previously.
We ought to have drawn inspiration earlier, as we do today, from aero-
nautical technologies, in which human problems have for long had priority
attention: it is recognized that with very advanced techniques human
failure is a leading cause of incidents.
Since 1979, much has been done. I will classify it in 5 categories:
1. Training
2. Explanation and information
3. Presentation and aids to operators
4. Taking incident situations into account
5. A proper balance in man-machine relations.
The first two points have been discussed at length. Training has im-
proved, in particular with the use of simulators that take more and more
complicated and realistic accident situations into account, and also by
additional means such as Computer-Assisted Teaching, which provides
operator training for accident cases, and function simulators.
Information and explanation still require much effort to arrive at. total
understanding of procedures, signs and symbols. Some new developments
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(colour codes, for example) are not easy to apply in operating power
plants.
Adequate presentation of data and results is also being achieved more
or less everywhere.
It ofte~ involves complete redesign of control rooms to simplify the
amount of information and how it is read; once more, this is often diffi-
cult in completed power plants. These problems will be covered at
length during our meetings.
I shall link together the efforts made to take account of incident situ-
ations and proper use of machines, i.e. in this case computers.
New safety boards that display the results of calculations and sometimes
new procedures for special situations, and lastly the redundant use of
an engineer (STA, ISR) to analyze difficult situations, will lead us in
the future to give very close attention to a whole series of problems that
are both technical and human, complex and promising. These new devel-
opments are already appearing.
It is lastly obvious that the best operators are those who have been
chosen weIl, trained weIl and kept up to date; but they are also those
who are particularly motivated. This is a difficult element to
define, which varies from country to country.
5. OTHER PROBLEMS
Many other
mentioned.
and I have
numerical
problems could be discussed here; some
I have by no means dealt with all the
concentrated on water-cooled reactors,
importance.
have already been
important problems
in view of their
I will raise a few special points that were deliberately omitted above.
5.1 The reduction of workers' exposure doses:
Very great efforts have been made and are in progress to follow the
recommendations of ICHP. These concern:
workforce training,
physical protection of fixed or mobile irradiators,
water chemistry and the choice of alloys used in circuits.
5.2 Establishing measures to be taken in the case of an accident, both
inside and outside power plants.
5.3 Environmental problems:
The object is to minimize and standarize radioactive (and technical)
waste, and to keep the public informed on routine problems and in-
cidents. On this last point, each country has its customs, and no rules
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Can be laid down. Here again, the situation has changed much since TMI.
5.4 Lastly, 1 would like to mention certain advantages of fast-neutron
plants, which are as yet not very numerous and hardly appear in the
statistics. However, they deserve mention:
- they are easy to operate, both in normal and accident conditions: this
is essentially because the cooling circuits are not pressurized, and
there is therefore no risk of a double-phase (liquid, vapour)
accident system.
workforce exposure doses are low; collective doses are substantially
reduced.
6. CONCLtJSlON
General comments:
I would like to draw some essentially qualitative conclusions from power-
plant operation in recent years, and in so doing reply, if possible,
to the questions raised in the introduction.
1. We should note the great efforts made everywhere in nuclear power-
plant operation. This effort did not begin in 1979, at the time of the
TMI 2 accident, but it has developed a great deal since then. The new
awareness is however not yet general. It has not always fil tered down
to the operating teams, or at least not enough. Too often, we have
heard talk of "craftsman" technical habits, which are those of the
conventional p __ ants, whereas nuclear operation demands more rigorous
methods and discipline that was not necessary before.
This progress in operation has been accelerated by the collective action
that has been taken to assemble and analyze accident information and to
learn from it; this action is often international, either because the
data banks and analyses are themselves international, or because publi-
cations and meetings permit very fruitful confrontation of information
and points of view.
2. While these efforts are visible, especially to managements, their
results are not always apparent, especially when the quality criterion
taken is the load factor in the different plants. Some people may think
that the effectiveness of these efforts is reduced, partially at least,
by the effect of power-plant aging. I do not really think this is so.
I will come back to it in amoment.
1 believe above all that when it is necessary to modify components and
techniques or it is desired to change human individual or collective
behaviour, no results are seen immediately.
Some techniques can only really be modified when the time comes to
replace the equipment. Some changes can only be made on new units,
whose design and construction can only be renovated then.
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I would add that while the time required for aetion ean sometimes be
fatal eonstraint, it ean be useful: same teehnieal modifieations, if
are made tao early, ean ereate new defeets: this means that numerous
tests, sometimes at full seale, are neeessary.
3. Results sometimes appear eontradietory. Same load faetors may
increase and others diminish.
a
they
In the period immediately after TMI, load faetors dropped in many
countries, beeause the safety authorities often demanded inquiries that
required certain reaetors to be shut down, or detailed inspeetions.
Ta this must be added the appearanee of eertain faults, same of which
were generie, whieh should be ealled eomplaints of maturity rather than
of old age.
There is nothing to tell us at present whether a given preventive
measure is or not, taking into aeeount its disadvantages now, a produetive
investment for the future. This is the ease of numerous tests earried
out either during shutdown or operation. They may prove very benefieial
for the future (knowledge of the equipment, prevention of eertain in-
eidents, ete.). But their very number may in itself be a eause of aging!
The progress we may expeet from present efforts will probably only
appear some time in the future, and the visible fluetuations in the
apparent quality of power plants are dominated by the teehnieal habits
of eaeh eountry rather than by the modifieations that are taking plaee.
These teehnieal habits often relate more to eonstruetion quality than
to operating quality.
4. On eertain points, the results appear to show the influenee of
eertain preeise parameters. I say "appear", as it is extremely diffieult
to establish true eorrelations here, in view of the eomplexity of the
systems and also the variety of the methods of presentation and analysis
used in the different eompanies. Present conelusions are very
qualitative.
Among the eorrelations that seem to me signifieant I would mention:
4.1 The influenee of the fuel-Ioading method, during operation or not. In
the ease of the heavy-water reaetors, it seems indeed that charging
during operation gives them an advantage. This is not elear at presenc
for thegraphite-gas reactors, for which other faetors apply the other
way around (and in partieular the problem of the deterioration of certain
struetures, whieh requires intervention and which eould eome under what
I call maturity since this problem appears soluble).
4.2 The influence of aging, on the other hand, seems to me to have to be
kept for later, as I have already said.
4.3 The rate of development of the nuelear programmes in eaeh country
plays a role that works apriori in contrary directions. If this
rate i~ fast, it brings up teething problems each year that are not
a1ways eliminated by repetitive experience, especially when the models
are evolving, sometimes rapidly.
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The rate of construction also affects personnel recruitment and training.
Despite the efforts made everywhere, problems of selection and training
time may arise if emergencies occur. In the light of experience, I
do not however think that this factor is significant at present.
4.4 The advantages and disadvantages of series construction have often
been discussed. Its effect is certainly favourable on safety analyses,
on construction methods and times and consequently on costs, and also
on ease of operation (interchangeability of staff and of some equipment).
Against this it is often opposed that there are risks of generic incidents
and possible difficulties in exploiting experience, when substantial
technical modifications, as is sometimes the case, become necessary
(modification time and costs).
In fact many reactors that are apparently different nevertheless have
generic characters, due to the standardization of components. This
incidentally partly explains the interest of each operator in what the
others are experiencing, and why it is sought to internationalize
some problems.
4.5 The effect of unit ratings is also difficult to interpret. In the
case of PWRs and BWRs, it seems that the crossing of the (incidentally
artificial) frontier of 600 MW has led to reduced reliability. This is
not true of the other types of reactor.
Here again, many factors may apply. For instance:
- sometimes, the still unabsorbed youth effect of a new system (especi-
ally when it has been necessary to renovate conventional components
completely) ;
- the effect of innovation in itself, which while promising for later
may initially have an unfavourable effect: the changes may not take
account of or aggravate hidden faults.
- the search for the lowest establishment cost, which is sometimes
more conspicuous when one moves from prototypes to industrial routine.
4.6 One factor that seems to me very important, though it is apriori
scarcely quantifiable, is construction quality, and in particular
quality control and consequently the methods used for it.
Quality in component manufacture, even more than in its assembly, seems
to me an essential problem; and this quality, together with the methods
usedto check it, seems to me to vary considerably from one country to
another, despite appearances. In this field, traditions and "technical
culture" still vary a great deal in the different countries.
4.7 It is possible that certain methods used to improve quality can have
disadvantages in operation, for example with regard to worker ex-
posure doses. This is for instance the case when certain inspections are
frequently repeated, or when "commandos" with special training (always
the same team) are used in delicate work exposed to radiation. These problems
are being examined by the Nuclear Energy Agency.
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On the subject of doses, with which I shall not deal further, the choice
of basic materials and water chemistry play essential roles. There is
intense international cooperation on this.
5. I have mentioned incidents of varying importance, both concerned
with safety and not.
It is extremely difficult to draw conclusions other than very general
ones from this, while detailed analysis of each incident is of the
closest interest to every operator and should also interest every
manufacturer. On this subject, playback of incidents to manufacturers
and the incorporation of their lessons in new construction are still,
in my opinion, far from satisfactory, and yet they are essential. INPO
isatpresent conducting an interesting experiment on this.
Statistics of incidents and their interpretation are still very indi-
vidual in character, despite the growing effort (which looks like suc-
ceeding) made by the international bodies, IAEA (PRIS system) and NEA
(IRS). The international standards are beginning to be used generally.
I have emphasized the by no means negligible importance of incidents
in the conventional partof power plants (turbine, driers, superheaters,
etc.), and of those concerning basic components like valvegear and
pumps, as weIl as the capital importance of the numerous incidents that
occur in the cooling circuit, especially the secondary one. Reliability
of the steam generators plays an essential role.
Some repetitive incidents such as emergency shutdowns have an undisputed
influence at present on load factors, and for the future on component
aging.
Human problems, which have received much attention since the TMI acci-
dent, are analyzed in a way that makes international comparison very
difficult.
In particular, some design or manufacture defects, which have numerous
consequences for operation, can be due to human error (for example in
manufacture, and then in quality control). These consequences may
be difficult to pinpoint, but they deserve mention.
6. To conclude, I would like to mention some problems for the future,
which though weIl known seem to me particularly important: they also
concern the different types of error and incident I have mentioned.
6.1 Firstly, there is the policy for maintenance and trials during
operation (either at the time of annual outage or when the reactor is
functioning).
The policies adopted by the different companies, either on their own
initiative or prompted by the safety authorities, are without doubt
exceedingly diverse, and I am not sure that analysis of these policies,
the lessons to be drawn from them, and the adaptation of these lessons
to the different national cultures [ave been conducted in a sufficiently
systematic manner.
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6.2 A proper balance between human action and automation has not been
attained - far from it. It is certain that when they were first intro-
duced, and still now, reactors using ordinary water were often less
automated than some of their predecessors, like the gas reactors.
Automation is progressing slowly, for example, in the new control rooms,
for diagnosis of incidents. It is desirable that it should be taken
further, especially in the field of testing and of various current
procedures in which the risk of error is not negligible. Big changes
are going on at present in all this.
What is the final conclusion?
The record of nuclear-power-plant operation throughout the world is
clearly very positive. No really serious incident has occurred for
5 years, even though the number of operating hours in plants has
become considerable.
Redundancies and "in-depth defence" systems have shown much progress.
However, all the lessons of TMI have still not become current practice
yet. My impression, and probably that of my listeners, is that we are
in a transition period from three points of view:
The age of the earliest reactors; the real problems of aging may
appear in the next few years;
We are resolving the most obvious problems of "maturity";
- We are taking more complete account of the lessons of TMI (and of
other incidents too), and in particular in respect of human factors
and the man-machine balance (automation).
The most important development in recent years is certainly the estab-
lishment of data banks on incidents at national or world level, and the
growing and ever more effective intervention of the big international
bodies, such,as IAEA, OECD-NEA and the European Community.
Their joint efforts clearly augur weIl, for the future.
Table 1:
Table 2:
Table 3:
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Regu1atory Trends in OECD Member Countries
Presented by W. Dircks (USNRC)
and G. Naschi (ENEA)
on behalf of the OECD-NEA
Committee on the Safety of Nuc1ear Installations
ABSTRACT
At the beginnings of commercia1 nuc1ear power, national approaches to
safety regulation tended to fo110w the strong U.S. lead. With the subsequent
deve10pment and spread of nuc1ear techno1ogy, countries have since estab1ished
regu1atory practices specific to their own situation and no country now
dominates the deve10pment of regu1atory positions.
Even so, severa1 recent common deve10pments can be discerned,
inc1uding: a natural transition in regu1atory effort away from 1icensing of
new p1ants to ensuring the safety of operating p1antsj greater emphasis on
1earning from operationa1 experiencej moves towards standardising plant
designs and refining general safety criteria; redirection of safety research
and deve10pment of new regu1atory approaches to the severe accident question
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fo11owing the TMI accident; more attention to the human element in plant
safety; use of the know1edge coming fram 1arge research programmes to deve10p
new regu1atory requirements; increased app1ication of probabi1istic
assessment techniques to a broad range of regu1atory problems.
The introduction of probabi1istic approaches into safety ana1yses, and
the program of international information exchange and joint assessment
conducted under CSNI are both contributing to a better understanding of the
common basis of nuc1ear safety regulation.
The future is 1ike1y to see more attention being paid to the problems
associated with plant ageing, and a further convergence oE approaches as
safety research advances, operationa1 experience accumu1ates and assessment
techniques are Eurther refined.
Introduction
1. Commercia1 nuc1ear po~~r based on the light water reactor (LWR) was
first deve10ped in the Uni ted States. According1y, it was natural that for
quite same time the Uni ted States had an unmatched inf1uence on the
deve10pment of the re1ated regu1atory saEety phi1osophy. Other countries
adopting the LWR often tended to fo11ow the U.S. lead, by either mode11ing
their own regu1atory processes direct1y on the U.S. approach, or by at least
attempting to deve10p schemes campatib1e with U.S. regu1atory practice.
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However, these early regulatory requirements were developed when reactor
technology was rapidly evolving, and when both reactors and the potential
consequences of accidents in them were relatively small. Furthermore the
first regulations had to be developed on the basis of a limited understanding
of reactor behaviour in abnormal situations. Safety-related technical
information was sparse since safety research was at an embryonie stage and
little operating experience was available. What experience there was related
to the first prototype reactors, and needed to be extrapolated greatly in
order to predict the behaviour of the first generation of commercial plants
which were five to ten times larger. As a result a pragmatic approach had to
be adopted in devising early regulations. The need for caution made it
necessary to incorporate conservative assumptions due to the gaps in
knowledge. (The resulting conservatisms in reactor design were vividly
demonstrated by the 1}1I accident, where weak points in certain areas were
compensated for by the intentional over-design in others.) The size of
industrial power reactors has since doubled again, and increasing technical
understanding from research and operating experience has led to new and deeper
technical insights into safety questions.
Z. In recent years, rising expectations of individuals in industrial
countries have led to continuing demands that large-scale industrial
activities be conducted with no risk to the public. Nuclear power has borne
the brunt of this mood, in large part because of the intangible nature of
radioactivity and because of the military uses by which nuclear fission first
came to public attention. This has contributed to increasing pressure for
more stringent safety requirenents, criteria and standards.
58
3. Several countries have now developed an independent capability in
nuclear technology. Reactor vendors in different countries have produced
various comercial LWR designs, which have been adopted by many utilities.
Along with this spreading of nuclear technology, recent public debates
subsequent to the publication of the U.S. Reactor Safety Study (WASH-1400) and
the TMI accident have obliged each country to establish national regulations
as a function of their individual situations.
4. All of these developments have combined to produce the current
situation where no country clearly dominates the development of regulatory
positions. When countries need to formulate new safety policies or practices,
they are faced with a multitude of technical arguments and options as weIl as
differing practices in other countries.
Recent Common Trends in LWR Regulation
Development of Advanced LWR Designs and Refinements in General Safety Criteria
5. Notwithstanding this situation where diverse regulatory approaches
exist, one can identify several recent trends common to most countries. From
the very beginnings of commereial nuclear power, it was clear that the rate
that new capacity came on line would eventually slow down as the industry
matured. In consequence, regulatory authorities would have to shift their
efforts steadily from the task of licensing new plants to ensuring that plants
on-line were operated safeI}.
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The TMI accident has underlined a need now for greater regulatory surveillance
of operating plants. Ever-increasing efforts are being made to feed lessons
fram the rapidly accumulating operating experience back to operational
practice and regulatory activities. In several countries regulatory
authorities supervise a systematic programme of periodic re-evaluations of
plants throughout their operating life.
6. There is also a move towards evolving standardised advanced reactor
designs, which should be both cheaper to build and more straightforward to
regulate. This approach is now being followed up in several countries with
major nuclear programmes, including France (the N4 1400 MWe PWR), the Federal
Republic of Germany (the KONVOI scheme), Italy (PUN) and the Uni ted States
(GESSAR ~, CESSAR System 80, RESAR SP/90 designs). Parallel to these schemes
are regulatory efforts to refine general safety criteria, taking full
~ /
advantage of the lessons learned fram operating experience, the insights
gained fram safety research and the new analytical tools provided by
probabilistic approaches to safety assessment. The new criteria include, for
instance, revised requirements on the design, materials and inspection of
primary circuit camponents, pressure vessels and steam generators, which are
all aimed at reducing failure probabilities.
Long Term Regulatory Consequences of the TMI Accident
7. During the TMI accident the reactor core experienced transient
conditions much more severe täan foreseen in the design basis calculations.
Even so there were no demonstrable offsite health consequences. The U.S.
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regulations in force when TI.fI was licensed were based on defining a "maximum
credib1e accident" and demonstrating that its consequences could be
contained. Any worse situation that one might conceive was considered to be
so unlikely that i t was c1assed as "incredible". This in turn meant that
there was no need to take precautions against such events or their
consequences. This whole approach had first been chal1enged publically by
Reg. Farmer in 1967. Since no technology was free oE risk, he pointed out,
the mere fact of using nuc1ear reactors implied acceptance of same degree of
risk. There was no logical way of differentiating between "credible" and
"incredible" accidents. The 1975 U.S. Reactor Safety Study took this argument
further and made the first quantitative estimates of the probability and
consequences of the comp1ete spectrwn of conceivab1e LWR accidents. The
1engthy debate fol10wing the 1979 TMI accident on whether or not the design
'basis had been passed led to reconsideration of the regu1atory philosophy to
adopt regarding "severe" accidents, i. e. those involving 10ss of key systems
and eventual darnage to the care. Although the TMI accident had the effect of
concentrating the minds of the assessors on this issue, the resu1t was 1imited
to some changes in emphasis. The consensus now seems to be that resources
shou1d be devoted more to preventing severe accidents than to mitigating their
effects.
8. The accident at TMI also showed that inadequate attention had
previous1y been given to the ro1e of the human element in avoiding and
countering accidents. It pointed up a need to clarify management
responsibi1ities, especia11y in relation to those of regu1atory authorities,
for assuring safety during ~h routine operation and emergencies. Also
identified was a need to enswre that technica1 advice was avai1ab1e during an
61
emergency, either by upgrading certain shift personnel or by engaging experts
who were not directly involved in operating the plant. Regulatory authorities
in different countries have since reviewed the role of management, the
availability of technical expertise, and emergency planning for reactor
accidents. Concentrated efforts are being made to see that provisions are
improved where necessary.
9. The accident also brought to the fore the question of how reasonable it
was to expect operators to act effectively following a serious perturbation to
reactor operation, considering the stress imposed on them and the often
inadequate and even contradictory information available to them. Many
countries have since devoted substantial work on various aspects of the human
factors question: redesign of control rooms in order to support operators in
responding to an accident, design of emergency procedures in terms of the
plant state to supplement those for. each specific event sequence, provision of
control room simulators for training staff to handle abnormal situations, and
identifying extra equipment and making provision in advance to permit unusual
system configurations that could enable operators to keep control of a
situation involving core degradation.
Introduction of Probabilistic Techniques in Safety Analysis
10. In most technologies, safety requirements have been defined through an
empirical trial-and-error method, often in the wake of accidents which have
resulted in major 1055 of life. This approach was never considered acceptable
in the nuclear industry. As noted above, extreme prudence in setting the
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first regulations led to substantial conservatisms in early plant designs, in
order to compensate for the limited knowledge of reactor behaviour in unusual
operating conditions. Regulatory organisations have recently devoted great
efforts to develop and evaluate probabilistic methods of analysis suitable for
making safety assessments. These new tools provide an additional means for
assessing the level of safety in various parts of each plant and in the plant
as a whole. It is becoming possible to demonstrate that balanced safety
coverage is being maintained over the entire plant. In consequence, certain
current safety requirements may turn out to be superfluous, while other
measures may warrant reinforcement to remedy weak points. Even with the
uncertainty inherent to global risk assessments, the risk-equalisation
approach can provide useful indications of the safety value of various changes
to reactor design or in its operation, and on how to set priorities on
regulatory issues requiring attention or additional research.
11. The most comprehensive potential regulatory use of probabilistic
methods is in the process of granting construction and operating licenses.
Although the use of PRA is growing, it seems likely for the present that in
most countries such studies will not be a required component of an appliqation
for aplant license. (In some countries a preliminary probabilistic safety
assessment is required at the early design stage.) Some countries have gone
so far as to develop "safety goals" in terms of accident probability and
consequences. Safety goal efforts can at best serve as sources of guidance to
decision-makers for their evaluation of accidents beyond the design basis and
the relative risk of nuclear and other sources of power.
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12. Fo110wing WASH-1400 and TMI there has been a more systematic use of
probabi1istic techniques 1ike fault trees and event trees, not on1y to
eva1uate and improve safety levels within a given plant, but also to compare
the levels attained by different p1ants in the country, and even by p1ants
abroad. Event tree ana1yses are making it possib1e to balance
deterministica11y-based decisions with probabi1istic insights. For instance,
system re1iability ana1yses are now being used to develop optimum programmes
of quality assurance and preventative maintenance schedu1es.
13. The increasing use of probabilistic techniques is also helping to
improve the common technica1 basis for regulation among OECn Member
countries. For examp1e, by the very nature of event trees they cannot
incorporate the concept of inviolab1e barriers (nor of "incredib1e" sequences
of events). As a resu1t, it is generally agreed that the severe accident
issue will not be reso1ved without the assistance of probabi1istic techniques
of analysis.
Contributions of Safety Research
14. Severa1 1arge sca1e p~clear safety research programmes were begun in
the 1960's and 1970's. These are now producing the answers to many of the
long-standing technica1 questions about the safety of modern nuclear p1ants.
The resu1ts of these studies and the introduction of the probabi1istic
approach to assessing safety are a110wing regu1atory authorities to fix their
po1icies and requirements on the basis of measured physica1 phenomena and
best-estimate calcu1ations, rather than conservative bounding arguments. This
shou1d contribute towards a refinment of 1icensing approaches into a coherent
streamlined who1e from a senes of positions taken on individual issues.
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15. On the severe accident question, for example, as noted above, many
experts agree that emphasis should be placed on prevention rather than
mitigation. Recent research indicates further that radioative releases from
severe accidents may be lower than predicted in the predominantly conservative
assessments used in previous risk studies. Preliminary indications from this
work indicate that this could have a substantial influence on the
understanding of the consequences of severe accidents, hence emergency
planning for them. Some countries are now applying the probabilistic approach
to investigate the value of deliberate controlled venting of the containment
atmosphere in certain accidents. By affecting the timing of the radioactive
release, it is suggested, it should be possible to reduce both its size and
the eventual consequences. However containments differ widely, and their
detailed behaviour plays a key role in an accident sequence. Further work
will be needed before the value of venting can be firmly established.
16. In parallel, following extensive experimental and theoretical studies
there is less concern today that large steam explosions after a core melt
present a realistic threat to containment integrity. A number of countries
are continuing to carry out research into the behaviour of hydrogen generated
from the zircaloy-water reaction, corium reactions and the behaviour of
fission products inside the containment.
Evolution and Influence of CSNI Activities
17. The international co-operation on safety matters organised through the
NEA Committee on the Safety of Nuclear Installations (CSNI) constitutes
another means for limiting the current tendency to regulatory divergence. The
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evolution of CSNI's programme over the years has also reflected the trends in
the preoccupations of national regulatory authorities. When the Committee was
established in the early 1970's, its activities were concentrated on
identifying safety research needed to improve understanding of reactor
behaviour in accident conditions, the performance of safety systems and
interactions between plant systems. CSNI has since been steadily shifting its
efforts towards the comparison and joint assessment of research results and
operating experience. This helps ensure that regulators in all countries have
a common data base, as wide as possible, available to them. This fosters the
development of technically coherent safety requirements in all countries (even
if detailed designs will always vary somewhat for a variety of reasons).
Following are several illustrative examples of recent developments in the CSNI
programme.
18. In order to profit from the lessons of operating experience, all
regulatory authorities have long-running programmes to collect and evaluate
reports of safety-related occurrences. To maximise the benefits from these
national schemes, CSNI established in 1981 an international Incident Reporting
System (IRS) covering all OECD countries with operating power reactors (which
represent about 80% of the world's nuclear capacity). Hundreds of incidents
of particular safety interest have since been circulated through the IRS. As
weIl as broadening the background information available to safety analysts for
assessing incidents in their own country, the IRS gives regulatory authorities
advance warning of potential safety problems and of the approaches being taken
elsewhere to solve them.
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19. Because of the strong influence that different countries' policies can
have on one another, it is increasingly important for regulatory authorities
to have regular opportunities to exchange views with their counterparts in
other countries on important basic technical issues and regulatory practices.
The CSNI sub-Committee on Licensing has held special meetings in recent years
on several regulatory topics, including the backfitting of safety equipment,
advance planning for nuclear emergencies, and the selection of sites for
nuclear power plants.
20. The emergency planning case illustrates weIl how different practices
can develop unrecognised. This area was the subject of a topical meeting of
the sub-Committee in June 1981. The fundamental principles underlying
emergency planning were reviewed, as were the practical measures that had been
adopted or.proposed in the different countries. Whilst all countries
currently carry out emergency planning around nuclear plants, there were
different views about its relationship with the licensing process.
Considerable differences in actual practices were found, for example, in the
scale and organisation of emergency planning, basic attitudes thereto,
reference levels, the demands of the licensing process, the extent of public
involvement, and so on. While some of these variations arose from countries'
different traditions and administrative structures and were thus to be
expected, others were technical in nature and primarily a result of current
uncertainties in the source term.
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21. In June 1983 the Nuclear Energy Agency convened an informal meeting of
the Heads of the regulatory authorities from those countries having the
broadest experience of industrial nuclear power development. The aim was to
improve, at the highest level, mutual understanding of current trends in
nuclear safety. The Heads of nuclear regulatory authorities acknowledged that
in recent years there had been a growing tendency for OECD regulatory policies
to diverge, and they undertook to work towards greater harmony, primarily
through CSNI. As a practical step, they agreed to consult together in this
framework as new major regulatory positions were being developed so that,
first, some warning of impending changes could be given and, second, other
countries could contribute to the process. These consultations have been
implemented in the form of special meetings, two of which have been held so
far.
22. The first was a special meeting convened early in 1984 to consider the
regulatory basis for actions taken with regard to the problem of pipe cracking
in boiling water reactors. After reviewing countries' experience with this
phenomenon, the meeting went on to examine various technical aspects of
detection and analysis of crack behaviour and how to mitigate the problem. It
concluded with a general discussion of regulatory positions. The special
meeting reached a number of conclusions: the phenomenon of inter-granular
stress corrosion cracking (IGSCC) was weIl understood, low carbon material was
preferable where stainless steels were used. and precise sizing of cracks
during in-service inspection was a key safety factor in plants containing
susceptible piping. Indeed tne point was made strongly that the main reason
for countries adopting conservative safety margins with regard to pipe failure
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was lack of confidence in methods of predicting crack growth and in the
precision of u1trasonic sizing methods. The meeting went a long way towards
c1arifying the position regarding pipe cracking in BWRs, provided a great deal
of information about what countries were doing and why, and reached consensus
about the merits of the various interim solutions. As a resu1t of the meeting
there will be a fundamental technica1 compatabi1ity between the different
approaches that the various national authorities come to adopt.
23. The second meeting, held in May 1984, took up the question of general
safety criteria for advanced LWR designs. In some countries, most p1ants are
of unique design, which means that regulatory authorities must review each of
them in detail. The resu1ts are both high construction costs and a high level
of regulatory effort required to license them. With the recent development of
probabi1istic techniques for safety analysis, a steady stream of resu1ts
coming frorn safety research, and rapid1y accumu1ating operating experience,
regu1atory bodies are now in a position to devise a new generation of general
safety criteria that are more ba1anced and interna11y coherent. Such a
development will contribute to more uniform plant designs, which will cost
1ess to build and be easier to regulate. Consistent with this idea, the
purpose of this meeting was to promote more coherent regu1atory approaches
among Member countries.
24. The meeting first reviewed the current programmes in France, the
Federa1 Repub1ic of Germany, Italy and the United States to develop
standardised advanced PWR designs, along with related efforts in these and
several other countries to revise existing general safety criteria. Severa1
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specific issues related to safety criteria were then singled out for further
discussion. For example, it was noted that the Uni ted States was the only
country to have formulated quantitative safety goals, and even there, these
were being implemented on a limited trial basis. Most other countries were
waiting for the results of the U.S. trial before proceeding much further in
this area. Discussion of the degree to which operators are allowed to
intervene during emergency situations revealed that the underlying
philosophies in each country were not as dissimilar as the differences in the
formal criteria would imply. Significant differences were found in the
single-failure criteria in use in various countries. It was noted that
whereas a single-failure criteria could be stated in rather general terms, its
application was often quite complex. Even though probabilistic analyses of
the current practices might show that there were no significant differences
between them as regards risk, there was no clear picture of the philosophies
on which the different practices were based. Concerning the question of
anticipated transients without scram (ATWS), the meeting found that many
countries were in the process of formulating or finalising new criteria.
Approaches under consideration included efforts to reduce scram frequency and
improve the reliability of existing scram systems, or a requirement for
diverse actuation - or even complete - scram systems.
ZS. The meeting was very useful for identifying the fundamental
philosophies of countries on a broad range of current interrelated questions.
Future meetings will delve deeper into the reasons underlying the observed
differences in several specific areas, and it will be valuable to take into
account industry views in these discussions.
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Future Outlook
26. The rules and regulations governing nuclear power programmes are
necessarily complex. As illustrated above, the original V.S. lead in LWR
regulation has given way to the current regulatory situation in which each
country conducts largely independent activities reflecting its own particular
situation. The natural tendency for these parallel efforts to diverge is
being limited by the widespread introduction of probabilistic approaches to
safety assessment - a trend given added impetus by I~ASH-l400 and TMI, and by
the international collaboration organised through CSNI.
27. Nuclear regulation has come a lang way from the initial attempts which
had to incorporate substantial conservatisms to compensate for limited basic
technical knowledge of the time. Regulation is becoming more coherent and
balanced as a result of ever-increasing understanding from research and
operating experience and the availability of'more powerful assessment tools.
Regulators are using the most modern analytical techniques and research
results available in order to improve understanding of reactor behaviour and
to make safety assessments as efficient and definitive as possible. Along
with the development of standardised advanced LWR designs, work towards the
development of general safety criteria should also encourage further
convergence of different countries' approaches.
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28. As stated earlier in the paper, there is a clear trend whereby
regulatory authorities are applying the lessons from operating experience to
improve regulatory processes. New questions will certainly arise in
connection with plant ageing, and the regulation will need increased
flexibility in order to devise plant-specific interim remedies to enable
continued operation with adequate safety margins, quite apart from long-tehm
solutions which may need several years to develop and implement.
29. It should always be kept in mind that by the very nature of the
regulation function, the responsable authorities cannot take the lead in
nuclear power development. Regulatory bodies can only strive to be responsive
to advances (such as standardised plants), novelties (such as controlled
venting), and proposed technological changes (such as improved
instrumentation). It is up to industry to identify ways to improve plants and
to see to it that they are operated in a safe manner. The nuclear industry
must always remember that dedication and will on the part of all involved is
indispensable to keeping nuclear power safe.

73
FUEL BEHAVIOUR UNDER DBA CONDITIONS
(1) D 0 Pickman
(2) A Fiege
(1) Uni ted Kingdom Atomic Energy Authority
Springfields Works, Salwick, Preston, PR4 ORR, UK
(2) Kernforschungszentrum Karlsruhe GmbH,
Postfach 3640, D-7500 Karlsruhe 1, West Germany
ABSTRACT
In a Design Basis Accident the fuel cladding experiences a temperature
transient which is terminated when the core is reflooded by the ECCS. Depending on
the severity of the transient, in terms of the peak temperature attained and the
duration, cladding may be embrittled or may undergo substantial deformation. Both
these processes have potential for affecting subsequent coolability during reflood.
The embrittlement of cladding is caused by oxidation and oxygen pick-up by the
metal. During this oxidation hydrogen is generated and may accumulate in the
pressure vessel or primary containment. This paper reviews the status of fuel
behaviour with particular emphasis on embrittlement and deformation.
INTRODUCTION
Ta ensure that fuel elements remain intact and retain a coolable geometry
after a Design Basis loss-of-coolant accident (DBA) is an important requirement in
all LWRs and various criteria have been established and specified by licensing
authorities to this end.
CSNI/NEA, through the medium of its Emergency Core Cooling Working Group and
later its Principal Working Group No. 2 (PWG 2), have promoted studies in the
thermal-hydraulic and fuel behaviour areas and reviewed the evidence, concluding
in general terms that the necessary criteria will be met by present designs.
PWG 2 has also sponsored the preparation of a State-of-the-Art Report (SOAR) to be
published shortly. Contributions from all OECD countries have been sought i.n the
preparation of this SOAR which will be submitted to PWG 2 for approval.
The DBA is the warst conceivable LOCA, a guillotine break of a cold leg,
but there are a range of smaller breaks more likely in practice than the DBA.
Depending on the size, the rate of vessel depressurisation may be slow, but the
core will not uncover, even partially, with ECCS in operation. This review does
not deal with the severe consequences that could arise from a LOCA if the ECCS
failed. It is, in the main, specific to PWRs, but much of the data reviewed is
equally applicable to BWRs.
TEMPERATURE TRANSIENTS
The temperature transient experienced by the fuel elements in a DBA is of
crucial importance in determining what, if any, damage will occur. For a large
breach of the primary circuit the blowdown time is very short, of the order of
20 s, and the stored heat in the fuel is largely removed during this period. The
temperature then starts to rise because the fission products generate decay heat.
The rate of temperature rise and the peak temperature reached depend on the
magnitude of the decay heat, and the internal and external heat transfer from fuel
to cladding and cladding to the external environment. The external heat transfer
depends on the type of ECCS adopted, cold leg injection or combined hot and cold
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leg. During refill steam is generated by residual heat in the system, but the
temperature will continue to ramp. During reflood, ie once the coolant starts to
cover the core, the heat transfer improves and a mixture of steam and water
droplets arrests and reverses the ramp, ultimately quenching the fuel.
The duration of the period that the cladding spends above about 925K is
critical, because only above this temperature does significant oxidation and
deformation ocurr. A typical time above this temperature is in the range
100-150 s. Because the rate of temperature rise during the ramp and the peak
temperature attained are dependent on the prior rating and burn-up of the fuel,
there are a range of temperature transients for different fuel rods, illustrated
schematically in Fig. 1.
POTENTIAL DAMAGE MECHANISMS
Concern about fuel behaviour in the short-term transients typical of large
break LOCAS is centred on the two phenomena of clad embrittlement and deformation.
A subsidiary concern would arise should the oxidation of the Zircaloy cladding
result in the generation of a large volume of hydrogen.
Embrittlement arises from pick-up of 0 in the metal underlying the oxide
layer and a sufficient thickness of unembri~tled material is required to resist
the thermal shock when the cladding is eventually quenched. If a lot of clad
rupture should occur, the resulting geometry may inhibit coolant flow through the
region and cause a hot spot, apart from which a major spill of U02 would cause
major clean-up problems.
It is weIl known that Zircaloy can deform to very high strains in the high
a-phase region (975-ll25K) under certain conditions and the concern over clad
deformation is whether such large strains can arise in practice and whether they
will result in such a degree of blockage that cooling during the reflood stage and
subsequently is impaired.
In the remaining parts of this paper the evidence available from many sources
on these phenomena is reviewed and general conclusions are drawn.
OXIDATION
Oxidation Kinetics
The oxidation of the Zirra~o3 ~1506s in steam has been very extensively
studied by many investigators ' , , , , . These alloys are oxidised by steam over
a wide range of temperature, but the effects on the underlying cladding only
become significant in the DBA context above 1050K.
The rate of reaction is temperature dependent and with unlimited availability
of steam is generally believed to be controlled by the rate of diffusion of oxygen
anions in the anion deficient oxide layer at temperatures above l200K. Over a
wide t~mperature range Zircaloy oxidation has been shown to obey a parabolic rate
law, w = Kpt, where w is the weight gain, t the time and Kp is the parabolic rate
constant which is dependent on temperature accordi!:!g to an Arrhenius expressi.on.
At temperatures below the a/ß transus some workers report a change in oxidation
kinetics to a cubic growth rate, a~d over longer times (up to 25 hours) at
temperatures below l300K Leistikow found accelerated oxidation with linear
kinetics probably caused by oxide cracking and which may be associated with the
tetragonal to monoclinic phase change in the zirconia.
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Most of the data on Zircaloy oxidation has been obtained in isothermal tests,
but p~rabolic rate constants derived from transient heating tests performed by
Sagat et al at Chalk River are in good agreement with those determined in
isothermal tests.
Effects of Irradiation
Durigg a LOCA y-irradiation will deposit energy in the Zircaloy and steam.
From work on the effects of irradiation on the oxidation of Zr alloys in steam at
lower temperatures no enhancement of oxidation is expected, which is in agreement
with theoretical predictions.
Effect of Specimen Geometry
The initial parabolic oxidation kinetics will change when the oxygen content
of the substrate ~etal increases, which occurs in practice with thin specimens,
such as fuel cladding, at temperatures above about l145K where the flux of O2 into
the ß-phase is substantial.
Effect of Pre-Oxidation
Fuel cladding rapidly develops an oxide layer in-reactor, which can vary in
thickness from a few microns to 50-100 ~ depending on the reactor system and the
watergchemistry control. In any subsequent high temperature excursion it has been
shown that these pre-formed oxides are generally protective and behave similarly
to oxides formed at higher temperatures, although at 'temperatures below about
l400K there may be some memory effect ~hile oxygen gradients adjust by diffusion.
Effect of Impurities in Steam
Impurities most likely to be present in steam during the refill and reflood
processes are air and hydrogen, ~he latter from oxidation of the clad by steam.
In pure oxygen or air, Leistikow showed that oxidation rates were similar to, bot
slightly higher than, those in steam, the rate in air being the highest.
Cathcart10 and Furuta11 have studied the effect of H2 in steam on oxidation
rate. While small additions had no effect for H2/H20 rat~os above 0.3 there was a
marked reduction in oxidation rate at 1275K and above, reaching a maximum of a
factor 3 at a volume ratio of 2.
Effects of Deformation and Rupture
During a typical LOCA temperature transient the cladding may be deforming and
may indeed rupture during the time period when most of the oxidation is occurring.
The effects of deformation and rupture are therefore amongst the most important.
Several investig~~ol§ have stucied oxidation and simultaneous deformation in creep
or tensile tests ' and have observed enhanced oxidation (thickness increase)
with factors varying between 1.2 and 2. The temperature range covered was 975K to
l275K. There is, of course, some enhanced oxidation (weight gain) because of the
creation of new surface, but the increased oxide thickness is a result of
increased access of steam to the underlying metal when cracks form in the oxide.
Regions of increased penetration of a-Zr[O] beneath cracks in the oxide film are
observed. The thinning of the underlying metal, especially close to a rupture,
would also be expected to enhance oxidation because of the earlier saturation of
the ß-phase layer. At and close to a rupture the thinning effect of deformation
and the enhanced oxidation rate are compounded by double sided oxidation,
operative from the time of rupture although internal oxidation is more influenced
.by steam starvation by H2 generated by the oxidation reaction.
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stress and Dimensional Change Effects
The molar volume of ZrO is appreciably greater than that of Zr (Pilling-
Bedworth ratio about 1.5) ana significant compressive stresses are generated in
the zironia layer which are balanced by tensile stresses in the underlying metal.
The Zircaloy is also subject to dilation as a result of the oxygen in solution,
and at increasing temperature and time the oxidation dilation effect dominates.
The nett result of these stresses generated in the clad and oxide layer is that
tensile strains of the order of 1% are generated within a few hours at
temperatures above 1075K.
structural Changes
Oxidation at temperatures within the a-phase range, up to 1145K, results in
little structural change in Zircaloy, apart from some grain growth. At
temperatures above the a/ß transus the flux of 02 from the oxide/metal interface
increases and the increasing 02 content close to the interface results in a layer
of retained a-phase, ° being an a-stabilising element. With increasing
temperature and time t~e thickness of this so-called 'retained a-phase' layer
(a-Zr[O]) increases at the expense of the prior ß-phase layer. The distinction
between these two regions is very clear on subsequent metallography (Fig. 2).
InternalOxidation
During a DBA the external pressure on the cladding reduces rapidly to near
atmospheric and the cladding initially expands away from the fuel. There is
therefore no hard contact between U02 and cladding and internal oxidation fromthis source during a typical LOCA trarsient is minimal.
EMBRITTLEMENT
The importance of oxidation during typical LOCA transients is that if the
a/ß transus temperature is exceeded then the inherently brittle phases, zirconia
and a-Zr[O] are formed and oxygen diffuses into the underlying ß-phase. The
fracture toughness of the ß-phase is reduced by 02 and the tube may be completely
embrittled unless a sufficient thickness of unembrittled ß-phase remains.
The fragmentation of embrittled cladding could in principle occur over a
range of temperatures below the peak temperature obtained in the LOCA, by seismic
forces, hydraulic forces during refill and reflood, thermal shock during
re-wetting, or mechanical forces associated with fuel handling and transportation.
Most attention has been devoted to fragmentation by thermal shock on re-wettigg
which takes place at the Leidenfrost point in the temperature range 750-875K .
Fragmentation during fuel handling or transportation would occur at ambient
temperature.
As a result of experimental studies of fragmentation behaviour and
correlation with cladding condition, structure and extent of oxidation, various
criteria for avoiding fragmentation have been proposed.
Criteria related1gpecifically to fragmentation by thermal shock were adopted
by the US AEC in 1973 ,and similar criteria have now been adopted by most other
countries involved with LWRs. These criteria are:
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1. The calculated maximum fuel element cladding temperature shall not
exceed 1477K.
2. The calculated total oxidation of the cladding shall nowhere exceed
0.17 times the total cladding thickness before oxidation.
The widely used 17% criteri~g was based on quenchinT4experiments and has been
reviewed and extended by Parsons and Chung and Kassner . The extent of
oxidation in these experiments was expressed as the fractional wall thickness of
Zircaloy which would be converted to stoichiometric zirconia if all the oxygen
taken up were converted to Zr02 . It is therefore a measure of the total Zr
reacted or the total 02 uptake without regard to the detailed reactions or oxygen
distribution in the clad wall. This equivalent metal reacted concept, although
not accurately describing the condition of the cladding, was found to correlate
~ell with survival or failure of the cladding under the thermal shock of
re-wetting.
Other work has confirmed that the fracture toughness of Zircaloy is not
uniquely dependent on total oxidation, but is particularly influenced by the
profile of diffused 02 in the ß-phase. The resultant mechanical properties of the
cladding will depend on the details of a particular LOCA transient including
heating and cooling rates as weIl as time at maximum temperature, in that they
determine the eventual location of the oxide and o.-Zr[O] phase boundaries as weIl
as the amount and distribution of 02 in the ß-phase.
The 1477K maximum temperature criterioY7(the '2200F' limit) was applied on
the basis of work by Hobson and Rittenhouse who found that the growth of the
oxide and a-Zr[O] phases accelerated above this temperature. In relation to
embrittlement of cladding it has little validity as a criterion, but the concept
of a maximum acceptable temperature may be desirable for other reasons such as
compatibility between cladding and structural components.
Relationship between Embrittlement and Distribution of Oxygen
Diffusion calculations based on ideal models were used by Pawel18 to predict
02 concentration ~90files within the cladding wall and for comparison with the
results ~Ö Hobson on deformation of ring specimens cut from oxidised tubes.
Sawatzky measured the tensile properties of oxidised Zircaloy 4 as a function of
temperature and oxygen concentration and as a result proposed an alternative
embrittlement criterion, that the 02 content should not exceed 0.7 w/o over at
least half the cladding thickness.
Chung and Kassner14 carried out a comprehensive study of the fracture
behaviour of Zircaloy which they related to various parameters for expressing the
extent of oxidation. Parameters used were: equivalent cladding reacted (ECR);
fractional saturation of ß-phase (Fß); fractional thickness of ß-phase (FW)j and
thickness of ß-phase layer containing less than a specified amount of 02 \LCa). A
number of these criteria were found to depend on the rate at which cladding was
cooled through the a/ß transformation temperature and Chung and Kassner concluded
that the best correlation was with the minimum thickness of ß-phase layer
containing less than a specified concentration of 02 (Lca). The failure map for
this criterion is shown in Fig. 3 and the chosen values were 0.1 mm and 0.9 w/o 02
for fast cooled and 1.0 w/o 02 for slow cooled cladding, ie cladding with a
thickness of prior ß-phase containing less than 0.9 w/o 02 of 0.1 mm or more would
not fail by fragmentation. This criterion is obeyed irrespective of wall
thickness, overall oxidation or maximum temperature of oxidation exposure. Thus
in a LOCA, regardless of clad thinning, rupture and internaIoxidation, this
criterion is valid, whereas the ECR criterion is very conservative.
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There being little or no accurate data on the magnitude of post-LOCA low
temperaf~re clad loadings representing seismic or handling loads, Chang and
Kassner chose a 0.3J impact as a best estimate and performed such tests at 300K.
This led them to propose an embrittlement criterion for such events of a minimum
0.3 mm thicknE'ss of ß-phase layer with less than 0.7 w/o 0Z.
Limited data on fragmentation is available from experiments performed in PBF
as part of the IE and PCM se2fes. Failures occurred both on quenching and on
subsequent handling. Haggag reviewed these results and found pOOl' agreement
with the ECR and F criteria for both types of failure, but that the Chung and
Kassner criterion ~redicted the thermal shock failures. No criterion predicted
the handling failures, but the problem may lie in the difficulty in calculation of
the ß-phase oxygen concentration gradient for a specimen experiencing a
non-isothermal film boiling transient.
CALCULATION OF TRANSIENT OXIDATION, HYDROGEN GENERATION
AND EMBRITTLEMENT
Having established criteria for oxidation and embrittlement of Zircaloy in a
DBA, it is necessary for any postulated transient to be able to calculate whether
these criteria would be breached, or not. Oxidation, and hence equivalent metal
reacted, can be calculated using the isothermal parabolic rate constants by
approximating the transient to aseries of small isothermal steps, the sum of the
isothermal oxidations representing the total oxidation in the transient. However,
in order to be able to apply the more complex criteria, depending on the detailed
distribution of 0z in the ß-phase, it is necessary to use more scphisticated
techniques and fundamental oxygen transport data.
Calculational techniques such as BILD 5 and COBILD are available for
semi-infinite P22abolicZSrowth conditio~~ and more complex codes such as
SIMTRAN/MULTRAN ,ZORO and PRECIP-II which take account of changes in the
parabolic raf9szgue to approach to saturatio~~ Z~alues of diffusion
coefficients ' and interface solubilities ' have been determined and
published. These codes do not, however, account for certain aspects of complex
transients, for example, the anomalous 2~idation in transients with two
temperature peaks. Suzuki and Kawasaki improved and extended the SIM1'RAN ccde
for predicting oxidation in LOCA conditions and the resulting PRECIP-II code
predicts weight gain, oxide and a-Zr[O]phase thickness to within 10% of measured
data from LOCA transients.
It can be concluded that computer codes such as SIMTRAN/MULTRAN and PRECIP-II
are accurate enough for calculation of oxidation under typical LOCA conditions.
Calculation of Hydrogen Geheration
The hydrogen generated fromthe Zircaloy-steam reaction in a large break LOCA
is the most significant quantity of HZ generated during the first few hours after
such an accident, although in the longer term HZ production by radiolysis or other
metal corrosion reactions is likely to dominate. The USNRC have laid down a
maximum hydrogen generation criterion for licensing purposes. This criterion
states that the calculated total amount of HZ generated from the chemical reaction
of the cladding with water or steam shall not exceed 0.01 times the hypothetical
amount that would be generated if all the metal in the cladding cylinders
surrounding the fuel, excluding the cladding surrounding the plenum volume, were
to react.
steam is directly
For each kilogram of Zr
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The HZ released during oxidation of Zircaloy by
proportional to3the O2 consumed or Zircaloy reacted.
reacted 0.491 m (STP) hydrogen are produced.
OckenZ8 has suggested thnt internal and external heating of specimens results
in parabolic rate constants with different pre-exponential factars and activation
energies due to the different temperature gradients across the cladding wall, but
the uncertainty in temperature measurement in such work is greater and data from
isothermal tests is generally used to calculate HZ generation.
In conditions of steam limitation (steam-hydrogen mixturesl, most likely in
beyond DBA situations, lower oxidation rates have been measured and HZ generation
would also be reduced. The rate limiting process is not steam starvation, but
probably a surface reaction limitation.
PLASTIC DEFORMATION OF CLADDING
The driving force for cladding deformation in a LOCA is the internal gas
pressure, pre-pressurisation plus released fission gas, which coupled with the
temperature increase can lead to high strain rates. The creep strength of
Zircaloy falls rapidly with temperature and the ductility is high, particularly in
the high a-phase region even under oxidising conditions. Strains of 100% or more
have been measured, compared with the 30% or so needed to cause neighbouring rods
to interaet in a typical PWR assembly. The key questions to be answered are what
magnitude of strains will occur in practice; how much blockage of eoolant flow
channels will occur and whether the blocked region will be coolable.
Factors Controlling Deformation and Rupture
The basic factors controlling deformation of Zircaloy cladding are stress,
temperature, time and creep strength, the latter being influenced by material
eomposition (within specificationl, grain size, anisotropy and oxidation state.
When the temperature of a stressed tube is uniform, unstable deformation sets in
at a particular axial location at a low strain value and rapidly leads to rupture.
The location of such a rupture will be influenced by local faetors such as
variations in material properties or dimensions and the probability of rupture
occurring on a neighbouring rod at the same axial location is small. In a cooled
environment, however, such as one with unidirectional steam flow, once a local
diameter increase occurs its temperature will be redueed and deformation will
proceed towards one end of the original deformed region depending on the direction
of any axial temperature gradient. For example, in upflowing steam, if the decay
heat gradient is flat, deformation will continue in an upwards direction because
of the increasing degree of superheat of the steam. This, in turn, will lead to
larger strains and to 'carrot' shaped overall deformation, as well as to similar
deformation in a similar location on neighbouring rods.
The internal gas pressure can be calculated by one of the well established
steady state fuel performance codes, allowanee being made for stored gasZ9
temperature variations in the LOCA. What experimental evidence there is shows
that additional fission product gas release does not occur in a typical LOCA
transient. This evidence is supported by post-irradiation heating data and by
code predictions, which indieate negligible additional fission gas release apart
from the small quantity expected if new cracks form in the UOZ
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Despite the high inherent ductility of Zircaloy, local exhaustion of
ductility can occur at low overall strain values if there is a circumferential
temperature variation around the cladding. This is particularly marked because of
the high temperature sensitivity of Zircaloy, and the magnitude of the effect is
illustrated in Fig. 4.
Non-uniformity of either external or internal heat transfer is the most
likely cause of circumferential temperature gradients, but the anisotropie
behaviour of Zircaloy tUbing (preponderance of radial or near radial basal poles)
can accentuate temperature gradients once formed. This is because this particular
texture is very resistant to wall thinning and the deformation tends to be
accommodated by an axial flow of material and shortening, causing the tube to bow
away from the hot side and the hot side to remain straight. This strain
anisotropy effect has been directly observed and is at a maximum in the range
1000K to 1050K.
Mechanical interaction will occur if the combined radial strains of
neighbouring rods exceed about 65%. After touching, the radi i of curvature of the
ares of cladding not in contact decrease, so reducing the hoop stresses and
deformation is more likely to continue above and below the contacting region.
Time to rupture generally increases if mechanical interaction occurs.
Fuel cladding under normal service conditions is most commonly in the
cold-worked and stress-relieved condition, the structure consisting of distorted
lenticular grains. This structure, which also contains irradiation induced
defects, recrystallises rapidly above about 975K (ca lOs) and the defects are
annihilated by the advancing boundaries of the recrystallising structure, leading
to the possibility of high circumferential strains in the range 975-1075K. Above
about 1075-1095K thetransformation to the ß-phase begins. The presence of
ß-phase in the a-phase matrix reduces the strength considerably. This, combined
with the temperature dependence of the amount of ß-phase present, means that in
this mixed phase region, although ductility remains high, the sensitivity to
circumferential temperature gradients is increased and large strains do not
usually occur.
A large body of experimental data is available on the deformation of
Zircaloy, including materials property tests, tests on simulated fuel rods heated
by various techniques out-of-reactor, single and multi-rod irradiation
experiments. Some of the key results of these experiments and programmes are
summarised in the following sections.
Single Rod In-Reactor Tests
Three series of in-reactor single rod LOCA tests have been reported. KfK29
tested short (50 cm active length) PWR type rods in the FR2 reactor. The
behaviour of irradiated rods (2500-35,000 MWd/tU) was compared with that of
unirradiated rods and rods with electrically heated simulators. Various rod
internal pressures were used. Transients with a peak temperature of about 1200K
and heat-up rates in the range 6-20 K/S resulted in all pressurised rods rupturing
during the heat-up phase. Rods strained circumferentially over their entire
heated lengths, the axial strain profile corresponding to the power profile with
the maximum strain and rupture occurring near the peak power position. Burst
strains of irradiated, unirradiated and electrically heated rods are shown in
Fig. 5. There was no noticeable effect of irradiation damage or fission products
on deformation or rupture, alt§8ugh it is known that such effects could be
expected at lower temperatures . A further observation was that fuel fragments
slumped into the ballooned region of the cladding at the time of burst, but that
no additional fragmentation occurred as a result of the LOCA transient.
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Aseries of tests (LOC) performed in the PBF reactor at INEL31 had 0.91 m
long rods of a 15 x 15 PWR type. Peak temperature and internal pressure were
varied in these tests which included irradiated and unirradiated rods. Nine rods
in this series ballooned and ruptured in the centre third of the fuelled length
over which the power distribution was flat. Maximum clad strain varied from 19%
to 74%, but there was such a big variation in heating rate, 0-100 K/s, and burst
temperature, 1066-1350K, that no clear conclusion on the effect of irradiation
could be established. The data from this test series are included in Fig. 5 and
fit well into the scatter band of other data.
Multi-Rod In-Reactor Tests
Multi-rod tests in-reactor, provided the rods are of an adequate length and
sufficient in number to reveal interaction effects, are the most relevant of all
tests in demonstrating behaviour in a LOCA. Such tests are, however, the most
difficult and expensive to carry out. There are problems in the design of such
tests, bearing in mind that the number of rods is necessarily limited, that they
are closely confined in a reactor loop, and that the loop integrity must be
protected from contact by deforming fuel rods. Correct representation of the
resistance to outwards movement by swelling rods after they start to interact and
of flow by-pass around a swelling region are problems not fully solved in the
experiments that have been performed so far.
Four multi-rod tests have been performed by the US NRC and UKAEA in a test
loop in the NRU reactor at Chalk River. Bundles tested were of full length PWR
fuel rods of a 17 x 17 design. The rods were in fact some 600 mm longer than the
reactor core. A maximum of 12 rods (4 x 4 less corner rods) could be pressurised
and these were surrounded by a row of unpressurised guard rods at standard pitch.
The rods were not pre-irradiated, except they were taken briefly to full power
three times to pre-crack the UO pellets. The decay heat was simulated by running
the reactor at low power with s~eam cooling and the transient started by shutting
off the steam flow, so that the rods heated up adiabatically at about 8 K/s. The
transients were terminated either by tripping the reactor or by bottom reflooding
with water at a controlled rate. In three of the tests, MT1, 2 and 4, run by US
NRC, the deformation occurred during the ramp, but in the other test, MT3, run by
UKAEA, the major part of the deformation occurred during the flat topped part of
the transient. The deformations produced in these experiments are shown in
Fig. 6. It is evide§~ that the deformation in all cases was substantially
co-planar and in MT3 the grids had a significant effect on the axial shape of
the balloons, a consequence of de-superheating of the steam in the steam/water
dropletmixture as it passes through the upstream spacer grid. The swollen
section of the MT3 bundle, with guard rods removed, is shown in Fig. 7.
Post-irradiation examination of rods from the MT series showed that except for the
actual burst positions, or where rods were dented by adjacent bursts, the bulges
remained circular. This indicated that the mechanical restraint from rod to rod
inter~§tion seen in some tests with a larger number of rods was not present.
Haste has modelled the effect of the presence of more pressurised rods and
concluded that the measured flow blockage in MT3 of 55% would have increased to
70%.
A multi-rod test (215P) was performed by CEA France in the PHEBUS loop on a
5 x 5 pressurised rod bundle of 17 'x 17 PWR type rods with an 800 mm active
length. Twenty-one of the rods burst within 14 s of one another at the top of the
ramp, about 1110K, just prior to the start of re-flooding. Rods in a central
3 x 2 array, showed typical 'carrot' shaped co-planar deformation with peak clad
strains of 43-53% and strains in excess of 33% over about 80 mm length. Four
external tie rods provided mechanical restraint to two central cross bundle rows
of rods at right angles. This restraint was sufficient to cause mechanical
interaction and the central rod deformed into a shape close to the theoretical
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square. The average flow3sestriction in the central 3 x 3 array, including 3 rods
with low strains, was 56% and the greatest individual sub-channel flow reduction
80%.
Out-Reactor Tests
Several important series of out-reactor tests, single and multi-rod, have
been conducted, notably in the FRG, USA, Japan and UK. It is on the basis of data
obtained from these many experiments that the safety of PWR fuel assemblies under
DBA conditions has been established. The role of the in-reactor experiments has
been to demonstrate the validity of the more extensive out-reactor experiments and
to endorse the data base that they represent for validation of the predictive
codes required for licensing calculations.
To review all the out-reactor tests in detail would be a task beyond the
compass of this paper. It is proposed to review firstly the key aspects of some
of the single rod tests, to describe the results obtained in the REBEKA series of
tests conducted as part of the PNS programme by KfK and to comment brieflyon
supporting or contradictory findings from the other multi-rod programmes.
Provided comparable and realistic test conditions are adopted, remarkably
similar single rod behaviour has been found in most experiments. To provide the
best simulation the following requirements should be satisfied:
(a) internal heating with pellet/clad gap simulation
(b) simulator length should exceed one inter-grid span
(c) external radiative heat loss should be prevented
(d) coolant flow should be simulated
(e) bending should be restrained
Much of the early reported work was done using direct resistance heating of
the cladding with large radiative heat losses or external radiant heating with
little or no external convective cooling. Early observations of large diametral
strains (up to more than 100%) over long lengths were unrealistic of anything
other than an improbable flow starvation situation. Work with realistic steam
flow, typical of the refill and reflood stages of a DBA, resulted in a swelling of
very different morphology, with the position of maximum swelling displaced in the
direction of steam flow, the length much reduced and with a tendency for the
swollen portion to have a carrot shape. Large swelling strains were found in the
high C<, C<+ ß and ß -phase fields, except that in oxidising conditions, such as in
steam, there was a dramatic reduction in ggctility above about 1150K. The very
elongated balloons found in early UK work were a result of largely radiative
cooling, which increased with strain, and the high temperature dependence of
creep. As one axial region strained and cooled, it stabilised and creep started
in neighbouring regions. Under significant convective flows the superheating of
the flowing steam produces a temperature gradient, positive in the downstream
direction, and maximum strains appear close to the downstream end of the heated
length. There is still some thermal stabilisation involved, but in practice
further extension in the downstream direction is inhibited by the end of the
heated length, or, in a long multi-rod bundle by the restraint of the spacer grid
and the de-superheating of steam in the grid region. Since when clad straining
occurs there is simultaneous wall thinning and diameter increase, both leading to
higher local stresses, it follows that to avoid instability the reduction in creep
rate due to the temperature drop must override the increase due to the higher
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stress. At very high ramp rates (> 20 K/s) the thermal stabilisation mechanism
can be overridden and local instability occur. In such cases the balloons are
generally short and not co-planar.
In the REBEKA multi-rod test programme at Karlsruhe36 6 tests have been
conducted, Rl to R4 with 3 x 3 bundles of pressurised rods and an external row of
guard rods at standard pitch, R5 and R6 with with 7 x 7 bundles of pressurised
rods and a restraint shroud half a rod pitch from the centres of the outer rods.
Although most of the tests were designed to investigate the behaviour of fuel in a
PWR (17 x 17 design) with combined upper and lower plenum injection, typical of
KWU designs, one test, R6, represented a cold leg injection only design. The
rods used in the REBEKA tests were all full length having a heated length of
3900 mm and were ramped at 7K/s. The test loop was able to circulate steam from
the top or bottom and reflooding water from the bottom. The axial strain
distributions obtained are shown in Fig. 8. In particular the results of tests R5
and R6 illustrate the big difference between tests simulating the combined
injection and cold leg injection systems. The results of R6 ~2e very similar in
general terms to the results of the MT3 in-reactor experiment and go a long way
towards confirming the view that properly conducted out-reactor experiments are a
valid representation of in-reactor §7haviour. An explanation for the behaviour in
R5 has been given by Erbacher et al . At the onset of reflooding, the downflow
of steam has established a temperature gradient in the rods with peak temperature
near the bottom ends. This temperature profile reverses over a time period
following the start of re-flood, but because of various inhomogeneities in the rod
bundle caused by locally different rod power and coolant flow, the individual rods
have different temperature histories and burst at different times. Because of the
time variation ofaxial temperature profile this leads to different burst
locations.
Tests have been reported by JAERI38 on 7 x 7 bundles of 15 x 15 PWR type.
Many of the tests were performed with a very low steam flow and an unheated
shroud. Rods near the centre deformed more and the presence of unheateg9rods,
simulating control rods, did not reduce the strain in neighbouring rods . In
later tests the unheated shroud was replaced by a guard ring of heated rods which
resulted in greater and more co-planar deformation. A final test series to
investigate the maximum flow blockage had the shroud reintroduced between the test
bundle and the guard rods. Tests were performed at ramp rates of 1 K/s and 7 K/s
and 4 control rod guide tubes were introduced in some tests. Flow restrictions in
the range 80-90% were produced, with slightly higher values in the slow ramp tests
and a greater a~bal extent of the high blockage region in the tests with control
rod guide tubes .
Tests at ORNL on 4 x 4, 6 x 6 and 8 x 8 bundles of 17 x 17 type PWR rods have
been reported. Many of the tests were performed with high ramp rates (28 K/s) and
low downward steam flows. Heated or unheated shrouds were used, the latter at
half a rod pitch from the outer rod surfaces to examine the effect of 41st array
size on deformation and rod-to-rod interaction. In the 8 x 8 test B.3 all the
rods (except one that failed to retain pressure) burst within a few seconds at
about 1050K. Peak strains varied from 25-75% and interaction resulted in some
deformed rods having a 'square' section. The ORNL conclusion was that flow area
restriction may be underestimated by the use of small unrestrained arrays and that
2 rows of deforming guard rods are necessary to simulate the radial temperature
and mechanical boundary conditions of a large array of rods such as a whole fuel
assembly. It should be noted that this conclusion is based on single phase
coolant tests and that the bund~2 size effect found in tests with 2-phase cooling
is not so pronounced. Test B.6 ,the last of the ORNL series was designed to
fail at 1200K, well into the a + ß phase region to check whether the smaller
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strains found in single rod tests would also apply in a multi-rod test. The
results confirmed this expectation with burst strains ranging from 22-56% and
maximum blockage over a 4 x 4 region of 46%.
A large programme of single rod testing has been conducted by the UKAEA43
using resistance heating of the cladding under various external' heat transfer
conditions. The dramatic effect of oxidation above about l150K'was observed and
in later work the strain-cooling effect leading to axially extended deformation,
under either mainly radiative or convective cooling conditions, waS demonstrated,
tagether with the effect of steam flow in modifying the typical strain morphology.
Same 4 x 4 multi-rod tests have been conducted to examine rod-ta-rod interaction
for code development purposes, and a major facility, MERLIN, capable of testing
72 rod bundles, is being sammissioned. Work using irradiated fuel rads heated by
external radiant heating, showed that the deformation was comparable to that
obtained in the unirradiated cladding tests. Behaviour of the fuel pellet stack
was a prime interest in this work. In tests at 975-l075K, deformation was stopped
at about 40% strain; the fuel was fixed by resin in-filling and the spatial
distribution examined by X-radiography, gamma scanning and sectioning. Less than
5% of fuel axial relocation was found in the ballooned regions.
BLOCKAGE MEASUREMENT
One of the most important outputs from a multi-rod LOCA experiment is an
assessment of the blockage caused within the bundle of rads and its axial
variation. Because in so many experiments the external restraint has not been
correctly represented, rads have pushed apart when interaction started and little
sub-channel blockage has resulted. However, because many investigators have used
a total area method of assessing blockage, the measured blockage may appear to be
much larger than it actually iso Using this method, blockage values in excess of
100% can be calculated, when substantial coolant sub-channels remain. If the
blockage is defined in terms of the change in cross-sectianal area within the
original coolant channel area, then values in excess of 100% are not possible.
This method can be applied by using a transparent mask over sectians of the
bundle. There can still be large differences between blockage values derived by
this 'mask' method over a number of rads and maximum sub-channel blockage. A
mathematical description of sub-channel blockage has been derived for use in the
MABEL code in the UK.
COOLABILITY
The importance of all the work on clad swelling in DBA simulation tests is
to enable an assessment to be made of the effect of local blockages on
coolability. This information does not readily come out of the many multi-rod
experiments that have been conducted, because they are eventually reflooded under
forced cooling conditions without a representative flow by-pass path.
The effect of a blockage on coolability is determined by the extent of local
sub-channel blockage in terms of area reduction, length over which the area
reduction extends and number of neighbouring sub-channels affected. A reduction
in sub-channel area does not necessarily result in reduced cooling, the situation
being influenced by many factars. Firstly, the clad lift-off causes at least a
temporary decoupling from the decay heat source and is accompanied by a drop in
temperature and more rapid rewetting, secondly, up to a certain area reduction the
coolant flow velocity may be accelerated, causing improved cooling and, thirdly,
entrained water droplets may be broken up causing local de-superheating of the
steam phase. The overall effect is, of course, very much influenced by the
increase in pressure drop in the blocked region and the ready availability of
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alternative flow paths. An interesting feature of some of the REBEKA tests was
the formation of a second rewetting front in the region of a clad rupture which
persisted and advanced until the primary rewetting front caught up.
Numerous experiments have been carried out to measure the effect of blockages
on coolability. The FLECHT series of tests sponsored by Westinghouse, EPRI and
NRC have been criticised on grounds of the unrepresentative simulation of
deformation and because they were performed under forced cooling conditions
without by-pass.
Reflood tests conducted by KfK in the FEBA facility on 5 x 5 arrays, having a
3 x 3 grouping with attached double tapered sleeves (180 mm in total length),
showed that with a 90% blockage there was only a small temperature incre~ge
downstream of the blockage as compared with rods in the unblocked region . These
tests were done under forced reflood conditions with by-pass and taken in
conjunction with results from the FLECHT series and the JAERI SLABCORE test
facility on larger arrays are considered to represent a convincing demonstration
of coolability of severely deformed bundles.
Experiments were performed by the UKAEA in the THETIS facility46. Arrays of
7 x 7 full length fuel rod simulators had idealised ballooned regions attached as
sleeves to a 4 x 4 group of rods representing a 90% flow blockage over a 200 mm
length. During reflood the rewetting front velocity reduced in the region of the
peak cosine heat flux, but time to rewet in the blocked and unblocked regions was
very similar, except at the highest bundle power (200 KW) when it was late by
about 10 s in the blocked region. The surface heat flux reduced away from the
rewetting front because of steam superheating and spacer grids only reduced the
superheat if they were wet. The blocked region was cooled successfully providing
the reflood rate was not less than 30 mm/s. Cooling was very dependent on water
droplets penetrating the blocked region, which was a function of droplet velocity,
greater some distance ahead of the rewetting front.
It appears from these test results that concern about lack of coolability does not
arise if local blockages do not exceed 90%.
PREDICTIVE COMPUTER CODES
The ability to predict fuel clad deformation in any postulated LOCA is
important in the licensing context. Workers in several countries have developed
codes for this purpose which attempt to predict deformation, its distribution and
termination by rupture, maximum clad temperature and, in some cases, the extent
and effects of interaction between neighbouring rods.
Such codes typically take input information on coolant conditions from a
thermal-hydraulic code and data on fuel condition from a steady state fuel
performance code. A range of sub-codes calculate clad stresses, temperatures and
deformation. The modelling of cladding behaviour requires good creep data,
representative of the cladding used, or to be used. Even within specification
creep properties of Zircaloy can vary quite widely because of small variations in
composition, texture and structure.
The version FRAP_T547 of the well known US code developed at INEL calculates
the transient response of a single fuel rod under a range of accidents including
LOCAs. Fuel temperature, internal gas pressure and deformation are calculated
iteratively using various sub codes, with input data from FRAP-S or FRAPCON and
RELAP. A sub-code FRAIL predicts failure of the cladding and sub-channel
blockage. There is a later version FRAP-T6 which has an improved swelling
sub-code BALON-2 and a better fission gas release model FASTGRASS.
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Th~8SSYST code has been developed in the FRG, the latest version being
SSYST-3 . This code takes input on the fuel state from COMETHE and on
thermalhydraulics from RELAP 4/MOD 6. Sub-modules calculate heat transport, gap
conductance, rod internal pressure, Zircaloy oxidation and clad deformation. The
code has been used to model FR2 and REBEKA experiments and is used to predict core
behaviour in a LOCA, including a probabilistic analysis.
MABEL is an interactive thermalhydraulic-deformation code developed in the
UK49 . The code takes input from one of the fuel performance codes SLEUTH-78,
MINIPAT or HOTROD and from either RELAP 4/MOD 6 or TRAC. Starting from the steady
state MABEL-2 performs aseries of transient calculations at variable timesteps,
including sub-channel heat transfer, fuel to clad gap. fuel and cladding
temperatures, fuel rod internal pressure and clad deformation. The code also
calculates clad deformation after interaction with 8 swelling neighbouring rods.
Other available codes include: CUPIDON50 , developed5~y CEA, which uses the
RESTA or5~EMETER fuel performance codes and RELAP; CARATE developed by KWU; and
ACCREL-2 ,developed by VTT Finland, which is a fast running modular code
suitable for core-wide fission product release studies.
Validation of LOCA codes is an ongoing process. The clad deformation codes
are generally accurate and well validated, but the problem with the combined codes
is the relative inaccuracy of temperature prediction (up to l50K) which, combined
with the high temperature sensitivity of deformation, leads to inaccurate
predictions for particular cases. The problem basically is that the blowdown,
refill and reflood processes in an intricate mechanical core are very complex. A
further problem is to input the factors which lead to circumferential temperature
gradients in the cladding. Some codes attempt this by introducing an arbitrary
pellet eccentricity distribution factor during the ballooning process.
Recognising that progress in the development of LOCA fuel behaviour codes might be
advanced by such exercises, CSNI has initiated an International Standard Problem,
ISP 14 based on a test performed in REBEKA in 1983.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
The state of knowledge on fuel behaviour in a DBA has advanced enormously in
recent years as a result of the intensive world-wide R&D effort that has been
deployed. Progress has been accelerated by excellent collaboration and free
exchange of information, and by the various specialist meetings on the subject
organised by CSNI, IAEA and other bodies.
Oxidation and Embrittlement
As with other phenomena, the effects of oxidation in leading to embrittlement
are strongly dependent on the duration and peak temperature of a particular
transient. If the upper bound temperature is not above about l150K and the time
before quench does not exceed about 300 s, then the risk of embrittlement either
on quenching or during subsequent post-quench operations is negligible.
For transients exceeding these limits of temperature and time data is
availab!~ to predict the extent of oxidation, and the criteria of Chung and
Kassner are recommended as appropriate to asseSs the risk of framentation during
quench or subsequently. Calculation methods to assess the state of cladding in
relation to these criteria are available.
The risk of fragmentation is not one which should be accepted, because the
indeterminate geometry which will result is not amenable to coolability
calculations or experiments.
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Hydrogen Generation
The hydrogen released as Zircaloy is oxidised in steam is directly
proportional to the oxygen consumed by oxidation and oxygen pick-up of the
Zircaloy. The calculation of hydrogen generation can be made using the available
parabolic rates of reaction OVer the tamperature range from'975K-1475K, or higher.
It is unlikely that steam starvation will limit oxidation or HZ generation under
DBA conditions.
Glad Deformation
Glad deformation is primarily influenced by stress, temperature and time in a
transient. Because of the influence of oxidation and 0z pick-up on creep and
ductility, the most extensive deformation will not occur in the highest
temperature transient experienced by peak rated fuel. Such fuel is likely to
rupture with high, but very local, strain during or soon after the ramp up to peak
temperature. Maximum strains, 'with an axial extension of the strained region of
about ZOO mm will occur in fuel cladding which reaches temperatures in the range
975-llZ5K. The location of peak strain (and rupture) regions on rods is very
dependent on the nature of the EGGS used. For combined injection systems a random
distribution within one spacer grid span can be expected, but in systems with
cold-leg injection only deformation is expected to be substantially co-planar on
all rods and displaced towards the upper end of the critical spacer grid span.
Some more limited deformation can be expected in a neighbouring inter grid span.
The maximum clad swelling that will occur on rods whose cladding reaches the
high a-phase temperature range is expected to be about 80%. The resultant degree
of coolant flow blockage, assuming swelling of several rows of neighbouring rods
to beyond the 30% strain required to interact, and assuming a distribution of
strains below the peak value, is about 70%. However, since much of the data was
determined on limited size bundles of unirradiated rods, out-reactor, it is
probably safer to conclude that the maximum flow blockage in a local area of some
tens of rods could reach 80%.
The available experimental data on coolability gives no reason to believe
that such an area, with an 80% flow blockage, should not be coolable both in the
short and long term. Test results on 90% flow blockages, in which there was very
little effect on coolability, represent a sufficient margin to give confidence in
the 80% case.
The development of computer modelling codes to predict oxidation and hydrogen
generation is weIl advanced, provided parabolic kinetics obtain, and codes for the
prediction of clad deformation are satisfactory, but temperature uncertainties
arising from the thermal-hydraulic codes restrict the accuracy of prediction for
particular experiments. The representation of factors causing circumferential
temperature gradients, and so limited deformation, has not been satisfactorily
solved in any of these codes and seems likely to be based on arbitrary assumptions
for some time to come.
If there is any area in which more data would be welcome, it is 'to confirm
understanding on larger bundles and pre-irradiated fuel, since both factors appear
to promote somewhat larger strains, but some of the' large bundle factors have
already been taken into account in arriving at a best estimate flow blockage of
70%, so it would appear very safe to assurne a worst case of 80% for coolability
assessment purposes.
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'Typical fuel clad temperature ana5system pressure transients
fo1lowing a cold leg break LOGA. '
'Zircaloy-2 oxidised in steam at 1675K for 200 s'.
'Thermal shock1aai1ure map for Zircaloy-4 cladding. Gooling
rate 100 K/s. '
'Dependence of burst strain of Zircaloy-4 cladding on azimuthaI
temperature variation from REBEKA tests'.
'Burst strain of Zircaloy cladding as a function of temperature. ,45
'Axial distribution of clad strain in cladding of rods from NRU
MT3 test'.
'Glad deformation of pressurised rods from NRU MT3 test'.
'Influence o~6flow direction on axial distribution of clad
ballooning. '
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Yig. 1.
1ypical fuel clad temperature and system
pressure transients following a cold leg
break LOCA.
Fig 2.
Zircaloy-2 oxidised in steam at 1675K
for 200 s.
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Fig. 3.
Thermal shock failure map for Zircaloy-4 cladding.
Cooling rate 100 K/s.
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Burst strain of Zircaloy cladding as a function of temperature.
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Influence of flow direction on axial distribution of clad ballooning.
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ABSTRACT
The state of knowledge relative to the evaluation of source terms
subsequent to a severe reactor accident is examined. The following
matters are assessed: the methods and assumptions usedto describe
fission product behavior and retention associated with various
phenomena, response of plant systems and structures, and a summary
of source term results obtained by various investigators. These
are compared to results quoted in WASH-140o.
INTRODVCTION
The source term means that amount and type of radioactive materials
which would be available for escape to the environment from a reactor which
has undergone a severe accident. This is an accident in which fuel is damaged
by overheating to the point of allowing substantial escape of fission products
to the containment from the fuel and the containment may not have functioned
adequately to prevent the es cape ~significant amounts of radioactivity to
the environment.
Source terms have been recognized from the early days of nuclear energy
development as the important factor of risk. Because the technology for
making accurate and valid. estimates of the source term was not available at
that time, the conservative, non-mechanistic assumption was made that
essentially all of the fission products could be released from a severely
damaged reactor. This conservative assumption was later slightly modified
and Qucorporated into regulations which are still in force at this time.
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This early assumption and the subsequent regulations focussed on radio-
iodine as the principal substance of concern. This was because of its
relative abundance, its high biological activity (iodine is known to concen-
trate in the thyroid), and its assumed elemental gaseous form, which provided
ready transportability.
During the Three Mile Island accident in 1979, a surprisingly small
amount of iodine escaped to the environment, contrary to expectations based
on regulatory prescriptions. It was then theorized that the iodine, escaping
from the fuel into a chemically reducing atmosphere (due to the presence of
water and hydrogen) became an iodide, was readily dissolved in the water,
and so became unavailable for escape. Thus, chemistry, which previously had
been largely neglected, was seen to play an important role in severe accidents.
Other aspects of severe accident considerations were identified at that time.
As a result, large programs to investigate source terms, with the objective
of providing a more realistic and accurate estimate, were undertaken by
government agencies and industry, both in the U.S. and abroad.
The principal focus of this work was the analysis of severe accident
sequences chosen because they represented the upper range of consequences
and/or exemplified phenomena believed to be important in understanding the
chemical and physical processes that determine fissionproduct behavior in
severe accidents. This work is an extension of the methodology brought to
a considerable stage of maturity by WASH-1400 (The Reactor Safety Study, 1975),
an earlier effort to quantify the risk from nuclear energy.
The American Nuclear Society chartered the Special Committee on Source
Terms to examine the state of knowledge relative to the source term, and the
methods and assumptions used to describe fission product behavior and
retention associated with various phenomena, plant systems, and structures
in a severe reactor accident. The Committee was also to provide a summary
of source term resu1ts obtained by various investigators, and to compare these
data to those presented in WASH-1400.
The Committee recognized that both probability and consequences are
intrinsic elements of risk; however, the Committee's charge inc1uded on1y
an examination of consequences as predicted by ana1yses, and these on1y up
to the point of potential escape of radioactivity to the environment. The
probability of occurrence was examined in a general way to show that severe
accidents are predicted to be exceeding1y rare.
CONSIDERATION OF" SEVERE ACCIDENT SEQUENCES
The accidents upon which ana1ysts are focussing their attention comprise
four fami1ies of sequences, name1y: the 1arge and sma11 break 10ss of
coo1ant accidents, the transient initiated accident, and the containment
bypass sequence.
The details of the scenario that a specific accident sequence fo110ws
depends on the assumptions made about the operations of engineered safety
features (ESFs). If a fraction of the capacity of ESFs is assumed to function,
the sequence may be terminated or its consequences greatay ame1iorated. Also,
1ater phases of a given sequence depend strong1y on what is postu1ated to
happen in ear1ier phases. For examp1e, if on1y a fraction of the fue1 degrades
sufficient1y to form a debris bed at the bottom of the reactor pressure vesse1,
reactor vesse1 penetration and, subsequent1y, core-concrete reaction wou1d
not be expected to occur. Reactor design also strong1y inf1uences accident
progression.
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A large number of ,scenarios have been, derived from the four families
of sequences listed above and examined by the numerous investigators in this
field. The ones previously believed to have high potential consequences
have been studied in sufficient detail to make source term estimates. Because
of the large number of sequences that have been so examined, and since no
additional sequences have been revealed which,could lead to high consequences,
the Committee is persuaded that the analytical field as represented by the
four families of sequences is, for all practical purposes, complete.
Some sequences are predicted to be very protracted in time, so that
important additional considerations may include, for instance, restoration
of interrupted electrical power or operator action to place a disabled ESF
back into operation. Such sequences may be terminated or greatly ameliorated
by these events and actions. Operator actions generally are not taken into
account in the analyses.
Significant advances in technology that have taken place since the comple-
tion of the Reactor Safety Study (WASH-1400) include: serious consideration
of the chemistry of fission products; careful treatment of aerosols, evaluation
of containment integrity; elimination of concerns related to steam explosions
and short term overpressures as modes of containment failure; more realistic
approaches to fuel degradation in severe accidents; and the recognition that
base mat penetration by hot core debris is a much slower process than pre-
viously postulated and results in very little, if any, escape of radioactivity
to the environment.
IMPORTANT RADIONUCLIDES
Typically, a large number of fission product species exist in the fuel
in a nuclear reactor. Radionuclides escaping into the environment in the
unlikely event of a severe reactor accident vary in' their importance as to
potential consequences. The factors determining the importance of a radio-
nuclide in this regard are: 1) its total inventory in the reactor; 2) its
physical and chemical properties which determine its behavior in the plant
and the environment; and 3) its biological characteristics. Some of these
factors are inherent, and others depend on features of the accident and plant
design; thus, the importance of a radionuclide depends to a significant extent
on specific aspects of the hypothetical accident sequence being considered.
Radioiodine has long been and still is considered to be a very important
radionuclide. However, it is clear that its treatment has been significantly
over-conservative, and even historically incorrect. Other important radio-
nuclides include cesium, tellurium, and, of much lesser importance, some of
the alkaline earths and noble met als. Like iodine, the importance of cesium
also has been previously overstated.
The noble gases, though very volatile, are chemically inert, and thus
have a low importance in severe accidents.
98
CHEMICAL AND PHYSICAL PROCESSES AND THEIR APPLICATION TO THE SOURCE TERM
A number of fundamental chemical and physical processes are importantly
involved in severe accident sequences. These phenomena control the escape
of fission products from overheated fuel, and the transport and behavior of
fission products in the reactor coolant system (RCS), containment, and con-
tiguous structures. The chemical environment and applicablei:aerosol processes
play an important role. The natural processes and their application to
accident sequences, and the operation of engineered safety features and
containment systems in the amelioration of the source term are summarized
below.
Chemical Forms and Interactions
The fission products that are released from severely damaged fuel are
subsequently transported through the RCS either in elemental form or as a
corresponding oxide. The important exceptions, however, are the halogens
(I, Br), the alkali metals (Cs, Rb), the chalcogens (Te, Se), and the
alkaline earths (Sr, Ba).
Because cesium is present in ten-fold excess over iodine, and water is
available, the predominant form of fission product cesium in the RCS will
be cesium hydroxide. In contrast, the predominant form of fission product
iodine will be cesium iodide, because of the reducing environment. Cesium
hydroxide can react with metal oxide surfaces or with boron control rod or
reactor shim materials, and this may result indirectly in the decomposition
of CsI and the formation of other iodide compounds. However, the dominant
processes will be the dissolution of these highly soluble chemical forms in
any water that is present, and their proclivity for the formation of aerosols.
Tellurium, which is an iodine precursor in the decay scheme, will behave
differently from cesium during the course of an accident; this could result
in the formation of small amounts of radioactive iodine in regions devoid
of cesium. This addition to the source term is not expected to be significant.
A hydrogen burn or radiation effects may increase the production of
volatile organic iodides in the containment building, but the concentrations
that might be produced are expected to be small.
Aerosols
In a severe accident, energy from the decay of fission products, from
the exothermic reaction of overheated fuel cladding with steam, and, in some
accidents, from continued fission can cause the fuel and core material to
heat up end result in the vaporization of the more volatile fission products,
components of control rods, and structural material. These vapors can nucleate
to form aerosols or can condense on cooler RCS surfaces or on other aerosol
particles present. An analysis of the physical and chemical processes which
can occur is necessary to determine the amount of these materials escaping
to containment or contiguous buildings.
The transport and deposition of fission products and aerosols within
the RCS is a transient convection problem of a multicomponent, multiphase
mixture with simultaneous heat and mass transfer, chemical reactions, and
aerosol kinetics. The flows may be laminar or turbulent, and conditions are
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typically dominated by natural convection during much of the time in many
of the accident sequences. A number of transport phenomena are modeled in
the analyses to represent these processes. Some very similar considerations
are required in the containment; however, transport mechanisms for fission
product vapors do not appear to be important there because of the lower
temperatures. There are a number of computer codes available for treating
most of these phenomena. Presently, only Trap-Melt, Retain, and RAFT are
formulated for direct application to the RCS.
Escape of Materials from a Degraded Core
The escape of fission products and other materials from the reactor core
in which the fuel has undergone substantial degradation in an accident occurs
during fuel overheating, fragmentation, liquefaction, debris bed formation,
and from core debris-concrete reaction. Chemical forms of materials escaping
from a degraded core can be predicted from thermodynamic calculations.
A number of models havebeendeveloped to predict the escape of fission
products from fuel during heat-up. However, since a large fraction of the
volatile fission products is expected to escape before fuel degradation, the
choice of models for these species is not very important. Also, comparative
calculations using the different models provide escape rates that are substan-
tially similar.
Non-fission product material escapes from the core during heat-up in
far larger quantities than fission products. These releases are important
because the resultant aerosols strongly influence the transport and attenuation
of air-borne fission products in the reactor coolant system and in the containment.
If the hot core debris causes penetration of the reactor vessel and comes
into contact with the base-mat, the concrete could be eroded by the debris,
possibly resulting in the generation of combustible gases (HZ and CO) and
substantial quantities of aerosols. These aerosols would be made up mostly
of non-radioactive material, but would be expected to carry some quantities
of fission products. It is postulated that the escape would be caused
principally by sparging of the gases created during concrete erosion.
Models for predicting escape of fission products during this phase of
an accident have been formulated recently. These models are far more mechanistic
than the model used in WASH-1400, which was based on simple volatility calcula-
tions.
Recent code developments (such as the
can be placed on the extent of severe core
reaching containment in a severe accident.
better than conservative postulates.
code, MELPROG) indicate that limits
damage and the amount of fuel
Former assessments had been little
Reactor Coolant System and Containment Transport and Retention Characteristics
Fission product retention in the RCS was not taken into account in WASH-
1400 because of uncertainties in the technology and the need for conservative
evaluation. Current analyses, however, indicate that a significant fraction
of the vaporized fission products would be retained in the reactor vessel
upper internals and, in some accident sequences, in other parts of the RCS.
Revaporization of the deposited materials could occur due to continued decay
heating, with fission product compounds moving to a cooler surface.
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~Iaterials not retained in the RCS leak to containment or other structures
as aerosols borne with the escaping mixture of hydrogen and steam. There,
the aerosols undergo physical attenuation processes, principally agglomeration
and settling. Current capability to model such processes in containment is
substantially improved over WASH-1400.
Additional aerosols containing fission products could be generated if
the accident proceeds to the reactor vessel penetration stage. This would
result from such mechanisms as forcible ejection of degraded core material
from a pressurized reactor vessel, energetic interaction of hot core debris
with a water pool below the vessel, or from degradation of the concrete base
mat by hot core debris.
Containment protection engineered safety features could reduce the airborne
concentration in a matter of minutes, while natural aerosol processes would
achieve similar reduction in a matter of hours. Therefore, release of radio-
nuclides to the environment in significant quantities would occur only if
breaching of the containment is postulated to occur in the first several hours
following the onset of severe fuel damage.
Containment
Containment is a key factor in determining if a severe accident results
in a significant source term. If containment is not breached, the leakage
of radioactivity would be inconsequential. If containment breaching is delayed
for more than a few hours subsequent to core degradation, there would be a
very large reduction in the source term due to the performance of containment
engineered safety features and the effects of natural aerosol depletion processes.
Containments are required by regulation to be able to accommodate design
basis accident pressure and temperature conditions. Higher challenges can
be imposed by severe accidents. These could include steam explosions, steam
pressure pulses, hydrogen burns, and long term over-pressure conditions caused
by steam production by decay heat or the buildup of non-condensible gases
such as hydrogen or carbon dioxide.
Because the methodology is extremely complex, conservative simplified
analytical methods generally are used to assess the capability of containments
to meet these challenges. The loadings represented above are slow from a
mechanical response aspect; thus, static analysis usually suffices for determining
expected containment response.
As noted previously, steam production by decay heat is an important loading
mechanism. Containment integrity is protected by engineered safety features
such as containment sprays or atmosphere coolers. These systems are designed
to extract the heat load; therefore, it is necessary to postulate their failure
to pose a significant long term pressure challenge to containment. Passive
heat transfer through the walls is insufficient to prevent long term pressure
buildup by decay heat effects.
Excessively high temperatures, combined with elevated pressure , can cause
breaching to develop in containment seals and penetrations. These are thought
to be likely sources of containment openings in severe accidents. Another
possible source is a procedural failure to close valves or other openings
which penetrate containment.
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An important consideration is that containments generally are partially
or entirely surrounded by auxiliary structures, such as the service building
or turbine hall in the case of PI,Rs, or the reactor building for BWRs. Leakage
occurring from containment breaching is likely to be into such structures,
with,their large volumes and surface areas providing opportunities for additional
natural depletion processes to reduce significantly any leakage to the
environment.
The Committee concluded that containment breaching by a missile generated
by a steam explosion within the reactor vessel, breaching by hydrogen deflagra-
tion, or breaching directly by apressurepulse from a steam explosion are
not credible events. The Committee observed that margins against overpressure
breaching were in the range of factors of two to four, because of conservatisms
in design methods and the use of materials in construction with better properties
than the design values. Also, the Committee observed that breaching is most
likely to occur as the opening of small pressure sensitive leakage paths which
would also serve to mitigate the rise of internal pressure.
COMPUTER PROGR~lS FOR ACCIDENT ANALYSIS
A variety of computer pro grams (codes) have been developed to predict
radionuclide release, transport, and attenuation in the analysis of severe
reactor accidents. The codes are arranged in suites, with each element in
the suite addressing some part of the sequence. Output from one code often
serves as input for the code covering the succeeding part of the sequence.
The codes are based on established physical and chemical laws and principles,
and the computations are performed on computers. Approximations and limitations
on applicability are used to simplify the codes so that computations are not
excessively time-consuming. Experiments are used to provide information of
use to the developer, and to check how weIl a given code or group of codes
represent reality.
Standardized problems can be calculated to compare the performances of
codes which purportedly are used to predict the same part of a sequence.
Limited experience with standardized problems for some computer codes and
pre-prediction of experiments appear to indicate that there is a basis for
substantial confidence in severe accident analyses performed 'by knowledgeable
analysts using current computer codes.
PARAMETRIC STUDY OF FISSION PRODUCT RETENTION
A parametric study of fission product retention in PWR containment struc-
tures and contiguous structures due to physical retention processes was
conducted on the Committee's behalf. No active engineered safety features
(e.g., containment sprays) were assumed to function; thus, only naturally
occurring retention processes were considered in the study.
The study represents a careful appraisal of a number of parameters which
affect fission product retention in PWRs which had been neglected or over-
simplified in some analyses. Due to the paucity of data and' the state of
technology atthe time of the Reactor Safety Study (WASH-1400), most of the
parameters addressed in the present study were not included at that time.
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The study includes analyses of releases of fission products with a postu-
lated pre-existing breach of the containment, and early (i.e., during the
first several hours) and late ( 24 hrs.) breaches of the containment. The
results indicate that fission product releases for postulated early breaches
of containment are comparable to those for pre-existing openings. However,
without a pre-existing opening, containment breach is not expected to occur
for days, if at all. The releases associated with late containment openings
are observed to be small in comparison with those for pre-existing openings.
Thus, the study is focussed on the potential releases associated with pre-
existing openings.
Inclusion of these effects results in a large overall reduction in releases
of fission products to the environment when the effects are considered together,
although the reduction from any single effect is not very large when considered
alone.
In another phase of the study, it is shown that releases in the containment
bypass accident (V sequence) could be small. This is because the postulated
break in the low pressure emergency core cooling system piping would be sub-
merged in ,~ater draining from the refueling water storage tank, based on a
review of the Surry plant design. The V sequence is very plant specific,
justifying additional review of the generic applicability of this finding
to other plants.
The results of this study of fission product retention in containment
and structures outside containment can be combined with the results of studies
of retention in the core and ReS performed by other investigators. When the
reductions reported in the study are combined appropriately with the reductions
from stud1es of retention in the ReS, such aB those reported in the recent
NRC sponsored work at Battella Columbus Laboratories (BMI-2104), very low
predicted releases result. More recently, detailed studies of aerosol retention
in structures exterior to containment have been completed by the IDCOR pro gram
investigators.
COMPARISON OF RESULTS
The results of a large number of computations of course terms for the
four families of sequences previously listed have been tabulated and compared,
to draw inferences from the data to the extent possible, recognizing the
difficulties in the face of variations in assumptions and modeling between
investigators. Tables I-VI are included here, with results arranged in accordance
with the type of reactor, investigator, accident sequence, and the timing
of containment opening. More detailed tables will be included in the report
of the Special Committee. Data include that for, the, corresponding WASH-1400
release category.
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TABLE I
PRE-EXISTING OPENING
COMPARISON lVITH lVASH-1400 'CATEGORY PlVR-2
Plant and Area of Calculations Fraction of Core Inventory
Accident Pre-existing Done by Released to Environment
Sequence Opening (m2) I Cs Te
PlVR-2 lVASH-1400 7.0E-Ol* 5.0E-Ol 3. OE,... 01
Surry-ABf3 3.3E-02 BMI 8.7E-02 8.5E-02 7.0E-02
Surry-ABla) 3.3E-02 BMI 5.0E-02 4.9E-02 4.7E-02
Surry-AB~(b) 3.3E-02 SlVEC 4.7E-02 4.6E-02 3.2E-02
Surry-ABP(b) 9.3E-03 SlVEC 1. 2E-02 1. 2E-02 8.9E-03
France-900Mw-A~(c) 5.0E-03 CEA 5.2E-02 5.2E-02
FRG-1300Mw-FK-2 7.lE-02 KfK 6.4E-03 6.9E-03
Surry-TML~(b) 9.3E-02 SlVEC 1. sE-02 1. 3E-02 6.4E-02
SUrrY-TML~(b) 9.3E-03 SlVEC 2.lE-03 2.lE-03 2.3E-02
France-900 w-TMLBt 5.0E-03 CEA 1. 7E-02 1. 5E-02
Zion-TMLB 5.lE-02 mCOR 1. OE-02 1. OE-02 3.0E-04
Sequoyah S2HFp 5.lE-02 mCOR 2.0E-02 2.0E-02 4.6E-03
Surry-V 1. 9E-02 BMI 4.lE-Ol 4.0E-Ol 1. 2E-Ol
Surry-V 1. 9E-02 SlVEC 1. OE-02 1. OE-02 6.5E-03
Zion-V 9.3E-03 mCOR 8.0E-05 8.0E-05 8.0E-05
Sequoyah-V 9.3E-03 IDCOR 1. OE-04 1. OE-04 1. OE-04
*7.0E-Ol read as 7.0 x 10-1
(a) Repeat of 1st reported calculation with four node model of containment. '
(b) Retention in RCS taken from BMI-2l04 Volume V.
(c) Retention in RCS taken from BMI-2l04 Volume I, Retention outside containment
neglected.
TABLE II
EARLY CONTAINMENT BREACH
COMPARISON lVITH lVASH-1400 CATEGORY PlVR-2
Plant and Containment Calculation Fraction of Core Inventory
Accident Breach Done by Released to Environment
Sequence Area(m2) Time (hr) I Cs Te
PlVR-2 2.5 lVASH-1400 7.0E-Ol 5.0E-Ol 3.0E-Ol
Surry-AB- t 6.sE-Ol 4.5 BMI 5.7E-02 5.9E-02 1. 4E-Ol
Sllrry-AB-& (a) 9.3E-02 0.5 SlVEC 8.4E-02 8.4E-02 5.3E-02
Surry-AB- O(a) 9.3E-03 0.5 SlVEC 1. 6E-02 1. 6E-02 1. 6E-02
Surry-AB-$ (a) 9.3E-02 3.0 SlVEC 8.4E-03 8.4E-03 l.lE-02
Surry-TMLB- b 6.sE-Ol 2.5 BMI 4.4E-02 4.3E-02 l.lE-Ol
Surry-TMLB- s(a) 9.3E-02 3.0 SlVEC 1. sE-02 1. 3E-02 6.4E-02
Surry-TMLB-1!. (b) 12.0 BMI 2.6E-03 3.0E-04 7.9E-02
Sequoyah-TMLB 6:5E-Ol 2.5 BMI 1. 7E-02 2.3E-02 1. 4E-02
Sequoyah-TMLB 6.5E-Ol 9.0 BMI 3.9E-02 4.5E-04 2.3E-03
(a) RCS retention based on BMI-2l04 Volume V.
(b) Based on base mat penetration neglecting retention in earth, etc. , outside
containment, essentially a puff release.
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TABLE III
LATE CONTAINMENT BREACH
COMPARISON WITH WASH-14DO CATEGORY PWR-2
Plant and
Accident
Sequence
Containment
Breach
Area(m2) Time(hr)
Calculation
Done by
Fraction of Core Inventory
Released to Environment
I Cs Te
PWR-2 2S WASH-1400 7.0E-OI S.OE-OI 3.0E-OI
Surry-AU(a) 24 BMI 4.8E-OS 4.7E-OS 4.0E-OS
Surry-AB (b) 9.3E-02 24 SWEC 4.0E-04 4.0E-04 1. 9E-03
Surry-AB S(b) 9.3E-03 24 SWEC 3.0E-04 3.0E-04 1. 4E-03
Surry-TMLB $(b) 9.3E-02 27 SWEC 3. GE-OS 3. SE-OS 1. 8E-03
Surry-TMLBb(b) 9.3E-03 27 SWEC 2.8E-OS 7.7E-OS 1. 4E-03
Zion-TMLB~ 4. GE-02 32 .IDCOR 2.0E-03 2.0E-03 2. OE-OS
Zion-TMLB 6(d) 4.GE-02 32 IDCOR 2.0E-03 2.0E-03 2. OE-OS
Sequoyah-TMLB 1> 9.3E-03 28 IDCOR 2.0E-04 2.0E-04 2.0E-04
Indian Pt.AB(c) 24 NYPA 3.0E-06 8.GE-OG 1. 3E-OG
Indian Pt.TMLB(C) 24 NYPA 1. 9E-OS 1. 7E-OS 1. 9E-OS
Indian Pt.TMLB(C,d)_- 24 NYPA 4.2E-OG 2.2E-OG 3.3E-09
FRG-1300Mw-FK-G 3.0E-02 120 KfK 1. OE-04 1. OE-06
FRG-1300Mw-FK-6(e)3. OE-02 120 KfK 4.7E-07 S.GE-09
Sequoyah-S2HF 9.3E-03 24 IDCOR 6.0E-04 6.0E-04 2.0E-04
(a) Based on base mat melt-through. neglecting retention in earth. etc. outside
containment, essentially a puff release
(b) RCS retention taken from BMI-2104 Volume V
(c) Puff release at 24 hr~.
(d) Pump Seal LOCA
(e) Filtered
TABLE IV
CONTAINMENT BREACH PRIOR TO CORE DEGRADATION
COMPARISON WITH WASH-1400 CATEGORY BWR-2
Plant and
Accident
Sequence
Containment Calculation
Opening Done by
Area(m2) Time(hr)
Fraction of Core Inventory
Released to Environment
I Cs Te
BWR-2 30 WASH-1400 9.0E-OI S.OE-OI 3.0E-OI
Peach Bottom-TG1' G. SE-Ol 0.97 BMI 3.4E-OI 2.9E-OI 3.2E-OI
Peach Bottom-TC')' G.SE-OI 0.97 BMI 2.0E-OI 1. GE-OI 2.IE-01
Peach Bottom-TC 1. 9E-02 13.0 IDCOR 3. OE-O 2' 3.0E-02 7.0E-02
BWR-3000-TC S.OE-Ol ELSAM 7.0E-03 2.0E-04 2.0E-04
Shoreham-TC O.S SAI 7.3E-02 2.SE-02 <S.OE-04
Grand Gulf-TC 9.3E-02 1. 33 BMI 1. OE-OI 3.SE-02 1. 3E-OI
Grand Gulf-TC 1. 4E-OI 1.0 IDCOR 8.0E-04 8.0E-04 8.0E-04
Peach Bottom-TW 6.SE-OI 29.2 BMI 2.8E-OI 2.7E-OI 1. 8E-OI
Peach Bottom-TW(a)9.3E-03 34 IDCOR 1. 3E-OI 1. 3E-OI 1. 3E-OI
Shoreham-TW 24 SAI 2.0E-04 2.SE-02 <3.0E-03
BWR-3000 S.OE-OI 33.G ELSAM 7.0E-03 2.0E-04 2.0E-04
Browns Ferry-TW ORNL 2.0E-03 S.8E-OS
Grand Gulf-TQW 9.3E-03 40 IDCOR 3.0E-04 3.0E-04 2.0E-04
Grand Gulf-TPI 22.2 BMI S.IE-02 3.4E-02 3.2E-02
(a) If CRD flow or drywell sprays are reestablished after vessel failure or
before hour 6S, the releases for thissequence are reduced to 3.0E-02.
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TABLE V
CONTAINMENT BREACR DURING CORE DEGRADATION
COMPARISON WITR WASR-1400 CATEGORY BWR-2
Plant and
Accident
Sequence
Containment
Breach
Area(m2) Time(hr)
Calculation
Done by
Fraction of Core Inventory
Released to Environment
I Cs Te
BWR-2
Peach Bottom-AE
Shoreham-AV
BWR-3000-AW
6.SE-Ol
30
0.S6
loS
WASR-1400
BMI
SAI
ELSAM
9.0E-Ol
2.lE-01
1. 6E-Ol
l.lE-Ol
S.OE-Ol
2.lE-01
2.8E-02
1. OE-Ol
3.0E-Ol
6.7E-Ol
~2.SE-02
1. OE-Ol
TABLE VI
CONTAINMENT BREACR SUBSTANTIALLY AFTER CORE DEGRADATION
COMPARISON WITR WASR-1400 CATEGORY BWR-3
Plant and Containment Calculation Fraction of Core Inventory
Accident Breach Done by Released to Environment
Sequence Area(m2) Time (hr) I Cs Te
BWR-3 30 WASR~1400 1. OE-Ol 1. OE-Ol 3.0E-Ol
Peach Bottom-TQUV 9.3E-03 18 InCOR S.OE-02 S.OE-02 4.0E-02
Shoreham-TQUV SAI 2.0E-04 9.0E-OS <4. OE-OS
Browns Ferry-TQUV 4 ORNL 7.lE-03
Grand Gulf-TQUV 13.9 BMI 1.2E-03 7.1E-04 4.SE-03
Grand Gulf-TQUV 9.3E-03 47 InCOR 7. OE-OS 7. OE-OS 3. OE-OS
Grand Gulf-AE 9.3E-02 S8 InCOR <1. OE-OS 1. OE-OS 1. OK... OS
Peach Bottom-S1E 9.3E-03 23 InCOR 1. OE-02 1. OE-02. 1. OE-OZ
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PWR Observations
a) Late containment breach results show very low releases to the environ-
ment and good agreement among investigators.
b) Early containment breach results are somewhat higher than for late
breaching and have a wider spread.
c) Pre-existing opening results show close agreement for similar cases
and have releases in the mid-range.
d) The data indicate that lower releases are obtained when a more detailed
(4-node) representation of containment is used rather than the usual single
node representation. The importance of incorporating details of containment
and auxiliary structures in an analysis is thus emphasized.
BWR Observations
For early containment breach, and for breach occurring during core
degradation, the results are from one to two orders of magnitude higher than
the late opening case; however, the results in a given investigator's work
are fairly self-consistent, and all cases (with oneexception) are substantially
lower than calculated in WASH-1400.
The higher results and the data spread are attributed to: (a) Differences
in assumptions, e.g., containment opening size. (b) Whether aerosol attenuation
in the reactor building was taken into account. (c) Assumption of excessive
suppression pool bypass for large containment opening cases. (d) An error
in one of the scrubbing models used for suppression pools. (e) Use of
inappropriate thermal-hydraulic modeling.
The Committee is persuaded that, if these differences are properly accounted
for, the BWR releases in general would not be greatly different from the PWR
releases.
FINDINGS, OBSERVATIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE COM}IITTEE
Major Finding
The Committee has concluded that the state of knowledge and the analytical
methods and assumptions on which current calculations of the source term are
based have progressed far beyond those on which WASH-1400 (The Reactor Safety
Study,1975) was based. In general, an ample foundation has been provided to
warrant reductions of the source term estimates in WASH-1400 by more than an
order of magnitude to as much as several orders of magnitude. This major conclu-
sion is based on reviews of chemical and physical processes relevant to severe
accident analysis; severe accident sequences which bound risk from nuclear
power plants and represent the ranges of phenomena involved; the status of
J severe accident modeling and calculational codes; containment capability; and
the results of a number of source term studies performed both here and abroad.
In addition, the Committee has considered studies performed on its behalf of
a number of important parameters and phenomena which had not previously been
given adequate emphasis. The noble gases are exceptions because of their
chemically inert character, and because they do not und ergo the wide range
of chemical and physical interactions which are the fundamental cause of the
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reduced release of most fission products; however, the very fact that they
are inert also leads to low radiological consequences.
Findings Supporting or Qualifying the Major Finding
a) Iodine will be released and transported predominantly as cesium iodide
and cesium as cesium hydroxide. These species will form aerosols and be subject
to aerosol depletion processes, are highly soluble in water, which will be
present, and can be irreversibly adsorbed onto metal surfaces, resulting in
greatly reduced releases compared to WASH-1400. This finding holds for all
light water reactors and all accident sequences.
b) The more severe accident sequences developed in WASH-1400 and more
recent Probabilistic Risk Assessment studies provide a suffiently complete
basis for in-depth analyses of source terms. These sequences cover the high
end of the release spectrum and involve the phenomena and processes that are
considered to affect the escape and transport of fission products.
c) Sequences and plant details are important in estimating plant-specific
source terms.
d) If there is no breach of containment, there is essentially no release
of fission products; if containment breach is delayed more than a few hours
after core degradation, the source term is greatly reduced, independent of
the final size of containment breach. Containment is less susceptible to early
breaching than previously believed.
e) A substantial basis exists for knowledgeable analysts to calculate
LWR source terms with a high degree of confidence in the results.
Specific Findings Relative to Containment
a) Three of the four causes of early containment breach are no longer
considered credible. These are: steam explosion within the reactor vessel;
hydrogen deflagration; and steam explosions in containment. The fourth potential
ca~se of early containment breach, a pre-existing opening in containment, is
important in severe accidents.
b) Because of previously underestimated containment strengths, times
to containment breach have been unrealistically short. Langer times to breach
allow a greater degree of aerosol depletion.
c) The development of distributed containment breaching (cracking) serves
to limit pressure rise and is likely to prevent gross containment breaching,
while allowing only small quantities of radioactivity to leak out.
d) The penetration of the base mat by hot core debris has a much lower
potential than estimated in WASH-1400, and would lead to minor releases only
if it were to occur. Therefore, this mechanism for fission product escape
is unimportant.
e) Pressure suppression pools in BWRs are very effective in rernoving
fission products, as shown experimentally.
f) The effectiveness of ice-condensers in removing fission products is
predicted to be high, but has not been shown experimentally.
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g) In some plants, containment bypass accidents will release fission
products under water in flooded compartments; in these cases, the release will
be very small. In other plants, the release will take place inside containment,
as a containment protected small breach accident; in these plants, the release
also will be low. In yet other plants, the release will take place in a large
auxiliary building; in these cases, it will be necessary to consider the aerosol
depletion and other processes, which can be quite effective. These considerations
point up the importance of plant design differences in calculating source terms.
Thermal Hydraulics
The technology is sufficiently advanced and tested against experiments
for accident analysis purposes.
Fission Product Transport and Deposition
a) The follow factors, which have significant release attenuating effects,
have been inadequately treated or omitted in many analyses: size of containment
opening; timing of containment opening; diffusiophoresis; suspended liquid
water in containment; compartments within containment; and adjacent buildings
and structures surrounding containment.
b) Revaporization of deposited fission products in the RCS can occur,
but is not yet weIl characterized. However, conservative formulations generally
are used, and some retention in the RCS will be long term and will result in
decreases in the source term.
Escape of Material from a Degraded Core
Differences in several available models in predictions of the escape of
fission products from overheated fuel are not significant.
Computer Pro grams for Accident Analysis
Substantial development of computer programs has taken place since the
publication of WASH-1400, including some useful diverse development, which
provides a certain degree of testing. In addition, the data base supporting
the computer pro grams is substantially larger and more complete than that which
existed a decade ago. Finally, in the Committee's view, many of the difficulties
attributed to computer pro grams are more closely related to differing assumptions
and boundary conditions than to the algorithms used. Also, the Committee con-
cludes that the existing codes are gene rally conservative representations of
the processes involved in severe accidents.
Matters Where Additional Investigation Appears Warranted
These areas of additional investigation are suggested to confirm existing
source term calculations and to assure that no important phenomenon has been
neglected. They should be evaluated in-depth to ascertain whether further,
and how much, work is necessary. The Committee believes that these will not
cause a major impact on its assessment.
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a) Surface/fission product chemistry.
b) Tellurium behavior.
c) Role of boron in fission product chemistry.
d) Rate and mode of core damage progression.
e) Role of control rod material.
f) Role of contiguous buildings and containment compartments.
g) Effect of suspended water and diffusiophoresis.
h) Revaporization of deposited fission products.
i) The development of a de minimum criterion.
j) Uncertainty estimates.
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ABSTRACT
This paper provides a summary of the designs and capabilities of
principal containment systems associated with BWR, PWR and PlIWR
reactors in operation and under construction in the Uni ted
States, Canada, West Germany and Sweden.
The many conceptual differences in design and modes of operation
following accidents are briefly described, with commentary on
their evolution and alternatives considered. Specific examples
for each reactor system in operation in the four countries are
detailed [1,2,3,4]. The containment design differences and
requirements are mainly attributable to the fundamental
arrangements of the reactor and secondary side systems, and their
demonstrated behaviour during normal operation and following
accident conditions. However, two other important considerations
which strongly influence design are national regulatory
requirements [5,6,7,8] and the number of generating units in a
station. These broad issues, together with site conditions and
proximity to population, dominate containment performance
requirements for economic generation of electricity and public
safety.
Emphasis is focused on the capability of the various systems to
meet design basis accidents. However, the TMI-2 incident has
caused plant owners and regulators to examine the ultimate
capability of containments, far beyond maximum credible accident
bases. Postulated severe degraded core accidents, with a
predicted frequency several orders of magnitude lower than other
recognized world-wide hazards for which protection is provided,
are currently under intense scrutiny [9,10,11]. This paper
describes the status of some of these .studies.
CONTAINMENT FUNCTIONAL AND DESIGN REQUIREMENTS
The universally accepted philosophy for providing assurance of nuclear
safety in accidents is the adoption of the principle of "defense in depth",
which prevents or limits the release of radioactive material for a wide
range of circumstances. "Defense in depth" embodies a multiplicity of
physical and chemical actions actributable to station process systems, but
specifically includes three, often duplicated and diverse, safety systems
to effect prompt reactor shut-down, ensure continuing and controlled heat
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removal and automatically minimize/prevent radioactive release to the
environment.
Containment systems are the ultimate line of defense and safety barrier
for preventing the escape of radionuclides to the environment. The
functional requirements of containment do not differ in principle for BWR,
PWR and PHWR systems, but design requirements are significantly different.
The design requirements are not only set by the overall arrangement of the
primary reactor and secondary systems, but also (importantly) by national
code and regulatory differences. A major additional influence which
determines containment system designs is the extent, rate and duration of
accident pressure and temperature transients.
During normal operation the function of all containments is to minimize
the release of gaseous, liquid, and solid radioactive materials produced
during electricity production and which are not retained in process
systems. The objective is to ensure that emissions are as low as
reasonably achievable; economic and social factors taken into account.
Following an accident, the objectives are to retain radioactive materials
released as a result of process equipment failure.
Thus, containment system designs have evolved from the basis that they
should provide radiation shielding and retain all of the steam and water
discharged following an internal reactor system piping failure. The
primary element of containment systems is a practical engineered and
economic "leak-tight" building which covers and encloses the reactor
systems. Piping or ventilation systems which might convey radioactive
material outside the containment boundary are isolated immediately after an
abnormal condition is detected. sub-systems to reduce pressure in the
building also feature in the designs. In some designs these systems
include venting to "gravel" beds or the atmosphere in a controlled manner
to ensure safe regulatory releases are met.
In addition to the provision for internal containment loads, protection
of containment and hence reactor systems against external loads (i.e.,
earthquakes, hurricanes, tornadoes, explosions, aircraft impacts and plant
induced missiles), are also major design requirements.
PRESSURIZED HEAVY WATER REACTOR DESIGN REQUIREMENTS
In Canada, PHWR containment designs must adhere to the CSA N290.3
standard which differs only in detail from similar ASME codes. The CANDU
containment design requirements are uniquely influenced by the adoption of
multi-unit stations (eight units in the case of Pickering NGS, four units
per station in other plants) and on-power refuelling, where a single
integrated containment system employing negative pressures, dousing water
pressure suppression and a vacuum building is deployed. Elsewhere in
Canada and overseas, AECL designed 600 MWe single CANDU units include
similar dousing water pressure suppression systems and filtered air
discharge.
The fundamental difference in design of PHWR's and LWR's, namely the
physical separation of the primary coolant and moderator systems within the
PHW reactors, reduces the probability of core melt in postulated severe
accidents by orders of magnitude. In essence, the large heat sink provided
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by the moderator system gives high assurance of fuel channel integrity, and
prevents gross fuel melting to the extent that meltdown sequences are not
generally considered credible [12].
The design of CANDU containment features are influenced by the
structure of the Canadian Atomic Energy Control Board (AECB) regulatory
requirements. To provide understanding of this influence, the AECB siting
Guide [6] is briefly described. The logic of this Guide is based on a
two-tier radiation dose limit applied separately to the most exposed
individual and to the population. Process failures are judged against a
'single failure' dose limit (e.g. 3 rem to the thyroid of the most exposed
individual). In common with LWR systems, these single failures range up to
a guillotine break of the largest-diameter heat transport system piping.
The limiting frequency of serious process failures (those requiring
intervention by a safety system in order to prevent fuel failures) is one
per three years. It must be emphasized that 'single failure' in this
context is a different concept than that used in LWR licensing logic. In
this case it means total failure of a system with no mitigating action by
other process systems; only the safety systems can be credited.
The second part of the AECB Guide requires the analysis of 'dual
failures', involving serious process failures with simultaneous failure of
one of the safety systems (either the emergency coolant systems, or a major
containment subsystem) to per form its function. This particular
requirement is unique, but not necessarily more demanding than those of
other national regulatory jurisdictions. The thyroid dose limit to the
most exposed individual from these "dual failures' is 250 rem. Containment
design is strongly influenced by the requirement to meet this dose limit.
LIGHT WATER REACTOR DESIGN REQUIREMENTS
The majority of nuclear power reactors in operation and under
construction in the world today are either Pressurized Water Reactors (PWR)
or Boiling Water Reactors (BWR).
The design requirements of PWR and BWR Containment Systems must adhere
to the national codes and regulatory licensing requirements in the country
of plant siting. In the Uni ted States principles have been developed for
steel and concrete structures by the American Society for Mechanical
Engineers (ASME) and American Concrete Institute (ACI). These code
requirements for containments and their subcomponents, have historically
developed over the last thirty years culminating in an ASME and a joint
ACI-ASME Code, which caters to the many different combinations of steel and
concrete structures which constitute the containment of operating reactors
and those under construction. The ACI-ASME code combines a factored load
approach with allowable stress criteria for all interna1 and external load
consequences.
The various national codes, in addition to consideration of the ASME
(steel) and ACI-ASME (concrete) codes for containment design, performance
and serviceability, reflect geographieal, social, political and regulatory
requirements in their own environment. Thus the 'Kerntechnischer
Ausschu~', Swedish and Canadian codes reflect differences from those in the
Uni ted States, as weIl as alternative requirements for external loads such
as historical seismicity, siting conditions, and threats of local explosion
and aircraft crashes.
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The accident internal service load is historically associated with any
single component failure in the generating plant having a frequency typically
greater than 10-7 events/yr wh ich causes a maximum energy, pressure,
temperature, and radioactive release. In this regard, the design basis
accident for which most containment systems are conservatively designed is the
largest double-ended primary pipe rupture, (predicted frequency of 10-4/yr ),
recognizing that while continued operation of the core cooling system is
likely, its full credit cannot be assured in all accident conditions.
Certain combinations of extreme internal/external loads are also
typically used in design of containments. Perhaps the most famous one is the
combination of LOCA with some level of earthquake. In this issue, there is no
general agreement worldwide. In the United States, for example, the largest
postulated LOCA has been combined with the largest Safe shutdown Earthquake
(SSE). In other countries, while the combination is considered, it is not
necessarily assumed that the largest LOCA and the largest earthquake are
coincident. The reasoning for this position is that the reactor coolant
system is specifically designed to resist earthquakes, therefore earthquakes
do not cause LOCA's, but such an independent event cannot be discounted
immediately following. The impact of military aircraft, blast waves and a
turbine wheel rupture impact are also considered in many designs.
The following categories of loads are not normally considered in the
design process but have received increasing attention in determining
containment performance capability.
The first category includes those loads with a negligible frequency
( -< 10-7 per yr). Such loads would typically include meteorites, large
commercial aircraft impact, and volcanic eruption.
The second category involves extreme internal accidents. Most countries
typically do not combine LOCA with a secondary system failure as a design
basis, although analysis of this combination is often undertaken. ~otating
equipment and pipe support failure within containment are also not typically
considered. Also major component rupture, such as vessel, pump, steam
generator and pressurizer ate not typically a design basis.
The third category involves the quest ion of the degraded core, the
so-called "Class 9" accident. There are three particular types of containment
loads that might be associated with such a situation. These loads include
degraded cores possibly leading to some melting of containment, steam
explosion, and hydrogen generation if it results in deflagration. As a
result, containment overpressurization at elevated temperatures due to
postulated failure of mitigation systems is under study.
CHANGING EMPHASIS ON PERFORMANCE REQUIREMENTS
Table I [10] summarizes the evolution of containment performance
criteria. The order listed, relates to the growing emphasis that each have
received OVer the last forty years, culminating with containment capability
for degraded core accidents.
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TABLE I: EVOLUTION OF PERFORMANCE CRITERIA
1. Criteria for radiological releases
2. Criteria for direct radiation dos~s
3. Protection against external missiles
4. Consideration of degraded cores
The criteria for radiological releases were the first to be developed.
For all but extremely remote sites, this led to the use of containment systems
with acceptable leakage related to si te specific characteristics. Most often
these pressure retention containments were freestanding steel or steel-lined
concrete structures which, for LWR designs, could be demonstrated to leak
considerably less than 1 percent of the containment volume per day during
accident conditions. For multi-unit CANDU systems, where accident source
terms and energy release into containment are lower, and filtered venting to
control long term releases is deployed, leakage rates of less than 1 percent
per hour have been adopted.
These criteria provided protection against leakage but not from direct
radiation due to radioactive material within the containment after accidents.
It was initially assumed that people near the site could be evacuated to
minimize their exposure from material inside containment if an accident
occurred.
The next criterion added was the requirement of shielding from direct
radiation at all but the most remote sites. This led to the widespread use of
steel-lined, reinforced or prestressed concrete structures for containment
which combined low leakage capability with shielding from possible radiation.
The next important criteria to be added were for protection against
external phenomena, such as missiles resulting from tornadoes. Similar
criteria were developed relating to aircraft crashes at sites depending on the
frequency of air traffic. These additional criteria made the use of
reinforced or prestressed concrete containments or the addition of a special
concrete missile shield essential.
The fourth set of criteria associated with degraded cores, or more
precisely the need for them, have been under intense scrutiny and debate since
the Three Mile Island Unit 2 accident on March 28, 1979. There are two major
investigations addressing these issues in the Uni ted states. One is aseries
of programs funded by the NRC on containment integrity. In these programs the
behaviour of isolation features, structural capacity of containment, leakage
characteristics of mechanical and electrical penetrations and behaviour of the
base mat when subjected to a core melt are being investigated [13,14,15,16].
The other major investigation is the extensive U.S. IDCOR Program [9J, which
is currently under discussion with the USNRC. Also, intensive studies [2],
concentrating on the sequences of core meltdowns and the accompanying accident
consequences, have been conducted in the Federal Republic of Germany during
11 6
the past ten years to ascertain the ultimate capability of containment systems
for their operating LWR's. In Canada, important fission product distribution
studies concentrating on "Lessons learnt from Three Mile Island" have resulted
in containment design modifications. Also, heavy emphasis on dual failure
accidents (e.g.: a large LOCA resulting in stagnation cooling conditions plus
assumed coincidental containment impairment) continues in that country.
CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS AND COMPONENT FUNCTION
The specific details of existing containment systems depend on the
project commitment dates, but their generic nature are a function of reactor
type, site location, utility preference, economic considerations, number of
units per station and national regulatory influence. Thus, there is
considerable design diversity in existing structures, although basic concepts
have not radically changed in more than twenty years.
In the 1940's, the control of public exposure following a design basis
accident was provided by the use of large exclusion areas, rather than a
containment structure. For example, the Clinton pile at Oak Ridge was
associated with a 60,000 acre site, the Hanford production reactors with a
larger area and the U.S. National Reactor Testing station was located in the
Idaho desert. The need to locate nuclear power plants nearer the consumer
resulted in containment systems. Early containments were static pressure
envelopes with few penetrations. These were not practical for commercial
electrical generating stations. subsequently, active containment structures,
with a mUltiplicity of penetrations designed to close on accident signals to
form a leak-tight barrier, evolved. Later, systems were introduced to
suppress pressure and temperature within containment following accidents, and
also mitigate fission product transport to the environment either by chemical
means, controlled filtered venting or returning leakage to pontainment by the
addition of an outer barrier and pumping circuits.
Tables 11 and 111, respectively, list the principal containment systems
which are in general use, and those which have seen less use or just studied.
Figure 1 illustrates the many variations of PWR containments in operation
or committed by 1972, worldwide. The variations on the three basic systems,
(i.e.: the dry pressure retention containment, the ice condenser pressure
suppression and subatmospheric pressure suppression) include single versus
multiple barrier, the geometry of the steel or concrete structures and the
nature of allowable structural stress. The dominant system is the medium
pressure, dry containment with a single pre-stressed concrete cylinder. The
majority of these containments are in the United States.
Today, the tendency for PWR containments is towards two dry barriers to
fission product release, with provision to filter and vent the annular
separation space.
All modern BWR containments are of the pressure suppression type (wet
weIl and dry weIl) in order to reduce containment volume. This is because, in
a design basis accident, B~ffi's would blow down by far the largest volume of
high energy fluids of all water reactor systems. There are three variants
(General Electric Company, Mark I, 11 and 111) of this basic system, with
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TABLE 11: PRINCIPAL CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS
Confinement: Reactor systems enclosed in a low leakage
building, filtered discharge and negative
pressure.
Low Pressure: Large diameter hemispherical dome, 35 kPa.
Medium Pressure: Low leakage PWR steel or steel lined concrete
structure (0.2 to 0.5 MPa). Variants in France
and U.s.
High Pressure: Low leakage, PWR for pressures
vessel (FRG,' U.S. and France).
0.5 MPa, steel
Pressure suppression: BWR system within compact low leakage steel or
steel lined concrete structure, water and drywell
energy suppression.
Ice Condenser: A PWR energy suppression system
CANDU Pressure Suppression: Reactor and primary systems within steel lined
prestressed concrete containment at negative
pressure. Pressure suppression by dousing.
CANDU shared Containment: Large prestressed concrete containment at
negative pressure surrounding multi-units
connected to vacuum building. Pressure control
via dousing and filtered venting.
TABLE 111: OTHER SYSTEMS IN USE OR STUDIED
Multiple Containment: Two pressure retaining low leakage barriers
Pressure Release: Controlled filtered venting and scrubbing
stronger Containment: Increased wall thickness for 0.85 MPa
Shallow Underground: Standard containment with 10 m overburden
Deep Undefground: Containment 30 m underground, turbine at grade
Increased Volume: Double normal volume, 0.42 MPa pressure
Compartment Venting: Vented to high pressure structure with douse
Thinned Base Mat: Permit Core melt to inert gravel bed.
Evacuated Containment: Operates at 35 kPa or less.
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PWR Containment Designs
(Committed by 1972)
specific differences adopted in West Germany and Sweden. The Canadian PHWR
System requires the lowest demand for design basis accident energy containment
due to the physical separation of primary, secondary and moderator systems.
In more recent times there has been a trend towards standardization for
PWR, BIVR and PHWR containments with differences in detail only dependent on
the country of siting. Selected designs for the Uni ted States, West Germany,
Sweden and Canada follow.
PRESSURIZED WATER REACTOR CONTAINMENTS
Figure 2 shows a low leakage, pressure retention design, consisting of a
prestressed concrete cylinder with a steel liner. A vertical buttress system,
together with a horizontal ring at the spring line, is used to anchor
prestressing tendons. The dome and cylinder are separately prestressed. This
design is widely used in the Uni ted States. More recent modifications to the
design eliminates the dome ring, introduces partial buttresses in a
hemispherical dome and anchors the wall and some dome tendons at the base
mat. As noted in Figure 1, this type of single barrier containment is the
most widely used in PWR stations operating today. Another version of this
type of containment is the deformed bar-reinforced concrete cylinder and dome.
Steel containments, either cylindrical or spherical, are widely used in
U.s., West Germany and Japan. In these double barrier designs a concrete
biological shield, which also serves to protect against external loads,
surrounds the steel containment. The cylindrical design shown schematically
in Figure 3 has wide application in the Uni ted States and Japan.
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A common form of double barrier containment in the future is expected
to be the steel sphere surrounded by a concrete shield building, as
developed in West Germany, and also applied to some plants designed in the
U.s. Figure 4 shows a sectional view of the German, 1300 MWe Biblis B
plant [2]. The inner detached steel shell of the containment (wall
thickness 29 mm) constitutes a passive pressure tight barrier. The
containment sphere has a free volume of 70,000 m3 • The concrete
structures within the steel containment (about 15,000 m3) also reduce
longterm pressurization by their heat storage capacity, and physically
separate safety systems and the irradiated fuel storage pool.
The annulus between the steel containment and the outer concrete
shielding (l.8 m thick), which is exhausted through a qualified filter
system and stack, provides for additional deposition of radioactive
products in the event of containment impairment. A sUbatmospheric pressure
system is designed to direct flows from compartments having lower activity
to those with higher activity following any accident.
Another double barrier annulus concept developed in France, includes a
cylindrical concrete containment lined with steel and an outer concrete
shield. Recently, France has developed a design for 1300 MWe plants which
does not require the steel liner.
Two types of pressure control containments have been developed for
PWR's, the subatmosphere containment (- 5.0 psig operating pressure), and
the ice condenser.
A typical ice condenser containment is shown in Figure 5. steam and
air resulting from an accident is forced by the pressure from the lower
compartment through the ice beds where the steam is condensed. The design
pressure for this containment is one bar whereas a PWR dry containment for
the same rating would range from three to five bar. However, current
economic considerations have limited this design to 1000 MWe units and
larger.
BOILING WATER REACTOR CONTAINMENTS
All modern BWR containments are of the pressure suppression type,
incorporating drywells and wetwells as pressure suppression chambers.
Following a LOCA, the steam/water flow causes a rapid increase of pressure
and temperature in the drywell. The pressure difference between the dry
and wet wells forces the contained water out of the blowdown pipes and high
pressure steam then flows to the wetwell pool. steam condensation occurs
and non-condensible gases collect in the wetwell airspace or compression
chamber. Given the relatively small containment volume of BWR's compared
with other reactor systems, this condensation process is the key element in
limiting maximum pressures to 3 bar or less.
During the last thirty years there have been progressive changes to
the shape, geometry, size and location of the various suppression chambers
relative to the reactor core within containment. The latest Mark 111
General Electric design is shown in Figure 6. The quenching pool has been
moved to the side whereas in the previous Mark 11 design it was underneath
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the reactor vessel. This made it possible to reduce the elevation of the
reactor vessel, and created the best compromise with regard to the height
of the vessel, its accessibility and construction of containment. The
design shown in Figure 6 uses a steel containment within a concrete
shield. However, because of localized dynamic loading from the wetwell
during LOCA and safety Relief Valve discharge, the steel containment was
replaced by a hybrid shell in later designs. This hybrid employs a
concrete base mat, a concrete shell in the pool region with a steel
containment shell above the pool. In future applications of U.S. built
BWR's, it is anticipated that a full height reinforced concrete shell would
be the preferred arrangement, wh ich is also the practice in other countries.
Modern large Bvffi's typified by the'U.S. General Electric Mark 111
design, the Gundremmingen KRB-2 1300 MWe units in West Germany and the
Swedish BWR-75 1000 MWe units, have steel liners and cylindrical
pre-stressed concrete containment structures. The German and Swedish
designs, however, have retained features of the Mark 11 concept where the
dryweil is both under and over the reactor vessel. The overall objective
of these systems is to maintain low design pressure with relatively small
containment volumes, and to provide for an emergency condenser during plant
transients and accidents.
In West Germany, earlier BWR containments were a spherical steel
shell. The current KRB-2 design is changed as shown in Figure 7. It
consists of a cylindrical prestressed concrete structure with an embedded
steel liner which is protected by additional concrete. The dryweil space
surrounds the reactor vessel and heat transport piping extending to the
second isolation valve. Many large diameter vent pipes from the dryweil
extending into the pool provide the path to condense LOCA induced
steamlwater mixtures. Aseparate pressure relief system provides for
coolant pressure control.. The containment is protected from large wetwell
overpressures relative to that in the dryweil during LOCA, by vacuum
break er swing check valves which allow pressure equalization in the two
chambers. The suppression system design pressure is typically 4 bar
compared with maximum expected LOCA pressures of less than 3 bar. The wall
of the reactor building serves as a secondary containment and the annular
space between it and containment is sUbatmospheric to prevent leakage to
the environment. German regulatory authorities require the reactor
building walls to withstand an external blast wave of 0.45 bar, a site
dependent earthquake and the crash impact of military aircraft. To provide
further assurance of containment integrity from external events the reactor
buildings are not rigidly joined, apart from the common foundation.
Figure 8 shows a sectional view of the Swedish BWR 75 containment [4]
which is a reinforced, partly prestressed concrete cylinder provided with
an embedded liner of carbon steel. The drywell, wetwell and blowdown pipes
are similarly arranged to the German KRB design, and the entire containment
is totally steel lined. A different labyrinth arrangement exists between
the upper dryweil and wetwell than in the West German design. The
containment and reactor building basement structure is different, but each
design has no structural tie (other than expansion joints) between
containment and adjacent buildings. The steel liner embedment of between
20 to 30 cms within the concrete is deeper than the KRB containment. The
upper drywell contains primary and secondary reactor process systems,
including main steam, feed water and containment cooling systems. The
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lower drywell contains systems such as the control rod drives and
recirculation pump motors. The wetwell is an annular enclosure. Blow-out
panels in the lower part of the reactor concrete shield provide a path to
the lower drywell in the event of a LOCA within the reactor compartment.
PRESSURIZED HEAVY WATER REACTOR CONTAINMENTS
This section concentrates on the CANDU containment system associated
with the multi-unit stations in Canada [3]. The single 600 MWe units
designed by AECL, use similar negative pressure containment (NPC) systems
with the omission of a vacuum building.
The NPCl design concept, (where reactor units are isolated from one
another), is used in the eight-unit Pickering NGS station, which came into
service in the per iod 1971-1985. The second major type (NPC2), was used in
the four-unit Bruce NGS Astation, which came into service in 1977-1979,
and in all subsequent four unit stations.
The prime difference between the NPCl and NPC2 concepts is that the
latter locates most of the supporting process equipment outside the primary
containment envelope, although it follows that some equipment must be in
secondary confinement areas. Another feature of NPC2 is that the four
reactor vaults are interconnected during normal operation due to the choice
of common on-power fUelling systems for all units.
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The main reason for adoption of the NPC containment concept was
increased effectiveness required to satisfy concerns for relative close
population siting which existed at the time of the Pickering NGS A project
commitment. The NPC2 design was developed primarily to improve maintenance
access to process equipment during operation.
The basic operating principle of negative pressure containment is to
maintain a negative pressure such that air leakage through the structure is
inward. Any discharge required to maintain this negative pressure'
differential is along defined pathways which can be filtered, treated and
monitored to control releases to the environment.
Figure 9 shows the NPC2 containment envelope which is normally at
sub-atmospheric pressure. In the event of a LOCA, various systems act to
provide for short and long term pressure and effluent control. The short
term per iod extends from the LOCA, when very fast pressure transients are
experienced with possible "puff" releases of radioactivity, to the
re-establishment of sub-atmospheric pressure within containment. The long
term per iod is associated with the initial activation of the Emergency
Filtered Air Discharge system (EFADS) until cleanup operations are
complete. EFADS is manually activated when containment pressure approaches
atmospheric seVeral days after the event. Figure 10 lists the systems
which collectively perform the containment function in the two time frames.
The principles of pressure control used in the CANDU NPC2 containment
in the short term are "pressure relief" followed by "steam suppression" as
depicted in Figure 11. Following LOCA the reactor vaults and fuelling duct
connecting the multi-unit station are pressurized by the resulting high
enthalpy fluid flashing to steam. The extent of pressure rise is limited
by the very large volume of the containment envelope. The increase in
pressure, acting across the Pressure Relief Valve (PRV) pistons,
automatically opens the valves and releases the air-steam mixture into the
vacuum building (VB).
The steam suppression function is carried out by a dousing system
located in the vacuum building. When the PRV's open and VB pressure rises,
water is forced over a weir structure and into spray headers located under
the dousing tank. The spray water falls through the steam-air mixture,
reduces pressure, and provides for soluble fission product retention.
The principle of effluent control used in the short term is isolation
by physical barriers. Containment operates at 98 kPa (-.5 psig) and the
vacuum building at 7 kPa (-13.7 psig). Typical design pressures for
containment are 170-200 kPa (10-14 psig) and 50 kPa (-7 psig) for the V.B.
CONTAINMENT CAPABILITY STUDIES
Over many years, there have been numerous containment
studies [2,3,11,13) performed with the aim of establishing design
parameters, proving that regulatory limits for design basis events are met
and identifying ultimate capability to withstand severe postulated
accidents. Given, that current research to provide "best estimate" source
terms and fission product transport, is also important to demonstrating
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containment capability, there is no doubt that high emphasis of nuclear
reactor safety R&D today, is on containment systems.
This section summarizes this containment R&D, and provides a few
examples of the many studies performed in West Germany, Sweden, USA and
Canada to demonstrate containment capability for LWR and PHWR nuclear
stations. Present studies are largely associated with very low frequency
(~ 10-7 events per year), high consequence events, since it is generally
recognized that all containment systems are adequately designed for likely
accidents.
Containment Research
Tables IV and V provide a synopsis of typical integral containment
tests for PWR's and BWR's to verify containment analysis codes, and assure
adequate designs. Many experiments have been performed elsewhere, notably
in Japan.
TABLE IV: INTEGRAL P~ffi CONTAINMENT EXPERIMENTS
Year Facility
1965 CSE, USA
1970 CVTR, INEL, USA
1975 BatteIle, Frankfurt
1981 Lucas Heights
1982 HDR, Kar1stein
1983-6 Sandia Nat.
Labs., N.M.
Measurement Purpose
Vessel blowdown
Peak pressure and
temperature effects
Pressure and
temperature
measurements
during blowdown
Pressure/temperature
response, small
steel containment
Blowdown for
different break
sizes/locations
Failure conditionsl
modes beyond DBA
Specific Information
Fission product
transport and removal.
Axial wall
temperature
distribution, heat
transfer coefficients.
Pressure waves,
wall 'temperatures,
HIT coefficients, jet
impingement and
hydrogen distribution.
Compartment pressurel
temperature
and heat transfer.
Wall temperatures,
steam-air
concentrations, jet
impingement, strains,
accelerations.
Structural failure
mode, leakage paths,
penetrations
behaviour, base mat
melt, bypass, margins.
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In addition to these integral tests, there have also been numerous
separate effects tests performed in all countries (often involving
international collaboration eg: Marviken) to understand jet impingement
loads, vent flows and condensation heat transfer. Experiments [17,18] to
determine the effects of external missiles, (including large steel piping
and segments of a turbine rotor), impacting on containment have been
performed in the U.S. and elsewhere.
In Canada, as elsewhere, there have been a number of on-site
containment tests during the per iod 1970-1983 conducted by AECL and Ontario
Hydro to determine leakage rates and the thermal utilization of dousing
flow in the Vacuum Buildings, and/or containment. In addition separate
effects tests of all containments have been performed over the per iod 1960
to 1984 to understand transient compressible flow in interconnected
volumes, jet loading, tee-junction losses, vessel-pipe fluid mixing and
liquid-steam phase separation at tee junctions.
TABLE V: BWR CONTAINMENT EXPERIMENTS
Year
1960's
1972/73
1972,75
1975, 77
1976/77
1978/80
1984
1983/86
Facility Measurement, purpose
Humboldt Bay DryweIl, Wetwell Pressure transients
Bodega Bay
Marviken, Sweden Full scale containment tests
GKM I, KKB Vent Pipe Loads, Full scale
Kar1stein Large Tank Multivent pipe tests
and concrete cells
GKM 2S Vent pipe and pool wall loads,
condensation, transient and
static tests
Studsvik, Sweden Pool swell in different geometries
GKSS Vent clearing, pool swell and fall
back.
Sandia Nat. Labs., N.M. Large scale, Mk I, 11, 111
overpressure tests, failure model
timing, and design margins.
The majority of current containment research is cent red on the
ultimate capability of LWR systems when sUbjected to severe accidents in
the Class 9 category as typified by the IDCOR program. The Industry
Degraded Core RUlemaking (IDCOR) Program in the U.S. is supported by
sixty-two nuclear utilities, architect-engineers, LWR vendors in the Uni ted
States, and by Japan and Sweden. The IDCOR mission was to develop a
comprehensive, technically sound position on the issues related to
potential severe accidents in light water power reactors.
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IDCOR resulted from the USNRC's evaluation of the TMI-2 degraded core
condition which was more severe than that previously assumed in a design
basis accident. In October 1980, the NRC initiated a "long-term rulemaking
to consider to what extent, if any, nuclear power plants should be designed
to deal effectively with degraded core and core melt accidents". The NRC's
rulemaking proposed to address the objectives and content of a degraded
core-related regulation, the related design and operational improvements
under consideration, their effects on other safety considerations, and the
costs and benefits of design and operational improvements.
subsequently, the NRC issued a proposed Commission Policy
Statement [19], to implement the October 2, 1980, "Advance Notice of
Rulemaking", and identify the severe accident decision process on specific
standard plant designs and on other classes of existing plants which may or
may not include rulemaking.
IDCOR identified key issues and phenomena; developed analytical
methods; analyzed the severe accident behaviour of four representative
plants; and extended the results as generically as possible. The methods
used in the study were "best-estimate", rather than conservative
engineering approaches in technical analysis, usually characteristic of
licensing submissions. Existing methods and experimental data Were
thoroughly reviewed and new programs were undertaken where confident
support of prior positions was uncertain. In general, IDCOR has
demonstrated that consequences of dominant seVere accident sequences are
significantly less than previously anticipated. Most accident sequences
require long times to progress, allowing time to achieve safe stable states.
Table VI lists the reactor safety phenomena considered in reaching
these conclusions.
TABLE VI SEVERE ACCIDENT PHENOMENA ADDRESSED
BY IDCOR TO ESTABLISH ULTIMATE
CONTAINMENT CAPABILITY
1. Steam explosions causing pressure pulses, liquid slugs or missiles
2. Overpressure due to rapid steam generation
3. Overpressure due to hydrogen generation combustion
4. Containment by-pass via interface systems to environment
5. Overpressure due to noncondensable gases
6. Melt through of containment base mat
7. Overpressure due to loss of containment heat removal
8. Containment failure modes
9. Radionuclide release and transport
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While studies continue, the most important results to date, are:
containment overpressure capability is several times the pressure
associated with the design basis accident; limited impairments of the
containment envelope would likely occur on failure, thus stabilizing or
gradually reducing pressures which would limit the rate of radioactive
release; hydrogen related concerns can be mitigated or do not exist; and
early failures of containment due to all causes are most unlikely, thus
permitting sufficient time for interdictory actions.
Corium and Fissium experiments [20,21] are also on-going in the U.S.,
West Germany and Sweden. Concrete-Corium interaction tests to determine
the extent of base-mat erosion are continuing in West Germany and U.S.A.
Current experiments at Sandia National Laboratories [13,14,15,16] sponsored
by USNRC, are addressing the issue of "when, where and how" will various
steel and concrete containments fail and the resultant extent of
radioactive release. Large scale models have or are being constructed to
identify containment safety margins, and the integrity of containment pipe
and electrical penetration assemblies when subject to overpressure loads.
This large program is scheduled for completion by the end of 1986. In
West Germany [2], studies suggest that the weak point of their PWR
containment is associated with the sealing box which is part of the main
airlock, in the event of overpressure accompanying a Class 9 accident. It
is considered that the failure mode will be "leak instead of break", which
will either result in a maximum stabilized containment pressure below
ultimate capability, or reducing pressure. In other words, containment
pressure relief will occur rat her than gross containment failure.
Experiments to prove this engineering assessment are now being planned [2].
Another area of research of importance to all nuclear power systems,
and prompted by TMI-2, is that of ensuring control of hydrogen generation
in severe accidents. This subject is the focus of attention of a current
IAEA working group who are reviewing the issues identified in Table VII,
using information from the major investigations already carried out by
EPRI, Sandia Labs and WNRE.
TABLE VII: IAEA REVIEW OF HYDROGEN STUDIES
1. Hydrogen distribution in containment
2. Lower flammability limits
3. Combustion limits of H2~air-steam-C02mixtures
4. Available hydrogen and oxygen detectors
5. pre-inerting as a mitigation scheme
6. Effectiveness of various ignition sources
7. Controlled burning and extinguishing systems
8. Fog/spray suppression
9. Minimum equipment to survive degraded-core accident.
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These studies are confirming that hydrogen re-combiners or igniters
for controlled burning, will prevent large containment overpressures. In
many containments, the predicted volumetric concentration of hydrogen is
far too low for combustion to occur.
Containment Response Analyses
The objectives of containment analysis are to establish design
parameters and to verify that regulatory dose limits are not exceeded
following any process system failure which leads to arelease of
radioactive material within the containment envelope. Design and
regulatory processes require that containment response be analysed for a
large number and variety of postulated system pipe failures ranging from a
small leak up to a guillotine failure of the largest pipin~ in the heat
transport system.
A. PHWR Analyses
For CANDU reactors, accidents are characterized according to the
postulated LOCA break discharge rate, since this parameter has the dominant
effect on subsequent containment response. A coolant channel end-fitting
failure is used to bound the radiological consequences of small breaks in
the heat transport system piping. The accident sequence postulated is an
instantaneous maximum opening break, with the resultant ejection of all 13
fuel bundles from the·channel. Severance of an end fitting results in an
initial coolant discharge rate up to 200 kg/s. The ejected fuel bundles
will likely be damaged on impact with the reactor vault, and will release
fission products into containment at a rate dependent on the extent of fuel
cooling.
The containment pressure due to small breaks is strongly affected by
containment heat sinks and, in particular, by the number of vault air
cooling units assumed operational at the time of the break. Figure 12
shows containment press ure transients for various initial break discharge
rates. For small breaks above 80 kg/s, the duration of the overpressure
per iod is determined by the time for the pressure relief manifold to
pressurize to the setpoint of the pressure relief valves (PRV's). Below
this discharge rate, energy removal due to air coolers and condensation on
cold surfaces is sufficient to off set the energy addition from the break,
with the result that the containment pressure can remain slightly above
atmospheric without initiating PRV opening. The containment overpressure
per iod will then last until either the break energy discharge rate
decreases sufficiently that the heat sinks are able to reduce the pressure
to subatmospheric by steam condensation, or the operator manually
intervenes by switching the PRV's to control mode.
In spite of the potentially extended containment overpressure per iod
for certain small breaks, releases into the environment are very small
since fuel damage is limited to a fraction of the core inventory.
Certain large breaks in the heat transport system, which could result
in coolant stagnation within fuel channels~ are capable of producing
extensive fuel failures throughout the core. In addition, the initial
pressure excursion presents achallenge to containment integrity.
Figure 13 shows the estimated pressure transients in the accident vault and
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vacuum building following a postulated guillotine break in a pump suction
line.
In this event, a peak pressure of 150 kPa occurs in the accident vault
at less than 3 seconds. This is substantially below the containment design
pressure. One minute after the break, the accident reactor vault becomes
subatmospheric. From this time onward, the heat removal rate exceeds the
steaming rate at the break. The containment atmosphere continues to cool
down and depressurize, until in the long term it becomes repressurized by
air in-leakage, instrument air, and any gas evolution within the
containment envelope.
Even with the fuel cladding damaged, the fission product release from
the fuel is initially limited to a gradual escape of the "free" inventory
of volatiles. Only when the fuel heats up to high temperatures (well in
excess of 1000·C) can a significant amount of volatiles start escaping from
the "bound" inventory. Thus, the concentration of activity in containment
takes some time to build up to appreciable levels. With the effective
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pressure suppression provided by the NPC system, the amount of activity
escaping to the environment by pressure-driven leakage is correspondingly
small.
The bulk of activity enters the containment during the subatmospheric
holdup period. These fission products then experience decay and undergo
numerous interactions before a small portion is gradually released by
(EFAD) filtered venting. With the exception of noble gases, the fission
products become trapped in water within containment either by dissolution
in liquid droplets or by becoming nucleation centers for liquid aerosols.
Eventually, the airborne activity consists of only the noble gases and a
small amount of volatile chemical compounds (e.g. organic iodides) in
equilibrium with the solution on the floor.
Figure 14 illustrates the mitigating processes of CANDU containment
systems in terms of 1131 attenuation resulting from the largest LOCA.
Assuming the most adverse weather conditions, the "effective release" is an
equivalent amount of 1131 that an individual could receive if present at
the exclusion boundary for several months. The total attenuation for this
severe accident is at least ten orders of magnitude, and the resultant
dose, if individuals remained indefinitely at the site boundary, is within
regulatory requirements.
In Canada, the current emphasis is on studies to delay or reduce the
extent of containment venting even though regulatory limits are met.
Regulatory requirements demand that dual failure dose limits not be
exceeded for LOCA's coincident with various containment impairments
including failure of isolation dampers, simultaneous deflation of four
air lock seals on a double door system, failure of pressure relief valves
and loss of reactor vault air cooling units.
B. PWR Analyses
As an example, the containment response analysis performed in
West Germany [2) to establish DBA parameters, and capability in severely
degraded core accidents for the standard 1300 MWe PWR is next described.
While assumptions required by the German Advisory Committee on Reactor
safeguards (RSK) are not the same as those in the Uni ted states, the
analysis results are generally typical of most PWR's. Also, while the
extent and timing of BWR severe accidents is different from PWR's, the
quest ions on ultimate containment capability are not dissimilar. The
German containment design basis accident (DBA) is a double ended break in a
main coolant pipe. For containment design purposes, RSK also requires a
number of conservative assumptions which include:
(a) Decay heat according to ANS Standard plus 20 percent.
(b) Maximum LOCA pressure assuming a 2 percent decrease in containment
volume, and a 2 percent increase in primary and secondary circuit
volumes (blowdown mass and energy include one secondary steam
generator content).
(c) A l~ percent safety margin applied to calculated maximum LOCA
pressure, and
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(dl The steel containment shell to be designed for maximum containment
atmospheric temperature (145°Cl, rather than its expected
temperature (60°C).
Figure 15 shows that the "best estimate" of the maximum LOCA pressure
will be 4.2 bar. Also shown, are the design calculation results assuming
(al (b) and (dl above, for the press ure transients when the additional
energy from the assumed secondary break is either excluded or included.
The containment design pressure of 6.3 bar includes the additional
assumption (c). The containment test pressure of 7.74 bar, prior to
reactor criticality, is set by the difference in yield at the testing and
LOCA temperatures. Thus, there is a substantial margin (up to 84 percentl
between the expected LOCA pressure and the demonstrated test capability.
In the event of a core melt-down, there would be a substantial release
of fission products and steam/water to containment. The extent of release
to the environment is highly dependent on the containment isolation time,
the extent and nature of any containment leakage, and the transport and
driving force paths from the annular space between containment and the
reactor building. A very important mitigating process in this regard, is
the finding [22] that all radioactive substances, with the exception of the
noble gases and airborne gaseous iodine, are bound to aerosol particles and
subject to highly effective removal mechanisms. These removal mechanisms,
involving plate-out and absorption on containment structures, reduce
aerosol mass concentrations by five to six orders of magnitude within five
days. Containment overpressure failure at the weakest point is not
expected during this per iod.
Figure 16 shows the predicted pressure variation in containment for a
core melt-down sequence. The maximum transient pressure during blowdown of
5.3 bar is reached at 17 seconds after LOCA. The transient LOCA pressure
which is relieved by the containment volume and condensation reduces to
2.5 bar during the next 10 3 s. The core melt-down process due to the
onset of evaporation of the moderator water and assumed complete absence of
emergency forced cooling, commences at about 20 minutes.
core degradation then proceeds accompanied by hydrogen production due
to steam/zirconium reactions. shortly after one hour, the core structure
is predicted to fail allowing significant amounts of core material to drop
into the water contained in the lower plenum of the reactor vessel, with
the resultant violent evolution of steam.
subsequently, at about 1.9 h after blowdown, reactor vessel failure is
predicted to occur and core melt interaction with the concrete basemat
begins. Given that 80 tonnes of metallic melt and 130 tonnes of oxide melt
at a temperature of 2400°C are assumed available, it is predicted that the
concrete shielding surrounding the reactor vessel will be eroded within 7 h
causing the containment sump water to contact the melt. Violent
evaporation of the sump water in the isolated containment, subsequently
results in its pressurizatidn to design pressure after three days and to
9 bar after five days, as shown in Figure 16. This sequence of events
raises the quest ion of ultimate containment overpressure capability, the
mode and extent of containment failure, and subsequent extent of
radioactive release from the annulus between containment and the reactor
building, via filtration to the environment. These questions also
highlight the "defense in depth" provided in LWR stations for public
protection, and the extended time available for any necessary emergency
evacuation.
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Figure 16
German PWR Containment in Core Melt
Accompanied by Failure of the Sump Cooling System
Recent studies in West Germany (2) and those of IDCOR (9) in the
Uni ted States are showing that containment overpressure capability before
failure is up to 2-3 times design pressure for the undisturbed steel
shell. As an example, West German experts predict overpressure failure of
the 1300 MWe standard PWR containment to be above 14 bar in this case, and
that the mode of failure will be "leak ,instead of break".
It is considered that containment overpressure will result in a leak
at weak points, such as in mainairlock components or at electrical/pipe
penetrations, and will either permit a stabilization or reduction of
containment pressures. The net result is the maintenance of major
containment integrity, and only gradual activity release (likely after
filtration), to the environment. Also, recent West German studies and
those in the Uni ted states have demonstrated that previously assessed
source terms are too high by several orders of magnitude.
SUMMARY
This paper has discussed the functional requirements, the evolution of
designs and the influence of national regulatory requirements on
containments for PWR, BWR and PHWR reactors. Particular containment
designs are not only a function of national siting requirements in the
Uni ted States, West Germany, Sweden and Canada, but also relate to specific
reactor system performance in perceived accident conditions, and the number
of reactors constituting the generating station. In all cases, it is
evident that the various containment systems easily meet their design basis
accidents. Since the TMI-2 accident all jurisdictions have examined the
need for design changes to meet post-accident scenarios.
In Canada, increasing attention has been placed on large stagnation
LOCA's with assumed coincidental containment impairments. In this regard,
methods to delay or reduce the extent of atmospheric venting of containment
to relieve pressure are under active study, even though regulatory limits
are met.
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In West Germany, the Uni ted States and Sweden, emphasis is on the
ultimate capability of PWR and BWR containments to withstand overpressures
and evaluate environmental releases for class 9 core melt accidents, which
are beyond or bordering on the range of credible frequency. Current
information from the U.S. based IDCOR study and the independent West German
and Swedish research work, indicate that LWR containment designs are
capable of withstanding overpressures up to three and possibly four times
their design pressure. In the event of containment failure, it is
predicted that radioactive release will likely result from gradual leakage
from weak points (rather than a gross containment break) to the reactor
building, resulting in a slow and delayed discharge to the environment.
Experiments and scaled tests of containments have been performed or are
currently underway in many countries to determine ultimate containment
ability and failure modes. These tests, together with al lied fission
product source term and transport tests, and comprehensive experiments on
hydrogen generation and mitigation, are an important area of reactor safety
research today.
In addition, research in the U.S. is directed at decoupling LOCA plus
SSE as a design basis, and reducing postulated high energy system pipe
breaks and loading phenomena.
If containment failure were to occur, in either the CANDU, PWR or BWR
reactor systems, it is predicted to do so many days following the most
severe postulated accident, permitting adequate time for assurance of
public safety.
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PROBABILISTIC RISK ASSESSMENT
MERITS AND LIMITATIONS
H. W. Lewis
Unive~sity of Califo~nia, Depa~tment of Physics
Santa Ba~ba~a, Califo~nia 93106, U.S.A.
ABSTRACT
The me~its and limitations of p~obabilistic ~isk as-
sessßlent a~e discussed, with a special effo~t to
distinguish between those limitations which a~e in-
t~insic to the method as p~acticed and those which
a~e not. Emphasis is on the limitations, even though
probabilistic risk assessment is the most ~ational
and effective way to study the safety of ~eactors.
INTRODUCTION
P~obabilistic ~isk assessment (PRA) is regarded with suspicion in
some qua~ters, both for ~easons which will emerge in the discus-
sion of its limitations, and for less defensible reasons. The~e
is a great deal of resistance to the use of probability, espe-
cially in the face of the great uncertainties that are inevitable
accompaniments of current assessments. Licensing decisions, in
particular, must be unequivocal, and there are great problems in
laying a probabilistic base for binary decision-making. The
uncertainties are of course also present in any other form of
analysis -- they are not invented by PRA -- but there is no way
to conceal them in a properly performed PRA, as there is in a
deterministic process. Though much of what follows will focus on
limitations, PRA (not necessarily as currently practiced) is the
r,;\tional way to make safety assessments.
It is necessary to make one disclaimer. Though I have had, and
now have, connections with the regulatory agencies in my country,
110thing that follows reflects anything but my own personal views,
as will be quite clear from the context. I wish it we~e not so.
PROBABILITY
The concept of p~obability ~equi~es a few wo~ds, pa~ticularly
when one is dealing with ext~emely 101'1 p~obabilities of ~a~e
events -- often events that have never occur~ed, and may never
occur. Such a p~obability can not be defined as the limit of a
frequency, but is instead a measure of the odds of a fai~ bet on
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whether or not the event will occur. These odds are inevitably
derived from a combination of expert opinion and of operating
e>:perience, and are bound to change as our eHperience and our
wisdom increase. They are also themselves uncertain, and it is
perfectly reasonable to speak of a probability of a probability,
as a measure of the uncertainty in estimating the odds of a fair
bet. Bookmakers have this problem in everyday life, and seem not
to be bothered by it as much as nuclear engineers. Such proba-
bilities and probability distributions must be kept current, and
must be responsive to the accumulation of operating eHperience.
On the other hand, it is important to resist the temptation to
overstate the predictive power of operating eHperience -- the
fact that somethi ng has happened after 10111 hours of operation
does not mean that it will happen every hundred hours. The fact
that something that was estimated as having a very low probabil-
ity actually happened does not necessarily mean that the original
probability was wrong. A disciplined approach to the estimation
of probability, and to the uncertainty in the estimated probabil-
ity is essential to the proper use of PRA. In particular, it is
wrang to describe the probability of (say) a core melt by a
single number, without any reference to the uncertainty in that
number. Indeed, it is not helpful to describe the uncertainty by
a single number, though that is almost universal practice. The
point of this section is that the concept of probability should
be treated with respect.
MERITS
The merits of PRA are so clear that they hardly need mentioning.
In the first place, performance of a PRA on a plant requires at
the beginning that the structure of the plant be fully under-
stood, along with the interactions, both intentional and inadver-
tent, among its constituent parts. The various possible accident
sequences must be written down eHplicitly and understood, and
finally reasonable probabilities of failure must be assigned to
the elements of each accident chain. All of this requires such
depth of analysis that it is almost inevitable that a greater
understanding of the vulnerabilities of the plant is obtained in
a disciplined and rational way. More often than not, the process
itself leads to changes in design or procedures whose effect is
to reduce the probabilities of the dominant accident sequences.
Finally, PRA provides a correct procedure for the integration of
operational data and eHpert opinion, which is essential for the
analysis of the low probability events in which we are interested.
LIMITATIONS - INTRINSIC
The line between intrinsic and practical limitations is indis-
tinct, but there are some limitations that are easier to fiH than
others. Nearly all of the limitations we will list in this
section could be dealt with in a better world, but it seems to be
eHtremely difficult at present. In the neHt section we will deal
with the limitations which are simply matters of practice, and
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which are bound to improve as understanding of the techniques
becomes more widespread. Nonetheless, in my personal view, the
limitations in the second group are far more damaging to the
utility of PRA at the present time.
a) Completeness - It is a truism that not all possible accident
sequences are contained in a PRA, and that will always be true.
It is true at two levels. In the first place, it is obvious
that, being mortal, we have not thought of everything, and it is
always possible that one of the accident sequences we have not
thought of is of transcendent importance. As time goes by
without the revelation of important new sequences, this becomes
less likely, but it is never out of the question. At a second
level, no accident sequence in a PRA is intended to be unique --
there are far too many unique sequences, differing in only minor
details. Each is meant as a surrogate for a class of related
sequences, and the probability for the sequence is meant as an
aggregate of all these probabilities. (This is particularly
important to remember when people look back at something that has
occurred, like Three Mile Island, and ask whether it was pre-
dicted by a PRA.) There is no cure for incompleteness, but
concern about it is bound to decrease with time and with the
accLlmulation of wisdom and eHperience.
b) Inadequate Data Base - The data base will always be inade-
quate, again at several levels. For items that fail frequently,
like valves, information about the mean rate of failure may
accumulate, but questions about the failure distribution are
bound to remain. The population is not homogeneous, the failure
rates are sensitive to maintenance practice, etc., and it is out
of the question that the technology will stagnate to the point at
which one will have a complete failure rate distribution for such
items. It would be an indictment of the industry if it were to
happen. For items that have never failed, like reactor pressure
vessels, failure rate estimates will have to come from informed
estimates of the effectiveness of inspections at both the manu-
facturing and maintenace levels, along with improving under-
standing of fracture mechanics and of radiation effects. These
items are unlikely to close in the foreseeable future. There are
i ntermedi ate cases between these two e>ltremes, but i t i s cl ear
that the data base will always be inadequate for those who would
like a clean empirical approach to risk assessment. For mortals,
this requires that PRAs be done with a judicious miHture of
e>:pertise, data, and judgment.
c) Fault Tree/Event Tree Analysis - There are some structural
imperfections in the conventional format for a PRA, that can not
be removed without fundamental change. Recall that these anal-
yses are usually structured from the and- and or- gates borrowed
from Boolean symbolic logic (and now familiar because of digital
electronics), and that many relationships can not be e>:pressed in
these terms. For eHample, such logic symbols are used to de-
scribe whether or not a component fails, but provide no means of
describing the gradual degradation of a component. Such logic is
intrinsically sequential, and cannot easily describe unstable
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loops or such things. Nor does it have provision for the mea-
sLlrement of time, e>:cept in terms of temporal priori ty, so that a
component failure that takes place over six days is indistin-
gLlishable from one that takes sb: microseconds. That is not a
description of the real world. Of course, one can make ad hoc
procedures to deal with some of these extreme cases, but the
basic limitation is intrinsic to the structure.
d) Human Performance - It need hardly be said that it is diffi-
cult to predict human performance, yet nearly all events in
reactors so far have involved human intervention of some sort.
In a PRA, human error is accounted for in some averaged way
(though there is no way to predict the depths of human ingenuity
in making mi stakes) , but there is little or no accounting for
human positive input. Yet humans are capable of constructive
input in accident situations, and it is surely biased to consider
only the negative aspects. (This has implications also for the
difficult question of the right degree of automation, on which
whole nations disagree.) It would be very useful for someone to
make a random search of events initiated by mechanical failure,
just to find out how often innovative behavior by the operators,
beyond their standard procedures, helped to control the incident.
A higher level of automation will make it easier to do PRAs, by
eliminating this human unpredictability, but may make reactors
less safe.
e) Common Cause Failures - A common cause failure compromises the
effectiveness of a fault tree/event tree analysis by producing
concurrent failures in supposedly independent systems. The stan-
dard e>lamples are e>lternal events -- earthquakes, tornadoes,
floods, sabotage, etc. -- but manufacturing errors and mainten-
ance errors are other examples. (In the U.S. an aircraft had
failures in all three supposedly independent engines on one
flight, because the same maintenance crew had made the same
mi stake on all three engines one night.) It is possible to
protect against known causes of such failure, but it is difficult
to incorporate them into a PRA. It is in fact done, but it is
not done weIl.
LIMITATIONS - PRACTICAL
The limitations that folioware my personal list of things that
we don't seem to be doing as weIl as we might -- others could
weIl have a different list, or even differ about items in this
one. One should rejoice at the fact that there are things to be
improved, and that in fact most of them can be improved. There
is no special order to this list, though some items are clearly
more important than others.
a) Consistency - By now there have been dozens of PRAs performed,
and it is impressive that, though they contain great uncertain-
ties, the results for the final probability of core melt are not
widely divergent. It is weIl to bear in mind that some of this
consistency is illusory, since there is considerable communica-
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tion within the community of pur-veyor-s of PRAs. We will discuss
the meaning of uncer-tainty neMt.
b) Uncer-tainty - The lar-ge uncer-tainties in the final r-esults of
PRAs ar-e well-known, and it is wor-th discussing what is meant by
such lar-ge uncer-tainties. When we state that the computed esti-
mate of (say) a cor-e-melt pr-obability is uncer-tain by a factor- of
plus or- minus ten, that is an almost meaningless statement, just
as it is almost meaningless to state the or-iginal pr-obability
without some descr-iption of the uncertainty. One is, in both
cases, tr-ying to describe an unknown distribution, the pr-obabil-
ity distr-ibution for- the pr-obability of cor-e melt, by one or- two
par-ameter-s, and that can simply not be done. Nor-, on"the other-
hand, is ther-e ever- enough infor-mation available to pr-oper-ly
descr-ibe the entir-e distr-ibution. This can lead one into consid-
er-able confusion about just what is meant by the number-s quoted
as the end r-esults of a PRA.
It is ver-y popular-, for- lack of better- infor-mation, to aSSLlme
that all distr-ibutions involved in PRAs ar-e lognor-mal, and ther-e
is indeed in the central limit theor-em some basis for- this ap-
pr-o>:imation in some cases. Just as an e):ample, SLIppose the
pr-obability distr-ibution for- the pr-obability of cor-e melt in a
par-ticular- r-eactor- is in fact descr-ibed by a lognor-mal distr-ibu-
tion, and suppose that the standar-d deviation is a factor- of ten.
In that hypothetical but not atypical case, the mean pr-obability
will be a factor- of four-teen lar-ger- than the median, and it is
clear-ly important to know just which one inter-ests us most. One
hear-s people speaking of the "best estimate" without clar-ifying
what is meant. If indeed it is the median that is meant, then it
is not at all clear- which is most impor-tant to the pr-otection of
society, though it is mor-e likely the mean than the median. This
is not meant to ar-gue for- one or- the other-, but only to say that
quoted pr-obabilities without this much specificity have little
meaning.
These comments ar-e even mor-e relevant to statements about the
uncer-tainties in the estimates of probability, which ar-e usually
stated as plus or minus a factor- of M, without any clar-ity in
what is meant. Is it a standar-d deviation in a conjectur-ed
lognor-mal cur-ve? Is it an absolute set of bounds? Is it a rough
estimate (whatever- that means) of the psychological indecision of
the pur-veyor- of the PRA? What i s i t? These may seem li I:li? aca-
demic questions, but they must be answer-ed if the final r-esult of
the PRA is to be of use to society. Ther-e ar-e lar-ge factor-s
contained in the alter-nate definitions of these ter-ms, and to
handle them loosely is simply not responsible. It is, however-,
common.
As a final comment on uncertainty (though ther-e is far- more to be
said), ther-e is a natur-al human tendency to believe that the
r-ight answer is in the middle of the "uncertainty band". (Usual-
ly, with these broad distr-ibutions, people mean the logar-ithmic
uncer-tainty band.) If this were so, of course, there wouldn't be
as much uncer-tainty. It is important to keep emphasizing that a
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genuine uncertainty in probability means that the "true" proba-
bility may very weIl be displaced from the center in either
direction, by an amount comparable to the uncertainty. Uncer-
tainties are real. In a PRA there is an opportunity to deal with
them carefully, but they are equally present in a deterministic
assessment, though weIl concealed.
c) Categorization - As mentioned earlier, each accident sequence
in a PRA must really be regarded as a surrogate for a class or
category of sequences of the same general type, and its probabil-
ity ölS the sum of all the probabilities of its class members. It
is therefore incorrect to observe a sequence in practice, and ~o
then ask in retrospect whether it was contained in a particular
PRA. (Of course, if nothin~'1ike it has been considered, that is
another matter.) In particular, it is incorrect to infer that
the probability of a sequence is high, just because it has been
observed, and to then mistrust a PRA because it seems not to have
given a high probability for that particular sequence. Remember
all the sequences in the PRA that haven't yet been seen. This is
a common misunderstanding of the meaning of probability among
people unfamiliar with the concept, and we all have to deal with
it in speaking to non-professional groups and individuals.
d) Human Positive Input - We have al ready said that analysts
normally treat humans as just another component of the system,
which either works normally or malfunctions. In fact, of course,
though a valve or relay may not be able to rise above the occa-
sion and perform innovatively, a human can. There are many
cases, of which the first Browns Ferry fire is a good example.
There a control rod drive pump was used innovatively to cool the
core, though it would have been impossible to make allowance for
such action in a PRA. My personal view is that such a human
resource is an important defense, and its omission from PRAs is a
major defect. This is a self-nourishing defect, in that failure
to recognize the value of positive human intervention (as we do,
for example, in aviation) lowers our sights in terms of the
qLlal i ty requi red of reactor operators. I do not li ke to f I Y wi th
pi lots whose upper bound of performance i s the i nstructi on bool(.
It is, however, extremely difficult to see how to incorporate
such a factor into a PRA.
e) Bottom-Lining - During the course of the performance of a PRA
many intermediate results are obtained about the expected behav-
ior and reliability of systems and subsystems, about failure
modes and sequence morphologies and probabilities, etc. These
results vary in reliability for many reasons, among them those
mentioned above and below, and the insight they provide varies
accordingly. When they are all combined to provide a "bottom
line" estimate of the probability of damage to life and property,
this is inevitably the weakest and least reliable result of the
PRA. Nonetheless, social and regulatory pressures combine to
provide emphasis on this small fraction of the PRA output, im-
pairing the credibility of the entire process. One cannot deny
that there is a great societal hunger for the bottom line, but it
is the weakest use of PRA and emphasis on it detracts from the
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many othe~ benefits of the analysis.
statements about safety.
One should ~esist one-digit
f) Consequenees - The p~evious statements a~e pa~tieula~ly
~elevant when one ea~~ies the ~esult of the ealeulation to an
estimate of the p~obability of a ee~tain numbe~ of latent eanee~s
in the population, because this ealeulation eombines all p~evious
unee~tainties with the genuine unee~tainty about the effeets of
eMtremely low levels of ~adiation on la~ge numbe~s of people.
These effeets will neve~ be unde~stood empirieally, beeause they
a~e so small that the~e is no possibility, even if the~e we~e a
la~ge aeeident with ~adiation ~elease, of an epidemiologieal
dete~mination of the level of damage. The~e is, afte~ all, a
fifteen pe~eent p~obability that we each die of eanee~ anyway,
and one man-rem eontributes less than one thousandthof this. It
may, so fa~ as we know, eont~ibute nothing. As the SOL~ee te~m
~eseareh comes to its eonelusion, the numbe~ of predieted aeute
fatalities will p~obably also be g~eatly ~edueed. Sho~t of a
monumental b~eakth~ough in ou~ unde~standing of the meehanism of
~adiation-indueed eance~, the~e will always be g~eat unee~tainty
in these p~edictions.
g) Conse~vatism - Unfo~tunately, PRAs a~e done in a ~egulato~y
envi~onment, which does not ~ewa~d realistie estimates. In an
ideal wo~ld, one would make an estimate of the safety of a ~eac­
to~ as ~ealistically as possible, and then, and only then, apply
a sufficient safety facto~ to satisfy the conservative needs of
society. It is a sad fact that people who make PRAs always deal
witl1 unce~tainty by e~~ing in the conse~vative di~ection, tl1e~eby
giving the enti~e ente~p~ise an unknown, but substantial, bias.
Even though an e~ro~ in eithe~ direction is an e~~or, one lea~ns
quickly that an e~~o~ in the non-conse~vative di~ection p~oduces
a flood of abuse, while a conse~vative er~o~ p~oduces ha~dly a
mu~mu~. One can cite many e>:amples. This has th~ee impo~tant
eonseqLlences.
First, the magnitude of the e~~o~ is no~mally unknown, since it
is pe~vasive and unquantified, pe~haps, in many cases, unquanti-
fiable. This makes the meaning of the bottom-line estimates of
~isk even mu~kie~ than befo~e, with the consequent disse~vice to
all who look at them, fo~ wl1ateve~ pu~pose. To the eMtent that
the numbers a~e taken se~iously, they then deceive the ~egulators
and mislead the public. That is bad.
Second, the eMcuse is often given that a calculation done conse~­
vatively at every point in doubt, must, in the end, lead to a
conse~vative ~esult. That statement is tal se. IIt also confuses
the duty of the p~actitione~ of PRA, whieh is to honestly analyze
the plant, with that of the ~egulato~, which is to assu~e that
deg~ee of safety ~equi~ed by the public.) A conse~vatism is a
misstatement, howeve~ hono~ably motivated, and the~e is a theo~em
in logic to the effect that if a collection of postulates has one
which is false, it is then possible to p~ove any theo~em. This
theo~em is not obvious, but it is t~ue. The~e is no reason to
have contidence that a calculation done conse~vatively at each
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decision point will lead to a conservative result.
think of counterexamples.
It is easy to
Third, conservatisms can lead to gross distortions of priorities.
Consider two accident sequences, A and B, of which A has the
lower median (or meanl probability, but much greater uncertainty.
Conservative estimates of each will have a larger effect on A,
and may very weIl invert their order. One will then find oneself
giving greater regulatory and research attention to the sequence
of lesser importance. (An example will be cited below.l This
problem is so widespread in the regulatory apparatus, at least in
my country, that it would not be unfair to say that our regula-
tory effort is directed mostly against uncertainty, rather than
against r-isk.
Probably the single greatest defect in the use of PRA is the
failure to understand and account for uncertainty.
hl External Events - External events can lead to common cause
failures, and the difficulty in accounting for them in the con-
text of a PRA leads to the assignment of particularly great
uncertainty to the estimates. In the U.S.A. accidents induced by
earthquakes are a good example. Because there are such great
uncertainties, the difficulties mentioned at the end of the last
section are present in force, with the consequence (in my viewl
that we greatly overestimate the seismic threat. This distortion
of priorities leads to misplaced regulatory and research effort,
with a consequent reduction in the level of safety. (Who can
forget how the overemphasis on large LOCA, in the years before
Three Mile lsland, led to neglect of the problems associated with
transients and small LOCA, and therefore directly to the acci-
dent?l We may yet learn, at DiabIo Canyon (near my homel, that
the years of fighting about the overstated seismic threat have
diverted us from any real problems afflicting the plant.
il Safety Goals - No one knows "how safe is safe enough", so it
is natural that regulatory agencies should grasp at any straw in
seeking reasonable standards for a proper standard of regulation.
Whether in the form of de minimis levels of exposure or in the
form of quantitative criteria for licensing, these always depend
upon some quantitative measure of the safety of a reactor, and
that can only be given by a realistic PRA. But there are prob-
lems.
In the first place, PRAs will, for the foreseeable future, have
butlt-in uncertainties of factors of ten or more, and there is no
reasonable way to set standards which are so unclear. Even so,
this is often done, and the USNRC has promulgated proposed
quantitative safety goals which are precisely stated, eVen in the
face of these great uncertainties, and in which it is not even
clear' whether it is the median or mean or something else that is
meant. These e>lactly stated goals produce a false illusion of
precision, and I have heard experts say that the calculated
probability of core melt is .00015, and that it needs to be
reduced to below .001Z11. That is simply wrong! It is easy to
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lose track of the meaning of probability in the face of great
uncertainty, as mentioned earlier, and, in particular, to ascribe
greater accuracy to the calculations than is justified.
The second problem is to find some reasonable source for the goal
as stated. In a rational world, the level of societal risk we
are willing to accept from a technology bears some relation to
the benefits we perceive from it, or at least to the drawbacks of
the alternatives. For most (if not all) technologies these
balancing estimates are made informally, through the normal
process of social intercourse. In particular, they involve more
than risk. We accept aviation -- most of us flew to Karlsruhe --
despite the known risk, because it is a relatively fast and
comfortable form of transportation. We drive cars for the same
reason. We eat strange foods at distant castles. We stand
in front of strange audiences delivering speeches. In each of
these cases we could reduce the risk, but there is more to life's
judgments than the reduction of risk. On the other hand, there
are some risks we don't take, and in each case there is some
tacit balance struck which involves many considerations of risk
and benefit. The point is that the evaluation of benefits is
even more difficult than the evaluation of risk -- it is not just
financial benefit that is involved -- and is the responsibility
of the entire society, not just the regulatory apparatus. How
does one match the impact of coal-burning on the German forests
against reactor risk. What about the coal miners?
The USNRC has promulgated a set of quantitative safety goals, for
evaluation, test, and comment, which ignores these considera-
tions, and which is, in my personal view, wholly irrational. The
criteria are based on bottom-line estimates of the effects of
reactor accidents on human health (see above), are precisely
stated without any mention of the uncertainty problems (see
above), and are derived entirely from risk considerations (see
above). Specifically, they seek to make the risk of reactor-
induced cancer to the nearby population less than .001 of the
risk of cancer from other causes, and less than .001 of that due
to other alternative means of generating electricity. It is easy
to see the fundamental flaw in such criteria. For the first,
notice only that a substantial fraction of cancer in the U.S. is
unambiguously due to ci~arette smoking -- does this mean that a
reduction in cigarette smoking requires an improvement in the
safety of nuclear power plants? What is the connection? For the
second, suppose I invent a hypthetical means of generating
electricity which is absolutely safe, but which produces enough
foul-smelling waste to cover the entire country to a depth of one
meter. Must reactors be absolutely safe to compete? These are
efforts by an agency which is responsible only for risk to find
some risk-based goals, and such an effort is doomed to failure.
This is not to say that there is no merit in quantitative safety
goals -- quite the contrary. It is extremely important to find a
way out of the open-ended regulatory dilemma in which we find
ourselves. Quantitative goals which are stated as ill-defined
objectives for the regulatory agencies, provided as guidance for
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the necessarily deterministic regulatory process, and which are
derived from an arbitrary estimate of the level of safety desired
by the public in view of the public benefits, would be very
helpful. It is amusing that, in the U.S., the corresponding
regulatory agency for aviation, the Federal Aviation Administra-
tion, has no defined quantitative goals, yet regulates an accept-
ed technology. IThis was not always 50, and there are still many
people afraid of flying.l When asked, officials of the FAA will
normally say that they do everything in their power to continue
to make flying safer, yet that is not true. There is room in the
rational management of a society for social contracts which are
not drawn up precisely by lawyers.
In addition, PRA-derived goals for the safety and reliability of
subsystems can be very helpful in determining design tradeoffs,
as long as they are not somehow translated into acceptance crite-
ria by the regulatory agencies. One cannot help but sympathize
with regulators who are required to decide how safe is safe
enough in the everyday course of events, without much help.
j) The Use of PRA - Despite all that has been said above, the
limitations on the performance of a PRA are small compared to the
problems involved in integrating PRAs into the regulatory
environment. Regulatory decisions are often made whimsically,
and PRA provides a mechanism for assessing the impact of such
decisions on the safety of nuclear power, even in the face of the
problems listed above. Its use should be widespread and
enthusiastic, rather than limited and grudging. Perhaps that
will change, in time.
CONCLUSIONS
There is little to add here. Probabilistic Risk Assessment is a
known lperhaps the only currently knownl methodology for the
quantitative assessment of reactor risk, and thereby the best
known way to provide a rational base for reactor regulation. It
also serves as a systematic means for the quantification of the
performance of a plant under upset conditions, and thereby a
means for the identification of weak points in design or opera-
tion. It is not used as effectively as it can be, nor have the
regulatory agencies yet effectively integrated PRA, with its
inevitable uncertainties, into their operations. There is more
room for progress in that area than there is in the improved
performance of PRAs. In that arena, the major need among those
mentioned above is a systematic purging of the conservative
influence on the conduct of a PRA, so that the results (including
the uncertaintiesl are given generally understood meaning.
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INTRODUCTION
Absolute safety and zero risk are unattainable in any of man's endeavours.
Any human activity has an element of risl< attached to it, even the activity of
physical inactivity, so prelavant in developed societies amongst the population
of desk-bound office workers, has associated medical risks.
In the field of nuclear power, there is a weIl developed technology for
identifying and quantifying the risks associated with the operation of power
plant. Indeed, nuclear power safety assessment may be said to be at the
forefront in this area, and techniques developed in the nuclear field are now
being applied elsewhere. Given this capacity to quantify risks, even down to
extremely low levels of probability for the case of very unlikely accidents
wi th the potential for significant consequences, i t is natural to look for
corresponding statements on acceptable levels for such risks. An initial
attempt to produce an acceptance criterion quantified in terms of frequency
events was made by Farmer. This initial critel~~n was stated in terms of the
frequencies of various levels of release of I . Subsequently many other
proposals have been put forward suggesting acceptable frequencies for various
events whose consequences were expressed in a 'variety of ways. A milestone was
reached in 1982 when the USNRC published their proposed safety goals which
incorporated an element of probabilistic assessment. Proposals such as that by
AECB (Canada) make the distinction between a rigid acceptance criterion, which
must be met, and a target or safety goal which should be aimed at.
The development of such approaches forms the subject of what folIows.
OBJECTIVES OF SAFETY GOALS AND CRITERIA
Safety goals and acceptance criteria may be proposed with a variety of
objectives in view. The scope and detail of the criteria proposed will vary
depending upon which objectives are addressed. Also, the objectives may have a
bearing on the underlying philosophy and so on the approach adopted.
a. Public Demonstration of Safety Adequacy
Goals and Criteria aimed at this objective seek to draw
between risks in the field under discussion and those elsewhere.
comparisons
As a result,
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they are often fairly broadly drawn rather than relying on detailed
plant-specific requirements. They will tend to lean towards comparison with
other risks, either technological risks assumed to be already accepted by
society, or natural hazards of recognised rari ty such as lightning strikes,
meteorites, etc.
b. Regulatory and Licensing Decisions
Where safety goals and criteria form part of the regulatory and licensing
decision-making process, they need to be clear and unambiguous. Consequently,
a considerable amount of detail may be necessary in order to specify the
requirements wi th sufficient precision. The inclusion of this detail is
necessary if the criteria are to be useful in a regulatory context; however it
can result in requirements which are specific to a certain design of plant.
c. Aiding Siting Decisions
Criteria aimed at aiding siting decisions need to address the plant in the
context of the proposed site and so must link the characteristics of the plant
to the impact on the area surrounding the site. The plant characteristics
might, for example, be expressed in terms of assessed frequencies of releases
of various categories of activity, and the surroundings of the site in terms of
the population distribution, meteorology, topography, and geology. Depending
on the approach adopted, either the plant characteristics or the site
surroundings might be assumed to be 'typical' or 'standardised' data.
d. Aiding Design Development
In order to aid design development, safety goals and criteria expressed in
terms of targets for the plant characteristics are the most useful. In this
way development of the design can be decoupled from site-specific aspects.
However, such criteria must retain some link to the surroundings of the site
either directly or by means of consequence analysis at a later stage. The use
of quantified acceptabili ty criteria in design development can have great
benefits in producing a balanced or optimised design and also in efficiently
allocating the resources used to produce such a design.
e. Aiding Research Priority Decisions
In addition to aiding design development, safety goals may be aimed at
aiding research priority decisions. In this case it is particularly useful if
the safety goal or criterion addresses the problem of uncertainties in the
results of quantified safety assessments, since the areas which contribute to
significant uncertainty in the risk estimates are those of relevance in
prioritising research work.
f. Rationalisation of Resource Allocation
Safety goals and criteria may be set with the objective of rationalisation
of resource allocation. Optimisation of a design or a research programme are
examples of this which have been mentioned above. Other examples include
optimisation of safeguards, or of maintenance and inspection periods.
As will be seen from the above, the objectives for setting safety goals
and safety criteria cover a wide span and in some cases the different
objectives resul t in very different requirements which seem sometimes to be
mutually exclusive. To date, most safety goals and criteria have addressed
primarily (a), (b) and (d) above. The proposals which have been made include a
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wide variety of different approaches. These differences can be described in
terms of the differing forms in which the goals or criteria are stated and in
terms of the differing underlying philosophies.
FORMS OF SAFETY GOALS
Safety goals and safety criteria are usually formulated in terms of a
constraint on some aspect of an activity. The form of the constraint depends
to a certain extent on the objective or objectives being addressed. Safety
goals and criteria already published have included constraints on the
following:-
a. Plant Damage (Fig 1)
The constraint may be expressed in terms of frequency limits on specified
states of the plant, for example the US ACRS criteria (1) include acceptable
limits and targets for specific core damage states, such as core melt, as do
the USNRC'Safety Goals. (2) The constraint may be expressed in terms of more
severe but less specific plant states, such as those of the UK CEGB Design
Safety Guidelines (3) which require the sum of the frequencies of all se~~nces
leading to large uncontrolled releases of activi ty, to be less than 10 per
year, or of the ACRS criteria which have_~ constraint on the frequency of co~6
melt with significant release (of 5 x 10 per year as an upper limit and 10
per year as a goal). Such constraints are clearly not site specific.
b. Radioactivity Releases (Fig 2)
As an alternative to constraints on plant state frequencies, constraints
may be quoted in terms of the frequencies of releases of activity. The
earliest numerical safety criterion of all, proposed by Farmer, (4) was of this
form. However, subsequent proposals have not taken this form.
c. Radiation Dose (Fig 3)
Several criteria are based on or include constraints on radiation dose to
members of the public. In the UK both the NIl safety assessment principles (5)
and the CEGB Design Safety Guidelines (3) constrain the acceptable frequencies
of releases of activi ty leading to various doses to members of the public.
These doses are expressed in terms of the Emergency Reference Level of 10 rem,
a dose specified by the UK Medical Research Council as being a level of dose at
which countermeasures should be considered. (Recently the UK NRPB have made
more detailed recommendations on this topic (6)). It is important to note that
the CEGB DSG is for a11 accidents in each consequence decade whilst the NIl
assessment level is for discrete sequences. The Canadian AECB criteria
proposals (1) are expressed in terms of reference values for the sum of the
frequencies of all accidents leading to specified dose levels covering the
range from routine releases up to severe accidents.
d. Individual Risk (Fig 4)
Criteria expressed in terms of radiation dose may clearly be related to
individual risk values. In addition, several published criteria or safety
goals include constraints on individual risk. The US ACRS gives limits on the
risk to the most highly exposed individuals. The Kinchin criterion (7) proposes
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acceptable values for individual risk. The USNRC Safety Goals include limits
for individual risk specified as a percentage (0.1%) of the 'background' risk.
All these specify different values for the case of early death and delayed
death, with some weighting factor between these.
e. Societal Risk (Fig 5)
In addition to constraints on individual risk, some criteria contain
statements on societal risk, either as a single figure (for example the
expected number of deaths per year of reactor operation) or more commonly in
graphical form. In some cases (eg the Kinchin criterion) the constraint is an
iso-risk line, that is, one where the frequency decreases in inverse proportion
to the increasing severity of consequences, but in some cases an element of
risk aversion is incorporated so that frequencies are constrained to fall more
rapidly than this. The US ACRS proposals include a weighting in the formula
for evaluating the number of 'equivalent early deaths' for this purpose. The
USNRC Safety Goal relates acceptable risk to a proportion (0.1%) of the
background risk. Such criteria are of interest in comparing risks in different
fields such as other technologies or natural or background risks.
f. Cost-benefit Aspects (Table 1)
The ICRP in recommending that radiation exposure should be 'as low as
reasonably achievable' allow for an optimisation in radiological protection by
balancing benefits against costs. This concept is also incorporated into some
published safety criteria, for example the USNRC safety goals give a figure in
dollars per man-rem for the assessment of an incremental reduction of societal
risks below the numerical guidelines, and the ACRS give figures for assessment
of the cost-effectiveness of measures to reduce both early and delayed deaths.
PHILOSOPHICAL BASIS - Table 2
The philosophical basis underlying published safety criteria or safety
goals may vary, indeed in some cases it may not be stated at all. Various
reference points may be identified with which to compare the risk levels
derived.
a. Comparison with Prevailing Risk Levels in Society
Several criteria and safety goals are based on comparing the risk level
which they represent with that current in society. In the case of USNRC safety
goals, the risk level is expressed as a percentage (0.1%) of that resulting
from all causes. In other cases the link is less direct but for example both
Farmer and Kinchin derived their criteria in the context of prevailing risks in
society.
In a document recently submitted to the Public Inquiry into the building
of the Sizewell 'B' PWR (8), Locke (a consultant to the UK Health and Safety
Executive) considers the risks posed by a nuclear plant just meeting the NIl
Safety Assessment Principles. In relation to natural hazards he considers land
contamination and large scale evacuation and re-location. The frequency of
such an event in the borderline nuclear case considered is 1 in 300,000 per
year. This is contrasted with the frequency of 1 in 1,000 per year which is
the estimated frequency of a North Sea tide overtopping the newly-installed
Thames Barrage and flooding London.
b. ·Comparison with other Technological Risks
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Many criteria and goals are based on comparison wi th other, apparently
acceptable, technological risks. The USNRC's safety goals require that the
risk from nuclear power plant accidents should be comparable to or less than
the risks from generating electricity by viable competing technologies.
Others, for example, the Farmer criterion and the US ACRS, are also based on
inter-comparison with other technological risks.
In the document by Locke (8), the risks from a nuclear plant just meeting
the NIl Safety Assessment Principles are compared also wi th risks from other
industrial plant. He finds the risk of small scale accidents, such as might
require local temporary evacuation, arising from the borderline nuclear plant
to compare favourably with risks of similar events, for example, LPG storage or
a chemical factory. More severe accidents, wi th lower frequencies, are
compared with similar consequence accidents involving railway trains or
aircraft, or large chemical complexes. Again the result is that the risk
implied by the NIl safety assessment principles is lower than those from
'conventional' sourees.
c. Consideration of Low Probability Natural Hazards
Some criteria, for example those proposed by Farmer and Kinchin, refer to
the risks posed by 101'1 probability events such as lightning strike and
meteorites.
d. Consideration of Accepted Voluntary Risk Levels
The Kinchin criterion is derived in relation to accepted voluntary risks
in society as a whole. Comparison is also made with other risks such as risks
from illness and disease which are not accepted by society and which as a
result are the subject of research programmes. From these, an indication of
the boundary between acceptable and non-acceptable risk levels is inferred.
COMPARISON OF EXISTING SAFETY CRITERIA AND SAFETY GOALS
Published proposals for risk acceptability criteria and safety goals
differ widely in their approach and structure, in their philosophical basis and
the form of constraint adopted. In the preceding discussion, examples have
been given of some of tqese. It is tempting to compare the relative stringency
of the various criteria available. This is possible in some cases where
equivalent figures are given, but in most cases the differences between the
form of constraint do not permit direct comparison. Even when apparently
equivalent figures are given, care must be exercised. For example the CEGB and
NIl lines in Fig 3 appear to be comparable but in fact are significantly
different, the CEGB one is for all sequences whereas the NIl one is for a
single discrete sequence. However, where comparisons can be made then it is
useful to do this, and an extensive comparison has been prepared in the Federal
Republic of Germany. Amongst international organisations the NEA has provided
the forum for useful discussions in this field through i ts Committee for the
Safety of Nuclear Installations, whose Principal Working Group 5 covers Risk
Assessment, and also through its Licensing Group. The CEC is also active in
this area: it has a permanent working party on Safety Goals and Objectives
whose recent report reviews the position in CEC member countries.
In practice, any criterion or safety goal must be assessed in a specific
context of typical data on population, meteorology, atmospheric dispersion and
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health physics, as well (possibly) as plant-specific data. As an example of
what is involved, the NIl have recently carried out an exercise relating their
Safety Assessment Principles to levels of risk to the public (9). In order
to do this, they have had to make assumptions on the spectrum of accident
sequences for the plant concerned, the population distribution around the site
and the meteorological data for the site, as well as detailed assumptions
regarding the type of release. The resul t of this is that the Safety
Assessment Principles are tentatively estimated to be equivalent in risk ter~5
to an upper limit for individual risk of death from cancer of the order of 10
per year for an individual at the site boundary. This is shown on Figure 4 as
'NIl Inferred'. This value corresponds to accidental releases and a figure of
similar magnitude is obtained for routine releases.
Wi th regard to societal risk, the results are even more dependent upon the
assumptions made and the NIl have calculated a band of possible risks which
reflect this difficulty. The results of the NIl calculations are shown
superimposed on Figure 5 where the band of possible risks for each of the two
assumptions for the spectrum of plant risks (A and B) is shown. The wide range
of results is obvious from this. The risk of 10 fatal i ties , for example,
varies over 2Yz decades, depending upon the assumptions made. Since the various
published cri.teria and goals have evolved in different parts of the world,
where population distributions and meteorology in particular may be very
different, the choice of 'appropriate' or 'typical' data for such a comparison
becomes very difficult. Therefore it is no simple matter to take a comparison
of different criteria and goals beyond that presented already. The prevailing
impression emerging from that comparison is the very wide span of approaches
encompassed by these criteria.
THE PRACTICAL APPLICATIONS OF SAFETY CRITERIA AND SAFETY GOALS
The practical application of safety criteria and safety goals throws up
many difficulties. Some of these may be peculiar to a particular way in which
the constraints are framed, or to a particular design-specific aspect. However
others are indicative of more fundamental problems underlying the application
of many formulations. These can be seen as falling into two categories - those
relating to information requirements for the application of a criterion, and
those relating to choice of various options or alternatives in carrying out the
assessment.
1. Information Requirements
Some safety criteria or safety goals apply to the plant i tself, in
isolation from siting considerations. Examples of this are those criteria
applying to plant damage states (ACRS, NRC, CEGB). A plant design can be
assessed against these, to a greater or lesser extent, wi thout the need to
consider site-specific data such as population, meteorology etc. Other
criteria or goals, however, relating to societal risk, for example, can only be
considered in relation either to a specific site or to some 'typical' location.
These are therefore more difficult to use at the stage of design development,
since the site may not be specified at this stage. Criteria and goals relating
to individual risk fall in between these two extremes. These may, for example,
be applied at the site boundary, which is a less site-specific constraint than
one which requires consideration of the distribution of the surrounding
population.
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2. Alternative Methods of Assessment
In many areas,
can depend strongly
summarised in the
various areas:
the numerical result of a quantitative safety assessment
upon the choices made during the assessment. These may be
following possible approaches which could be adopted in
a. Degree of Pessimism
In many areas it is possible to choose either to carry out a
'conservative' or 'bounding' calculation, or to carry out a 'best estimate'
calculation. It is usual in certain cases to choose a conservative
calculation: this is usually the case for example in licensing areas
particularly where design basis accidents are being considered. In other areas
it is more usual to consider best estimate calculations, an example being in
severe accidents beyond the design basis for which there may not be clearly
defined conservative assumptions which can be made. The convention as to what
assumptions and methods are 'usual' in particular cases may vary from country
to country, from group to group, and also may change with time. It is clearly
essential that calculations should involve the same degree of pessimism as that
which those proposing the criteria or goals assumed would be used i i t is
clearly not sensible to compare 'conservative' calculations with criteria or
goals intended for 'best estimate' calculations, or vice versa. Therefore it
is necessary for those proposing criteria to indicate what degree of pessimism
they intend should be employed.
b. Population to be Considered
As a particular example of the need to specify the degree of pessimism, is
the need to specify whether 'populations' and ' individuals ' referred to in
safety criteria or safety goals should be average in some sense, or those most
highly exposed, or (hypothetical) persons located at the most exposed location
accessible to the public. It is possible to frame constraints in terms of any
of these alternatives, w~th valid reasons for the choice, but unless the choice
is clearly specified wide dispari ties can seem to exist between different
formulations because of this.
c. Interpretation of Analysis Results including Areas of Uncertainty
In carrying out a complete safety analysis there are various areas which
currently present technical problems in that the analysis methods or the data
base or both are not sufficiently developed for quantification to the same
degree of certainty as the rest of the analysis. Such areas are the subject of
current research and of much debate: they include, for example, human factors,
common cause effects, certain external events, etc. Inclusion of such aspects,
and the method by which they are included, could have a marked effect on the
results of the analysis. Further, these are areas where there is prospect of
considerable evolution in techniques in the future, and so the effects on the
analysis could weIl change with time. Therefore it is important that, where
such changes might affect the interpretation of a safety criterion or goal,'
sorne guidance should be given as to how they should be interpreted for this
purpose.
d. Risk Cutoff
It is the nature of the risk from radioactive discharges that, as the
material moves further from the point of discharge, although it becomes diluted
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and dispersed, the number of people who might be exposed increases rapidly
although the risk to the individual in the distant population may be
infinitesimal. Because of this effect, which can cause unnecessary emphasis to
be placed on those most distant and therefore least at risk, it is sometimes
the case that societal risk criteria imply some cutoff point at which the
infinitesimal risks to distant individuals cease to be added into the total.
However, because the effects of this on the totals which result from the
mathematical analysis can be significant, it is essential that in any criterion
or goal which is intended for use with such a cutoff, this is made clear so
that compatible calculations can be carried out.
e. Treatment of Multi-plant Sites
Many nuclear sites contain more than one reactor installation. Therefore
i t is essential in defining a safety goal or safety criterion to make clear
whether the constraints in terms of frequencies etc apply to an individual
reactor, to a particular installation, to the site as a whole, or even (in some
cases) to a national programme involving several sites.
f. Treatment of Mitigation and Emergency Response
In many postulated accident scenarios it is possible to mitigate or even'
remove the consequences by some emergency response, either by the site
personnel or by public authori ties, at the time of the accident. In a
realistic analysis, this would be taken into account, but in many safety
criteria consideration of such actions is explicitly or implicitly excluded.
It is obviously essential that the proposers of a criterion should state what
their intentions are on this aspect. .
KEY QUESTIONS
From the review of the various approaches to safety goals and safety
criteria, several key problems emerge which any new or revised proposals should
seek to address. These fall into the following three broad areas:
1. Problems in Defining Acceptability
Various problems remain in the area of definition of acceptable risks.
These include:
a. The concept of risk aversion - should it be incorporated into safety goals
and if so, how?
b. The weighting between early and late effects is seen by several bodies as
a meaningful and useful approach but weighting factors have been proposed which
cover a wide range.
c. Optimisation between risks from routine operation and risks from
accidents.
2. Specific Problems in Assessment Methods, Techniques and Data Bases
In many areas, items can be identified on which there is as yet no clear
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consensus and which may require interpretation when applying safety goals or
safety criteria to a particular plant. \<lhere this is the case, the safety
goals or criteria should include some guidance on the interpretation to be
adopted. Some of these are mentioned below:
a. The treatment of uncertainties.
b. The treatment of mitigation and emergency response.
c. The effect of in-service modifications.
d. The 'effects of human factors and human reliability.
e. The effects of common-cause failures.
f. The application of a risk cutoff when calculating societal risk.
g. The consideration of time-dependent populations.
3. General Problems Related to Application
Some general areas can be identified, as opposed to the fairly specific
technical problems mentioned above, which relate to the applications of safety
goals or safety criteria to an actual plant. These may be grouped as follows:
a. Should the criteria or goals be specified in great detail to give clear
but possibly very rigid design specific requirements, or should a broader 'in
principle' approach be adopted with amplification where necessary by associated
guidance notes?
b. Should criteria or safety goals be
adhered to, as a target to be aimed at,
rigid limit and a lower target?
intended as a rigid boundary to be
or should they include both an upper
c. Should
'conservative'
reasonable but
(beyond design
safety criteria or
or 'best estimate'
clearly conservative
basis) accidents?
safety goals be specified in
analyses? 1s i t possible to
route for calculating the outcome
terms of
define a
of severe
d. What range of applicability should be aimed for? Should criteria or goals
be plant-specific or applicable to a range of plant types or indeed to a
variety of installations?
e. Should safety goals or criteria be framed in relation to a specified or
implied 'typical' site or population distribution, or should they always relate
to actual populations?
f. How should uncertainties or errors be addressed?
goals be essentially single-valued or should they
associated with a constraint in some way?
Should the criteria or
specify the confidence
CONCLUS10NS - WHAT SHOULD WE BE A1M1NG FOR?
The overall aims and objectives for setting safety goals and safety
criteria may vary, so also may the philosophical basis. As a result the
formats adopted for safety goals and criteria cover a wide range, making
inter-comparison difficult. This difficulty is compounded in many cases
because the underlying assumptions are in many cases not fully specified - a
fact which also makes application of particular goals or criteria to specific
plant difficult in some cases. Key questions relating to the formulation of
safety goals have been set out which seek to shed light on the way forward.
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But the question remains, what should we be almlng for? In assessing the
acceptability of a safety case three tests can be proposed:
The first is that of consistency. Dur experience is often obtained from
events in poorly characterised situations such as incidents or accidents. We
cannot make predictions on this basis alone. Predictions are made based on
data from well-characterised experiments and using an analytical capability.
However these predictions must be consistent with our experience if they are to
form a firm foundation for predicting the safety of nuclear plant.
The second test is the test of completeness. This is linked to the first,
for without experience we do not have a sound basis on which to make a test of
completeness. Therefore in some areas it may be necessary to 'generate' such
experience by integral testing programmes in order to satisfy the test of
completeness.
The third test is the test of importance. The greatest attention should be
paid to the most important topics. To be able to address the question of
importance, we must be able to satisfy the tests of consistency and
completeness, at least to some extent. Having done this, even roughly, the
test of importance may tell us that our present knowledge is adequate to decide
on the importance or unimportance of a topic. The need for further work in
this topic will thus be determined by this test.
In formulating safety goals and safety criteria, our aim is to set down the
rules to be used in this last and vital test of importancej however we must not
forget that this test rests upon the two other tests of consistency and
completeness.
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TABLE 1
Cost-Benefit Aspects
ACRS (1) $lm per delayed cancer death averted.
$5m per early equivalent (weighted) death
averted.
USNRC(2) $1,000 per man-rem averted.
UK Annual dose_3 5 x 10-
5 Sv f:2000/man Sv
NRPB (10) (5 x 10 rem) (f:20/man rem)
Annual_gose between_4
nO,OOO/man Sv5 x 10 _3and 5 x 10 _2Sv
(5 x 10 and 5 x 10 rem) (HOO/man rem)
Annual_aose between_3 f:50,000/man Sv5x 10 _2and 5 x 10 _lSv
(5 x 10 and 5 x 10 rem) (f:500/man rem)
TABLE 2
Philosophical Bases.'
Farmer Kinchin USNRC ACRS
Prevailing
risk levels I I D
Technological
risks I D I
Natural
hazards I D I
Voluntary
risks I
D Direct comparison
I Indirect comparison
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ADVANCES AND TRENDS IN REACTOR SAFETY RESEARCH AND
TECHNOLOGY
Prof. Dr. A. Birkhofer
Gesellschaft für Reaktorsicherheit (GRS) mbH
Forschungsgelände, 8046 Garehing, FRG
"Safety has been an important consideration from the very beginning of
the development of nuclear reactors". This is the opening sentence of the
famous book on "The Technology of Nuclear Reactor Safety", published in 1964
by T.J. Thompson and J.G. Beckerly.
A number of fundamentals did remain unchanged over four decades of
reactor development. So, reactor safety is still based to a high degree on
the theoretical analysis of postulated accidents, in order to anticipate and
thus to avoid bad experiences.
Also, like in the early years, safety of nuclear power plants in all
count ries is supervised by governmental agencies and is seen to a high
degree as a public affair.
One consequence has been, that complex technical matters had to be
explained and discussed in front of non-technical decision-making bodies and
of a broader public. On this field nuclear energy played a pioneering role
also for other technologies.
In spite of these and other conformities, a lot has changed from the
safety design of early small scale reactors nntil that of modern commercial
nuclear power plants.
For a number of years the problem of power excursions played a
predominant role in accident analysis. Severe excursions in research
reactors like SPERT and SL-l gave an additional rise to analyse very
carefully the dynamic behavior of reactor cores and to develop effective
protection systems.
Due to the small size of the nuclear reactor plants safety of the
public could be achieved either by geographie isolation or by containments,
which like an "umbreila" protected the environment in any case.
The Ergen-Report in 1966 made clear that it is not sufficient to limit
the radioactive releases after a Loss-of-coolant accident (LOCA) by means of
a containment. It had been recognize9 that the integrity of containments
could be jeopardized by a core melt down. Therefore, something had to be
done to maintain core cooling in case of an accident.
In the following years concentrated attention has been given to all aspects
of emergency core cooling.
A specific experiment in the first "SEMISCALE"-test facility and a
growing tendency to lower core damage in case of a complete failure of a
main coolant pipe (MCA - maximum credible accident) resulted, in 1971, in
the publication of the "Interim Acceptance Criteria for Emergency Core
Cooling Systems" of the USNRC followed by extensive hearings and a large
research program.
In the seventies research about the effectiveness of ECCS concentrated
on large break LOCA's, because such breaks would produce the highest loads
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on the reactor system. Some small break analysis had been done at that time
and more significant research was planned after the major questions related
to large break LOCA had been answered. However, the event of TMI-2 and
results from risk studies changed the priorities. More emphasis has been put
on operational transients and small break LOCA's.
Although some research to study core melt phenomena started at the end
of the sixties and beginning of the seventies the major increase in funding
and efforts was pushed by the TMI-2 accident.
In addition to thermohydraulic research, material issues have been
considered and addressed. Material research started with the study of
neutron irradiation, while other material behavior has been considered to be
known. However, during manufacturing of big pressure vessels, underclad
cracking and reheat cracking were found. At the beginning of the seventies
an extensive (and expensive) research program on material issues was
initiated. In addition, limitation of radiation dose to the reactor pressure
vessel was required by new guidelines.
It has to be realized that reactor safety research requires time,
funding and expertise. The time span between the realization of a "problem"
and its solution can be more than 20 years as in the case of large break
LOCA research. For severe accident research this period could be reduced to
about 8-10 years. This acceleration is due to effective project management,
trained experts and experienced laboratories.
By analysing the steps and progress in LOCA research it can be seen
that this research was organized such that new projects were based on former
results. This procedure was acceptable from a plant safety point of view
because the design of ECCS was based on conservative assumptions.
In fig. 1 time-history of the budget for reactor safety research of two
selected organizations is shown in relative units. Despite the fact that in-
flation has not been taken into account a major increase in the budgets
between 1970 and 1980, the additional push by the TMI-2 accident and the
decrease after the year 1982 can be recognized.
The question is, whether it is advisable to further decrease the
budgets.
An advisory board to DOE has assessed the annual expenditures for LWR
safety R+D within the free world to be about 800 million US$. This number
includes efforts by governmental agencies as weIl as industry. It can be
compared with a produced electrical power of about 800-1000 TWh in 1983 with
the expected increase as shown in fig. 2.
Currently, industry and governmental agencies together are spending only a
few percent of a sum, matching the costs of the produced electrical power,
for nuclear safety research. This is about equal to the relative funding for
safety research within the automobile industry.
Considering the great importance, reactor safety is given by the public
for good reasons, we may ask ourselves whether is justified to continue the
present trend of decreasing nuclear safety research expenditures.
Let me return to the technical questions. Many safety problems in
nuclear engineering are not very different from those in nonnuclear fields.
However, they are complex for a variety of reasons:
167
In nonnuclear industries components can often be tested in advance or
during operation. In nuclear technology, the component and system
behavior cannot in all cases be directly studied and experimentally
verified, especially for low probability events.
For design or operational purposes component and system behaviör has to
be simulated by means of computer codes. Most problems are
mathematically very complex and sometimes highly nonlinear.
Due to the harsh environment - including radiation - material and
design requirements are specific.
Stringent licensing requirements lead to conservative assumptions
resulting in complex designs.
The area of reactor safety research and technology is wide spread.
Dr. Stratton has covered the present status on source term research and
Mr. Gauvenet evaluated existing operating experience. To avoid duplication,
I will not assess both topics in detail. My comments will concentrate on the
following topics:
Thermohydraulics and fuel behavior research for transients including
loss-of-coolant-accidents
Physical phenomena and system behavior during severe accidents
Material issues of the pressure boundary and secondary circuit
Probabilistic methods in reactor safety
Optimization of instrumentation and control, including man-machine
interaction
Interaction between licensing and research.
THERMOHYDRAULICS AND FUEL BEHAVIOR RESEARCH FOR TRANSIENTS
INCLUDING LOSS-OF-COLLANT ACCIDENTS
The objectives in thermohydraulics and fuel behavior research are to
prove the effectiveness of reactor control and ECC-systems, during an
accident. These objectives require a detailed description and simulation of
physical phenomena and system behavior and, in addition, allow the assess-
ment of safety margins remaining if design limits should be exceeded.
The physical phenomena during operational transients, small and large
break LOCA's have been studied and simulated mostly with appropriate com-
puter codes.
Three-dimensional effects need further study in certain areas, like
large break LOCA, the mixing behavior related to the
pressurized-thermal-shock (PTS) problem or stratification during small break
LOCA.
System behavior in case of operational transients and small break
LOCA's for large reactors has successfully been simulated in research
facilities in spite of scaling problems. Most of the older test facilities,
like LOFT and LOBI, have been designed primarily for large break LOCA
research and were later modified to address small break LOCA and operational
transients.
The ROSA-IV and BETHSY facilities now under construction or in the
planning phase have been designed to study small break and transient system
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behavior. Realising the capabilities of these facilities, between 150 and
200 experiments will be available at the end of this decade in addition to
about 400 integral experiments which are available now.
Construction and operation of thermohydraulic test facilities is
expensive. It should be envisaged that a group of interested countries could
operate an existing facility to continue research and, especially, keep a
group of experts trained. This would allow fast reactions to unforeseen
events.
The OECD LOFT Project is an example of successful implementation of
this concept. In fig. 3 the time schedule for existing or planned integral
test facilities is shown.
Fuel behavior research has recently been assessed by a Principal
Working Group of CSNI. It stated that the relevant research work has been
done and an appropriate computer simulation has been achieved.
There are, however, some areas in which more or better data or codes
are desirable, e. g. blockages in large rod bundles and high ,burn-up fuel,
modelling of co-planarity and maximum swelling strain, high temperature
oxidation, modelling of PCI in the presence of aggressive fission products
and fission product release during transients. A status report is under
preparation.
In summary, this area is weIl covered and international cooperation has
been very successful.
Computer codes in thermohydraulics are a major factor in reactor safety
assessment. Codes for detailed assessments, e.g. for design purposes or pre-
diction of complex accident conditions, are needed in addition to fast
running codes for parametric studies and for use in simulators or plant
analysers .
To decrease the verification effort the same code should be used for
both purposes with - perhaps - coarse nodalisation and large time steps for
faster running applications.
To avoid misleading results codes should - as far as
possible - calculate best-estimate behavior. Conservative assumptions - if
any - should be included in the initial conditions Ce.g. power level),
boundary conditions Ce.g. availability of systems) or design limits.
Best-estimate assumptions are first of all necessary for codes to be used in
simulators or plant analysers.
Past experience with experiments and calculations has shown that
complex codes are not necessary in all cases and simpler codes are
sufficient in many cases. A typical case is the simulation of
fluid/structure interactions.
Major codes simulating system behavior like TRAC, RELAP, DRUFAN,
CATHARE require developmental efforts of 100 man-years or more and are now
nearly finalized. Maintenance may require 0.5 million dollars/year or more.
To increase confidence in code results, two efforts are underway.
1. Within CSNI a verification matrix is being prepared in order to allow
comparisons between different codes and to demonstrate the capabilities
of these codes. It might be possible to approve a code for licensing
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calculations after successfully simulating the experiments of this
matrix. In Fig. 4 an overview of the proposed verification matrix is
given.
2. Experience shows that the user is sometimes the "most uncertain
variable", and therefore it has been proposed to initiate users groups
for the codes. This was one result of International Standard Problem
Exercises, when different participants used the same code version.
Considerable research results, valuable code work and operating ex-
perience have been acclooulated during the last three decades in the nuclear
field. For the overall benefit efforts should be undertaken to use this
know-how also in non-nuclear areas.
Based on the current state of knowledge systems can be optimized, e.g.
by adjusting number, pressure level and injection location of ECC-systems.
As an example, in the FRG high pressure injection has been relocated from
the cold to the hot leg side to avoid pressurized thermal shock.
In summary:
What has been done?
The main objecLives for thermohydraulics and fuel behavior research
within the DBA frame have been achieved.
IYhat remains to be done?
System behavior assuming multiple failures should be simulated in
computer codes and test facilities mainly to study the interaction
between different components including instrumentation and control more
realistic. This recommendation is supported by operating experience.
Fast running codes are required for plant analysers and simulators.
Three dimensional effects have to be studied and mode lIed in some
areas.
At all times at least one test facility should be maintained to allow
fast reactions in case of unforeseen events.
Improve confidence in computer code calculations by using verification
matrices and install users groups.
PHYSICAL PHENO~lliNA AND SYSTEM BEHAVIOR DURING SEVERE ACCIDENTS
To further assess the overall safety of plants, analyses and
experiments are currently underway using the assumption that ECC-systems are
partly, temporarily or completely ineffective.
The objective is to study the physical phenomena and system behavior
during severe accidents with the aim to identify and - if advisable - to
further reduce potential risks.
Risk studies and the TMI-2 accident have increased the efforts in the
severe accident area. Whether and which additional safety systems are
appropriate to minimize technical risks has to be decided on the basis of
sound analyses of the real system behavior in case of an accident.
For the analysis of the analysis of in-vessel behavior it is useful to
define three categories of core degradation.
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Category I: Core temperatures and core damage stay within design limits
but licensing requirements have been violated.
Category 11: Core is degraded to an extent that cooling can be restored by
flooding.
Category 111: The coolability of the core cannot be restored, rapid energy
transfer into the remaining fluid may happen.
Using this categorization, in contrast to a "melt no melt" approach the
effectiveness of measures against core melt (accident management)
can be assessed more adequately.
Experimental and analytical work on core behavior has been performed or
is underway. The progression of accident investigations into substantial
core degradation and finally core melt resulted in out-of-pile and in-pile
experiments for oxidation behavior, hydrogen production, U02-ZrO?-inter-
action, debris bed formation and the beginning of core melt. MosE experts
agree that relatively simple codes should be linked to those experiments.
This opinion is based on the lack of experiments studying the maximum
permissible core degradation under which cooling can be restored ("point of
no return").
Steam explosion phenomena have been subject to intensive research.
Although detailed mechanisms are still imperfectly understood, it'can be
judged that in-vessel steam explosions capable of damaging the containment
are very unlikely.
In fig. 5 the times for specific events, such as core uncovery, are
shown. For the most probable cases, transients and small breaks, generally
hours are available before high core degradation would occur. The time span
would allow for appropriate counter measures. For example, to increase the
time to core uncovery in case of high system pressure, the accumulator could
be used. By opening the pressurizer valves, the system pressure could be
sufficiently decreased to allow accumulator injection (fig. 6). This water
reservoir of the accumulators alone would increase the time until core
uncovery by about 1 1/2 hour, so that other actions could be undertaken by
plant personnei.
In summary, appropriate accident management actions have the potential
to decrease core melt probability substantially.
Ex-vessel phenomena cover a wider range of events, e.g. rapid melt/
water interaction, melt/concrete interaction including crust formation,
hydrogen distribution and burn, temperature and pressure behavior. Excellent
work is underway and will improve the understanding of those phenomena.
Containments are designed for DBA's with safety margins which would
allow, in general, higher loads'than design loads. Therefore, with most
containments, no early failure would occur except in case of leakages.
Appropriate measures, using existing components, could further reduce
the loads on the containment. It has to be analysed which measures should be
taken after electrical power is restored. Studies performed and system
behavior during the TMI-2 accident have shown that a flexible use of
existing systems can effectively be used to restore coolability and to
prevent core melt through.
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Survivability of instruments and necessary components should be tested.
The assessment of loads on containment, structural components and
instruments should be based on realistic conditions in order to avoid an
accumulation of conservation. Uncertainty bands of the results should be
estimated which is sometimes difficult due to the lack of experimental data.
The knowledge of the behavior of fission products during a hypothetical
accident has been very much improved in the last few years and conservative
assumptions could be reduced. With the better understanding of the relevant
processes a reduction of estimated source terms could be achieved.
The amount of reduction of the source term, however, depends very much
on both the reactor type and the special accident sequences. The source
terms are greatly influenced for example by the deposition in the primary
system for small LOCA, by the separation within the containment and by the
retention in the annulus and auxiliary building in the case of containment
leakages. An international consensus on fission product behavior in the case
of an accident should be achievable within the next years.
In summary:
What has been done?
An extensive research program is underway or has been completed with
many results already in hand. Further results will be available within the
next years.
What remains to be done?
Containment failure modes and possible leakages should be studied in
more detail.
A common understanding about the physical phenomena and their relevance
has to be reached, e.g. through CSNI expert groups.
Accident management should be further improved to allow appropriate
measures using existing components.
~1ATERIAL ISSUES OF THE PRESSURE BOUNDARY AND SECONDARY CIRCUIT
The main safety objective is to avoid material failures which could
initiate accidents. Therefore,
possible failure mechanisms and the influencing variables
must be understood
the safety margins should be known at any time
the quality of design and material must be high to minimize the
potential for failures.
Material aspects related to components are - due to time limitation -
not part of my presentation.
In the past, the causes responsible for the development of micro- and
macro-cracks in heat-affected zones have been determined and the
significance of these defects with respect to the safety of the components
has been deeply investigated. In addition, optimized parameters to prevent
cracks and degradation of material toughness for new components have been
studied and approaches to determine the critical crack length and
leak-before-break conditions have been developed. Remote control
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manipulators and computerized data processing are used to improve nonde-
structive testing techniques.
Based on these improvements it has been decided in Germany and in the
US (for some plants) that a guillotine-type break of a main coolant pipe has
only to be considered for specific "umbrella-type" analyses. This approach
results in a simpler layout of the system by eliminating pipe whip
restraints, optimizing the supports and simplifing and making more effective
inspection.
In the future, research in material issues has to be continued to
further improve and validate knowledge and calculation methods.
PROBABILISTIC ~lliTHODS IN REACTOR SAFETY
The objective is to gain additional insights into safety aspects to
improve the reliability of system and to develop a quantitative measure of
safety.
Very high functional reliability of safety related systems has always
been a major demand in reactor technology. Deterministic criteria have been
and are being applied to assess reliability, e.g. the single-failure
criterion, and the requirements of redundancy, diversity and
fail-safe-design.
Soon, however, efforts have been made to arrive at quantitative
measures of reliability. For that purpose probabilistic methods have been
developed and are being used in growing extent.
The use of probabilistic methods has been stimulated by various incentives.
o To arrive at highly reliable systems, it is helpful to compare
different system designs and procedures. The most appropriate way is to
quantify and to compare the respective reliabilities.
o
o
It was feIt that the application of deterministic criteria, although
leading to a high level of overall safety, can not guarantee a balance
between the different aspects of safety. A comprehensive probabilistic
analysis of the plant, considering the interaction of the various
safety and operational systems, can determine weak features in
sensitive areas as weIl as excessive features in less important areas.
Beyond the scope of system reliability assessment probabilistic methods
are being extensively used in risk analyses. Some of these studies have
been aimed at an estimation of the accident risk, which is posed to the
public by nuclear power plants. Up to now, more than 30 Probabilistic
Risk Analyses (PRA) have been performed in different countries.
Today, the probabilistic approach is considered mainly as an
alternative, and in many respects powerful method to assess the technical
safety. The use of PRAs in public discussion plays only a minor role for
several reasons which will not be discussed here.
Probabilistic safety analyses have proven to be useful in many in-
stances, for plant specific as weIl as for generic decisions. They provide
information in which way core damage could occur and how it can be prevented
and they allow a relative ranking of safety issues. In many cases,
qualitative insights gained during the analysis are more important than
quantitative bottom line results.
173
Probabilistic analyses and especially PRAs are an attempt to
prognosticate the future behavior of systems. Like all prognoses they are
unavoidably affected with uncertainties. Various sources of uncertainty can
be identified, ranging from incomplete knowledge of accident behavior of the
plant to the lack of component and human reliability data. Some of the
problems are inherent to the method. So, it will always be necessary to
include subjective judgment especially if very remote accident sequences
have to be considered.
An intensive evaluation of operating experiences and a comparison with
analytical results is most important for further improvements.
What has been done?
Effective probabilistic methods have been developed and applied in many
instances to gain better insights into safety issues.
They are widely accepted as a useful addition to the approved
deterministic approach.
Wbat remains to be done?
A broader basis for component reliability data has to be established.
For this purpose detailed evaluation of operating experiences including
maintenance and repair of components is required.
The confidence in probabilistic analyses should be improved by
comparisons between operating experience and analytical results on the
level of systems. Appropriate analytical consideration of system
interdependences has to be checked by evaluating abnormal occurrences.
Methods have to be developed and data have to be collected which allow
a more realistic consideration of human influence and common cause
failures.
OPTIMIZATION OF INSTRUMENTATION AND CONTROL SYSTEMS, INCLUDING
MAN-MACHINE INTERACTION
The objective is to improve the plant availability while maintaining
the high safety standard by means of advanced I&C systems, by computerized
aids to the operators and by early detection of incipient failures.
The availability (and safety) of nuclear power plants is considerably
influenced by the effectiveness of I&C systems, by the degree and scope of
automation, by the skill and knowledge of the operating crew and by the
quality of maintenance.
Substantial research in the human factors area has been performed
especially in the US during the last years following the TMI-accident. This
has led to improvements of the control room design, of operating procedures
and of the training of personnei.
Nevertheless, there is still a need for further research especially
with respect to a better structuring of alarms, a greater transparency of
complex systems, a better support in decision making. In addition,
maintainability and testability of systems should be improved.
Extensive work has been performed in this area in the various coun-
tries, which can only be highlighted here.
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The development of various Safety Parameter Display Systems (SPDS) the
human factors field, research on modified I&C-concepts characterize the
US-situation.
The work in France was concentrated to a great extent on the
development of a symptom-oriented approach for unforeseen events. The
introduction of the so-called U- and H-procedures and of the pertinent
hardware features as weIl as research on the organizational aspects indicate
the leading role in this field.
In Japan great research efforts are undertaken to develop advanced
control rooms and computerized operator aids.
The situation in Germany is not directly comparable because of the
early introduction of a high degree and scope of automation within the
operational systems and also within the engineered safeguards. Especially
the limitation systems have to be mentioned. They have demonstrated their
effectiveness in limiting disturbances and avoiding unnecessary scrams,
component stresses and containment isolation.
They allow for an early detection of disturbances and for appropriate
countermeasures like limitation of reactor power and other process
parameters. These systems allows to restrict the reactor protection system
to such events when the reactor has to be shutdown together with containment
isolation in most cases.
Another important aspect is the use of redundant control systems in
order to reduce deviations from normal operation caused by control system
malfunctions. Thls I&C-concept has proven to be effective. Further
development of microprocessor technology will allow even more efficient
limitation and control systems. Other areas of interest are the development
of advanced control rooms with computer-based operator aids.
In order to detect incipient failures as early as possible, diagnostic
methods like loose-parts monitoring and on-line vibration analysis are being
developed. Up to now the long-term stability of monitored vibration
functions (patterns) during the undisturbed power operation could be shown.
The main aim of further research is to study the influence of changed
operational conditions (reactor power, pressure, temperature, number of main
coolant pumps in operation) on the patterns. 'In a second step influence of
changed mechanical parameters on these patterns will be investigated by
analytical model calculations.
By comparing the two kinds of deviations in the monitored functions a
bandwidth of "allowed changes" of the patterns in question can be defined
and recommendations for performing vibration monitoring will be worked out.
In addition to training simulators more flexible plant analysers are
under development in different countries using existing as weIl as newly
developed safety analysis codes. The analysers should be capable to provide
easy-to-use, cheap and reliable tools for fast analysis of transients and
loss-of-coolant accidents.
What has been done?
Advanced design of instrumentation and control systems, based on
operating experience and pertinent research, has improved plant
availability and safety.
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Human influence on plant safety, in spite of automation, has been
realized. This resulted in initiation of relevant research projects.
Wha·t remains to be done?
The general philosophy should be to detect disturbances as early as
possible in order to avoid hard countermeasures.
Systems should be designed to allow a flexible response to abnormal
occurrences.
INTERACTION BETWEEN RESEARCH AND LICENSING
In most countries, responsibility for reactor safety research is
maintained separate from licensing and supervision of operation. Research
has to develop the knowledge needed, while licensing has to determine the
necessary safety level.
In the licensing process, the results of research must be considered in
order to achieve weIl balanced decisions. On the other hand research has to
consider operational experience, but it must remain free from licensing
pressure. Research is broadj licensing is somewhat more focused on actual
needs.
In reactor safety research one has to adopt a realistic, best estimate
philosophy, while in licensing a conservative approach which sometimes
results in nonphyiscal assumptions and results, must be maintained.
Therefore, to improve confidence, the physical process should always be
simulated using best estimate procedures and conservatisms should be applied
only to design limits (safety margins) and initial and boundary conditions
(e.g. initial power level and system availabilities).
The licensing process is mainly based on rules and guidelines. These
rules and guidelines must satisfy licensing requirements while maintaining
enough flexibility to allow and encourage progress. In my view, too many
regulations and overenforcement hinder rapid incorporation of new results,
actual needs and potential improvements.
Countries with significant operations and licensing experience should be
encouraged to adjust rules and guidelines more often to actual needs than it
is experienced now.
Finally, international cooperation in research areas has been signifi-
cantly improving and common understanding is progressing e.g. through CSNI
efforts.
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SYSTEMATIC ANALYSIS OF PLANT DISTURBANCES WITH A
VIEW TO REDUCING SCRAM FREQUENCY
Kari J. Laakso
AB ASEA-ATOM
S-721 04 Västeräs, Sweden
ABSTRACT
The goal of this project is to improve plant safety and reliability in Swedish
BWRs by reducing the frequency of reactor scrams.
The history of plant disturbances leading to reactor scrams and turbine trips in
five Swedish nuclear power units was reviewed and the contributing causes were
carefully analyzed. A total of 625 plant disturbances was included in the search.
Improvements to be made in the units were identified and the merits of possible
modifications were assessed using reliability engineering and PRA techniques.
Emphasis was given to design improvements in the NSSS (Nuclear Steam Supply
System) as weil as in the electricity generation (turbine plant) area.
Examples of various types of recommended modifications will be given,
including either their proven or expected efficiency in reducing scram
frequency.
The project[ IJ was sponsored by the Swedish Nuclear Power Inspectorate.
BACKGROUND
The background to this study is that the probability of deficient reactor core cooling,
which may cause severe reactor core damageL~, being caused by transients is rnuch higher
than that caused by a postulated LOCA (Loss-of coolant accident). Sufficient reason exists
therefore to aim at decreasing the reactor scram frequency even further. Such a reduction
of transient frequency would also lead to a reduction of unanticipated electricity
production losses and to a reduction of thermally and dynarnically induced stresses that
may contribute to darnage and leakage in cornponents and piping. Some transient events,
for instance turbine trips, which do not lead to reactor scrams may, nevertheless, have an
effect on nuclear safety. A reduction of such events also contributes to a lower probability
of deficient core cooling.
Another background to this,. s~udy is the principal recommendation - inclUdedj'n the
U.S. Kemeny Commissions reportL 3Jand in the Swedish State Public Investigation[ 4 after
the nuclear accident in 1979 at Three Mile Island, U.S.A. - that the industry needs an
irnproved feedback and learning from operating experience.
The present study is based on follow-up and analysis of Swedish BWR plant
disturbance experience up to and including 1982. The units are of earlier ASEA-ATOM
design and they are owned by Swedish utilities. Four of the five turbine plants analyzed are
designed by and manufactured by ASEA STAL AB, three of them in license co-operation
with Brown, Boveri & Cie. The first unit, Oskarshamn 1, was synchronized to the power
grid in 1971. In this way the study covers an analysis and feedback of a total of 44 years
operating experience.
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In the case of the later BWRs, since 1980-1982 in commercial operation, a systematie
approach was taken to reduce the transient frequency. Feedback of operating experience
from the earlier units was implemented in the functional analysis and commissioning of the
newer units and in the training of their personnel by the vendors and the owners. Suitable
design modifieations were introduced as a result of the analysis of commissioning tests and
experienced operational disturbances, in these newer units TVO land II (ASEA-ATOM
turnkey deliveries in Finland) and Forsmark land 2 in Sweden.
The resulting design improvements, the more mature BWR design implemented by the
vendors (ASEA-ATOM and ASEA STAL) and the performance of the utility personnel have
contributed to the fact that these newer units have exhibited a fairly low scram frequency
from the start of operation. For example, the mean figure for TVO land II is about 2
scrams per year and unit during the later period 1982-1983. It is therefore evident that this
design and operating know-how can, in a systematie way, be used to support the owners in
reducing the transient frequency in BWRs even further.
THE NUMBER OF THE EVENTS
The project "An analysis of steps to ·be taken in order to reduce the reactor scram
frequency in Swedish BWRs" covers the history of all plant disturbances leading to
automatie or manual reactor scrams, turbine trips and generator load rejections in five
different units.
The annual distribution of the number of reactor scrams in the two oldest units, from
the first synchronization with the grid up to and including 1982, is presented in Fig. I.
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Comparison of the annual scram frequencies
The long-term trend for the number of these events has been decreasing. The mean
figure for e.g. the Ist unit in Ringhals is about 12 scrams per year. The trend for the scram
frequency in this unit has been, however, decreasing since 1976 and is now 3 scrams per
year during the later period 1980-1982.
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The study contains an analysis of a total of 625 events, of which 476 are reactor
scrams and 240 turbine trips, some of which also gave rise to reactor scram. Reactor
scrarns occurring at all operational states (ind. trips during start-up or shut-down of the
reactor when the reactor was criticaJ) were induded in the search.
A total of 1188 failure events has been identified as contributing causes to the
analyzed plant disturbances in the five different units. The failure events which have
contributed to the reactor scrams in the first unit of Oskarshamn have been broken down
into plant parts and failure types in Fig. 2•
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Reactor scram analysis. Breakdown of the failure events
(J 971 * - 1982) into plant parts and failure types
As seen in Fig 2 a large number of failure events, which have contributed to reactor
scrams, originate from the turbine plant systems and components and from the inadvertent
protection functions of the reactor.
METHODS AND MODEL USED IN THE ANALYSIS
The sequence of the plant disturbanees, and the failure functions contributing to
reactor scrams, turbine trips and generator load rejections, has been analyzed by using the
event reports or analyses, operation reports and maintenance reports from the power plants
as source material. Additional information, concerning the disturbances and the corrective
actions, has been collected through discussions at the units. Preliminary event analyses,
prepared during this project, were used as source material for these discussions with the
operation management and personnel.
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To be able to systematically identify the contributing causes to the plant distur-
bances and to divide the contributing causes into failure types five different failure types
were defined. The failure types are shown in Table I. The failure types are specified so that
each one is matched with one type of corrective action required.
Table I Failure types
I. System malfunction
-
Unsuitable design due to insufficient knowledge of
behaviour of process variables
- Poor redundancy
2. Component failure
- Component unsuited to the environment
-
Unreliable component which can be a result of poor
preventive maintenance
3. Inadvertent protection function
- Protection function was tripped even though
the event would not have caused any damage
(if the trip had not occurred)
4. Testing
- Intentional trip due to planned test
- Unplanned trip initiated during testing
5. Human error
- Incorrect, incomplete or unclear operating instructions
(procedures)
- Deviations from operating instructions
In order to be able to systematically divide the contributing causes to the plant
disturbances into the plant parts and equipment involved, a suitable functional group
division was developed for this study.
These functional groups (FG) have been made similar for different units. Therefore
these FGs can easily be used for transfer of operating experience concerning failure
functions and correctlve actions between different units at functional group level.
This functional group division is based on functlon, and not on the hardware, which
makes a functlonal analysis of the plant disturbances easler than by uslng the tradltlonal
plant system and equlpment classificatlons.
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An example of an event analysis concerning the Ringhals I unit is shown in Fig. 3 as
follows.
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Fig.3 Event analysis. An example
It should be noticed that one reactor scram is usually caused by several interacting
failure events and/or functional deficiences in different plant parts and functional groups
of the unit.
All 625 event analyses, worked out during this project, were systematically docu-
mented in the similar standardized forms, as shown in the example above. Thus storing of
all event analyses in a transient analysis data base was facilitated.
A computer program has been used to store, sort and select the event analysis data
accumulated during the study. This computer program has facilitated the statistical
treatment of the many failure events and thus the identification of either the recurring
event sequences or the recurring failure events and their long-term trends.
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For the first unit in Ringhals a probabilistic risk assessment study [5] was available.
According to this PRA study the offsite power disturbances have a significant effect as
initiating transients on the probability of severe reactor core damage.
Consequently an event tree is prepared in Fig. 4, which is based on .selection and a
qualitative and a quantitative analysis of both the recurring scram sequences and the
interacting failure events included in the scram sequences, occurred as a consequence of
offsite power disturbances.
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Fig.4 An event tree showing generator full load rejections which
always led to reactor scrams
When working out this event tree several selected event analyses, exhibiting similar
event sequences to the analysis in Fig. 3, have been used·as source material. In that way all
offsite (400 kV) power disturbanc;:es}up to and including 1981, were included in the source
material.
This prepared initiating event analysis data, in conjunction with identification of the
dominant accident sequences that could follow according to the unit-specific PRA study,
could then be applied in order to form a model, for ranking the nuclear safety significance
o~ proposed corrective actions. The use of this model resulted in rough quantitative
estimates of how the recommended corrective actions, which will give a reduction of the
reactor scram frequency, contribute to areduction of the probability of deficient reactor
core cooling.
The steps. and methods included in the model for analysis and evaluation of
opportunities, to'improve both the plant reliability and the nuclear safety, are described in
detail in Swedish in the main research re~ort "A Systematic feedback of plant disturbance
experience in Swedish BWR power plants"Li].
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It is known that partially sirnilar projects to this [6J, concerning feedback of
operating experience or analysis of accident sequence preco/sl'rs, are being performed in
U.S.A. by e.g. the Institute of NucJear Powl'lr Operations L7J, Electric Power Research
Institute, NucJear Regulatory Commisson [8, 9J and plant vendors and owners and in other
parts of the world. For example, the NucJear Safety Board of the Swedish Utilities has
started ERF - a Swedish computerized information and communication system - for feed-
back of operating experiences [lOJ, where Asea-Atom is also contributipg. The present
development work at e.g. the Swedish NucJear Power Inspectorate airns [llJ to tie together
the systematic reJiabiJity analyses (PRA), the event reports and the event analyses in such
a way that a systematic feedback is provided to a number of safety activities.
SELECTED AREAS FOR FURTHER REDUCTIONS OF THE SCRAM FREQUENCY AND
FOR IMPROVING NUCLEAR SAFETY
Several opportunities for reducing the reactor scram and turbine trip frequency in
individual units have been identified during this project.
As seen e.g. in Fig. 2 above a large number of failure events, which have contributed
to reactor scrams, originate from malfunctions in the turbine plants and from inadvertent
reactor protection functions.
The turbine plants in ASEA-ATOM BWRs are designed with 100 percent dumping
capadty in order to be able to cope with turbine trips and full load rejections without
reactor scram. The analysis results as illustrated by Fig. 5 show that about 50 percent of
all generator load rejections fram full power have been accomodated without tripping the
reacfor.
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Fig.5 The proportion of generator load rejections which led to reactor
scram
188
As seen in Fig. 5 the generator load rejections have in the more recently started units
studied, Oskarshamn 2 and Barsebäck 2, contributed with a lower, though significant
probability to the reactor scrams. Different opportunities for improving this percentage
even further, in the case of turbine trips and load rejections in individual units, have been
identified during this study. Similar design modifications to these have resulted in an
improved performance since being put into effect in the latest BWR nuclear power units
now in commercial operation, or in some of the earlier individual units analyzed in this
study.
In connection with the evaluation of effected corrective actions, a study has always
been made of whether the same initiating failure events have continued to result in scrams.
Examples of the proven efficiency, of some of these corrective actions since being put into
effect by the vendors and the owners, in reducing scram frequency will be given as folIows:
introduction of a filtration of APRM-scram limit values in the reactor protection
system in order to avoid inadvertent scrams. These scrams were caused by very
short-Iived increase of neutron flux, initiated by pressure transients (turbine control
and bypass valve mismatch) in the reactor core.
Number of annual
inadvertant prot~tjon
functions
123456789
. Operating experience
11.""1
JThe averil9l! 23 was ca3 annual--.-_. wams prior 10 lhe eHect of
1"''''''';'0 ""ion in 197.
*, The analyzed period is from the dote of first
Jynchronization with the grid (1974-10·02)
Fig.6 Oskarshamn, unit 2. Scram analysis. The annual frequency of
inadvertent reactor core protection functions
As shown in Fig. 6 corrective actions have given a very promising effect. Operating
experience and aforementioned modification in the "oversensitive" reactor core
protection system have resulted in a total absence of scrams from this particular
problem category compared to an annual average of 3 scrams previously.
Auto tripping of the partial reactor scram (insertion of only one scram group) in order
to achieve rapid reactor power runback necessary in the case of e.g. sudden generator
load rejection.
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Improved supervIsIOn of the capacity of the operating oil accumulators for the
hydraulic operated turbine bypass valves. In this way a prolonged opening time of the
turbine bypass valves giving apressure transient in the reactor core and a reactor
scram can be avoided, in the event of turbine trip or generator load rejection.
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Fig. 7 Barsebäck, unit 2. Scram analysis, The annual frequency of
reactor pressure disturbances
As shown in Fig. 7 the corrective action has resulted in an absence of scrarns, caused
by mismatch of turbine control and bypass valves in the event of turbine trip or generator
load rejection.
The expected impact on reducing average scram frequency, of a possible implementa-
tion of these aforementioned modifications in the other units studied, was then quantitati-
vely evaluated. These modifieations have then been recommended for detailed surveys in
the units whieh by these means, according to the study, exhibit potential opportunities for
reducing scram frequency in the event of similar off-site power or turbine plant
disturbances. These improvements have afterwards been put into effect, decided or are
being surveyed in several applicable units.
The potential quantitative opportunities for reducing scram frequency when imple-
menting corrective actions, in different other problem categories identified in the
individual units, were also evaluated and reported in the study.
A pilot analysis was also performed to evaluate whieh effects some of the proposed
corrective actions, for reducing the scram frequency, give on the nuclear safety. In this
PRA-application (see Fig. 4 above) e.g. the following proposed actions were found to have a
signifieant improving effect on the nuclear safety in the event of offsite power disturban-
ces.
automatie tripping of partial reactor scram by the condition of full load rejection of
two turbo generators. When implementing this measure the in-house electric load
generation, without tripping the reactor scram, can be accommodated to the unit
with the second turbo generator, if the first turbo generator trips
automatie initiation of the rapid switch-over of the backup offsite power to the
affected 6 kV-buses in the event of unsuccessful establishment of in-house turbine
operation after full load rejection. When implementing this possible measure a loss of
feed water How and loss of condenser vacuum can be avoided if backup offsite power
supply is available.
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ESSENTIAL RESULTS
A large number of failure events, which have contributed to reactor scrams, originate
from malfunctions in the turbine plants and inadvertant (unnecessary for protection)
reactor protection functions. Several opportunities for reducing the reactor scram
frequency have been identified during the project and recommendations for improvements
in the operating units have been made. These improvement are aimed' at eliminating either
the primary faiJures or the secondary contributing causes in the disturbance sequences,
otherwise leading to reactor scrams.
The long-term trend of the scram frequency has been decreasing and the average
scram frequency in these units of the older BWR generation is about 4 scrams per year and
unit in 1980- I 982. A clear indication exists, arising from the study, that further reductions
in the scram frequency can be achieved by means of design modifications in reactor and
turbine systems and improvements of associated procedures.
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AN EXAMPLE OF OPERATING EXPERIENCE IN FRANCE
THE TRICASTIN 1 INCIDENT ON AUGUST 3, 1982
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ABSTRACT
On August 3, 1982, at the Unit 1 of the Tricastin nuclear power
plant, the rupture of the plug of apressure reducing valve on the
compressed air system serving the containment air lock resulted in
the lass of air to the inflatable seal of the two air lock doors ;
the lass was signalIed in the control room by the alarm "air lock
o m untight".
The containment integrity was lost for 45 minutes ; but the activity
released to the outside was very slight. By a rapid intervention of
the operator (another plug was put on) the compressed air feeding
was restored and consequently the hatch tightness ; the unit remai-
ned on power during the intervention.
The basic cause of the incident is a design error : the non-respect
of the single failure criterion on one auxiliary system of a function
important for safety (containment integrity).
This example of an incident, one of the most significant in French
900 ~llie PWR units since their commissioning, will serve as an illus-
tration of the experience feed-back process in France. Difficulties
in the implementation of the correctives actions decided after the
incident resulted in unjustified delays and in reoccurrences of
similar incidents.
INTRODUCTION
From the late seventies both the French utility (E.D.F.) and the French
safety authorities have been developing a system to collect, screen and ana-
lyze incidents, occurring in pressurized water reactors that came into opera-
tion, and to define subsequent corrective actions. For more than two years
this system has been fully operational and works satisfactorily.
With the example of one of the most safety significant incidents expe-
rienced on a French unit, this paper provides insight on the methodology used
for in-depth analysis of incidents in France.
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However there are some difficulties in timely
corrective actions defined after such an analysis.
delays in the detailed study of the modifications and
can result in similar incidents reoccurring.
implementation of the
Experience shows that
in their implementation
INCIDENTS SCREENING PROCESS [1]
The Safety Analysis Department reviews, on a weekly basis, all the infor-
mation pertaining to the safe operation of French PWRs. This information may
be obtained either by formal report for significant incidents or through the
E.D.F. event computer file for less significant events. All this information
is classified according to the following four categories :
1) Events that do not require specific corrective action are just stored in
the computer file (between 500 and 1000 per year : about 1 per unit and
per week).
2) As a minimum, all incidents notified as significant go through a rapid
review in order to detect whether they might be aprecursor of a more
severe accident and to verify that the corrective actions proposed by the
licensee are acceptable and sufficient (about 250 per year).
3) Incidents that are potentially expected to be precursors or that are
deemed to contain many interesting lessons, are submitted to an in-depth
analysis as described below. This analysis leads to detailed recommenda-
tions (between 10 and 20 per year).
4) Trends or patterns studies cover aseries of events with common charac-
teristics, i. e. series of events which affect the same system or com-
ponent.
IN-DEPTH ANALYSIS GENERAL METHODOLOGY
For in-depth incident analysis it is absolutely necessary to obtain
additional information through technical discussions on the site with the
licensee including, where necessary, with the operators who experienced the
incident in order to have a good understanding of the incident sequence and
circumstances.
The analysis in itself is done essentially through several interrogations
and a search for answers
Interrogation about consequences it is rather easy to determine the
actual consequences of an incident in terms of component damage or health
effects for the public or plant staff. It is much more difficult to
assess its potential consequences. This means how the incident could have
resulted in more severe consequences with different initial conditions or
with other failures ("what if" process). This very analysis of potential
consequences is of major importance to characterize the exact level of
significance of the incident and therefore the priority to be attached to
the corrective actions.
- Interrogation about causes : this process should go as far as possible to
reveal the root causes among the various factors that could have contri-
buted to the incident occurrence. This should be an.opportunity to deter-
mine whether these causes are generic (i.e. lessons are applicable to a
serie of units).
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Interrogation about operator actions and reactions, in order to assess
the different factors which. have affected their behaviour (training,
procedure completeness and clarity, man-machine interface ... ). This phase
also includes a review of technical specifications as they relate to the
course of the incident.
- It is also to be underlined that an in depth incident analysis should not
be performed apart from the general context of other incidents occurring
on operating plants throughout the world and cannot be limited simply to
the facts that actually took place in the incident sequence. It is very
important to look for analogical incidents and to try to make comparison
with similar situations already experienced elsewhere during such or such
·part of the incident.
Putting an incident in the general perspective of worldwide accumu-
lated experience is the best way to identify the general lessons which
are undoubtly the most beneficial for nuclear safety.
- Lastly, an in depth analysis includes an assessment of the corrective
actions proposed by the licensee and, if needed, recommendation of addi-
tionnal measures that appear necessary as a result of the preceding
steps.
The recommendations resulting from these analyses are discussed with
E.D.F. at periodic meetings in order to compare the lessons learned and to
follow up on the actions taken by the licensee, up to the implementation on
each unit.
LOSS OF CONTAINtlliNT AIR LOCK LEAKTIGHTNESS AT TRICASTIN 1
This incident occurred on August 3rd 1982. It resulted in a temporary
loss of the third safety barrier integrity (the ß mode of WASH 1400). Because
of its safety significance it was analysed according to the process described
above. Its main characteristics and the lessons learned are given below.
a) Initial condition
The unit was at nominal power. The pressure within the reactor building
was 1040 mbars. A controlled purge of the containment by the vent system was
planned, but had not yet begun.
b) Incident Sequence
At about 1.15 p.m., on August 3, 1982, the appearance in the control room
of both alarms : "Air lock 0 m defect" and "Air lock 0 m untight" alerts the
control room operator, who reports immediately to the shift supervisor. The
latter goes to the air lock. After having checked the local control boards
configuration, he hears the sound of an air leak. The plug of the pressure
reducing valve EPP 142 VA is ruptured. Consequently, no feeding reaches the
air lock door seals. Since the reactor building is in slight overpressure, the
pressure drops by 20 mbars ; this depressurisation results in the release of
1000 m3 into the environment.
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Another plug is put on. At 2 p.m., as soon as the plug is in place, the
seals are reflated and the containment integrity is restored.
c) Consequences. Significance of the incident
At the time of the incident, the activity of the containment atmosphere
was slight ; the actual consequences of the incident as regards the envi-
ronment were therefore negligible. This was confirmed by the readings of the
health physics instrumentations at the site boundary : no variation was noted
above the normal background (some ~rad/h).
This incident resulted nevertheless in a large loss of the integrity
function of the third barrier, and had the conditions within the containment
been different, the radiological consequences could have been~ore severe.
To assess more precisely the potential gravity of the incident, several
release calculations were made for various initial conditions. The first one
corresponds to the maximum technical specifications limits related to the
primary coolant activity and leakage. The second one corresponds to LOCA
conditions, maximum accident taken into account in the safety reports.
Dose equivalents which would have resulted from the releases made under
those conditions would have been :
- in the first case (technical specificatio~s limits) : 0.5 mrem of exter-
nal exposure and 4 mrem of internal contamination to the thyro~d,
- in the second case (loss of containment integrity after a LOCA) : the
consequences would have been very severe, and the releases would have
exceeded the values considered as acceptable in accident conditions.
d) Causes of the accident
In normal operation, the pressure of the door seals is maintained between
5.6 and 6 bars (relative). By means of an automatic control, air make-up to
the seals is provided as soon as the pressure decreases under 5.6 bars. The
alarm "air lock defect" is actuated when the periodicity of the air make-up to
one of the air lock door seals becomes less than 10 seconds. The alarm "air
lock untight" is actuated when the pressure in the seals of the two doors
be comes less than 0.5 bar (relative).
From the time the incident was first noticed, the quasi-simultaneous
appearance of the two alarms tended to indicate that a very fast deflating of
all the seals of the two doors had taken place and therefore the leak tight-
ness of two check valves was questioned. These check valves, EPP 135 VA and
EPP 136 VA are located immediately downstream of the pressure reducing valve.
However, during tests made to reproduce the incident, it was not possible to
reproduce such a rapid depressurization of the whole system. Perhaps when the
incident took place, the operator in the control room did not notice the first
alarm "air lock 0 m defect" and only became aware of it when he saw the second
alarm "air lock untight" appear. Nevertheless this assumption cannot be confir-
med, because the information processing system, that records automatically the
time of appearance of alarms, was not available at the time of the incident.
But it can be noted that the incident occurred just after a staff shift change.
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e) Lessons learned
The incident showed a common mode failure on the air make-up system of
the air lock door.
The main following corrective actions were then decided :
- doubling of the pressure reducing valve between the EPP 101 BA tank and
the two 135 and 136 VA check valves,
- addition of a device allowing the automatie isolation of the air make-up
of the seals of one door, in the event of apressure drop downstream of
the pressure reducing valve serving this door,
- addition of nozzles upstream of the pressure reducing valves and down-
stream of manual isolation valves of the seals allowing for possible air
stand by make-up from a mobile compressor,
- modification of the "air lock defect" alarm setpoints , which will be
initiated when the frequency of the air make-up to the seals is less than
2 minutes,
- increase of the "air lock untight" alarm setpoint which will be initiated
when the pressure inside the whole of the circuit becomes less than
3.5 bars, a value compatible with the maintaining of the air lock leak
tightness under the containment design pressure.
These lessons were discussed and agreed upon between E.D.F. and the
safety authorities at a meeting on February 21st 1983 .The modifications were
supposed to be treated with top priority and be implemented on each unit
during the first refueling outage.
In addition E.D.F. decided to replace immediately the plug of the
pressure reducing device that failed at Tricastin with a new improved plug on
every unit.
FOLLOW UP ACTIONS
In France, plant management have to submit to the safety authorities
two months prior every long outage a program of safety related maintenance
activities and modifications to be implemented during the outage [2]. The
review of such submitals for several units which were due for refueling outage
in the summer of 1983, revealed that the modifications described above for
improving the air make-up to the air lock doors seals were not being planned.
E.D.F. was required to conduct an investigation which revealed deficiencies in
the follow up management after the initial decision about the modifications.
Unit standardization is a characteristic of the French nuclear program.
With the full support of the safety authorities, E.D.F. wants all its units of
the same design to remain identical throughout their lifetime. That means
backfitting has to be decided at the national level and all modifications,
nnless the minor ones, must receive approval from the headquarter. This imp1ies
that every projected modification should be circulated in the various sections
of the E.D.F. organization, including those which were involved in the initial
design, for detailed studies, review and approval.
This process guarantees better quality of the modifications and better
integration in the original design. Howewer this is a lengthy process which
requires strong management when a modification has to be implemented on an
accelerated schedule.
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In the case of the lessons learned from the August 3rd, 1982, incident at
Tricastin 1 insufficient management on the fo11ow up decision resulted in
about six months delay in the implementation of the modification.
REOCCURRENCES
- Bugey 2
The design of the air make-up system to the air lock door seals is
slightly different on the Bugey units from the other 900 ~Me units. However,
this design presented the same weakness in sustaining a single failure.
On April 1st 1983 on Bugey 2 a rupture of a filter in the
system resulted in the deflating of all seals on both air lock
loss of containment integrity which fortunately lasted for
2 minutes.
- Tricastin
air make-up
doors and a
only about
On April 7th 1984 at the beginning of the annual refueling outage of
Tricastin 1 during which the air lock modifications were planned, a similar
plug rupture on an other pressure reducing valve of the air make-up system was
experienced. However only one air lock door leaked and the containment did not
lose its integrity.
- Chinon B2
On the eve of a week end Nay 18th 1984, the uni t was running at full
power. In violation of quality organization rules, the compressed air system
serving the one air lock was valve out for some works without preparing a
written temporary operating instruction. Consequently the p'ressure in the air
lock door seals was only maintained by the back up tank 101 BA. Because of the
seal natural porosity the pressure began to decrease and the alarm "air lock
defect" annunciated it reached 5.6 bars. On ~lay 19th, knowing that some works
were being done on the compressed air system the operator did not react to
this alarm which sometimes appear frequently. ~loreover this alarm regroups
several defects none of which require urgent actions. So the pressure in the
seals continued to decrease slowly. As the setpoint of the second alarm "air
lock untight" had not yet been modified to 3.5 bars, the air lock began to
leak in the early morning of ~lay 21st. This loss of containment integrity
remained undetected for about 3 hours until a decrease of the pressure inside
the containment was noticed.
CONCLUSIONS
From the experience reported here several conclusions should be mention-
ned both from the experience feed-back process and the technical point of
view.
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A good system to collect, screen incidents and determine the lessons to
be learned is not sufficient for a proper operation of the experience feed
back process. Once corrective measures have been defined strong management is
essential to ensure timely implementation. In order to avoid conflicting
constraints on the various people who have to be involved in the detailed
studies of modifications and who sometimes are far away from the actual plant
experience, it is necessary to determine priorities in the backfitting pro-
cess. These priorities should be consistent with the safety significance of
the incidents for which corrective measures are defined. Up to now the safety
significance of incidents is mainly based on engineering judgement. PRA could
be a useful tool in establishing a more quantitative basis for the deter-
mination of the time schedule in which to implement corrective actions after
significant incidents.
From a technical standpoint these incidents underline once more the
importance of support systems, such as the compressed air system, which serve
safety related functions.
In addition, given these incidents as weIl as others not mentionned here,
the Safety Analysis Department is questionning the reliability of the leak-
tightness of the containment air lock ,doors. The replacement of the inflatable
seals on the 900 MWe by a passive system self leak proof under containment
pressure, as is already installed on the 1300 MWe units, should be considered.
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ABSTRACT
Several ruptures of support pins have occured in France; some damage
was caused to steam generators. The failures Were caused by Inconel
X 750 stress corrosion; several parameters are assessed. Two safety
concerns are analysed: potential control rod guide tube misalignment
and consequence of a support pin as a loose part. The conclusion is
that a pin failure is of limited safety significance, at least at
short term, but the availability can be seriously impaired. That
leads to conduct inspections during refueling shutdowns, incorporate
a loose parts continuous monitoring system, develop an improved pin
design and replace the pins at existing plants.
INTRODUCTION
The past few years have shown that Westinghouse-designed PWR control rod
guide tube pins were subject to a stress corrosion phenomenon which ultimately
results in cra~king then rupture with potential migration of loose parts into
the reactor coolant system.
It was the discovery in autumn 1978, during annual plant inspection, of
a pin fragment in a steam generator at the Japanese plant of Mihama 3 which
first revealed this anomaly. In 1982, four other discoveries of pin fragments
in the reactor coolant system were made: three in France (at Gravelines 1,
Fessenheim 1 and Bugey 2) and onein the United States (at North Anna 1).
This paper summarises the action taken in France to remedy this problem:
modification of pin design, safety evaluation in case of rupture, protection
from loose parts, pin inspection, pin replacement and examination of removed
pins.
PIN DESIGN
1) Pin description and function
Support pins are bolted into the bottom plate of the lower guide tube to
align the bottom of the control rod guide tube assembly into the core plate at
the top of the fuel assembly. There are two'pins per guide tube. They provide
lateral support while accomodating thermal expansion of the guide tube relative
to the core plate.
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The pins are made of Inconel X 750. Each pin incorporates (see figure 1):
- a top section consisting of a shank and a threaded end accomodating the
drive nut.
- a collet for precise alignment of the pin in a flange hole.
- a bottom section containing two flexible leaves separated by a groove.
which fit into a hole in the upper core plate.
The pin is prevented from rotation relative to the nut by a dowel which
radially traverses the nut head. The dowel is welded to a locking device which
is prevented from rotation relative to the upper pin section by a slot. Both
the dowel and locking device are made of austenitic stainless steel.
To prevent pin fatigue due to alternating stresses exerced by hydraulic
loads on the guide tubes. apreload must be provided at joints as foliows:
- at the pin/bottom flange joint. preload is provided by tarquing the nut
to a value specified on the drawings.
- at the pin/upper core plate joint. flexible leaf size is made to exceed
the upper core plate hole diameter, providing apreload during the fit.
2) Pin stress corrosion
The anomaly affecting the pin is due to a stress corrosion phenomenon.
In most cases this takes the form of intergranular cracks leading to pin
cracking and rupture.
The pin stress corrosion phenomenon led to the discovery of two types of
rupture (figure 1) :
- at the shank/collet joint.
- in the flexible leaf region.
Nöte that some cracks have been observed in the thread region (figure 1).
The main parameters influencing stress corrosion are :
- the heat treatment processes undergone by the materials (solution heat
treatment and aging)
- stress intensity.
3) French pin fabrication and installation characteristics
In France pins have different characteristics for two reasons:
the reference specification has been subjected to variations in the following
areas :
- solution heat treatment.
- aging heat treatment,
- torquing.
Framatome has three different pin manufacturers dealing with three different
steelmakers for their INCONEL X750 bar procurement; pin fabrication by these
steelmakers varies in certain areas not covered by the specifications
(forging sequence. intermediate hardening .• . ).
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During the period preceding the discovery of pin anomalies in Japan, the
above factors led to wide pin diversity in France.
Based on the parameters considered as the most important as regards stress
corrosion (solution heat treatment and torquing), the pins existing at this
time in French power plants were c1assified into 4 groups.
4) New pins
The occurrence of pin cracking in Japan 1ed Westinghouse to design during
1979 a new pin model capab1e of being insta11ed in new units. A summary of the
design support work for these new pins is given be1ow.
Initial studies were conducted by Westinghouse to reduce the stresses in
the pins. But since know1edge was unavai1ab1e for the maximum permissible
stress value for avoiding the risk of stress corrosion, the new pin was design-
ed to yield the lowest stress compatible with the other design criteria. To
meet this requirement, the following modifications were made:
- reduction of torque
- switch from a circular shank/collet joint to a parabolic joint.
It Was also realized that heat treatment had a major impact on resistance
to stress corrosion; as a resu1t a number of tests on pin strength were per-
formed in France, in the Uni ted States and in Japan.
The tests all proved the existence of a solution heat treatment tempera-
ture range in which corrosion susceptibility is smaller.
5) Notes on the new design
Note that although the tests showed that the new pins had increased
corrosion resistance, no test has proved that they can perform their function
throughout unit lifetime. Studies and tests are being conducted as part of a
four-way CEA, EDF, FRAMATOME and WESTINGHOUSE agreement. The results obtained
up until now are consistent with those obtained in the past.
Note that as regards the flexible leaves, the only modification for upgra-
ding their strength concerns heat treatment. One may weIl wonder if this will
be sufficient.
FRAHATOME is current1y also looking into methods for reducing flexible
leaf stresses. This study could lead to the begining of a new fami1y of
"second-generation" pins.
Note that the Japanese have carried out a first series of modifications
which were slight1y different from those proposed by the Americans. They were
as fo1lows :
- increased solution heat treatment temperature but to a va1ue 1ess than
that chosen by the Americans and which lies outside the temperature
range in which corrosion susceptibi1ity appears to be smaller (see
above) ,
- reduction of torque to a va1ue half that used by the Americans,
- reduction of the gap between flexible 1eaves,
- shot peening.
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The Japanese started to instal these new pins in their units as soon as
1979. But during 1983, ultrasonic examinations of the new pins revealed anoma-
lies. This led the Japanese, in eonjunetion with Westinghouse 'and Babeock &
Wileox, to design a new type of pin whose heat treatment is praetieally identi-
cal to that adopted by the Freneh and Americans.
SAFETY EVALUATION
Since stress corrosion cracking ultimately leads to rupture, it is neces-
sary to assess the risks potentially eaused by control rod guide tube pin rup-
tures. Two questions can be asked as regards safety:
what are the risks induced by the migration of pin fragments to the
reactor coolant system?
- Do guide tubes with one or two broken pins still perform their safety
function, which is to guarantee control rod drop?
The answers to these two questions are summed up in the following two
paragraphs:
1) Impact of loose parts
The two types of pin ruptures give rise to 2 types of loose parts:
- a flexible leaf weighing 35 grams,
- a pin upper section weighing 190 grams which can disassemble or break
up (one case of a pin breaking up into 5 fragments was observed at
FESSENHEIM 1 on 16/3/1982).
b) Trapping in NSSS systems
Examination of possible trapping in the reactor coolant system and
related systems shows that:
- a loose part in the hot leg can either be captured on the RRA (Residual
Heat Removal RHR) system suction side in primary loop n02 or be trapped
on the hot side of a steam generators channel head if the loose part
cannot enter the SG tubes. A pin upper section may become trapped in
a steam generator as at MIHAMA 3, FESSENHEIM 1, NORTH ANNA 1 and BUGEY
2. Extensive damage can be inflicted on the channel head, with greater
impact on availability than on safety. A flexible leaf can theoretical-
ly enter an SG tube but with a clearance of several tens of millime-
ters.
- If the loose part is trapped on the RRA suction side, it will circulate
through this system upon entry into service. In this case, if the loose
part is entrained towards the RRA heat exchangers, it may become trapped
there (internal tube diameter 14 mm). But it mayaIso migrate through
the heat exchanger by-pass. It will then either be trapped in check
valves RIS (Safety Injection System SIS) 01 or 06 VP (as at GRAVELINES 1
of the 13/1/82) or migrate towards the reactor coolant cold legs, from
which it will return to the reactor vessel.
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Examination of the migration of the two postulated loose parts through the
reactor coolant system equipment highlights two points liable to have a safety
impact:
- jamming of a flexible leaf in a continuous guidance region opening,
highly improbable due to the arrangement of the current lines in this
region, could cause RCCA (Rod Cluster Control Assembly) blocking during
rod drop,
- jamming of a nut (cold) between the lower internals baseplate and the
bot tom of the reactor vessel (assuming that the nut had calculated
without trap by the RRA, and had been reinjected into the cold leg)
which could cause local damage to the internals and the claddings at the
bot tom of the reactor vessel.
in the event of disassembly, breakup or wear of the loose parts, the
impact of jamming between the reactor vessel bot tom and the lower internals is
smaller. However, for fragments of less than 3 mm, migration into the core
between the fuel rods or into the guide tubes is possible. The risks of fuel
rod damages or RCCA blocking are low, however.
To sum up the risks induced by the presence of a loose part, they are
mainly related to small loose parts. Breakup or wear of pin fragments in the
reactor coolant system should therefore be avoided. Provision must be made to
detect and rapidly remove these fragments from the reactor.
2) Maintenance of the guide tube function
Calculations were made and loop tests performed to evaluate the performan-
ce of the guide function with time in a certain number of configurations (one
pin with a broken leaf and an intact pin-2pins with broken leaves and shanks
etc ... ).
It appears that there is no problem of short-term loss of guide function
after breakage of one or more pins.
Starting from a situation in which all the guide tubes have broken pins,
it was demonstrated that:
- in the event of reactor coolant system breaks under 0.5 ft 2 , all the
rods drop into the core,
- in the event oJ reactor coolant system breaks over 0.5 ft2 , no rod
shutdown margin is needed to keep cladding temperature below the safety
criterion.
PROTECTION AGAINST ßROKEN PINS
Since loose parts impair the short-term availability and long-term safety
of a plant unit, Electricite de France has installed a reactor coolant system
acoustic monitoring system at each unit.
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This system can be used for continuous surveillance of the signals
transmitted by the accelerometers at the bottom of the steam generator channel
head (one per steam generator) and one of the 3 sensors atthe bot tom of the
reactor vessel. .
Current system performance is such that shank detection is highly probable
in a steam generator, but more unlikely in a reactor vessel and leaf det-ection
is problematic in a steam generator, highly improbable in a reactor vessel.
However, EDF is currently examining the possibility of upgrading acoustic moni-
toring, notably by re-analyzing detection setpoint values.
Twice in the past (16/3/82 at Fessenheim 1, 21/7/82 at Bugey 2), lhe sys-
tem has led respectively to the detection of a nut and a shank-nut assembly in
a steam generator channel head.
PIN EXAMINATlON
From the outset it has proved necessary to provide a capability for exa-
mining the state of in-place pins so as to detect possible cracks before rup-
ture. Actions have been undertaken on two fronts:
- TV camera inspection of the presence of nuts and leaves,
- Ultrasonic examination of pin soundness in both corrosion-affected
zones.
1) TV inspection
This system is currently used by EDF to inspect all its guide tube pins.
The pins are inspected during refuelling with the upper internals on their
storage stand at the bottom of the reactor cavity. It is estimated that it
might not be performed this inspection during the first refuelling operation
after installation of new pins.
This inspection is performed by a camera mounted on an automatic trolley
moving underneath the reactor internals.
Note that this inspection confirms the absence or presence of flexible
leaves but cannot detect cracked leaves, even if cracking is extensive.
Up until now, this inspection has demonstrated the absence of a flexible
leaf at GRAVELINES 3 during the second unit refuelling outage in October 1983.
The inspection also identified the pin from which a flexible leaf had been
discovered in the reactor coolant system of GRAVELINES 1.
Two methods are used:
- One called the "sabre" method, involves the insertion of a horizontal
borescope with a vertical viewing mechanism into the gaps separating the
guide tube rows; the image was transmitted by a TV camera.
- the other method, developed by FRA}~TO~rn which gave it its name, invol-
ves lowering a camera along the guide tube centerline after removing the
drive rod. This vertical-axis camera has a horizontal viewed mechanism
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which provides scanning of the nut contour through an opening in the
guide tube wall behind the continuous guidance system.
At FESSENHEIM 1, this inspection permitted identification of the coordina-
tes of the broken pin whose nut had been discovered in a steam generator.
During the same inspection, a pin was revealed to have a slightly slanting
nut.
In August 1982, a slanting nut was also discovered at BUGEY 4. In March
1983, a missing shank was found at the bottom of the reactor cavity and a
slanting nut was also discovered at BUGEY 3. At the time, the tooling for
replacing pins on irradiated guide tubes was not operational. As result it was
decided to apply hydraulic loads to all the pin nuts to find out if any pins
were at ruptur,e point. The system used, the so-called "hydrolaser", consits
of a high-pressure water jet 1 to 2 mm in diameter which is applied to the
nut.
This operation revealed a third broken pin. The three affected guide
tubes were replaced before startup. The "hydrolaser" examination was also
later performed at TRICASTIN 3.
As in the case of the leaf examination, allmvance must be made for the
limits of the nut examination which does not show if a pin is cracked and is
perhaps on the point of rupture. ,Accordingly, the TV inspection at BUGEY 2
showed nothing but, on re-startup, a pin shank was discovered in a steam
generator (21/7/1982).
Due to the limitations of TV inspection, EDF is analyzing another type of
examination for detecting cracks, e.g. ultrasonic examination.
2) Ultrasonic examination
Ultrasonic examination uses the discontinuity created by a crack in the
material to initiate an echo signal which, under certain conditions, should
enable identification of the position and size of the defect.
The first laboratory test demonstrated the difficulties of interpreting
signals as weIl as the importance of pin grain size in this type of examina-
tion.
To qualify the method, an ultrasonic examination was performed on the pins
at TRICASTIN 1. The pins were then removed and analysed. Comparison between
the examination results and the ultrasonic indications revealed that the
ultrasonic examination only indicated the real condition of the pins in 60 %
of cases. Given the fact that the TRICASTIN 1 pins had a fine grain size (ASTM
7 to 8) which lent itself to ultrasonic examination, it is easy to foresee the
difficulties which would be encountered with the new larger-grain pins (ASTM
o to 6).
This led EDF to abandon this method. However, research into another more
effective method is now under way.
PIN REPLACEMENT
EDF systematically replaces old pins by new pins. The first units in
which this operation Was performed in fact underwent guide tube replacement.
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The operation involved re placement of the irradiated guide tubes with old
pins by new guide tubes with new pins.
EDF subsequently had problems procuring new guide tubes, as a result of
which it decided to carry out "pin replacement", allowing reuse of the guide
tubes.
The procedure is as follows :
removal of irradiated guide tubes with old pins,
mounting of other irradiated guide tubes with new pins from the pin
workshop,
- transport of removed guide tubes to the pin workshop,
- removal of old pins and. mounting of new pins on irradiated guide tubes,
- transport of guide tubes with new pins to a site where pins are to be
replaced.
On December 31st 1983, 9 units out of 21 had had their guide tube pins
replaced. The other units will have their pins replaced according to a
schedule spanning 1984 and 1985.
The current status of pins broken during removal is as follows
Unit Date Equivalent Group Breaks
hours at
full power At extraction after extraction
FESSENHEIM 1 /7 /82 26.000 1 32 collets
FESSENHEIM 2 /1/83 31.500 2 8 collets 2 collets
BUGEY 2 /7 /83 19.400 1 20 collets 1 collet
8 leaves
BUGEY 4 /8/82 21.000 2 1 threadtop
BUGEY 5 /5/83 20.000 2
TRICASTIN 1 /1/83 15.000 3 4 leaves 2 collets
2 leaves
TRICASTIN 2 /5/83 15.500 4 4 leaves 28 leaves
1 collet
TRICASTIN 4 /11/83 15.000 4
GRAVELINES B1 /5/83 15.000 4 3 leaves 12 leaves
Note that 2 units out of 9 had no broken pins.
Group 1 seems particularly affected which is not surprising since the pins
in this group have undergone solution heat treatment which was unfavourable
according to thc corrosion test results. Group 2 which has a more favourable
solution heat treatment was less affected.
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As for graul' 4, it was considered that lower torque would provide less
rupture. This was partly confirmed since only one rupture was observed in the
collet region. However, it was observed that the flexible leaf region seemed
highly susceptible to breaks : 32 leaves at TRICASTIN 2, 15 at GRAVELINES BI.
Also note that there appears to be no obvious connection between the
number of broken pins and the operating time.
EXAHINATION OF REHOVED PINS
After being removed from the guide tubes, the old pins undergo a certain
number of examinations (visual, liquid penetrant test) to determine their
soundness.
At this moment, only the results of the pin examination at FESSENHEHl 1
and 2 are available.
Results are given below
Batch Collet defect Shank defect Break at No
1st thread defect
---------------------- ---------------- -------------- ------------- ----------
81 pins at FSH 1 75 18 0 4
71 pins at FSH 2 53 13 13
42 pins at FSH 1 or 2 23 8 17 4
There are a large number of defects (cracks or ruptures), most of which
probably occurred during guide tube removal. Removal force varies between 500
and 1500 daN. Despite this, it can be consldered that these defects only
occurred because the cracking process was weIl advanced.
Notethat for the moment there is no obvious connection between pin defects
and their locations in the reactor core.
Equally, no correlation could be proved with the pin position (two pins
by guide tube).
Also note that a large number of defects observed up until now in the
leaves are related to the presence of electric pencil marking (notch effect?).
The results of the examination for the other units will probably have to
be awaited before final conclusions can be drawn and camparisans made between
pin groups.
CONCLUSION
Ta sum up, it can be said that
As regards the causes of the pin stress corrosion cracking phenomenon,
We have still no discovered the parameters controlling this phenomenon,
even if we now have some idea of the influence of same of them,
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as regards the impact of pin breaks on safety, risks are acceptable, at
least on a short-term basis. It is therefore necessary to detect pin
breaks for protection against long-term risks.
- as regards the impact of pin breaks on availability, it is necessary to
rapidly detect a loose part in order to avoid serious damage, for
example to the steam generator channel head.
The last two considerations have led to
- inspect pins during refuelling,
- detect any pin loose parts by means of the acoustic monitoring system,
- replace old pins by neW pins with higher resistance to stress corrosion
cracking.
Replacement of pins in about twenty power plant units is a large-scale
operation. It provides proof that it is possible to successfullY carry out
difficult plant unit repairs.
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FAULT TREE ANALYSIS OF WESTINGHOUSE
SOLID STATE PROTECTION SYSTEM SCRAM RELIABILITY
Paul J. Amico
Applied Risk Technology Corporation
P. O. Box 175
Columbia, MD 21045, USA
ABSTRACT
In 1 ate 1981 and earl y 1982, as part of a larger PRA of a
Westinghouse nuclear power plant, a fault tree analysis was performed on
the solid state protection system (SSPS). Among other findings, this
analysis determined that the dominant contributors to unavailability of
reactor trip were common mode fail ure of t~e reactor trip breakers and
failure of the active SSPS train when the other train was undergoing
test. This was over one year before common mode breaker fai lure resulted
in scram failure at the Salem plant. Arecent expansion of this analysis
shows that unavailability can be reduced somewhat (but not significantly)
if the testing interval is shortened to on ce every 72 hours. Any further
reduction woul d begin to increase the unavail abil ity.
INTRODUCTION
In late 1981 and early 1982 a fault tree analysis was performed which
quantified the rel iabil ity of the sol id state protection system (SSPS) of a
~'iest i nghouse reactor. Thi s anal ys i s was part of a 1arger effort to perform a
PRA on a ~Jestinghouse nuclear power plant. The analysis included an
evaluation of both the reactor scram function and the safety equipment
actuation function of the SSP~ With the occurrence of a failure to scram at
the Salem plant, which is a Westinghouse plant. the scram failure part of that
ana 1ys i s was rev i ewed to see what it had s hown. The res u lts showed that the
domi nant contri butor to scram fai 1ure i s common mode fai 1ure of the reactor
trip breakers, the same failure mode as was seen at Sale~ One of the results
of the Salem event was suggestions that reactor protection systems such as the
SSPS be tested more often than the once per month which is now required.
However, the SSPS analysis also had shown that testing of an SSPS train in
combination with failure of the trip logic board in the active train was also
a large contributor to scram failure. Since testing also contributed to
potential scram fai lure, any change in test interval to improve breaker
reliability would bring with it increases in unavailability due to testing.
Therefore, in order to properly evaluate the trade-offs involved, the SSPS
analysis was recently expanded to determine the optimum testing interval for
the SS PS.
SYSTEM DESCRIPTION
The solid state protection system (SSPS) is designed to initiate
automatie reactor trips and actuate engineered safety features. It a1 so
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provides control signals for some plant systems used in normal operations,
signals to control room monitors and annunciators, and inputs to the plant
process computer. These functions are provided by an arrayof sensors tied
together by way of asolid state component matrix. For the purposes of this
analysis, we are concerned only with the reactor trip function of the SSPS,
and all further discussions will address only this function
Design and Operation
A simple layout of the solid state protection system is shown in Figure
1. The system consists of two trai ns of sol i d state logic and actuating
relays that analyze signals developed by four protection channels of bistables
and sensors. The sol id state logic determines whether the correct combination
of sensor inputs are present to initiate a reaetor trip. The descriptions
be1ow exp 1ai n the key parts of the system, fo 11 owi ng the fi gu re from 1eft to
ri ght.
Process Sensors
The process sensors monitor the plant conditions. In general, a process
sensor is a train of components consisting of a sensing devic~ a transmitter,
and a signal modifying device. The signal modifying device takes the raw
signal from the transmitter and applies some predetermined function to it.
This function varies from sensor to senso~ depending on the desired response
characteristics of the signal; it may be as simple as a straight ampl ification
function or it may be more complex, such as a square root function. In some
cases the signal is developed from a combination of inputs from more than one
sensor, and other devi ces (e.g., comparators, summing networks, or other
cal cul ational circuits) are used to obtain the desired signal. For certain
signa1s that monitor component states 1i ke va 1ve positions, the "sensors" are
usually local contacts, such as 1 imit switches. The sensors are divided into
four channe1s, each separate from the others, to pro vi de redundancy for each
parameter that is monitored. Some parameters have four sensors, while others
have only three, thus all four channels are not always used. The signals
developed are transmitted by each process device in a given channel to its
associated bistable.
Bistables
The bistables receive signals from the process sensor channels and change
state according to the conditions indicated by the signals as compared to a
preset value (or "trip setpoint") which is set within the bistable. Each
bistable has two pairs of contacts, one connected to each train of the sol id
state logic through an input relay. The purpose of the input relays is to
provide electrical isolation behleen the solid state logic trains and the
reactor protection sensor channels. Regardless of whether a bistable is
normally energized or deenergized, the contact pairs are closed when the
bistable is in its normal stat~ This generates B signal to the logic trains
during normal operation. vlhen a parameter passes its setpoint, the bistable
changes state and the contact pairs open. Thi s removes the signa 1 to the
logic trains and indicates an out of tolerance conditio~ Each bistable is
connected only to the associated process sensor channel. For any given
process parameter, usual ly at least two bistables, in different channels, must
change state to actuate a safety systen Conversely, at least two bistables
must fail to change state to prevent a system actuation if it is required.
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Thus, the failure of any one bistable (or the associated sensor train) will
not compromi se SSPS funct i onabil ity, either by cau s i ng i nadv ertant actuat i on
or preventing proper actuation. In addition, each protection channel receives
its control power from a different source, and therfore the fai lure of one
power source can cause the failure of the bistables (or sensors) in only one
channel. Oepending on the type of bistable (or sensor), this failure wi 11 be
in either the normal or the tripped state. However, since for each process
parameter the redundant bi stab 1es are in different channe1s, the same argument
appl ies, and the functionabil ity of the SSPS is not compromised.
Solid State Logic Trains
The solid state logic trains interpret the signals from the bistables to
determine whether the correct combination of signals exists for the initiation
of a plant trip. Each logic train consists of a number of universal logic
boards, three safeguards output boards (not used for reactor trip), and an
undervol tage output board. These boards per form the various logic functions
required to develop the safety system actuation signals using "positive NANO
logic." This means that the normal state of the inputs to, and the outputs
from, a logic circuit is the presence of a signal (voltage). The presence of
a signal is generally referred to as a "high" and the absence of a signal as a
"1 ow." I~hen an abnorma 1 condition occurs in one or more process parameters,
the bistables associated with these parameters change state, opening the
associated contact pairs and thus removing the signal (causing a "lo~' input)
to the associated logic train input. Hhen enough "low" inputs occur in a
given circuit to satisfy its particular logic function, a "low" output
results. These outputs are fed to other circuits. At any level, the presence
of a "1 ow" i nd i cates an abnormal cond it ion, and when a correct combi nat i on of
"lows" exists, the logic train produces a "low" at one of its ultimate
outputs. Each universal logic board contains thren circuits (one four-input
circuit and two three-input circuits). These circuits can be configured to
obtain various combinations of coincidence logi~ depending on how the inputs
are used. These circuits also a110w the use of an "inhibit" input, which can
be used to prevent a "low" output duri ng testing or other conditions when a
bypass is desired. The undervoltage circuit board is a large OR gate, where
the occurrence of a "low" on any of the inputs resul ts in a "low" output. The
undervoltage circuit board is used to transmit the reactor trip signal to the
reactor protection system breakers.
Reactor Protection System (Mechanical)
The mechanical part of the reactor protection system (RPS) consists
basically of the control rods and their driver mechanisms, two rod control
motor-generator sets, two reactor trip breakers, and two bypass trip breakers.
The rods are held out of the core by supplying power from the motor-generator
sets to the drive mechanisms, which keeps an electromagnetic clutch energized
on each mechanism. Removing power from the drive mechanisms by opening one of
the normall y cl osed tri p breakers wi 11 cause the rods to drop i nto the core
under the i nfl uence of gray ity, thereby shutt i ng down the nuc 1ear react ion.
Each breaker is kept closed by energizing its undervoltage coil using the
normal 1y "high" output of the undervo ltage output circuit in the associated
soli d state logic trai n. Hhen the undervo ltage output ci rcuit goes "1 ow," the
breaker's undervoltage coil deenergizes and the breaker opens, interrupting
power from the motor-generator sets to the control rod drives and causing the
rods to drop into the cor~ The bypass breakers, which are normal ly open, are
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provided to a110w testing or maintenance on one of the trains whi1e the plant
is in operation. vlhen a bypass breaker is c10sed, any trip occurring in the
associated train will not trip the reactor, since power will still flow
through the bypass breaker. A c10sed breaker is annunciated in the contro1
room to inform the operator that on1y one RPS train is active. A c10sed
bypass breaker will receive a confirmatory trip signal from the appropriate
(active) 10gic train in the event a trip condition occurs. The bypass
breakers are inter10cked such that any attempt to c10se both bypass breakers
will result in the immediate trip of all four breakers. In addition to the
automatic signals, the operator can manua 11y trip the breakers by means of
pushbutton switches in the contro1 room.
Testing and Maintenance
Periodic testing is performed on the components of the SSPS in accordance
with the plant technica1 specifications. Whi1e a given train is being tested,
it is comp1ete1y out of service. The trip breaker for that train is 1eft
open, and the associated bypass breaker is c10sed. Thus, during testing the
reactor can on1y be tripped by opening one of two c10sed breakers, both of
which get their signal from the sing1 e active 10gic train. l'lhenever any test
switches are in the test position, or a bypass breaker is c10sed, or an SSPS
cabinet door is open, a general warning signal is activated for the affected
train, which is annunciated in the contro1 room. If any action is taken on
the other trai n that wou 1d resu 1t in a gen era 1 warni ng, a plant trip wi 11
occur. Thus, it is genera11 y impossib1 e for both trains to have a test switch
mispostioned in the test mode, since if one train had a switch in the test
mod~ the plant wou1d trip as soon as any cabinet door on the other train was
opened, which 'wou1d obvious1y be before any switch positions on that train
cou1d be changed. Maintenance is performed only as needed. Thus, there is no
contribution to SSPS unavailability from scheduled maintenance. Components
found defective during testing or at any other time are repaired as required
in accordance with the plant technica1 specifications. Obvious1y, the general
warning inter10cks will also prevent double train outage contributions due to
maintenance. Testing and maintenance is discussed in greater detail below.
Process Sensors
The process sensors are tested once per refue1 ing cycle. They are tested
on1y while the plant is shut down and are verified serviceable before power
ascension. Maintenance is never performed on the process sensors during plant
operation. If out-of~service sensors violate the plant technical
specifications between refueling outages, the plant is shut down so that they
can be repaired.
Bistab1es
The bistab1es are tested once a month. Each bistable is isolated from
its input and output during the test. Since this produces a trip signal from
the bistable, the bistab1e is not considered to be out of service during the
test. A dummy signal is applied to the bistab1e and varied to verify that the
point at which the bistable changes state is within the proper limits. A
failure to restore the bistable to service after testing wi 11 continue to
produce a trip signal from the bistable. Maintenance (replacement) of a
defective bistab1e will also result in a trip signal from the bistable output,
since it is not present in the circuit. Thus, there is no test or maintenance
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contribution to unavailability from bistables.
Solid State Logic
Each logic circuit is tested once each month. Each logic train is
equipped with a semiautomatic tester that tests a circuit by applying test
inputs and pulsing them rapidly between the tripped and nontripped states for
all possible combinations of input states. The resultant pulsing of the
output of the circuit is monitored, and green lights indicate that the circuit
is operating properl~ If a circuit is bad, a red light comes o~ One train
is tested at a time. The operator places the train in test and then tests the
circuits one at a time by rotating a set of function selector dials until all
circuits have been tested. The pulses are of such short that the trip
breakers and safeguards output relays do not have time to change stat~ The
design of the testing system is such that, even though only one circuit is
being tested at any instant, the entire trai n is out of service for the
duration of the testing (approximately 2 hours~ Maintenance (replacement) of
a defective logic board requires taking the entire train out of service in
order to prevent inadvertant actuat ion of safety systems. The out-of-serv ice
time for this action is 5 to 6 hours. Logic board replacement is performed
only as needed, there are no scheduled replacements.
Reactor Protection System Breakers
These breakers are tested monthly during the testing of the solid state
logi~ The opening and closing of the trip and bypass breakers for the
purpose of taking an actuation train out of service provides for the opening
and closing of each of the four breakers. The sequence of actions fol lows the
following pattern for each train: close bypass breaker, open trip breaker,
test solid state logi~ close trip breaker, open bypass breake~ Maintenance
is performed on the breakers only when one fails during testing. The plant
must be shut down in order to perform maintenance on the breaker, . so breaker
mai ntenance does not contri bute to ov era 11 system unav ail abil ity.
METHODOLOGY
The system was modeled using standard fault tree techniques, which will
not be described in detail in this paper. The top event of the faul t tree was
"failure to shut down the nuclear reaction." Success was defined as the
insertion of control rods such that no five control rods anywhere in the core
or no three adjacent control rods remain uninserted This definition had no
effect on most of the analysis, since system failure in most cases resulted in
no rod insertion. The only effect was in the evaluation of the probability of
common mode control rod failures resulting in a failure to shutdown
configuration given that the trip breakers opened. The model incl uded all the
components of the SSPS; the sensors, bistables, sol id state logic boards,
breakers, and control rods. In addition to component faults, test and
maintenance and human error fault contributors were incl uded. Common mode
failure analysis was appl ied where appropriate. The data used for the
analysis was taken from a data base developed for the overall PRA from a
variety of sources. The development of this data base was aseparate task,
and is not a subject of this paper. Briefly, however, data pertinent to this
analysis and contained within the da ta base was obtained from different
sources, including l~ASH-1400 [1], MIL-HDBK-217C [2], and IEEE STD-500 [3] for
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component data, NUREG/CR-1278 [4] for human error rate data, and plant
specific experience for test and maintenance data. Additionally, plant
experience was included in the component and human factors data where it was
considered meaningful. The selection of the data source depended on which
source, according to expert judgement, had a better treatment of data for each
particular component or other event.
A number of bounding assumptions were made during the analysis and also
for the subsequent' ana lysis of the optimum test interva 1. These assumptions
were as fo 11ows:
- The failure of all components otherthan the RPS breakers and the
control rods were considered to be independent events, the breakers
and rods were evaluated for common mode failure contributions.
- The input relays that serve as an interface between the bistable
contacts and the solid state logic were ignored because the failure
rate of the relay is much lower than that of the bistable and the
relay failure affects only one train, while the bistable failure
affects both.
- The nonsafety functions of the SSPS were not considered in the
system models because they do not directly affect safety system
operation and indirect effects are eliminated by electrical
isolation through photo-diode pair coupling of the safety and non-
safety parts of the system.
- The failure rate of the solid state equipment, which is always
energized, is entirely time dependent; that is, there is no demand
contribution to fail ure.
- The failure rate of the trip breakers is a combination of a time
dependent factor and a demand factor, which can be represented by
the fo llowing equation;
For month 1y test i ng, the data base gave a tota 1 fa il ure rate, A, of
1E-3. It also gave a spurious actuation failure rate of lE-6/hr,
which was feH to also be applicable to the standby, or hourly,
contribution to the overall failure rate. Applying these numbers to
the above equation for the monthly test interval (T=720 hrs), yields
a failure rate equation for the breakers for any test interval T of;
A = 6.4E-4 + 1E-61fT/2
Using these assumptions, the unavailability of the SSPS scram function was
calculated for the "as built" plant conditions. This determined the expected
unavai labil ity of the trip function and the dominant contributors to this
unavailabil ity. Since the purpose of this paper is to investigate if al tering
test intervals will result in a lower unavailabil it~ calculations were also
performed for various test intervals, and a curve drawn which shows the
optimum test interval.
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RESULTS
The results of the original analysis of the SSPS, which reflect the
existing system configuration and test/maintenance conditions, are shown below
in the form of dominant cut sets (the most likely combinations of component
unavailabilities which would result in system failure).
Gut Set Demand Unavail.
Gommon mode failure of trip breakers 1.0E-5
Train A(B) in test AND failure of trip 8.6E-6
logic board B(A)
Failure of trip breaker A(B) AND failure 3.1E-6
of trip logic board B(A)
Failure of trip logic boards A AND B 2.4E-6
Random failure of trip breakers A AND B 1.0E-6
Train A(B) in test AND common mode failure 5.6E-8
of trip breaker B(A) with bypass breaker A(B)
TOTAL RPS UNAVAILABILITY
As can be seen from these resul ts, common mode breaker fail ure and test
unavailabil ity are relatively close together as dominant contributors. The
last cut set is obviously not a dominant contributor, but it has been incl uded
because it is partly the key to the test interval optimization, as wi 11 be
seen next.
As previously state~ the results above were based on the present plant
operating condition~ which includes a test interval for most components of
once per month (720 hours). In order to evaluate the effect of altering this
test interval, the model was reevaluated for test intervals of 2, 8, 24, 72,
168, 336, and 1440 hours. The results of this analysis are shown on Figure 2.
As can be seen in the figure, unavailabil ity is minimized at a test
interval of 72 hours (every three days). The cut set val ues for this test
interval are shown belo~
Gut Set Demand Unavail.
Train A(B) in test AND failure of trip 8.6E-6
logic board B(A)
Gommon mode failure of trip breakers 6.8E-6
Random failure of trip breakers A AND B 4.6E-7
Train A(B) in test MD common mode failure 3.8E-7
of trip breaker B(A) with bypass breaker A(B)
Failure of trip breaker A(B) AND failure
of trip logic board B(A)
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Failure of trip logic boards A AND B
TOTAL RPS UNAVAILABILITY
As can be seen from the above tabl~ the unavailability contribution due to
test is now dominant. The top cut set has the same value as before, since
both the test contribution and the logic board unavailabilities are affected
strictly by hourly contributions in equal degree but opposite direction. All
of the pure component failure cut sets have declined due to reduction in their
unavailabilities from the more frequent testing. The test contribution which
is now fourth on the li st has increased since the test unavailabil ity is
increasing more rapidly than the breaker unavai labi lity is decreasing. Any
further reduction in the test intervals causes this cut set to increase more
rapidly than all the component failure cut sets can decrease, thus increasing
overall unavail abil ity.
Using the results presented above for the 72 and 720 hour test interval
cases, the overall reduction in unavai 1abil ity by changing to 72 hour test
intervals from 720 hour intervals can be calculated to b~
(2.5 - 1.6) / 2.5 = 36%
CONCLUSIONS
The analysis performed gives a calculated reduction of 36% in scram
unavailability by changing the test interval for the SSPS to 72 hours.
However, it must be remembered that there are uncertainties invol ved in
cal cul ations of this type. In general, most practitioners of PRA techniques
do not consider any change less than a factor of three to be significant in a
statistical sense. Therefore, while we conclude that shortening the test
interval wi 11 probably give some reduction in scram system unavailabil ity, it
is li kely that the reduction will not result in a significant reduction in
ov era11 scram fa i 1ure frequency.
REFERENCES
[1] U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Reactor Safety Study-An Assessment of
Accident Risks in U.S. Commercial Nuclear Power Plants, WASH-1400,
October 1975.
[2] U. S. Dep artme nt of De fe nse, B.~l i abi l.:!.iLEredi ct i0.!l- of El~ct!Q.!lis.
Eguipment, MIL-HDBK-217C, April 1979.
[3] Nuclear Power Engineering Committee of the IEEE Power Engineering
Societ~ IEEE Guide to the Col lection and Presentation of Electrical
E1ectronic and Sensing Component Reliability Data for Nuclear Power
Generation Stations, IEEE STD-500, June 1977.
[4] Swain, A.D., H.E. Guttmann, Handbook of Human Reliability Analysis with
EmQbas~~.!l-Nus.lea!_EQ~~! fl~D!_ßEE1.:!.s.~!.:!.QD~, U.S. Nuclear
Regulatory Commission, NUREGTCR-1278, September 1980.
220
STATION BLACKOUT: A TEST ON A PLANT AT POWER
LESSONS LEARNED FOR SAFETY STUDIES
T. MESLIN • A. CARNINO • B. PA YEN. A. CAHUZAC
ELECTRICITE DE FRANCE 2 rue Louis Murat 75384 PARIS CEDEX 08 FRANCE
ABSTRACT
The paper describes a test of voluntary cut-off of the external electrie
auxiliary sources serving a 900 MWE PWR unit operating at full capacity.With help
of the emergency Diesel generators the purpose is then to bring back the unit to a
safe cold shut-down state,using natural circulation. Lessons learned during this test
are diverse. They deal with the physical transients of the reactor system as weil as
with ergonomie and human behaviours of the operators under incident conditions. In
partieular the effectiveness of natural circulation without forming any steam bubble
under reactor vessel head was demonstrated.
INTRODUCTION
This paper describes a test of voluntary cut-off of external electrieal
power supplying a 900 MWE PWR unit while operating at full power. With the help of
the emergency Diesel generators, the purpose was to bring back the unit to the safe
cold shut-down condition using the natural circulation.
Since this test was performed on a nuclearunit in operation, and since one
of the purposes was to validate a post-incident operating procedure for the first
time on site, the preparation of this transient has been analysed in depth by the
operating staff with the collaboration of other E.D.F. specialists. It has to be noted
that the Safety Authorities had given their authorisation to implement the test.
OBJECTIVES
General scope :
Electricite de France has begun since several years to study and to re-
write the operating procedures in case of loss of electrieal sources. As far as
possible, these procedures are validated on a simulator or a unit in actual operation.
This station blackout test takes place within this general pattern of EDF's policy. As
the conduct of the test involved numerous aspects, the objectives were also diverse:
Knowledge of the physical transients :
analysis of the reactor system behaviour under natural circulation
during the phases of stabilization, boration and safe cold shut-down
without formation of a steam bubble under the reactor vessel head ;
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the plant auxiliary systems behaviour during the transient i.e.
operation of emergency Diesel generators auxiliary feedwater system
(A.F.W.) as weil as condensate system.
Validation of the incident operating procedure :
technieal contents
ergonomie aspects : understanding, task distribution, work load.
Observation of the human behaviour during an unusual and long transient.
Others lessons :
Various lessons will be learned from this test such as technieal
recommendations for other incidental and accidental procedures and on site
validation of the accident program used on the full scale PWR 900 MW training
simulator.
TEST CONDITIONS
- Plant status
the test was performed on 1983, August 17 on the Unit n° 3 at
DAMPIERRE-EN-BURLY (900 MW 3 loops)
a few moments prior to the test, the reactor power was brought down
to about 50 per cent of its full capacity.
the burn-up was 9577 MWDay!t.
the two Diesel generators were started 10 minutes before the test.
the plant status was meeting the required technieal operating
specifieations
Operating crews
In the normal framework of the local training program, most of the
operating crews had been given a course on the new procedure to be used during this
transient. However, on account of the holyday period, apart of the morning crew
was not aware of the test. The Safety Engineer was new in his Job (l month) but was
aware of the schedule of the test.
Operating means
All the usual operating means were available. Agraphie table had been
added in order to record the primary pressure and temperature.
Procedure-Scenario of the transient
In case of station blackout, the incident procedure requires, after the
stabilization phase, to inquire about the expected time of the. return of the external
electrical sources. If no source is anticipated within 2 hours, it is required to put the
reactor on cold shut-down conditions (scenario of the test).
At first, the loops are borated, then, the pressurizer, after that the
primary circuit is cooled down by natural circulation until the Reactor Decay Heat
Removßl System conditions are reached.
If AC power is available early, it is required to wait in hot shut-down
status.
When reaching 177°C, 27 bars, the test is deemed finished. The external
electrical supplies are declared available and the plant is re-started wi th the use of
the normal operating procedures.
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TEST ANALYSIS (tables 1-2-3, figures 1-2)
Test chronology (cf. Tables 1-2) :
The station blackout is initiated at 2.24 a.m. The various automatie
protective signals are actuated : reactor trip, turbine trip, normal feedwater system
isolation, auxiliary feedwater system actuation, emergency Diesel generators
actuation...
Table I describes precisely the main automatie actions whieh occurred
during the first 5 minutes into the transient.
Stabilization of the primary loops is reached half an hour later. Primary
circuit boration is performed from 3 am to 7 am. At 7 am, it is decided to initiate
the cooling by natural circulation in order to reach the cold shut-down conditions.
The cooling rate is then constant at IO'C/hour. The depressurization is at first
"natural" and then monitored by following a track on the left border of the
authorized natural circulation operating area (cf. figure I) in order to prevent
bubbling underneath the vessel head. At 7 pm, the conditions are met for switching
on the Decay Heat Removal System. The bubble formation under the vessel head
highlighted during the 1977 St-Lucie incident has been avoided. No major problem
has been met during the course of the test.
Control actions from the operators (figure I - 2) :
Immediate actions
According to the usual operation practiees at E.D.F. the first phase in the
case of an incident is to verify and to "confirm" automatie and protective actions.
In the case of this test, the first phase las ted about ten minutes. The main
automatic actions occurred correctly, but the operators had to start up manually
several auxiliary ventilation systems.
Pressurizer level and pressure
The Charging and Discharging System (CVCS) remains in operation during
such a transient. Immediately after the turbine trip signal, the closure of the main
steam inlet valves involves a transitory heating of the primary loops with a raise of
both pressure and level in the pressurizer. The opening of the turbine by-pass valves
and the AFWS start-up .lead to a fall in temperature and pressure. The pressure falls
down to 148.5 bars and then goes up as a result of the pressurizer heaters. Without
the normal pressurizer spray, the pressure can go over 156 bars; consequently, the
operator uses alternately the auxiliary spray or the pressurizer heaters. The
pressurizer level follows the pressure. The operator governs it manually and tries to
control the auxiliary spray flow. The stabilization of those parameters is reached at
3.30 a.m.
Primary temperature and steam generators levels
The start-up of the whole AFW system leads to a feedwater flow of over
50t/h per steam generator (S.G.) and consequently a rather quiek cool-down of the
S.G. At first, the temperatures of hot legs and cold legs become equal ; then the .1t
increases between the cold point, (S.G. outlet), and the hot point, (vessel outlet). As
soon as the t is large enough, the natural circulation starts to establish.
The .1t is ranging about 15'C between hot and cold legs during the first
hour of the test, and the average temperature of the loops is 272'C.
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Boration
The technical specifications require operators to borate the primary circuit
while respecting the following rules :
reach adequate negative reactivity
maintain a difference smaller than 50 ppm between primary loops and
pressurizer.
The primary loops were borated at first during I hour 45mn. Then the
pressurizer was borated through the auxiliary spray system.
At 6.30 a.m., the negative reactivity condition was widely respected, but
the difference of 50 ppm was unachievable. Nevertheless it was decided to continue
the test: the boron concentration in the loops was good enough to justify it despite
the fact that the pressurizer concentration was too low.
Cool-down and depressurization (table 3)
The cool-down operations begin at 7 a.m. with the cut-off of the
pressurizer heaters and the use of the atmospheric relief valves. In this first period,
the pressure decreases slowly while the operator conducts the cooling process at a
rate of 15°C/h. The goal is to meet and to follow a track on the left border of the
authorized thermodynamic domain.
After this first step, the cooling rate will be of about 10°C/h and remains
almost constant during the whole test.
In this way, the depressurization is almost natural and does not necessitate
particular operations before reaching 130 bars.
After this period, the use of the auxiliary spray system will be more and
more frequent and will last longer since its efficiency decreases, while the pressure
decreases. lt was demanded about 15 times before reaching 27 bars.
The 109C/h cooling rate is slow enough to enable the operator to control
the cooling operations without any perturbation.
On another hand, this rate gives an absolute guarantee against the risk of
formation of a steam bubble under the vessel head.
General view
The general results of these different steps are summarized on table 1. The
cooling in natural circulation has been on for about 12 hours. The average cooling
rate was 9°C/h and the depressurization rate about 9,5 bars/hour.
Special remarks :
AFWS behaviour
The AFW system did operate without any major problem except as regards
the speed governor of the steam driven pump.
The total water used was "" 640 tons.
For this reason, the auxiliary water tank must be immediately refilled
after the beginning of the transient (from the adjoining unit).
Boration
The boration duration was quite longer than scheduled. It appears
practically impossible to make simultaneously homogeneous the boron concentration
in the loops and in the pressurizer. Following this test, new directions will be given
to borate the primary system in case of natural circulation in order to warrant
enough negative reactivity and not to loose too much time.
Primary pump seals
CVCS was in use all through the transient. No major problem was
encountered in connection with the pump seals, except some transitory surges of
n° 2 sealleakage flow rate.
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Secondary circuit
At 1+ a.m., some water hammer occurred in the condensate systems' pipes.
This phenomenon was not expected and resulted from some valves staying opened
due to the 1055 of power and thus connecting those pipes with the vacuum of the
main condenser.
Human behaviour :
During this test, we had the opportunity to observe individual and team
behaviour, communieation problems, work-Ioad and responsability sharing. We can
stress on the following items.
Written procedures have been used and followed during all the test. We
were very impressed by the good quality of team behaviour, first considering the
relation between the successive teams during the shift turn-over : every operator
explained to his folIower what happened and summarized the main events that
occurred. Most of the operators stayed in the control room a long time after the
planned hours of shift turn-over. Every shift beginning its work checked all the
information given by the previous team.
As far as work-Ioad is concerned , it appeared that the planned work-Ioad
was not weil shared among all the operators.
lt was also noted that, when operators have to perform an operation in a
way different from the usual one, due to the transient situation, they are reluctant
to change their normal operation routines. lt then should be recommended that the
operating modes required under abnormal conditions be as dose -as possible to the
normal operation modes.
There we~e some problems regarding communieations between the control
room and the Nudear Auxiliary Building and we noted that information feed-back to
the control room is not planned in the procedure.
As a final remark, we may say that after 12 hours, the attention of the
operators was notieeably less sustained than at the beginning, may be since
ererybody thought that everything was correctly fixed.
CONCLUSIONS
The new procedure was validated by the test and will be enhanced only by
minor changes in the detail of the operating instructions.
The test did show dearly that it is feasible to bring this PWR system from
normal conditions to cold shut-down, when using natural circulation and without
formation of a bubble under the vessel head. A cooling rate of about of lO·C/hour
gives a confortable guarantee against this risk. lt is also important to follow the
left border of the authorized thermodynamie operating domain.
The lessons learned from this test have lead to improve the operation mode
used in other procedures Iinked with the 1055 of electrieal supply.
From an ergonomie point of view, the test observations were important for
the new incidental and accidental procedure design under development at EDF.
Eventually, the observation of the operating crew during such a complex
transient has signifieantly increased our knowledge of operator and crew behaviour
under disturbed situations and helps to develop pertinent human analysis tools.
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Table I : TEST FIRST 5 MINUTES CHRONOLOGY
DATE f':., TIME EVENTS
2 h 24' 29" to= ° sec Initiating Event (Ioss of power)
24'29" 0,06 sec Turbine Trip
24'29" 0,14 sec Main Breaker opening
24'30" 1 sec Turbine by-pass opening
24' 35" 6 sec Primary pumps Trip
24'35" 6 sec Reactor Trip
24'35" 6 sec Nuclear power< 40 %
24'36" 7 sec Nuclear power< 30 %
24'37" 8 sec AFW Starting
24' 37" 8 sec Feedwater pumps in service
24' 37" 8 sec Nuclear power< 10 %
24' 38" 9 sec Electrical supplies switching
24'41" 12 sec Steam Generator drains closed
24'45" 16 sec Feedwater c10sed
30'25" 5mn 56 sec Primary temperature < 2840 C
Table 11 : TEST CHRONOlOGY
TESTPHASES MAIN ACTIONS BEGINNING END DURATIONPARTIAL TOTAL
Immediate Aetions Confirmation of automatie 2 h 24 2 h 30 6mn 6 mnproteetive aetions
Stabilization Control of L. and P pressurizer 2 h 30 3 h 15 45mnControI of S.G. level 2 h 30 3h 30mn 45 mn
Loops boration 3 h 15 5h 1 h 45mn
Boration Pressurizer Boration 5 h 10 6 h 30 1 h 20 mn 3 h 45 mn
CVCS ReIinning 6 h 30 7h 30 mn
~
Cooling/depressurization 7h 19 h 25 12 h 25 mn 12 h 25 mn
TOTAL 17h
N
N
CO'
Table m:PARAMETRES EVOLUTION
TESTPHASES INITIAL T&P FINAL T&P DURATION AVERAGE RATEST P
Stabilization 155 bar 145 bar 5h
1
Boration 303°C 290 °c 0
Cool ing to the 145 bar 118 bar 7h 1O°C/h 4 bar / h
2
left board 290°C 225 °c
Cooling folJowing 118 bar 72 bar
3
the left board 225°C 177 °c 4h 12°C/h 12bar/h
Depressurization 72 bar 27 bar
4 to the RHR 1 h 30 0 30 bar / h
conditions 177 °c 177 °c
N
N
--J
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Institut de Protection et de Surete Nucleaire
Boite Postale n° 6
92260 Fontenay-aux-Roses, FRANCE
ABSTRACT
A review of the French PWR situation concerning primary coolant
leaks is presented, including a description of operating technical
specifications, of the collecting system of primary coolant leakage
into the containment and of the detection methods. It is mainly
based on a compilation over three years, 1981 to 1983, of almost all
actual leaks, their natures, causes, consequences and methods used
for their detection. By analysing these data it is possible to
evaluate the efficiency of the primary coolant leak detection system
and the problems raised by compliance with the criteria defined in
the operating technical specifications.
INTRODUCTION
The integrity of a PWR primary coolant containment is ensured by strict
criteria taken into account at the stages of design, manufacture and produc-
tion. During normal operation, strict limits are defined in technical speci-
fications.
Nevertheless, the primary containment is not completely leaktight and any
leakage of primary water has to be detected. Moreover, the importance for
safety of such leaks depends on location, nature, flow rate and duration.
Therefore, it is important that, at any time, the operator should be able to
detect and locate a leak by means of a reliable and sensitive system intended
for that purpose.
This paper aims at reviewing the situation of French PWRs in regard to'
primary coolant leakage. It is mainly based on a compilation of all actual
leaks -their natures, their causes, their consequences, methods used for their
detection- between 1981 and 1983. However steam generator tube leakage and
reactor coolant pump seal failures are not taken into account. The analysis of
these data makes it possible to assess the efficiency of primary coolant leak
detection system and to raise problems related to compliance with the criteria
defined in operating technical specifications. These two points are presented
first.
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OPERATING TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS
French regulations related to primary circuit tightness are based on
requirements of Regulatory Guide 1-45 : "Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary
Leakage Dectection Systems" (1973).
French operating technical specifications distinguish two types of
leakage :
- quantified leakage is leakage collected and conducted to a tank 'and
monitored for the flow rate,
- unquantified leakage is all other leakage.
They set up conditions for normal operation arrd, corrective actions as fol-
lows
- with any unquantified leakage greater than 2.3.10- 1 m3 /h hot shutdown
should be reached within 4 hours and cold shutdown within 24 hours,
- with any quantified leakage greater than 2.3 m3 /h cold shutdown should be
reached within 10 hours.
Moreover leak detection systems have been analysed and approved by safety
organisms at the same time as the whole design of the plant. They are described
in detail hereafter.
COLLECTING SYSTEM OF PRIMARY COOLANT LEAKAGE INTO THE CONTAINMENT
Detection methods of primary coolant leakage are strongly dependent on
their collecting system design. It is therefore important to describe it, even
briefly. For this purpose two kinds of leakage will be distinguished :
- designed collected leakage which is especially conducted to a tank and
which may be characterized by the fact it is confined in a closed system
from the source to the collecting tank,
- designed unco11ected leakage is a11 other leakage which is, strictly
speaking, collected (at least by the containment general sump or another
sump or tank) but which is not confined and can spread over the contain-
ment atmosphere.
Collected Leakage
In the reactor building there are three tanks designed to receive col-
lected leakage j their characteristics are indicated on figures 1 to 3. The
three tanks are fitted with monitoring equipment (pressure, temperature,
level) ; some of the measurements are recorded in the main control room and
alarms and automatie actions are associated with them.
Note that criteria for collecting valve stern leakage are as follows
valves of radioactive circuits (reactor coolant system, chemical and volume
control system, residual heat removal system, safety injection system, nuclear
island vent and drain system) if their nominal diameter is greater than
5.10- 2 m or if they are regulating valves.
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Uncollected Leakage
Uncollected leakage may lead to water or vapor spreading over the con-
tainment ; it is collected in the containment sump either straight to it or
undirectly for some particular leaks with which specific detection means are
associated they are detailed hereafter.
- Reactor cavity
The bunker of reactor vessel pit is a water holdup point. Its level is
monitored and an alarm warns the operator in the main control room if the
water level reaches 5 cm. A draining line, normally isolated, is connected
to the containment sump.
- In core instrumentation room
This room is fitted with a leakage detection system quite similar to that
of the reactor cavity. Draining line to the containment sump is normally
isolated.
- Settling tank
It is normally designed for collecting any oil leakage from primary
pumps. This tank also collects floor drains from primary coolant pump
bunkers. Its level is monitored ; it can be drained into the containment
sump and any overflow is conducted to it.
DETECTION }lliTHODS OF PRIMARY COOLANT LEAKAGE
Among the different means for the operator to know the confinement state
of the second barrier especially with respect to the operating technical
specifications, we shall distinguish :
- primary leakage quantification methods with which specific detection
means are associated,
- primary leakage detection and location methods.
Quantification methods
Among the different quantification methods originally envisaged, Elec-
tricite de France developed four of them, based on the following measurements :
- chemical and control volume tank level,
- sump level and flow monitoring,
- airborne gaseous radioactivity,
- air cooler condensate flow rate.
The two first methods only are actually operational. Airborne gaseous
radioactivity monitoring does not allow quantification of primary leakage but
still remains a useful detection means . Monitoring of condensate flow-rate
from air cooler allows neither quantification nor detection of any primary
leakage. This method therefore has been dropped and plants are no longer
equipped with it. A new automatie method was designed and is currently tested
at Cruas unit 3.
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Chemical and volwne control tank method (total primary leakage)
This consists of estimating the weight balance of primary coolant during
a given period of time by monitoring the chemical and volwne control tank
level. Apart from this, the following parameters are taken into account :
pressurizer level variation, primary coolant volwne variation, makeup and
release volwnes during the same duration. When the reactor is in steady-state
operation, the operator tries to avoid any makeup or release so as to simplify
the method and increase its sensitivity and accuracy (about 150 l/h for a 2 h
test and 75 l/h for a 4 h test). In load-follow operation, for application of
this method, the release and makeup volwnes during the test period are to be
evaluated. Installation of volwnic counters on the two lines should make this
evaluation easier and more accurate.
Containment swnp method (unquantified leakage)
This method is closely dependent on primary leakage collecting system
design in which discrimination between quantified and unquantified leakage is
achieved. It is based on level indications and pwnp operation observation. As
this swnp collects primary leakage as weIl as secondary leakage, sampIes have
to be analysed to evaluate the respective part of each type of leakage.
Evaluation of quantified leakage flow-rate
It may be done
3 collecting tanks
unquantified leakage
either by measuring leakage flow-rates conducted to the
6r by calculating the difference between total and
flow-rates.
Automatie method of leakage evaluation
A code has been developped which allows, mainly from existing instru-
mentation (analog instrwnentation, on-off signals), calculation of the total
amount of primary coolant leakage : total, quantified and unquantified leakage
rates.
The total primary leakage is evaluated by calculating at regular inter-
vals the total weight of a reference volume which includes primary coolant
system and chemical and control volwne system. In order to improve the calcu-
lation accuracy, essentially dependent on non linear variations of water
density, this reference volume is "meshed" in 19 elementary volumes each
weight of which is calculated. The total leakage flow-rate is the difference
between two average weights from about 10 calculated values corrected if
necessary for makeups and releases.
The quantified leakage rate is also calculated by this code thanks to the
collecting tank instrumentation ; the unquantified leakage rate is obtained
from the two previous leakage rates provided some validations have been done.
This method, currently tested at Cruas unit 3, would be a great improv-
ment of the primary leakage detection and quantification systems and would
decrease the detection delay.
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Detection and location methods
Four types of detection means may be distinguished :
- detection means specifically IIssociated with primary leakage quanti-
fication methods (table I),
- detection means associated with particular leaks either unquantified or
quantified leaks (table 11) ; it clearly appears that for most of them,
leakage flow-rates must not reach limiting conditions set up by technical
specifications. It would be more consistent to complete them by taking
into account these particular leaks,
- detection means such as : airborne gaseous radioactivity in the contain-
ment, containment pressure, containment temperature, fire alarms,
- routine inspections.
The second and fourth types allow location of the leakage. For the third
type, fire alarms generally give an approximative indication of location.
Otherwise the best way to locate leaks remains local inspection.
LEAKAGE NATURE
Total leakage
Unquantified
leakage
Quantified
leakage
DETECTION MEANS
Chemical and volume control tank :
- visual detection on the level recording
- makeup frequency
- routine measurement
General containement sump :
- level alarms
- lifting pump operation
- routine measurement
Pressurizer relief tank :
- level and temperature alarms
Process drain and reactor coolant drain tanks
- level alarms
- pump operation
Table I - Detection means specifically associated
with primary leakage quantification methods
AFFECTED SYSTEM
OR COMPONENT
Component cooling system (u)
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DETECTION AND LOCATION MEANS
- Radioactivity alarms
- Storage feedwater tank level alarms
Safety injection accumulator tanks
(u) Level alarms
In core instrumentation room (u) Level alarms
Reactor vessel cavity room (u) Level alarm
Primary pump bunkers (u) Settling tank level monitoring
Primary pump seals n° 2 (q) High flow-rate alarm
Reactor vessel seal n° 1 (q) Level alarm
Reactor vessel external seal (q) Temperature alarm
Pressurizer relief valves (q) Temperature alarms
Various other safety relief valves Temperature probes or shift
(9 ) indicators
TAßLE 11 - Particular leaks among unquantified (u) or quantified (q)
leakage and specific detection means associated with them
OPERATING EXPERIENCE
This study covers 70 incidents which occurred between 1981 and 1983 and
collected in Electricite de France incident reporting system. Steam generator
tube leakage and reactor coolant pump seal failures are not taken into
account.
Initial condition and mode of operation reached after the incident
Initial condition
Power operation
36
Hot shutdown
15
Mode of operation reached
Power operation 4
Hot shutdown 18
Cold shutdown 14
Hot shutdown 6
Cold shutdown 7
Unknown 2
Cold shut down : 12
Discovered during shutdown 7
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It should be noted that among the 36 incidents which occurred when the
reactor was at power, the limit value set up in the technical specifications
for the flow rate leakage was reached for only 20 of them ; in those cases
implementation of .required actions was always correct. In other cases, ope-
rators anticipated the required actions.
Hain causes of primary leakage
The main components involved in primary leakage are as follows
a) valves : packing gland leaks, upstream-downstream leaks
b) reactor coolant pump casing seals
c) diaphragm flange connections
d) heat removal exchangers
e) glass inspection windows on purge lines.
a) Valves : In 1982 and 1983, the behaviour of valves as regards packing
gland leakage was considerably improved, through action taken by
Electricite de France : manual valve back-seating, implementation of new
specifications concerning valve stem leaktightness. Problems still remain
on pressurizer continuous spray valves and on motor-operated valve of the
charging line inside the containment.
The components affected by upstream-downstream leakage are mainly
the pressurizer relief and safety valves. Though these leaks are very
low, their potential consequences are important : hydrogen release to
pressurizer relief line and tank, suppression of safety valve water plugs
thus making safety valves open at apressure different than their set-
point.
b) Reactor coolant pump casing seals Although these leaks are very low,
these incidents, generally detected during refueling outage by boron
deposit on the casing, must be considered as break forerunners. They are
essentially due to inadequate stud tightening torque and to insufficient
seal quality. Corrective actions have been taken such as improvement in
seal quality, increase of tightening torque and reinforcement of periodic
controls.
c) Diaphragm flange connections : These leaks occurred mainly on reactor
coolant system temperature by-pass loops during temperature and pressure
transients. The replacement of these flange connections by welded joints
is still under study at Electricite de France.
d) Heat removal exchangers : These leaks occurred during reactor heat removal
system (RHR) actuation transients on exchanger threaded flange. The
improvements of RHR exchangers is still under study (seal modifications,
changes in studs tightening torque, modifications of exchanger pipe
supports ... ). Otherwise the RHR actuation procedure has been changed to
minimize pressure and temperature transients.
e) Glass inspection windows on purge lines : The glass inspection window
breaks mainly occurred during manual actions on reactor coolant tempera-
ture by pass loops. Procedures have been changed to solve this problem.
Primary leakage consequences
Reactor coolant leakage may be considered as a forerunner of a break in
the second barrier. Besides, these leaks often present' some drawbacks which
make reactor operating more difficult and reduce plant safety : releases of
radioactive and borated water or steam into the containment, reduced capacity
of collecting tanks, hydrogen releases, ferritic steel corrosion due to boric
acid.
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Hain problems encountered on French units from 1981 to 1983 due to
primary coolant leaks are as follows :
- valve stud corrosion j EdF is replacing all ferritic steel studs by
stainless steel ones on valves in contact with borated water,
- hydrogen fire on a pressurizer relief valve,
- in core instrumentation system spray due to leakage on valve packing
glands.
Leakage detection and location
As concerns the primary coolant leakage detection the main points drawn
from the examination of significant incident reports are as follows :
a) in normal operation, the main indicator of·a primary coolant leakage is
the behaviour of the chemical and volume control tank monitoring level,
b) this indication of primary leakage is often confirmed by simultaneous
indicator such as: containment radioactivity, containment pressure, tank
and sump levels (reactor coolant drain tank, process drain holdup tank,
containment general sump, in core instrumentation room sump, pressurizer
relief tank),
c) some particular leaks are detected by local fire alarm actuations j for
instance leaks into primary coolant pump bunkers and stern leakage of the
containment isolating valves on the charging line which are thus easily
located,
d) upstream-downstream leaks of the pressurizer relief and safety valves are
detected thanks to alarms generated by the temperature probes on the
relief lines.
Primary
seems to be
inspections.
coolant leakage location, particularly uncontrolled leakage,
rather difficult and is currently visually achieved by local
CONCLUSIONS
The French PWR situation concerning primary coolant leakage was assessed
on the basis of the analysis of leaks which occurred over three years, 1981 to
1983 (except steam generator tube leaks and reactor coolant pump seal failures)
it may be characterized as follows :
- the main components involved in these incidents are valves and, to a
lesser extent, primary pump casing seals ; actions have been taken or are
planned to reduce their reoccurrence as weIl as their consequences,
- no problem arised from the primary coolant leakage detection system and
thus from the leakage collecting system design. Nevertheless, the leakage
detection delay and the method sensitivity can't be accurately apprecia-
ted. However, the forthcoming implementation of a new automatic method of
primary leakage evaluation should improve its reliability and decrease
the detection delay,
- for all reported events, the application of operating technical speci-
fications was correct and in some case, anticipated.
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ABSTRACT
The French safety authorities have undertaken a systematic eva-
luation of the safety of. old nuclear power plants. Apart from a
complete reV1Sl0n of safety documents (safety analysis report,
general operating rules, incident and accident procedures, internal
emergency plan, quality organisation manual), this examination
consisted of analysing the operating experience of systems frequen-
tly challenged and a systematic examination of the safety-related
systems. This paper is based on an exercise at the Ardennes Nuclear
Power Plant which ha~ been in operation for 15 years. This paper
also summarizes the main surveys and modifications relating to this
power plant.
INTRODUCTION
French safety authorities have undertaken a systematic evaluation of the
safety of old nuclear plants.
Indeed, it has become apparent that these installations, which were not
designed to present safety criteria, should be the subject of areevaluation
primarily designed to establish their global safety level in relation to power
plants satisfying current requirements.
The first installation to have been reexamined in this way is the
Ardennes Power Plant (CNA) which has been in operation for approximately 15
years. Consequently this paper describes the process adopted by the Institut
de Protection et de Surete Nucleaire (IPSN) which is the technical arm of the
French safety authorities, through a reexamination of the safety of the CNA.
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PROCEDURE USED FOR REEVALUATING THE SAFETY OF THE
ARDENNES NUCLEAR POWER PLANT
The basis for reevaluating this installation was a complete rev~s~on of
the safety documents undertaken by the licensee at the request of the safety
authorities (safety analysis report, general operating rules, inte~nal emer-
gency plan, quality organisation manual). Its preparation included all studies
undertaken by the licensee in order to improve the plant's safety and led to
modifications both to the design and to the operating rules.
This reexamination therefore involved close cooperation between the
licensee and IPSN.
The basic idea behind this safety reevaluation was to endeavour to
establish the global safety level of the CNA in relation to 900 MWe pres-
surized water reactor power plants. For this purpose it was not considered
necessary to make a systematic analysis of all systems important from a safety
point of view.
Indeed, it seemed more appropriate to adopt different approaches depen-
ding on whether the system being analysed was frequently (or even permanently)
used or on standby during normal operation of the power plant.
In the case of systems frequently used, experience in operating the power
plant provided knowledge of each of them which Was considered sufficient in
order to assess their suitability for fulfilling the function for which they
were designed. The operating evaluation was drawn up on the basis of anomalies
and incidents occurring during operation as weIl as modifications made over
the years.
In the case of safety related systems for which there is insufficient
operating experience, the procedure adopted was to analyse each systematical-
ly, without it being required that they should satisfy all safety criteria
applicable to 900 and 1300 MWe pressurized water power plants ; a study was
carried out to assess them in relation to what is today considered to be an
acceptable safety level and was in two stages :
- a comparison of the system in relation to current design criteria,
- identification of problems in order of importance taking account of
the various aspects of the system (incidents, maintenance, periodic
testing, procedures ... ).
Further , two different approaches were adopted with regard to design
problems and operating rules.
The design criteria for 900 MWe pressurized water reactor power
plants were used as a reference for reexamining safety of the CNA and
only those design modifications which were of interest from a safety
cost-yield point of view were requested.
On the other hand, with regard to the general operating rules
(technical specifications, procedures ... ) it was considered necessary
that CNA should benefit from the considerable improvements made in this
field. It was therefore decided to adapt the CNA operating rules on those
of 900 MWe pressurized water reactor power plants allowing, of course,
for that power plant's specific features.
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In some cases the modifications to equipment necessary to bring safety up
to a level comparable with that now in force were such (due in particular to
the absence of redundancy and/or independence) that it was considered prefera-
ble, in agreement with the licensee, to give priority to a study based on
complete loss of the function with a view to establishing the procedures to be
applied in such a potential occurence. All the more so, since some specific
features of CNA could have a favourable effect on the consequences of total
loss of function as compared with the analysis made of 900 MWe pressurized
water reactor power plants. .
At the same time that this work was proceeding the licensee was also
asked to undertake areevaluation of margins relating to the risk of avessei
embrittelment. This point will not however be considered in this paper.
~~IN ACTIONS INITIATED OR UNDERTAKEN DURING TRE SAFETY
REEVALUATION OF TRE ARDENNES NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS
- Reexamination of the CNA site
Given the period at which the CNA was designed, site related safety
aspects were not considered as comprehensively as now. If was for this reason
that it was thought important that a complete reexamination should be made
during this reevaluation.
At the end of this work, the only point requlrlng particular conside-
ration related to checking the power plant's seismic resistance (NRC-RG-1.60
spectrum 0.1 g). In view of the opinion of experts it was decided to limit
this study to an examination of the behaviour of the primary system and its
supporting structures, to verifying the resistance of the emergency shutdown
and removal of residual power systems as weIl as the spent fue1 pool.
- Experience of the main nuclear .systems
An operating evaluation was made for the following systems
- chemical and volumetrie control system,
residual heat removal system,
auxiliaries cooling system,
raw water system,
compressed air system,
ventilation system,
normal feedwater supply system,
emergency power supplies.
The reliability of these systems was assessed on the basis of incidents
arising on the various items of equipment making them up, on information
obtained from preventive maintenance and periodic testing, as weIl as on
modifications made to the systems. This survey was carried out on the opera-
tion period of CNA before the safety reevaluation (1968 to 1982).
This operating evaluation showed that the various problems arising during
operation had been resolved by corrective measures whose effectiveness has
been confirmed by experience.
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Only the emergency power supplies were not satisfactory from a safety
point of view. Indeed, the CNA having been designed some 20 years ago, the
principle of separating redundant trains was not applied equipment was
grouped by function and all power supplies are located in the same building.
Three lines of action were followed in parallel in order to study and
improve this situation :
- limitation of potential causes of a loss of power supplies (improved fire
protection, physical separation of equipment as far as possible),
- study of the loss of external and internal power supplies,
- installation of new emergency generators as part of the new auxiliary
feedwater.
- Systematic analysis of the safeguard systems
Safety injection and containment spray systems
In this plant, the two "safety injection" and "containment spray"
functions are linked and use the same pumps for the recirculating phase.
It was for this reason that the systematic study of these two systems was
carried out in parallel.
A survey was made on the basis of 900 ~fWe pressurized water reactor
plants of the essential differences in equipment and operating modes
during the successive phases of safety injection and containment spray as
a function of different break sizes and consequently of the pressure
evolution in the primary system.
Following this comparison, the main studies and measures undertaken
to improve the safety of the reactor containment, safety inj ection and
spray systems aimed to
- a minimization of the risks of human failure during switch over from
"direct injection" configuration to "recirculating" configuration,
- an accommodation of all possible operating situations and in par-
ticular to be able to inject and cool the water in the containment
sumps if primary fluid pressure remains high (as in the case of
small breaks),
- an improvement of the automatie initiation of the "safety injection"
and "containment spray" systems.
Figure 1 shows the main modifications which it has been decided to
make to these systems.
In order to reduce the causes of single failure, the licensee
intends to double all valves involved in the safety injection sequence
and which could by a single failure result in loss of the safety
injection and/or containment spray functions.
On the existing circuit, those valves whose position changes during
switch over from "direct injection" configuration to "recirculating"
configuration are manual, with the exception of the valve located imme-
diately at the sump suction, which is pneumatic. Therefore, such a change
in configuration requires local operation by operators in order to align
the system. Given the risk of human error involved and the problem of
accessibility to the various rooms where the equipment to be operated is
located, the licensee intends replacing all the manual valves involved by
two motorized valves installed in parallel.
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During the recirculating phase, the cooling function for the primary
fluid sucked in the sumps is provided,by the residual heat removal system
exchangers which are not designed for high pressures. In order to ensure
the sump water injection and cooling functions should primary fluid
pressure remain high, the licensee intends to divide the output of the
injection pumps into two : one part will be directly reinjected at high
pressure into the primary loops and the other will be depressurized to
circulate in the residual heat removal system exchangers so as to cool
the water contained in the sumps by means of the spray ~ystem.
At the CNA, the safety injection sequence is initiated by a coYnci-
dence of the pressurizer low pressure and low level signals. This feature
was not modified by the licensee following the T~lI in order to avoid
spurious safety injection which, in the case of CNA, would involve a
delicate operating transient. Indeed, initiation of the safety injection
sequence involves complete isolation of the containment and in particular
loss of cooling of the primary fluid by the steam generators. Instruc-
tions in the control room require the operator to startup safety
injection on the "pressurizer low pressure" criterion. After discussion
with the plant staff it was decided to eliminate coincidence of the 2
signals and to maintain only the pressurizer low pressure signal, whilst
at the same time modifying the containment isolation function by intro-
ducing a 2 phases isolation identical to that already existing on 900 ~rwe
pressurized water reactor power plants. This modification will also
permit automatic initiation of the spray sequence which is up to now
manually controlled from the control room on a containment high pressure
criterion.
Auxiliary feedwater system
The auxiliary feedwater system was designed to accomodate loss of
offsite electric power supplies by ensuring maintenance of the unit at
hot shutdown for aperiod of the order of 15 to 20 h.
The design of the system is such that it does not permit switching
from hot shutdown mode to intermediate shutdown mode where pressure and
temperature can be controlled by the residual heat removal system.
After systematic analysis of this system it became apparent that it
was unable to cover the following situations :
- loss of normal feedwater,
- loss of external and internal power supplies,
- small and medium sized breaks in the primary circuit combined
with loss of outside power supplies,
- breaks in secondary system pipes combined with loss of offsite power
supplies .
Given this situation, the licensee has decided to install a new
auxiliary feedwater system for the steam generator satisfying all present
safety criteria (see figure 2).
This modification is the most important resulting from the ree-
valuation of this power plant's safety.
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- Containment
It was also considered important as part of the CNA safety reevaluation
to examine existing arrangements to mitigate, as far as possible, the conse-
quences to the power plant personnel and the environment of accidental and
post-accidental conditions.
In the case of CNA, the primary system as weIl as the auxiliary systems
are ins ta lIed in two separate containment vaults ; given this intallation and
a few relatively minoradjustments it was considered that the reactor vault
containment and that of the nuclear auxiliary vis 11 vis the environment was
satisfactory.
The two main studies undertaken following this examination relate to
conditions of access to equipment necessary in a post-accidental situation and
also to the qualification of the electrical and mechanical equipment under
accidental conditions.
- Revision of safety documents
Simultaneously with these improvements to the power plant, the licensee
undertook arevision of the safety documents.
These include the quality organisation manual, the general operating
rules, the incident and accident procedures.
Two priorities were established in applying the new quality organisation
manual. The first relates to the drafting of the technical specifications for
all Q.A. equipment. In carrying out this work the operator came up against
many difficulties arising from the age of the equipment, in particular when
the supplier of the equipment was no longer the original manufacturer. The
second priority relates to the application of the new quality organisation
rules for maintenance of the primary system and safety grade systems equip-
ment.
With regard to the reV1S1on of the general operating rules, the licensee
has been mainly concerned to improve the operating technical specifications.
These latter have been improved by adapting technical operating specification
of 900 }rwe pressurized water reactor power plants to the CNA.
Revision of all the CNA accident and incident procedures is in progress.
It is based on studies made for 900 }fWe pressurized water reactor power plant
procedures and has sought to quantify as much as possible the diagnosis cri-
teria and those applicable to the choice of measures to be taken. The safety
authorities have also requested that this revision should include checking
consistency between procedures and design ; in particular verifying the
accessibility of equipment necessary for the application of accident proce-
dures.
CONCLUSIONS
Reevaluation of the safety of old nuclear power plants provides an ove-
rall view of the plant in relation to safety criteria in force at the time. In
the case of the CNA this was not intended to pe an exhaustive analysis of the
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plant but was directed to highlight those aspects considered to be most impor-
tant to the safety of that power plant. Given the programme of studies and the
modifications undertaken, this examination has resulted in a favourable
assessment of the suitability of this power plant for continuing operation
under satisfactory safety conditions.
One of the reasons of the success of this programm relates to the good
relationship that existed from the very beginning between the licensee and the
safety authorities which worked in elose cooperation. This seems to be a
necessary condition.
The work undertaken as a result of this safety reexamination was spread
into three phases
- phase 1 overall definition of the modifications,
- phase 2 detailed design of the modifications,
- phase 3 implementation of the modification.
At the present time the licensee is completing the second phase of this
programme. The target date is to complete all these actions by the end of the
1985 refueling outage.
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HYDROGEN WATER CHEMISTRY - A PROVEN METHOD TO INHIBIT
INTERGRANULAR STRESS CORROSION CRACKING IN BOILING
WATER REACTORS
J. Magdalinski and R. Ivars
ASEA-ATOM
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ABSTRACT
Intergranular Stress Corrosion Cracking (IGSCC) of stainless steel has occurred
in several BWR plants in recent years. In Swedish plants the extent of cracking
has been limited and the conseguences, in terms of operational disturbances,
have been guite small. Some cracks have been detected recently in the Ringhals
1 plant, however. As a phenomenon related to ageing, the cracks and their
causes must receive the greatest attention.
ASEA-ATOM initiated experimental work in the laboratory and in the Oskars-
hamn 2 BWR plant in the late seventies. The method chosen for these
experiments, the aim of which was crack prevention, was hydrogen addition to
the feedwater. Full scale demonstration runs have shown that oxygen sup-
pression by hydrogen addition to the reactor coolant is technically feasible.
Materials tests carried out in reactor coolant in the Ringhals 1 plant have
demonstrated that intergranular stress corrosion cracking is eliminated when
the oxygen concentration is kept low.
The paper will present the main results of the Hydrogen Water Chemistry
program. The technigue developed has led to the design of a hydrogen injection
system which is now commercially available for IGSCC prevention.
INTRODUCTION
Intergranular stress corrosion cracking (IGSCC) cif austenitic stainless steel piping has
been a headache for BWR owners for more than a decade. It has caused significant losses in
plant availability and costly repairs. The phenomenon has been a problem for metallurgists
and corrosion engineers for many years but was first seen in nuclear power plants in 1974-
75, when a number of cracks were detected in the stainless pipework of 8 US BWRs.
The extent of cracking in Swedish plants has been limited and the conseguences, in
the form of disturbances to operation, have been very small. However, as a phenomenon of
ageing, the greatest attention must be paid to the cracks and their causes.
IGSCC occurs in the heat-affected zone of welds, an area that is sensitized by the
welding process. Three conditions must be satisfied simultaneously for IGSCC to occur:
tensile stress, sensitized material and oxidizing environment.
Tensile stress of sufficient magnitude occurs at almost all welds as a result of the
presence of normal structural stress, in combination with residual stress from welding.
Sensitization is the result of heat treatment and makes the stainless steel sensitive to
corrosion along grain boundaries.
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Anormal 18 Cr/8 Ni stainless steel with a carbon content of 0.02 - 0.08 % is
supersaturated with carbon. If the steel is heated, e.g. in conjunction with welding, the
mobility of the atoms increases and, if the heating is of sufficient duration within a critical
temperature range (500-9000 C), chromium carbides precipitate and grow. The carbide
precipitation occurs predominantly on the boundaries of the grains forming the structure of
the steel. The precipitation rate is strongly dependent on the carbon concentration, and at
concentrations below 0.04-0.05 % carbon the rate is so slow that the risk of sensitization
may be neglected. As a result of the carbide precipitation, the grain boundaries become
depleted of chromium, resulting in the boundaries losing its stainless properties and
becoming "sensitized".
Oxidizing environment, corrosive enough to permit attack on simtitized stainless
steel is given primarily by the presence of dissolved oxygen. Boiling water reactors of
current design use high-purity water with no chemical additives as primary coolant. A
steady state concentration of 100-400 ppb of dissolved oxygen is produced by radiolysis of
water in the reactor core. Oxidizing impurities, e.g. from resin intrusions or make-up
water, mayaiso be of some importance to the oxidizing potential.
In the case of Swedish boiling water reactors, ASEA-ATOM has set up stringent
material and manufacturing specifications to avoid IGSCC. The requirements apply to
limitation of the carbon content to a maximum of 0.05 % in steel according to Swedish
Standard SS 2333 in contrast to the 0.08 % carbon content of the American steel AISI 304.
Certain limitations also apply to heating during welding and to repair welds, to avoid
unsuitable heat treatment. These measures have delayed and limited the incidence of
IGSCC in Swedish plants, but during 1982-1983, cracks were detected in Ringhals I, which
has been in operation since 1974. Additional preventive measures have been taken in the
most recently built plants, including the limitation of the carbon content to a maximum of
0.03 %.
To achieve immunity against IGSCC and to prevent cracking it is sufficient to
eliminate one of the three factors mentioned above. In the case of the first - tensile stress
- a number of remedies have been developed which to some extent improve the stress
situation on the inside of tubes from' tensile towards compressive stresses. It is also
possible to affect the second factor - sensitization - by choosing a material with a
sufficiently low carbon content. Both of these remedies would be demanding and expensive
in the case of plants in operation, because they require the treatment of all welds or the
replacement of all stainless piping in extensive parts of the primary systems of the plants.
The development of a method to eliminate the third factor, i.e. to prevent corrosion
by reducing the oxygen content of the reactor water to very low concentrations has been
conducted by ASEA-ATOM. The oxygen content is reduced by the addition of hydrogen to
the feedwater system of the plant. This method, which will be known as Hydrogen Water
Chemistry (HWC), has also been adopted by General Electric in the U.S.A.
The water chemistry tradition of ASEA-ATOM has its historical roots in the fact that
the Swedish nuclear program once started with heavy water reactor concepts, in which the
careful treatment of the valuable coolant had high priority. The influence of different
additives on the decomposition of the reactor coolant was studied in several research
projects during the 1950-60's, for instance in the Halden Boiling Heavy Water Reactor and
in the Studsvik R2 Reactor. Based on this broad experience it was natural for ASEA-ATOM
to attack the environmental factor and to choose the HWC concept as the potential remedy
against IGSCC.
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During 1977-78 ASEA-ATOM carried out a pilot study on hydrogen water chemistry
for BWRs. An engineering evaluation of the feasibility of hydrogen addition to the reactor
feedwater to reduce the reactor water oxygen concentration was performed. The study
recommended a short-term demonstration test in the Oskarshamn 2 plant (570 MWe). That
test, the first in the world in a full-size commercial BWR, was carried out in November
1979 /1/. Technical feasibility of the hydrogen addition concept was convincingly demon-
strated.
Today a number of full-scale test runs have been carried out by ASEA-ATOM in
Oskarshamn 2 /2/ as weil as in Ringhals I (750 MWe) /3/. The testing has produced valuable
data on the plant response to hydrogen addition and on the hydrogen addition response to
plant behaviour. In Ringhals I IGSCC testing was carried out in a test loop using the
Constant Elongation Rate Test (CERT) technique. Strongly sensitized test pieces were
tested in reactor water with varying oxygen concentrations under full reactor power
operation. The conclusion was that IGSCC is completely eliminated when the reactor water
oxygen concentration is kept below 5 ppb and no other oxidizing impurity of significant
concentration is present. More details regarding materials tests in Ringhals I has been
reported by Ljungberg and Korhonen /4/.
In order to verify the hydrogen addition technique as a final remedy against IGSCC,
necessary follow-up investigations are being carried out. Studies of all relevant physical
phenomena and operation-related parameters, including inspection for any side effects, will
be continued.
The investigations carried out have been supported by the Swedish power utilities and
the Swedish Nuclear Power Inspectorate and have now reached a stage at which operational
application of Hydrogen Water Chemistry in Swedish nuclear power plants can be started
on a commercial basis.
The main features of the hydrogen water chemistry will be summarized below. Test
results will be presented primarily from the hydrogen addition test recently run in the
Forsmark I plant (900 MWe). .
RESULTS AND D1SCUSSION
Oxygen suppression
It has been known for many years that oxygen production from water radiolysis can
be suppressed by addition of hydrogen. A number of tests in the 1960's in experimental
reactors confirmed this phenomenon. In the pressure water reactor oxygen suppression was
used from the very beginning. However, since the BWR primary loop is not a closed system
with regard to noncondensable gases the BWR application of oxygen suppression must be
based on continuous hydrogen addition. When the pipe cracking problem made the hydrogen
addition concept interesting again, there were doubts that it would be a technically and
economically feasible method for BWR plants.
In ~ll reactor tests with hydrogen addition the hydrogen has been supplied from
standard compressed gas cylinders. After pressure control, flow monitoring and control the
gas has been injected .to the condensate downstream of the condensate clean-up system (fig
1). Control and shutdown features are varying in the different plant installations. In the
Ringhals I plant, which has the most advanced equipment, the system can be operated from
the central control room. The hydrogen injection flow is automatically controlled by the
preset reactor water oxygen concentration or the preset feedwater hydrogen concentration
(fig 2).
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Figure 1. Main f10w diagram of Oskarshamn 2
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Figure 2. Schematic diagram of hydrogen injection system of Ringhals I
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Data from Forsmark 1 regarding the oxygen concentrations in the core inlet and core
exit water as a function of tt1e hydrogen addition rate are shown in fig 3. Apparently the
oxygen content in the water below the core is much easier suppressed by hydrogen addition.
This phenomenon has been verified in all plants. The reason is that oxygen is consumed to a
considerable extent already in the downcomer region by recombination with the added
hydrogen. This recombination is catalyzed by the relatively high gamma radiation field in
the downcomer dose to the core. The fact that the water is subcooled and no gas stripping
occurs in the downcomer region also promotes the recombination reaction. This test result
is illustrated in fig 4, where oxygen concentrations in the reactor pressure vessel at
different hydrogen addition rates are indicated. The two different hydrogen addition rates
represents the important concepts of "Partial suppression" with low oxygen concentration
in the region below the core, and "Full suppression" with low oxygen concentration in the
whole water phase of the reactor pressure vessel.
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Figure 3. Oxygen concentration in core inlet and core exit water as a function of
feedwater hydrogen addition rate (Forsmark I, April, 1984)
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Figure 4. Oxygen concentration in reactor coolant at three feedwater hydrogen addition
rate levels (Forsmark I, April, 1984)
Offgas system
With hydrogen addition to the reactor the excess hydrogen suppresses water radiolysis
and there is no net consumption of hydrogen in the process. The net production of hydrogen
and oxygen decreases. The hydrogen flow to the offgas system is the sum of added and
radi~lytically produced hydrogen. As shown in fig 5 the hydrogen flow initially decreases
and passes through a minimum. At higher addition rates the hydrogen flow iricreases and
approaches the "addition rate line" asymptotically. In a BWR without offgas recombiner the
totaloffgas flow will have approximately the same curve shape as the hydrogen flow.
In a plant with recombiner the radiolytically produced hydrogen and oxygen are
recombined. During normal operation the offgases downstream of the recombiner consist
mainly of air from in-Ieakage to the turbine condensor. With hydrogen addition to the
feedwater the offgas flow decreases slightly at first, when oxygen from the air in-Ieakage
is being burnt by the added hydrogen. At higher addition rates the offgas flow increases as
the hydrogen flow and consists mainly of hydrogen and nitrogen.
In a permanent installation the excess hydrogen in the offgases can be conveniently
removed by the addition of oxygen upstream of the recombiner. The offgas flow will be
reduced, the time delay increased and a safe operation of the offgas system will be insured
(no risk for the occurrence of combustible mixtures of hydrogen and oxygen).
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Figure 5. Hydrogen mass balance versus feedwater hydrogen addition rate (Forsmark I,
April, 1984)
IGSCC tests
In the Ringhals 1 plant susceptibility to IGSCC was measured with the Constant
Elongation Rate Test (CERT) technique. Heavily sensitized test pieces of stainless steel
were tested in reactor water at various oxygen concentrations. lt was demonstrated that
IGSCC is inhibited when the reactor water oxygen concentration is kept below 5 ppb.
The conditions under which a Corrosion process can occur are determined by the
electrochemical potential (ECP), a fundamental qU<;lntity in the thermodynamics of
corrosion. ECP of the BWR reactor water is primarily controlled by the oxygen concentra-
tion. However, chemical and thermal transients may occur, resulting in oxidizing impurities
being transferred to the reactor water. In addition, short-Iived products of radiolysis are
present in the reactor coolant. Hence, ECP, rather than oxygen, should be used to
characterize the environment with respect to the risk of IGSCC, since it represents the
integrated effect of all oxidizing species. ECPs of construction materials have been
monitored in most of the hydrogen addition tests with metal sensor electrodes against
Ag/AgCI reference electrodes at high temperature.• However, the measurement· technique
must be further developed to be sui table for routine application. In-reactor tests to
determine the boundary .conditions of susceptibility to IGSCC are therefore strongly
recommended. Details regarding materials tests and ECP measurements in Ringhals I have
been reported elsewhere /4/.
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Radiation fields
An important side effect of hydrogen addition is the higher radiation level in the
turbine plant. This is caused by an increased stripping by the steam of short-Iived N-16
activity. In the reducing reactor water environment during hydrogen addition the fraction
of volatile species of nitrogen (e.g. nitrogen gas or ammonia) becomes larger.
Initially the radiation fields at the main steam Iines increase very slowly. A sharp
increase is followed by a continued slow increase at higher addition rates, fig. 6. Obviously,
the main steam line radiation is an additional measure of when the transition regime'
between oxidizing and reducing conditions is entered.
A typkai increase of the main steam Iines radiation level is 3-5 times that with no
hydrogen addition. As the increase is caused by short-Iived N-16 activity, the radiation
level is immediately reduced to the original value when hydrogen addition is shut down.
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Figure 6. Main steam line radiation field versus feedwater hydrogen addition rate
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Coolant chemistry
Some minor effects on feedwater and reactor water chemistry take place during
hydrogen addition.
The condensate and feedwater oxygen concentrations decrease with the decreasing
steam oxygen concentration. The order of magnitude of the decrease is determined by the
relation between steam oxygen concentration and air in-leakage rate to the turbine
condenser. There is no recombination of hydrogen and oxygen in the feedwater train.
The concentrations of chromium and Cr-51 activity in the reactor water decrease
signifieantly (lO-fold) with hydrogen addition. This is attributable to the chemieal
reduction of water soluble chromate into less soluble chromium oxides. The phenomenon is
also reflected in a reduced reactor water conductivity.
No other signifieant side effects of hydrogen addition have been observed, nor are
they expected in the long term. However, studies of all relevant physieal phenomena and
operation related parameters, including inspections for any side effects, will continue.
CONCLUSIONS
It may be concluded that intergranular stress corrosion cracking (IGSCC) in sensitized
austenitie stainless steel in the BWR primary system can be inhibited by hydrogen water
chemistry, the detailed specification of whieh may be specifie to a given plant.
A number of full-scale tests under realistie and operational conditions in authentie
BWR environment has demonstrated that Hydrogen Water Chemistry, where hydrogen is
.added to the reactor feedwater, is a viable option for BWRs.
A relatively moderate hydrogen addition to the feedwater achieves a major reduction
of the oxygen concentration of the reactor water downstream of the downcomer in the
reactor vessel and in connected systems. In the case of the Ringhals 1 plant it has been
demonstrated that a reduction of the oxygen concentration to below 5 ppb prevents IGSCC.
Except for an increased radiation level in the main steam lines and in the turbine
plant, no important side effects of Hydrogen Water Chemistry have been observed.
The investigations have now reached a stage at whieh Hydrogen Water Chemistry can
be applied on an operational and commercial basis in Boiling Water Reactors.
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Abstract
The main feature of the fine motion control rod
drive is the ball nut-spindle system inside the
guiding tube enabling continuous insertion of
the control rod into the reactor core. The
mechanical drive of the spindle is an electri-
cally powered motor transmitting the corres-
ponding revolutions over a gear to the spindle.
For reactor scram motion a hydraulic system is
used. It compris.es a high pressure nitrogen-
water reservoir connected by water lines to
the control rod housing. In case of demand a
fast opening valve allows water to flow into
the bottom of the housing to move a piston
which in turn moves the control rod upward.
Completely satisfactory results have been
obtained with this system over 16 years.
1. Concept
One of the goals of reactor technology is to
guarantee the safety, reliability and high availibi-
lity of nuclear power stations. Among all components
the control rods possess a key function.
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In general they have to perform two important
jobs
• power and burn-up eontrol
• reactor shut down
The very different demands of the kind of
motion /1/ aecording to task 1, a continuous slow
motion with a stay at intermediate positions, and
aeeording to task 2 a fast injeetion, are accom-
plished for the KWU boiling water reactors with two
independent drive systems.
The basie coneept is explained in figure 1 as
folIows:
Each of the control rods is coupled to one trunk
piston (figure 1, position 9) by means of a form-
elosed but flexible elutch. The piston itself is
loeated inside a housing pipe (pos. 19), welded into
the bottom of the pressure vessel (pos. 18). The
piston is driven by an eleetric motor at the bottom
of the housing and by a hydraulic system,whosepres-
surized water is injected through a lateral nozzle
(pos. 6) into the housing.
2. Design
2.1 Fine motion control system
The electric motor with its reducing gear and
the position finder are protected against the hot
reactor water by a flange onll penetrated by a
sealed drive shaft (pos. 2, 3). This shaft is
conneeted to the ball screw spindIe by means of a
bayonet eluteh; a relative axial displaeement over
a eertain range is possible. With the help of a ball
serew nut the rotation of the shaft is transformed
into an axial eontinuous motion with a low speed of
about 3 em/sec. In this manner the trunk piston with
the control rod is moved up and down.
The piston is surrounded by a concentrie guide tube
(pos. 13) with holes for pressurized water.
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This guarantees together with special rollers
(pos. 8) the guideance of the ball screw nut as well as
of the piston (together with the screw spindle). At its
inside a toothed rack is mounted, enabling the jaws
(14) of the piston collar, to fit the gaps between the
teeth. During the fine motion the trunk piston rests on
the nut due to gravitational force.
Special horns mounted on the nut cause the jaws
to leave their snapping position. Therefore a piston
motion up and down is guaranteed. The position finder
is completed by the following facilities, first a
limiting switch and second a disconnecting switch.
Limiting Switch
If the piston exceeds its end position during
normal operation and lifts the throttle bush, a rod
actuates a magnetic switch stopping the drive motor.
In addition to that for a reactor scram this switch
gives the signal of the arrival of the trunk piston
as an input for the reactor control.
Disconnecting Switch
The disconnecting spring (pos. 4) between spindle
and shaft is compressed due to the weight of the con-
trol rod, the spindle and the piston. This way a per-
manent magnet stays in a zero position. When the
weight is taken off for example due to a sticking of
the control rod during the downward motion, the spring
is discharged and themagnet is lifted. Now a magnet
switch gives an electrical signal, which interrupts
the motor rotation. The screw nut remainsin position
and prevents control rod drop out. For a reactor scram
this switch gives the signal -removal of the piston
from the nut- as an input for reactor control.
In.order to reduce the temperature inside the
housing pipe during operation time, a small mass flow
of rinse water at about 40 oe runs through the scram
line. Flowing through a throttle bush arrangement with
specially designed gaps (Pos. 11, 20), the water is
fed into the pressure vessel. Thereby the warm-up of
the housing is diminished, a leakage of hot reactor
water into the motor system (pos. 1) is prevented and
a lubrication of the rolling and sliding components is
reached. Thermometer probes signal a failure of the
rinse water system or a leackage of the shaft seal.
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2.2 Scram System
In case of fast reactor shut down pressurized
water is fed through the scram line into the housing
and after that it flows through gaps in the guide
tube. Due to the arrangement of the throttle bush
system, the pressure of the hydraulic system is built
up inside the piston. The resultant pressure diffe-
rence against the reactor water causes a force upon
the piston, injecting the control rod into the re-
actor. As a consequence the piston leaves the screw
nut. After the short shut down time the piston (with
its collar) is decelerated by disc spring elements
behind the throttle bushes.
The short displacement of the bush actuates a
magnetic switch and signals the end of the scram
stroke. Now the jaws of the piston collar are fitted
into the toothed rack ahd prevent the piston tube
sliding down due to gravity as soon as a certain
pressure difference across the piston has dimi-
nished.
The arrangement of thehydraulic drive system
presented in figure 2. Depending on the type of
reactor the following solutions were chosen with re-
gard to reliability.
Common tank system
This KWU system is incorporated in the reactor
plants of KWW, KKB, KKP1, KKI1, GKT and KRB-B, C.
Some independent operating tanks -for example 6
tanks in KRB2 (figure 2)- pressurized with nitrogen
gas provide the control rods by using a twofold in-
stalled ring header with the necessary pressurized
water.Ch~ck valves guarantee an unchanged availabi-
lity of the whole system, although a hypothetical
rupture of the line has been taken into account.
The scram valve is actuated by. the reactor control
system and opens the path for pressurized water, the
shut down procedure can start. The throttle valve
limits the speed and therefore the deceleration
forces below a maximum at the end of the scram stroke.
Furthermore it compensates tolerances of component
parts, so that all the control rods show the same
velocity at each pressure level.
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Single tank system
This KWU system is incorporated at first in
KWL and later in KKK. According to figure 3 each of
the control rods is provided with its own water tank.
The nitrogen gas, pressurized in a separate tank
causes the movement of a piston and starts the 'in-
jection of the water into the control rod drive.
The functions of the most important components
are similar to those of the common tank system.
3. Long Term Operational Behaviour
and Experience '
The drive system here presented was designed
in the period from 1959 to 1968 and operated first in
the nuclear power station Lingen in 1968. Up to that
time an extensive development /3/ was necessary. In
addition to modifications of the construction a
variety of technological problems was to be solved as
for instance corrosiön, friction, wear and fretting
problems and thermal behaviour under long term
operation /4/.
38 control rod drives were selected from the
528 drives of the plants KWW, KKB, ICKP1 and KKI over
a 12 years period (table 1). The result of their
supervision was: Not one of them had any defect,
no parts of the components had to be replaced.
Today 16 years later the result of behaviour
confirms the KWU concept employing two different
systems of the control rod motion. During this time
period about 1300 assemblies were manufactured and
installed in 9 I(WU boiling water
5
reactors with
electrical energy of more than 10 GWh produced.
Over the whole time only 4 insignificant
defects were noticed; not one of them caused a shut
down of the reactor. The defects were eliminated
during the normal service time.
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In addition extensive tests were carried out
respecting the scram motion. After starting the
scram valve it was observed, that the pressure
difference - hydraulic tank to reactor - caused
a high pressure in the hydraulic line system at
different places. Calculations with fluid dynamic
programs and structure dynamic modes were able to
simulate the measurements. It was shown that the
loads didn't exceed the design limits.
The values of shut down time measured were re-
producable and confirmed the calculations. The
evaluation of probability shows - for example in
KKK - with a good approximation asymmetrie and
reproducable bell shaped curve /figure 5/. 97 % of
the measured values had a scattering amplitude of
± 5 % of the average.
This result is an additional confirmation of the
design selected and the proven construction of the
system.
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Figure 1: Principle Assembly of KWU-Fine Motion Control Rod Drive
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Figure 3: Schematic Diagramm of the Single Tank-System (KKK)
Table 1: Supervised Control Rod Drives of
KWU Boiling Water Reactors
Reactor power Assembly Supervision Tank System
/MW/ /year/ /number/ /number/
KWL 250 1967 69 14 Single Tank Syst.
KWW 600 1971 104 Ü 6 x 50 %KKB 900 1974 129 38 3 x 100 %KKP1 900 1975 145 4 x 100 r,KKI 900 1976 145 3 x 100 %
GKT 1977 113 3 x 100 %
KKK 1300 1981 205 Single Tank Syst.
KRB-B 1300 1982 193 6 x 50 %
KRB-C 1300 1983 193 6 x 50 %
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Figure~ View of the Control Rod Drive System
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POWER UPRATES IN ASEA-ATOM BOILING WATER REACTORS
Ernö Legath
AB ASEA-ATOM
Box 53, 5-72104 VÄSTERÄS, Sweden
ABSTRACT
Power uprates in the order of 6-10 percent above the contractual power level
are possible in Boiling Water Reactors designed and supplied by ASEA-ATOM by
using calculated and measured margins.
Before performing the power increase the margins must be proved and
necessary equipment modifications identified. Usually only moderate hardware
modifications are needed.
The Oskarshamn 2 unit is since November 1982 licensed for operating at 106
percent continuously. The Olkiluoto land 2 units had 1983 a preliminary licence
for operation at 103 percent and have from June 1984 a final licence for 108
percent. Five other ASEA-ATOM plants are at present being prepared for power
increase to levels between 106 and 110 percent. The Barsebäck land 2 units are
expected to be licensed for 106 percent during the fall of 1984.
INTRODUCTION
A method to increase production and still maintain the safety margins antici-
pated in the initial operating licence should be of great interest to any utility
operating a nuclear power plant. Uprating was believed to be possible by increasing
the utilization of the fuel in older plants to data used in plants being built today.
Improved calculation methods and numerous verifying measured data have built up
considerable extra safety margins in the older plants. This paper is a case description
of how ASEA-ATOM BWRs have been or are expected to be uprated. It could be
assumed that other light water reactors could be uprated in a similar manner.
Together with' the utilities operating the Boiling Water Reactors supplied by
ASEA-ATOM and the licensing authorities stepwise programmes for uprating the
power of each unit were worked out. The programmes included generally three steps:
A preliminary study to establish the achievable power level
Detailed plant studies and calculations to update the safety analysis report.
Plant modifications and verification tests at increased power levels.
Examples of the work undertaken in each step is given below
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PRELIMINARY STUDIES
These studies concentrated on settling existing margins in the reactor core and
in the turbine. ASEA-ATOM had already estimated that power uprates in the order of
6-10 percent would be possible in the BWR's supplied by the company. The uprates
could be achieved using existing calculated and measured margins only. In some cases
minor plant modifications were anticipated. Core and fuel development had opened
the possibility to increase the power density. The preliminary studies aimed at
proving that the existing fuel power density of 22.5 W/gU could be increased to 24.2
W/gU and checking how various parts of the plant was affected.
The value of 24.2 W/gU corresponds to the fuel power density of the Forsmark 3
and Oskarshamn 3 units, the two ASEA-ATOM 1060 MWe BWR's to start operation in
1985. Fully used the higher power density would result in 6-10 percent more power
output. Also if the detailed studies showed that the increase could be performed
partly only, due to real or formal reasons, there would still be great incentives to do
so. The foreseen theoretical and practical work was so Iimited that itwould still be
economically motivated for the utilities.
The preliminary investigations also proved good prospects for power uprates of
the turbine plants with only minor modifications. All but one ASEA-ATOM BWR have
turbine plants supplied by ASEA STAL (former Stal-Laval). The investigations
undertaken by ASEA STAL indicated that the steam turbines had built-in margins to
allow power uprates in the order of 6-8 percent. This could be done with none or
minor hardware modifications and still maintaining sufficient control margins,
approximately 3 percent. ASEA STAL, however, recommended that this had to be
verified by actual overpower tests with each turbine. The investigation also proved
sufficient margins in the generator and in the turbine plant auxiliary systems.
The remaining ASEA-ATOM BWR, Ringhals 1, has a turbine plant supplied by
GEC, England. The outcome of the GEC studies showed similar results for everything
but the turbine itself. To increase power above 104 percent the turbine had to be
modified. To reach the planned 110 percent level the inlet nozzle box had to be
rebuilt and the high pressure turbine guide vanes had to be replaced•
....--------
Plant Planned Status of
uprate power uprating
------------- -~------------
Oskarshamn 2 106%,34 MW Licensed for 106% since end 1982
Barsebäck 1 and 2 106%,34 MW Licensing
Forsmark 1 and 2 108%,70 MW Licensing and testing
Ringhals 1 110%,75 MW Licensing
Olkiluoto land II 108%,50 MW Lincensed for 108% since mid 1984
Table 1 Uprating of ASEA-ATOM BWRs
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ANALYSES
The primary step in the uprating procedure consists of defining available
margins and identifying the equipment with the smallest margin, which may require
modifications.
The analyses are based upon the condition that margins, either calculated or
measured in the plants, will be utilized wholly or partially.
The verification and licensing of the plant for the higher power demand the
following work.
System and function analysis
Supplementing LOCA analyses
New dynamic calculations
Updating of documentation, like FSAR and operating instructions.
The system analyses comprise primarily a qualitative review, resulting in a
problem identifying list. For systems which are considerably influenced of the
uprating a special note is made on components and functions, which limit the
capacity of the system, and on the amount of verifying calculations, which are
required to establish system capacity.
In the analysis work the same safety criteria are usually applied which were
valid for the plant earlier. Also the earlier calculation models are generally used
unless new models are better justified, e.g. by better verification.
After the qualitative review detailed system analyses are carried out for those
systems that are affected by the power uprate. The analyses include the necessary
supplementary calculations.
In this stage such dynamic and core cooling calculations are made, which are
demanded to verify the feasibility of the uprate.
Examples of licensing calculations
largest steam pipe rupture
largest feedwater pipe rupture
bottom pipe rupture with 45 kg/s flow
bottom rupture with 200 kg/s flow
Q.~!:l.?:!!1J~_~_~~<:'':!!~!~~!:l.:U?~J!'_~~_~_(BISON)
The documentation, submitted to the authorities for application of approval for
tests with higher power, comprises areport of the analyses and a program for
modification of the plant.
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IMPLEMENTATION
The need for modifications and supplementation of the plant is elucidated in the
analysis work. The experience from the ASEA-ATOM plants shows that only moderate
hardware changes are necessary. As typical examples supplementing relief valves and
reinforce of cooling systems can be mentioned.
A summary of the specific programmes for the various ASEA-ATOM plants at
the power uprate is given below.
Plant Power uprate % Specific supplements
Oskarshamn 2 106 Increased opening pressure for safety relief
valves from 85 to 87 bar
Barsebäck land 2 106
Forsmark 1 and 2 108 One additional safety relief valve and
modified steam separators
Ringhals 1
TVO land II
110
108
Modified scram system and modified
turbine
One additional safety relief valve, mo-
dified steam separators and increased
cooling capacity for turbine auxiliary
cooling
------------------
Table 2 Summary of power uprate supplementation
Parallel with the analysis work tests and measurements have been made in the
plants on capacities of relief systems, condensation pool cooling systems and low
pressure injection systems for verifying the calculated margins.
After approval for test operation with the higher power the commlsslOning,
testing and evaluation is made in the normal order. The extent of the test programme
is assessed in cooperation with the authority.
The final documentation for licensing the plant with the uprated power
comprises
results from the test operation
updated documents:
FSAR
operating instructions
modification documents
According to the experience from projects carried out until now it is advan-
tageous to divide the power increase in two parts and perform tests in two successive
stages.
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RESULTS
Oskarshamn 2 is the first plant Iicensed for higher power. Since November 1982
the plant is operated with 106% continuously. No hardware changes were necessary.
Application for power uprate in Barsebäck land 2, which are of the same
reactor generation as Oskarshamn 2 is being treated by the authority. The plants are
expected to be licensed for 106% power during 1984.
The 'remaining ASEA-ATOM plants Ringhals I, Forsmark land 2 are presently
being prepared for an increase to 108-110%. The analysis work for verification and
Iicensing is in the main being made by ASEA-ATOM at the request of the utilities.
TVO has obtained the permission for operation at 108% power in both plants
from the operating season 1984/85, based on stepwise analyses, calculations and
tests. During the operating season 1983/84 the plants operated with apower of 103%.
COST AND TIME SCHEDULE
As an example of costs and time scheduJes the figures for the two TVO plants
are shown below.
Analyses, engineering
Supplementary equipment:
safety valves, heat exchangers
Total
Time schedule
Preliminary study
Analysis work
Order ofcomponents
Report to the authorities
Test step I (103%-106%)
Modifications and tests
108% power
2 MSEK
8 MSEK
10 MSEK
2nd quarter 1982
1983
Refuelling period 1984
From operating season 1984/85
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1 Introduction
The integrity of the tubing of a steam generator has a significant
effect on the availability of a nuclear steam supply system.
For this reason, the development of suitable inspection and repair
techniques has increasingly grown in importance.
Regular inspection of a representative number of tubes makes it
possible for preventive measures to be taken in good time.
The objectives behind KWU's greatly intensified development
aetivities have been to continue to improve the quality of information
obtained through inspection and the provision of effeetive repair
teehniques.
A eonsiderable amount of effort has also been put into redueing the
radiation exposure of inspection and repair personneI.
Through optimization of techniques and equipment, and extensive
mechanization and automation, it has been possible to reduce
oecupational dose rates significantly.
2 Preventive Measures
2.1 Eddy Current Examition
Meehanized eddy current examination is the standard inspeetion technique
employed in the inservice inspeetion of steam generator tubing.
Through the application of improved teehniques and equipment it has
been possible to enhance the quality of information obtained, to eut
down inspeetion preparation time and hence also to reduee the applied
dose considerably.
The standard technique uses multifrequeney equipment.
To suppress interference due to tube supports, expansion zones and
mechanieal influenees frequeney mix teehniques are employed.
The data obtained (tube position, defect loeation and eddy eurrent
signals) are transferred ta the mobile eompurterized data acquisition
and proeessing system.
It provides on-line data for further evaluation.
This system identifies suspect-defeet tubes automatically.
A special type of manipulator ealled the "finger walker" is used far
positioning. Its advantages inelude easy and quiek setup involving
only low radiation exposure, programmable positioning and a broad
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range of applications from inspection (standard eddy current
examinations as weIl as special inspection techniques) to repair
(plugging of tubes displaying unacceptable defects) and other
uses (visual examination using borescopes, profilometry, etc.).
The actual equipment setup also contributes towards reducing radiation
exposure.
The control panel, eddy current unit and the data acquisition and
processing system are installed in a mobile container set down outside
the reactor building and connected to the steam generator via a
200 m-long control and telecommunications cable.
Inside the containment a service crew is responsible for all in-
stallation and calibration work and for changing the probes etc.
This arrangement allows inspection to be performed with a minimum
of personnel inside the containment (see Figure 1).
2.2 Special Inspection Technique
A special new inspection technique is being applied to supplement
eddy current examination, which uses a rotational ultrasonic probe
(USAS) and a rotational eddy current probe (WSAS).
This technique enables precise measurement of wastage as weIl as
exact identification measurement of local defects. Combination of
the two into a single combination probe (USAS/WSAS) reduces the
number of steps involved in inspection and hence the associated
radiation exposure (Figure 2). Furthermore application of this
technique has greatly cut down the number of tubes which would
have to be plugged on the basis of eddy current examination results
alone. Plugging and the inspection techniques described above
practically rule out the possibility of leaks arising in the steam
generator tubing.
2.3 Visual Examination and Profiling
Visual examination methods are inspect tubes from the inside and
the outside, to inspect the secondary side of the tube sheet through
a vacant tube hole or from a tube lane, and to check the integrity
of the tube bundle.
Rigid and flexible borescopes are available for this. When they are
equipped with a small camera, the object image can be recorded on
magnetic tape. Furthermore, miniature TV cameras with outside dia-
meters of about 18 mm are available for use and new techniques
based on miniature, flexible, CCD cameras are being developed.
Remote-controlled inspection equipment and associated manipulating
devices have been developed for inspecting large numbers of steam
generator tubes from the inside.
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The manipulators used by KWU for eddy current examination are designed
such that by fitting them with special attachements they can also
be used for inspecting the inner surfaces of tubes. Equipment has
also been developed for profiling the inner surface of tubing using
different variations of profilometers bases either on direct contact
or no contact with the tube surface. Useful information in the
condition of the tubes as regards expansion zone dimension, tube
internal dimensions and any tube deformation can be obtained in this
way.
3 Repair Technigues
Should one of the inspection techniques discribed above identify
a defect, routine measures such as plugging or other corrective
actions are available for implementation.
Tube repairs have not to date been necessary at any nuclear power
plants inside West Germany but repair procedures have been developed
for implementation at any time in facilities located abroad.
3.1 Tube Plugging
Damaged steam generator tubes used to be sealed off by means of
explosive~weld plugs placed into the tubes by hand. Through the
development of remote controlled tools and devices, it has been
possible to reduce personnel exposure from about 1000 mrem to about
500 mrem per plug. Moreover, they obviate the need for personnel
to climb into the primary side in order to place the plugs.
Thanks to even newer plugs which have been in use since 1982, it
has become possible to cut radiation exposure down even further to
an average, depending on the number of plugs involved, of between
60 and 120 mrem per plug (see Figure 3).
The newer, mechanical plug in use since 1982 can be removed from the
tube at a later point in time. Insertion of this type of plug into
a steam generator tube does not usually require any preparatory
operations such as precalibration, perhaps machining of the tube-to-
tube sheet welding, final calibration and cleaning.
A remote-control plugging tool specially developed for this purpose
is positioned under the tube to be plugged by the finger-walker
manipulator employed for eddy current examination. The tool provided
for removing the mechanical plug at a later date is also remote-
controlled.
3.2 Tube Pulling
For the purpose of carrying out material examinations and validating
inspection results, individual sampIes of tubing are occasionally
removed from the lower region of a steam generator tube bundle.
3.2
3.3
4
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Steam generator tube sampling has been performed since 1972
with sampIes being taken from over 30 tubes in 7 nuclear
power plants. A cutting tool with retractable blade is em-
ployed for cutting off the required length of tube.
In order to keep pullout forces to aminimum, the tube is
shrunk in its expansion zone using a special deep whoIe
welding tool and is then pulled outh with the aid of a
self-tppping pull-rod which is automatically retracted by a
hydraulic cylinder.
The vacant position in the tube sheet can be sealed off by
welding plugs.
In order to avoid the release of radioactivity into the
secondary system from the remaining piece of tube, it is
possible to decontaminate the tube in quest ion by means of
one of the decontamination processes used repeatedly in the
past with great success by KWU.
Sleeving
Although KWU has never had to perform sleeving on .any of its
steamgenerators, it has nevertheless optimized the welding
process preferred by it for his application and now offers it
as a service for any nuclear power plants.
Through the 'selection of simple geometries and optimum for
sleeve welding, it is possible to establish sleeve weId
quality by easy, low-dose methods. Complicated inspection
techniques are thus rendered unnecessary.
The use of fully-automatic welding machines, remote controlled
tools and manipulators in the future will reduce the number
of operations performed in the radiation area.
Tube Replacement
A technique has been developed for replacing sections of steam
generator tubes damaged in the vicinity of the tube sheet or
tubes which have al ready been plugged.
This replacement technique is an alternative to sleeving. Through
careful selection of the new materials, damage can be prevented.
Also, in this way the full tube cross section is maintained
and available for inspection.
Highly advancedwelding techniques enable highquality welds
to be produced and facilitate weId quality control.
Eguipment Maintenance and Personnel Training.
Thorough preparation and maintenance of equipment as weIl as
intensive training of personnel under simulated conditions
contribute to a significant degree towards reducing occupational
radiation exposure.
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As a basis for this, KWU recently set up a Service Center
complete with a controlled access area and a hot shop for
storage and maintenance of contaminated equipment.
The tools and equipment intended for inspection, maintenance
and repair activities inside nuclear power plants can be
tested and prepared at the Center under simulated plant
conditions.
Equipment setup times and downtimes can bereduced through
personnel training, practising of operations to determine
lowest-dose procedures and equipment life test.
Proper equipment maintenance and comprehensive personnel
training enhance the performance of inspection activities
in the plant and radiation exposure is considerably lowered.
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INVESTIGATION OF A LIQUID ZONE CONTROL ASSEMBLY FAlLURE
AT A NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION
R.G. Sauv~ and W.W. Teper
Nuclear Systems Department
Ontario Hydro
Toronto. Ontario, Canada
ABS'l'RACT
The failure of the Liquid Zone Control (LZC) assembly at a nuclear
generating station was investigated. The work was performed in order
to determine the cause of st ructural failure in the LZC assembly
guide tube at the location of the bearing pads. The failure resulted
in leakage of light water into the moderator. Removal of the
defective unit revealed that severe fretting wear had occurred on the
guide tube at the location of the bearing pad to calandria bushing
contact area. The observed wear pattern was orientated approximately
90° to the direction of the bypass inlet flow. Structural
features of the system and results of the investigation including the
mathematical simulation models used are described in this paper.
Vibro-impact forces were determined in the damaged area using a
relatively new and efficient procedure2. They were found to be of
sufficient magnitude to cause the damage.
INTRODUCTION
This paper describes the analytical investigation of the Liquid Zone
Control (LZC) assembly of a nuclear generating station (Figure 1). The system
provides a flux distribution control in the reactor core by varying the
quantities of neutron absorbing light water. This workl * was performed in
* Superseripts Refer to References.
284
order to gain insight into the cause of a structural failure which occurred in
the LZC assembly guide tube at the location of the bearing pads which are
situated at the calandria nozzle (Figure 1). The fallure resulted in the
leakage of light water into the moderator. The LZC unit in question is almost
directly in line with the exit flow from one of the moderator cooling system
inlet nozzles. The orientation of the nozzles is indicated in Figure 2. This
analysis was initiated prior to any experimental work. however results of both
led to the same conclusions.
Subsequent removal of the defective unit revealed that severe fretting
wear had occurred on the guide tube in the bearing pad to bushing contact
arealO . The bearing pads on one side had worn to the point where they no
longer provided protecUon to the LZC guide tube and progressive thinning of
the tube wall resulted in a localized crack which lead to leakage. The
observed wear pattern was oriented approximately 90° to the direction of
the bypass inlet flow. Figure 1 shows the location of the failure. As
indicated in the figure. the wear was predominantly on one side of the tube.
although some wear was evident on the opposite side.
STRUCTURAL FEATURES AND MATHMEMATICAL MODEL
The LZC assembly consists of a tube 4.6 inches outside diameter and
4.5 inches inside diameter. approximately 564 inches long. The tube is simply
supported at the bot tom and at midheight and fixed at the upper end. There
are three small diameter vertical tubes tied to the outside tube at several
locations.
The mathematical model used to describe the LZC assembly structure is
shown in Figure 3. The guide tube arid interna1 tubes were modelied using pipe
elements based on the displacement method. continuity between internals and
guide tube was enforced at the bulkheads. The structure material was
zi rcalloy.
At node 1 restraints were included to simulate the rigid deck plate. Due
to the time-dependent nature of the problem and the inherent non-linearities
arising from the clearance present at the guide tube/calandria nozzle
location. the Ontario Hydro structural dynamic computer code H2DMAP2 was
utllized. This code. is applicable to a wide range of structural dynamic
problems including modal analysis. flow induced vibration and transient linear
or non-linear dynamic analysis.
The structure's inertial properties were introduced as distributed element
masses in accordance to the elements defined. The weight of water inside the
tubes was included in the model between nodes 30 and 59. along with the
hydrodynamic mass effect of the D20 surrounding the guide tube.
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The flow distribution was obtained using the MODCIR computer code
predicUons3 of the moderator ci rculation with one moderator pump running.
Using these results. the flow velocity distribution was determined and applied
to the analyt1cal model as shown 1n Figure 3. The forcing function was
developed from the velocities using the following periodic function6:
P(t) ; r(x)F sin(wt)
F 0.5 pVf d CL
where
mass density of surrounding fluid (D20)
maximum flow velocity
outside diameter of guide tube
lift coefficient .
driving frequency (radis)
force distribution vector
The value of w was determined by considering the frequency content that
the LZC assembly exhibited in a modal analysis and comparing these to the
frequency of vortex formation as defined using Strouhal numbers (fd/v) in the
range of .20 to .404•5. The forc1ng function was evaluated using a lift
coefficient6 CL ; 0.10.
These forces were applied to both a linear and non-linear model. The
linear model was as shown in Figure 3 except that at node 30 a rest raint in
the x-direction was included to represent the effect of the calandria nozzle.
In the non-linear simulation. the impact behaviour of the guide tube in the
calandria nozzle at node 30 was accounted for by incorporating one of the
non-linear elements available in H2DMAP with a contact stiffness of
105 lb/in. Application of the non-linear dynamic solution technique2
permitted the interaction forces at this location to be quantified.
ANALYTICAL RESULTS
Modal Analysis
A modal analysis of the linear model described in the previous section and
illustrated in Figure 3. was performed in order to obtain the dynamic
characteristics of the assembly. The results were obtained for two cases:
(a) rest raint at node 30;
(b) unrestrained at node 30.
These configurations represent the limiting cases of rest raint of the
assembly because. in reality a significant clearance exists at this location.
As a result. the model can be expected to exhibit natural modes of vibration
in the frequency range of these two boundary conditions.
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In both cases the fundamental mode of the assembly was of a global nature.
that 1s. the fundamental mode shape (e1genvector) 1nd1cated overall guide tube
motion and no localized excitation. Selected mode shapes for both cases are
given in Figur"e 7. The peak amplitude of relative motion as depicted by the
fundamental mode shape occurred at node 30 (X-DIR) in the unrestrained case
and at node 48 (X-DIR) in the restrained case. Table 1 lists the first six
natural frequencies predicted and a comparison with avallable experimental
data. In reference 9. the dominant frequencies of motion under operating
conditions were 4.2 Hz. 6.7 Hz to 7.1 Hz and 10 Hz. These frequencies range
between the case of the LZCU restrained and unrestrained at the nozzle
location making measurement difficult. comparison of these results with the
predictions (Table 1) indicates good agreement.
Flow Induced Vibration Analysis (Linear)
In the 1inear flow induced vibration analysis the steady state response
was obtained using the normal mode method. The first eight modes of vibratipn
were included in the analysis. Using the velocity distribution. the Strouhal
numbers were calculated for the two cases under consideration. They were
found to be in the range of .078 to .24. corresponding to the maximum flow
velocity Vr ~ 7.4 in/sec (1.9 rn/sec).
In Reference 4 it has been shown that response of a cylinder in cross flow
is significant for va lues of S in the range from 0.14 to 0.66. The region
where the frequency of excitation can "lock-in" or synchronize with tube
oscillations varies between S ~ 0.14 to S ~ 0.33. In addition. coupling of
tube motion in the drag and lift directions may occur when
0.20 < S < 0.33. This results in an orbital (whirling) response path.
Guide Tube/Nozzle Impact Simulation
The presence of a clearance at node 30 poses a non-linearity which will
rimder the actual response intermediate between those of the two cases. In
order to establish the intensity of fretting wear incident on the guide
tube/nozzle interface. the magnitude of the impact forces was required. This
necessitated the use of a non-linear simulation model as described earlier.
At node 30 a clearance was introduced as shown in E"igure 3. The equivalent
element force deflection characteristics used to represent this discontinuity
in the simulation is shown in E"igure 6. To provide a reasonable estimate of
the actual in-situ case. the clearance was assumed to be offset. Referring to
Figure 3. the total diametral clearance was .070 in. The parameters GAPI and
GAP2 shown in E"igure 6 were set to 0.40 in and .030 in respectively. The
simulation was run for approximately 11. 5 s where the steady state solution
was obtained.
The results" are displayed as plots in E"igures 4. 5 and 6. The maximum
response occurring in the span of guide tube in the calandria was found to be
approximately 0.045 in. Figure 6 shows the displacement of node 30 at the
guide tube/nozzle interface and illustrates the effect of a non-uniform
clearance. As seen. the impact occurs predominantly on one side of the
nozzle. The corresponding impact forces shown On E"igure 5. peak between 15
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and 20 lbs. As indicated in the trace of these forces. they are somewhat
periodic. subsequent operation under conditions of severe fretting/wear leads
to an increase in clearances and impact forces.
The materials used for the nozz le and guide tube and wear pads were
zi rcalloy. The available literature on the fretting/wear of Zi rcalloy tubes
does not permit a good quantitative assessment of the current problem.
However, the resuHs of short term tests of 16 hours indicate7. for example.
that under,combined rubbing motion and periodic impact forces of approximately
2 lbs. a weight loss of 2.83 mg occurs.
Using this information. three of the small wear pads would wear completely
in about two years assuming 7.000 h operation per year. The calculated impact
forces are much higher than this but the excitation frequency is lower than
that used in Reference 7. However, wi th high periodic impact forces more
severe wear can be expected due to the breakdown of the protective surface
oxide film under high impact7 . The resuHs indicate that severe fretting
wear was the cause of failure and that an improved design in the region of the
calandria nozzle and guide tube interface would be obtained by an increased
wear surface and a better material combination.
The analysis illustrates an application of a new method for computations of
vibro-impact forces2 . Good agreement was obtained between analytical
predictions and experiments. Fretting wear of complex structures with
clearances, subjected to impact forces. can be analysed at low cost.
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Condi- In
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5 11.0 21. 7.8 16.2
6 13.6 11.2
* See Modal Analysis Section.
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INTERi\CTION BET\IEI,N FUI,L CLAD BALLOONING AND THERMAL-IlYDRAULlCS IN A LOCA
F.J. Erbacher
KernforschungszentruIn Karlsruhe
Institut fUr Reaktorbauelemente
Projekt Nukleare Sicherheit
Postfach 3640, 7500 Karlsruhe
Federal '~Republic of Germany
ABSTRACT
The state-of-the-art experimental work in several countries
on LOCA simulation burst and reflood tests in PWR rod bundles is
reviewed concerning the influence of thermal-hydraulics on fuel
clad ballooning and coolability of blocked fuel rod bundles.
Representative two-phase flow heat transfer during reflood-
ing limits the mean total circumferential burst strains to ap-
prox. 50 %. Reversed coolant flow direction from the refilling to
the reflooding phase which Is typical of a combined emergency
core cooling injection results in a maximum flow blockage of
approx. 50 %. With unidirectional flow the maximum flow blockage
amounts up to approx. 70 %.
Reflood tests in partially blocked bundles have shown that
coolability of PWR fuel rod bundles bloeked up to 90 % ean be
maintained without any unaceeptable temperature inerease due to
the flow blockage.
INTRODUCTION
In the refilling and reflooding phases of a loss-of-eoolant aeeident (LOCA)
oeeurring in a pressurizedwater reactor (PWR) Zirealoy fuel rod eladdings may
reach temperatures which eause them to balloon and to burst due to internal
overpressure. Such loeal ballooning restriets the cooling ehannels in the fuel
element and may lead to loeal impairment of emergeney eore eooling.
In the LOCA analysis required for lieensing of a PWR, the number of rup-
tured fuel rods, the cladding deformations and their influenee on coolability
must be predieted. Flow blockage and quenching are finally the main coneerns in
the safety assessment, because they determine the maximum eladding temperature
which must be limited.
In manycountries burst and reflood tests in rod bundles have been perfor-
med to furnish experimental data.
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LOC" THE RHAL-llYDRAULI CS IN A PHR CORE
The thermal-hydraulies in the reaetor eore depends on the design oE the
emergency core cooling system. Für instance, the injection pressure of tlle accu-
mulators and the injection mode i.e. cold leg injection only and combiner! injec-
tion, respectively, determine the level of heat transfer and also the flol' di-
rection in the co re both of I'hich have a dominating eEfect on clar! ballooning.
Therefore, a I'ide range of thermal-hydraulic boundary conditions has been inve-
stigated in the LOCA simulation tests.
Figure 1 ShOHS as an example the Euel rod cladding load in a LOCA predicted
by conservative evaluation models for a PHR Hith combined injection.
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Fig. 1 Fuel rod cladding loading in a 2F-cold leg break LOCA
REVIEH OF LOCA SHlULATION TESTS
To revieH a11 tests in detail would be a task beyond the scope of this
paper. Therefore only several out-of-pile and in-pile bundle tests have been
selected.
Table I summarizes so me multi-rod burst tests /1-7/. Only tests using indi-
rectly heated fuel rod simulators and in-pile tests, respectively, are included.
From the individual test series only those are listed which have the potential
for maximum ballooning i.e. burst in the high ~ -phase of Zircaloy around 800 °c.
Table 11 summarizes all relevant out-of-pile reflood tests in partially blocked
bundles /8-11/. In these tests the flol' blockage due to ballooned claddings has
been simulated by sleeves mounted on electrical heater rods.
This paper reviews mainly the efEects of thermal-hydraulics on clad bal-
looning and the effects of floH blockages on coolability. Since the KfK-programs
REBEKA /12/ and FEBA /11/ covered a relatively wide range ofthermal-hydraulic
conditions the essential conclusions will be discussed on the basis of these
experimental programs.
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EFFECT OF IIEAT TRANSFER ON CLAD BALLOONING
In the REBEKA tests Zirealoy has been found
to show a speeifie deformation behavior in thc
0< -phase region, due to its texture and anisotropy
113/. Sinee always azimutlilll eladding temperature
differenees exist tube bending oeeurs where thc
hot side of the eladding tube during deformation
eontinues to bc in more or less elose eontaet
with the inner heat souree and the opposite cold
side is deformed in such a way that it eontinu-
ously moves apart Erom the inner heat souree
(Fig. 2). Via thi, r.eehanism heat transfer, I,hieh
is intensified during reflooding, leads to an
inerease in azimuthai temperature diEferenees on
the eladding tube. Fig. 3 makes evident that in-
ereasing azimuthai eladding temperature differen-
ces are deereasing the eireumferential burst
strains 113/.
Fig. 2
Bowing of Zirealoy tubes
during deformation under
azimuthai temperature dif-
ferenees and eooling
Figure 4 illustrates the influenee of heat trans-
fer on eladding tube deformation. During the re-
flooding phase of a LOCA h~at transfer eoeEfi-
eients greater than 50 W/m Kare developed dur-
ing cladding tube deformation. Under these eon-
ditions azimuthal temperature differenees of ap-
prox. 30 K were established in the REBEKA bundle tests at the time of burst
whieh limits the mean burst strain to values around 50 %.
REBEKA - dala
6. single (od tests
<) bundle lesls
O+--+~+--j-+--j--+--I---+-+----j
o ~ ~
azimuthol ciadding temperature difference A\,z[K]
~
Burst strain vs. azimuthai temperature
differenee
Other bundle tests (see Tab. 1)
performed in very low heat transfer by
steam eooling ( 5 W/m 2K) exhibited
higher burst strains. This is eonsi-
stent with the cxpericnee gaincd with-
in the REBEKA program (see REBEKA-H).
However, such high burst strains are
not typieal of PWR eonditions during
reflooding.
EFFECT OF COOLANT FLOW D1RECTION ON
FlOW BLOCKAGE
The flolV bloekagc eaused by the
ballooned eladding tubes is also de-
termined by the axial displaeement of
the bursts between two spaeers. Sinee
plastie deformation of Zirealoy eladd-
ing tubes reaets very sensitively to
the eladding tube temperature, the
axial displaeement of the bursts is
deeisively determined by the axial
profile of the eladding tube tempera-
ture prevailing between two spaeers.
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Fig. 4 Influence of heat transfer on clad ballooning
The profile of cladding tube temperature is among others the result oE the
thermodynamic non-equilibrium in two-phase flow and its being influenced by the
spacer grids. Moreover, it is determined by the direction of flow i.e., by the
fact whether during cladding tube deformation the flow is uni-directional or
whether it changes its direction between the reEilling and reflooding phases.
Figure 5 makes evident the influence of a reversed flow direetion from the
refilling to the reflooding phases on the deformation pattern in REßEKA 5. Oue
to irregularities in the rod bundle resulting from loeally diEferent rod powers
and eooling eonditions the individual rods show different plots oE eladding tube
temperature versus time. This implies different times of burst for the indivi-
dual rods and, beeause the eladding tube temperature maxima oecurring between
the spaeer grids are shifted as a funetion oE the time, likewise an axial dis-
placement of the bursts. Sinee the eladding tubes underwent bursting at a rela-
tively flat axial temperature profile, hot spots and eladding tube toleranees
eontribute in addition to an axial displacement oE the bursts on ae count oE the
extreme sensitivity to temperature of Zirealoy deformation. The bursts are di-
stributed over an axial length of 242 mm whieh results in a relatively low flow
bloekage of 52 %.
Figure 6 shows the deformation pattern obtained in the REßEKA 6 bundle test
in whieh the direetion of eoolant flow was maintained for the refilling and re-
flooding phases. Unlike in REBEKA 5, the temperature maximum was shifted tOllards
the upper spaeer grid from the beginning oE the experimeot. After the tempera-
ture profile has developed in the refilling phase the temperature maximum re-
mains largely stationary in its axial position. Therefore, irregularities eannot
make a eontribution to the axial displacement of the bursts. On aecount oE the
relatively steep axial temperature profile hot spots and eladding tube toleran-
ces neither make a decisive contribution. Consequently, the bursts are arrangen
so as to be relatively elose to eaeh other and thus give rise to a eomparatively
large flo\, bloekage. It is apparent Erom the figure that the bursts are dis-
plaeed solely over an axial length of 140 mm. The resulting ilow bloekage is 60
%, i.e., it is greater than in ease oE reversed flow direetion. 1 tremains to be
studied whether and to whieh extent this value is influeneed by partieularities
in this experiment - e.g., by a cold instrumentation tube, a multitwle oE ther-
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mocouples etc. - and flow blockage might have b\i'en underestimated for uni-direc-
tional flow in this tes~
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Fig. 5 Inf1uence of reversed f10\~ on axial distribution of clad ballooning
(REßEKA 5)
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Fig. 6 Influence oE unidirectional flow on axial distribution oE clad
ba 1100ning (REßEKA 6)
Figure 7 i llustrates by two photographs tbe influence oE fiow direction on
cladding tube deformation.
PIVR's equipped with a comhined emergency core cooling injection into tbe
cold and hot leg exhibit preferentially countercurrent Elow of steam and water
mainly downwards in tbe reEilling and upwards In the reflooding phase. This
situation gives rise to a relatively 101'1 Elow blockage of approx. 50 %. PWR's
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with cold leg injection only have preferentially unidirectional upward flow of
steam and water in the refilling and reflooding phases. This may result in a
relatively high flo\~ blockage of approx. 70 %.
The full-length bundle tests REBEKA-7 (7x7, all pressurized, unidirectional
flow) and NRU-HT 6A (5x5 without corner rods, all pressurized, unidirectional
flow) will finally show what maximum flow blockage has to be assumed with uni-
directional flo\~ in a LOCA.
IREBEKA-SI
location of
burs ts
11
IREBEKA-6J
grid spacer
,grid spacer
location of
bursts
Fig. 7 Influence of flO\~ direction on axial distribution of clad ballooning
EFFECT OF FLOH ßLOCKAGES ON COOLAB1LITY
Flow blockages produced by ballooned claddings change the cooliog mechanism
downstream of the blockage. The increased flow resistance in the blockeJ region
results in a reduction oE the coolant mass flow. On thc othcr hand, droplet
breakup and turbulence cnhancement occur at the blockage, which improve heat
transfer. Which oE these eEEects is more dominant depends on a numher oE bounda-
ry conditions.
Hithin thc FEßA program /11/ flooding tests with forced feed have been
perEormed under transient LOCA conditinns on a 5x5 bundle with coplanar conical
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sleeves simulating the flow blockage. Fig. 8 shows cladding temperature tran-
sients in the blocked and the unblocked regions for a flooding rate of 3.8 cm/s
and a blockage ratio of 62 % in the blocked region. It is evident from the
diagram that under the given conditions the effect of water droplet breakup,
which improves the heat transfer, overcompensates the degrading effect of mass
flow reduction with the consequence that the cladding temperature downstream of
the blocked region is somewhat lower compared to that in the unblocked region.
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Fig. 8 Cladding temperatures in partly blocked 25-rod bundle (FEBA)
Figure 9 shol<s corresponcling plots for a blockage ratio of 90 % in the
blocked region. It makes evident that under these severe conditions the cooIant
mass flOl< reduction overshadows the tl<o-phase cooling enhancement effect. llow-
ever, the temperature rise downstream of the blockage and the delay in quench
time are moderate. Frorn this it can be concluded that in fuel elements blocked
up to 90 % the coolability in a LOCA can be maintained.
These findings are consistent with the results from other tests listed in
Tab. II which were perEormed with larger bunriles, larger bypass regions and
partially with gravity feed. The higher temperature rise found in the TllETIS
blockage experiment is mainly the consequence ,?f a more severe blockage shape
and a low rod power both of which tend to deliver very conservative results.
All reflood tests on blocked bundles used solid electrical heater rods with
no gap between the cladding and the inner heating element. It has been shown in
the IlEBEKA- and SEFLEX-program that such gapless heater rods exhibit higher peak
cladding temperatures and longer quench times compared to nuclear fuel rods and
I{EllEKA fuel rod simulators, respectively. In addition it bas been found that
burst cladding tubes quench even earlier compared to intact cladding tubes aori
generate secondary quench fronts 114/.
Tbis recent experience suggests that the test results summarized in Tab. 11
are still conservative and that there is a higher safety margin in the coola-
bi lity oE a Ph'R in a LOCA.
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Fig. 9 Cladding temperatures in partly blocked 25-rod bundle (FEBA)
SUM~~RY AND CONCLUSIONS
- Substantial knowledge and a sufficiently reliable data base on the interaction
between fuel clad ballooning and thermal-hydraulics exist in order to prove
the safety of a PWR in a'LOCA.
- All test data are consistent.
- Differences in the test results are mainly due to different thermal-hydraulic
test conditions.
- Beat transfer during reflooding limits the mean total circumferential burst
strain of the Zircaloy cladding tubes to approx. 50 %.
- The direction of coolant flow in the fuel element during the refilling and
reflooding phases decisively influences the axial dis placement of the bursts
and the size of flow blockage caused in this way.
- Reversed coolant flow direction from the refilling to the reflooding phases
leads to a maximum flow blockage of approx. 50 %.
- Uni-directional coolant flow during the refilling and reflooding phases re-
sults in the highest possible flow blockage of approx. 70 %.
- Coolability in a blocked fuel element can be mainted up to a blockage ratio of
approx. 90 %.
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Table 11 LOCA simulation reflood tests in blocked bundles
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ABSTRACT
In support of the Pressurized Thermal Shock Integration Study,
sponsored by the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, the
Idaho National Engineering Laboratory has performed analyses of
overcooling transients using the RELAPS/MODl.6 and MOD2.0 computer
codes. These analyses were performed for the H. B. Robinson Unit 2
pressurized water reactor, which is a Westinghouse 3-loop design
plant. Results of the RELAPS analyses are presented. The
capabilities of the RELAPS computer code as a tool for analyzing
integral plant transients requiring a detailed plant model,
including complex trip logic and major control systems, are examined.
INTRODUCTION
The rapid cooldown of a pressurized water reactor (PWR) vessel during a
transient or accident accompanied by high coolant pressure is referred to as
pressurized thermal shock (PTS). The United States Nuclear Regulatory Commis-
sion (USNRC) designated PTS as an unresolved safety issue in late 1981, and
developed a task action plan (TAP A-49) to resolve the issue.
The safety issue exists because rapid cooling at the reactor vessel wall
inner surface produces thermal stresses within the wall. As lang as the reactor
vessel wall is ductile, overcooling transients will not cause vessel failures.
NRC staff analyses (SECY-8S-46S) showed, however, certain older plants with
copper and other impurities in vessel weldments may become sensitive to PTS as
the nil-ductility transition temperature of the weId material gradually
increases. The purpose of the thermal-hydraulic analyses presented in this
paper is to better understand the behavior of the H. B. Robinson Unit 2 power
plant during various kinds of postulated severe overcooling transients with
multiple failures of equipment and/or without operator corrective action. The
understanding gained in these analyses will be used to determine coolant
temperature and pressure responses in the vessel downcomer for other postulated
transients using a simplified mass-and-energy balance approach. For each of
the thermal-hydraulic transients, Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) will
per form analyses to determine reactor vessel temperature distribution and
stresses during the transient and the conditional probability of vessel failure
if one of these transients should occur.
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The analyses presented in this paper were performed for the H. B. Robinson
Unit 2 PWR operated at Hartsville, South Carolina, U.S.A. by Carolina Power and
Light Company. The reactor is a Westinghouse three-loop design power plant.
This is one of several PWRs the USNRC has identified for which PTS is of con-
cern. The USNRC has contracted with ORNL to integrate the investigation of the
PTS unresolved safety issue, and with the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory
(INEL) to support ORNL by performing therma1-hydrau1ic ana1yses using RELAPS, a
state-of-the-art computer code, and a p1ant-specific model for the H. B.
Robinson plant.
The transient simulations were performed from either fu11 power or hot
standby operating conditions using "best estimate" mode1ing assumptions for
plant conditions and 'responses to events specified in the scenario descriptions.
The reader is cautioned, however, that for bounding purposes, the scenario
descriptions were based on extreme1y conservativeßssumptions concerning equip-
ment ma1functions, operator actions and omissions, 'or combinations of these.
Whi1e the computer simulations represent "best estimate" plant responses to the
scenarios as defined, [Reference 1] they do not represent the "most probable"
plant responses to the scenario initiating events.
This paper describes the RELAPS model deve10ped for the H. B. Robinson
power plant which was used to perform the transients for the ana1yses. The
paper also describes the 37 transient scenario ca1cu1ations that were performed
with this model. Resu1ts of the study are presented by examining base case
transients and variations of break size, break location, power level, and/or
operator action. Also presented are capabi1ities of the RELAPS computer code
in performing analyses of this type.
Model Description
The transient ca1cu1ations presented in this paper were performed with a
RELAPS model of the H. B. Robinson, Unit 2 (HBR-2), PWR power plant described
herein. The model is a detai1ed therma1-hydrau1ic and contro1 system repre-
sentation of the plant. The therma1-hydrau1ic model represented all the major
flow paths of the plant and is shown in Figure 1. The HBR-2 plant has
three primary coolant loops and each loop is represented in the model. The
vesse1 model inc1uded all the major f10w and 1eakage paths of the plant. Also
mode1ed on the primary side was the pressurizer and its associated power
o pera ted relief va1ves (PORVs) and safety va1ves, and the emergency co re coo1-
ing (ECCs) system. The secondary side model of the plant inc1uded: all of the
major flow paths in each of the steam generator secondariesj the main steam
1ine out to the turbine inc1uding steam dump va1ves (SDVs), PORVs, and safety
va1vesj and the main feedwater system, inc1uding feedwater heaters and auxi1iary
feedwater systems. To simu1ate plant contro1, the major plant contro1 systems
were mode1ed using the contro1 system package contained in the RELAPS computer
code. The systems mode1ed inc1ude the steam dump contro1 system, steam gener-
ator level contro1 system, pressurizer pressure contro1 system and pressurizer
level contro1 system. Also inc1uded in the mode1ed contro1 system are control-
lers to simu1ate feedwater contro1 behavior during steady state and transient
modes. The HBR-2 RELAPS model contained 224 vo1umes, 242 junctions, 218 heat
structures and 300 contro1 system components. For a more detai1ed description
of the model refer to [Reference 11.
As acheckout of the model a simulation of an actua1 HBR-2 plant trip was
performed. Generally, the agreement between measured and ca1cu1ated data was
very good as characterized by the measured and ca1cu1ated pressurizer pressure
responses shown in Figure 2. The comparison provided a 1imited, but usefu1,
qua1ification of the plant model.
313
MAIN FEEDWATER SY6TEM
RELAP5 H.B. ROBINSON PLANT MODEL DESCRIPTION
Figure 1. RELAPS plant nodalization for the H. B. Robinson Unit power plant.
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trip transient simulated with the H. B. Robinson model.
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Transient Descriptions
There were 37 transient calculations performed with the detailed model.
The scenarios calculated were defined by ORNL and are categorized into
five types of transient events: (1) steam line break transients, which include
large and medium size breaks, stuck-open PORVs, stuck-open SDVs, and combina-
tion stuck-open PORVs and SDVsj (2) loss-of-coolant accidents, which include
isolatable or nonisolatable medium and small breaks on either the hot or cold
leg, stuck-open pressurizer PORV, and breaks with steam generator overfills;
(3) steam generator tube rupture transients, which include a single tube
rupture with or without operator action; (4) steam generator overfill and lass
of secondary heat sink transients; and (5) combination steam line break and
loss-of-coolant accidents which include combinations of stuck-open steam line
PORVs or SDVs with stuck-open pressurizer PORV or medium size breaks. In each
of the above transient events, the transients were performed at either full
power or hot-standby. [References 1 and 2)
Results
The reactor vessel downcomer pressure and temperature histories for a
representative steam line break, loss-of-coolant accident, and combination
steam line break and loss-of-coolant accident are presented. Break size, break
location, power level, and/or operator action parametrie variations are also
presented for the first two transient events. The transient calculations were
run with the detailed model out to where a stable trend in the response was
observed, then, based on past experience, a simplified model of the plant or a
simplified mass-and-energy balance approach was used to extrapolate the response
to two hours, the per iod of PTS cancern.
The reactor vessel downcomer pressure and temperature responses for a
0.09 m2 (1 ft 2) main steam line break transient from hot standby conditions
are shown as Curve 1 in Figures 3 and 4. The break occurred in the Steam
Generator A main steam line just upstream from the main steam isolation valves.
Primary system pressure rapidly decreased as break induced heat transfer to the
A steam generator peaked. As the A steam generator emptied, heat transfer to
this generator degraded and primary pressure stabilized. The vessel downcomer
temperature response also rapidly decreased during this time period due to the
enhanced cooling from the affected steam generator. At approximately 200 s the
volumetrie addition fr om HPI exceeded the volumetrie contraction from the cool-
down and the pressurizer began to refill, repressurizing the primary system.
At 600 s auxiliary feedwater was terminated, slowing the decrease in the
temperature response shown in Figure 4. IVhen the level in the pressurizer
recovered at 650 s, charging flow was automatically throttled and thus slowed
the primary repressurization rate. At 1100 s the affected steam generator
became dry and heat transfer from the primary was lost, resulting in a turn-
around of the downcomer temperature. At 1200 s the primary system pressure
exceeded the HPI shut off head, terminating HPI. The system pressure continued
to rise to the pressurizer PORV set point due primarily to volumetrie expansion
as the primary fluid continued to heat up.
Variations to the above transient include operator action, break size, and
power level. Curve 2 of Figure 4 shows the reactor vessel downcomer tempera-
ture response of a double-ended steam line break where the operator does not
terminate the auxiliary feedwater. IVhile the continuation of auxiliary feed-
water does not affect the pressure response significantly, the temperature
continues to decrease. Had the operator not terminated the auxiliary feedwater
in Curve 1 the response would be similar to Curve 2. The dominating factor in
the primqry pressure and temperature response of steam line breaks is secondary
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depressurization. Curve 3 of Figures 3 and 4, a sma11 steam 1ine break repre-
senting a stuck-open steam 1ine PORV, shows the pressure and temperature
response with respect to break size. Compared with Curve 2, the pressure and
temperature response of Curve 3 is slower because of the much sma11er break·
size. Curves 3 and 4 of Figures 3 and 4 show the effects of power level for a
stuck-open steam 1ine PORV transient. Because there is more energy to remove
at fu11 power (Curve 4) the pressure and temperature responded more slow1y than
at hot standby (Curve 3).
The reactor vesse1 downcomer pressure and temperature response for a
6.35 cm, (2 1/2 in.) hot leg break transient at fu11 power are shown in
Figures 5 and 6. The initial rapid decrease in primary pressure was a resu1t
of a high break volumetrie f10w due to subcoo1ed liquid at the break and the
rapid decrease in core power due to scram. At approximate1y 150 s the depres-
surization slowed due to vapor generation throughout the primary system and a
decrease in the break mass f10w rate which was due to t"o phase conditions at
the break. At approximate1y 1000 s auxi1iary feedwater was terminated and vapor
generation due to core decay heat resu1ted in a primary repressurization. The
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repressurization continued until the Core subcooled reducing the vapor genera-
tion rate. After this time, the primary pressure decreased until the energy
removal at the break balanced with the energy addition, and break flow equaled
total ECC flow.
The temperature response of this transient, shown in Figure 6, decreased
due to the cooldown of the system from the depressurization. Cold ECC fluid
mixed well with cold leg fluid during this time. As the loops and vessel
drained, loop natural circulation was lost and mixing of the ECC fluid with the
primary fluid decreased resulting in a faster cooldown of the downcorner temper-
ature. The downcorner temperature was domina ted by the ECC fluid temperature
due to loop stagnation throughout the remainder of the transient.
The effects of power level, break size, and break location on a loss-of-
coolant-accident (LOCA) are shown by Curves 2 through 4 in Figures 5 and 6.
Curve 2 is the same type of ttansient as just discussed except it began at hot
standby. The events of the two transients were similar except they occurred
earlier in the hot standby case. The higher power kept the system hotter
resulting in a slower depressurization and promoted better loop natural circu-
lation due to a larger density difference across the Core and better mixing of
the primary fluid with the cold ECC fluid.
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Curve 3 represents a 5.08 Cm (2 in.) diameter hot leg break at full power.
The trends in this transient are similar to those of the 6.35 cm (2.5 in.) hot
leg break except the events are delayed in time. The delay of events is due
mainly to the slower energy removal at the break.
Curve 4 represents a 5.08 cm (2 in.) diameter cold leg break at full power.
Compared with Curve 3 the depressurization is faster, due to a higher' break
volumetric flow rate resulting from colder fluid exiting the break. The
temperature response, however, remains about the same. Even though the pres-
sure in the cold leg break is lower, which would induce more ECC fluid into the
system, 1/3 of the ECC is going directly out of the break with the net ECC flow
being nearly the same in both cases. Thus, approximately the same downcorner
cooldown exists in both transients.
The reactor vessel downcorner pressure and temperature responses for a com-
bination LOCA and steam line break are shown in Figures 7 and 8 respectively.
As shown, the trend of the pressure response resembles that of the LOCA
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transients because of the break on the primary side. The temperature response
in this type of transient, however, resembles that of a steam line break
transient because of the dominant enhanced primary-to-secondary heat transfer.
Code Capabilities
Capabilities in modeling a complex plant of the nature of the
H. B. Robinson plant with the RELAP5 computer code [Reference 3) include control
system modeling, trip logic, and user conveniences in the input to constructing
models. The control system package included in RELAP5 provides the capability
to evaluate simultaneous algebraic and ordinary differential equations. Because
the control system used by the H. B. Robinson plant is complex in controlling
plant behavior, especially during transient situations, and the inability to
monitor this behavior manually, it was necessary to use the RELAP5 control
system package to model a majority of the actual control system. The model
checkout simulation of a plant transient mentioned earlier has demonstrated the
RELAP5 control system modeling adequately represented the actual control system.
Extensive trip logic has been implemented in RELAP5. A combination of
variable and logical trips was genera ted for the H. B. Robinson model to
describe the logic involved in determining automatie or manual actions the
plant experiences during a transient, such as reactor scram, or emergency
feedwater initiation.
Another feature of the RELAP5 code is the user friendliness of the input in
constructing large detailed models and the ability to economically per form cal-
culations with these models. Because the input to construct models with RELAP5
is user friendly, the analyst can efficiently and economically build large
detailed models. The CPU time to real time ratio (performed on a CDC 176 Com-
puter) for the transients performed with the detailed model range from 2.55 to
7.95. Those transients that exhibited high condensation rates or low primary
or secondary pressures executed more slowly.
The treatment of condensation effects under specific conditions, such as an
insurge to a pressurizer is another feature of the RELAP5/MODI.6 and MOD2.0 com-
puter codes. Condensation occurs at the interface between steam and liquid.
When the subcooled primary coolant first enters the superheated steam environ-
ment of an empty pressurizer, high condensation rates can be expected. However,
once a level has been established within the pressurizer, a layer of saturated
liquid is believed to form at the liquid steam interface decreasing the conden-
sation rate significantly. A model which allows vertical stratification of the
fluid in RELAP5/MODI.6 and MOD2.0, and the six field equations in MOD2.0 (which
allows subcooled liquid and superheated vapor to exist in the same volume) has
greatly improved the calculated pressurizer insurge response.
CONCLUSIONS
Ta perform the H. B. Robinson PWR power plant PTS study done at the INEL,
a detailed RELAP5 model of the plant was developed. A comparison of code-
calculated and measured data from a plant trip transient indicated generally
good agreement and thus provided a limited, but useful, qualification of the
model. A steam line break transient and a LOCA were examined with perturba-
tions of break size, break location, power level and/or operator action. It
was shown that both steam line break transients and LOCAs resulted in cold
downcomer temperatures. However, the steam line break transients resulted in a
system repressurization, whereas the pressure in the LOCA calculations continued
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to decrease. It was also shown that a combination steam line break and LOCA
transient exhibited a primary pressure behavior similar to that of a LOCA tran-
sient and a downcomer temperature response similar to that of a steam line break
transient. The RELAPS computer code adequately calculated the transient behav-
ior, due in part to its ability to handle complex control and trip logic, which
physically controls plant behavior. It was demonstrated that large integral
models can economically be run with RELAPS. Inclusion of a vertical stratifi-
cation model in RELAPS/MODl.6 and MOD2.0 and six field equations in MOD2.0 has
greatly improved calculated pressurizer insurge response.
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TRAC-PFI ANALYSES OF POTENTIAL PRESSURIZED-THERMAL-SHOCK
TRANSIENTS AT A COMBUSTION-ENGINEERING PWR*
Jan E. Koenig and Russell C. Smith
Energy Division
Los Alamos National Laboratory
Los Alamos, New Mexico USA 87544
ABSTRACT
Los Alamos Nat ional Laboratory part icipated in a program to
assess the risk of a pressurized thermal shock (PTS) to the reactor
vessel during a postulated overcooling transient in a pressurized
water reactor (PWR). Using the Transient Reactor Analysis Code
(TRAC) , Los Alamos studied the thermal-hydraulic behavior of the three
following accident categories: steamline breaks, runaway-feedwater
transients, and small-break loss-of-coolant accidents. These
accidents were simulated for a Combustion-Engineering (C-E) PWR,
Calvert Cliffs, and included multiple operator and equipment failures.
The results will be used by Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) to
determine the vessel wall temperature and stresses corresponding to
the bulk downcomer liquid temperature and pressure predicted by TRAC.
The study identified the importance of the initial plant
conditions and loop flows to the PTS issue. If the plant was
initially at hot-zero power (rather than full power), the same
accident initiator could produce significantly lower downcomer
t~mperatures because of the reduced decay. heat and stored energy.
Flow stagnation in all reactor coolant loops, which occurred in one
transient, could lead to avessei wall temperature that approached the
relatively cold high-pressure-injection fluid temperature. However,
routine operator actions would reduce the consequences of any of these
simulated accidents if the pres.sure-temperature relationships
prescribed in the operator guidelines are followed. ORNL will extend
the results of the Los Alamos study by determining the probability of
vessel failure and accident occurrence for an overall assessment of
PTS risk.
*Work supported by the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
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INTRODUCTION
Los A1amos National Laboratory participated in a program to assess the risk
of a pressurized thermal shock (PTS) to a reactor vessel. Our ro1e was to
provide best-estimate therma1-hydrau1ic ana1yses of 13 postu1ated overcoo1ing
transients using TRAC-PF1. 1 These transients Were all hypothetica1 and inc1uded
multiple equipment and operator fai1ures. Ca1vert C1iffs, a Combustion
Engineering (C-E) plant, Was the pressurized water reactor (PWR) mode1ed for
this study. Ca1vert C1iffs/Unit 1, 10cated on the Chesapeake Bay in Mary1and,
began operation in January 1975. Figure 1 shows the configuration of the
primary side of the power plant. Unit 1 has a 2 x 4 loop arrangement: two hot
1egs and two steam generators (SGs) with four cold 1egs and four reactor coo1ant
pumps (RCPs). The plant operates at 2700 MWth •
The reactor vesse1s of certain older p1ants containing copper impurities in
the vesse1 we1ds risk cracking if subjected to a thermal shock concurrent with
high system pressure (referred to as PTS). After years of irradiation, the
vesse1 we1ds in these p1ants have become more brittle; and therefore, the
temperature at which a crack may initiate or propagate increases. Overcoo1ing
transients can be postu1ated that may lead to a PTS. For this reason, in 1ate
1981, the US Nuc1ear Regu1atory Commission (NRC) identified PTS as an unreso1ved
safety issue and deve10ped a task action plan (TAP A-49) to reso1ve the issue.
An effort to assess the risk of PTS in represent at ive plant s of the three
US PWR vendors was estab1ished. A Westinghouse plant (H. B. Robinson) and a
Babcock & Wi1cox plant (Oconee) were also studied as part of the program. For
the C-E plant (Ca1vert C1iffs), severa1 organizat ions part icipated: the plant
owner, which is the Baltimore Gas and E1ectric Co. (BG&E); C-E; the NRC; Oak
Fig. 1
Primary side of Ca1vert C1iffs.
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Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL); Brookhaven National Laboratory (BNL); and Los
Alamos National Laboratory.
The NRC managed the multi-organizational project. BG&E and C-E supplied
extensive information about the plant and its operation. Los Alamos used this
information to prepare a comprehensive TRAC-PFI model of Calvert Cliffs. ORNL
identified 13 postulated overcooling transients that could lead to PTS, and Los
Alamos simulated most of these transients for 7200 s (2 h) after their
initiation. These transients were reviewed by BG&E, C-E, ORNL, and BNL. Our
results were provided to ORNL, who plan to extend these results to other
postulated PTS transients using a simplified mass-and-energy balance approach.
For each of these postulated transients, ORNL plans to determine the stresses in
the vessel wall and calculate the probability of vessel failure. ORNL then
plans to publish a report 2 that incorporates the entire study and identifies the
important event sequences, operator and control actions, and uncertainties.
The purpose of these calculat ions is to aid the NRCin confirming the
screening criterion (the criterion to determine if a power plant is subject to a
risk of PTS) in the proposed PTS rule (10 CFR 50.61). The current screening
criterion of a power plant is a reference temperature for nil-ductility
transition (RTNDT ) of 405 K (270 0 F) at 40 effective full-power years. The NRC
will also use these analyses to develop requirements for the licensees' plant-
specific PTS safety-analysis reports and the acceptance criterion for proposed
PTS preventive actions.
TRAC-PFI CALCULATIONS
TRAC-PFI is a best-est imate finite-difference computer code capable of
modeling thermal-hydraulic transients in both one and three dimensions. The
code solves the field equat ions for mass, moment um and energy conservat ion of
both vapor and liquid. The Calvert Cliffs model fully exercised the
capabilities of TRAC-PFl.
We performed thermal-hydraulic analyses of three accident categories:
runaway-feedwater transients, steamline breaks, and small-break loss-of-coolant
accidents (SBLOCAs). These transients were initiated from either hot-zero power
(HZP) or full power (FP). The RCPs were tripped 30 s after the safety-
injection-actuation signal in all but one transient. Parameters that were
significant in assessing the risk of PTS were the downcomer liquid temperature,
the system pressure, and the occurrence of flow stagnation in the reactor
coolant loops. This paper describes the factors that strongly affected these
three parameters in the TRAC PFI calculations. Table I lists a description of
each of the 13 transients, the calculated minimum downcomer liquid temperature,
and whether repressurizat ion and/or loop flow stagnat ion were calculated by
TRAC-PFl. This work is documented in detail in Ref. 3.
FACTORS AFFECTING DOWNCOMER LIQUID TEMPERATURE
The initial conditions of the plant were important. When a transient was
initiated from FP, the decay heat was high enough that a significant decrease in
the downcomer bulk fluid temperature did not occur. Uncertainty in the amount
of decay heat following FP shutdown exists because the decay heat is dependent
on the operating his tory of the plant and thus, the system energy following FP
shutdown can vary significantly. For the TRAC-PFI calculations, it was assumed
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TABLE I
TRANSIENT RESULTS a
Minimum T Repressuri- Flow
Descr ipt ionb K °F zation Stagnat ion
Runaway-feedwater Cases:
1. Runaway MFW to two SGs
from FP 480 404 yes no
2. Runaway MFW to one SG
from FP 490 422 yes one loop
3. Runaway AFW to two SGs
from FP 490 422 yes no
Steamline Breaks:
4. 0.1-m 2 MSLB
a. From HZP 395 251 yes one loop
b. From FP 468 383 yes one loop
c. With two operating RCPs
from HZP 446 343 yes no
5. Double-ended MSLB
a. With failure to isolate
AFW to broken SG from HZP 377 219 yes one loop
b. With two stuck-open MSIVs
from HZP 376 217 yes no
6. Small steamline break
(stuck-open TBV)
a. From FP 530 494 yes no
b. With one stuck-open MSIV
from FP 500 440 yes no b
SBLOCAs:
7. 0.002-m 2 hot-leg break
from FP 440 332 (low flow) one loop
8. One stuck-open pressurizer valve
a. With one stuck-open atmospheric
dump valve from FP 407 273 no one loop
b. From FP 350b 17lb no both loops
aNo operator intervention assumed except to trip the RCPs.
bEstimated.
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that the reactor had been in operation for an infinite length of time. An
assessment of the effect of the uncertainty of the decay heat following FP
shutdown is detailed in the full report (Ref. 3).
Plant features that signif icantly affected the rate and amount of primary
cooldown were:
(1) SC isolation capability - Valves on the main feedwater (MFW) lines and the
steamlines terminate flows (except auxiliary feedwater) into both SCs if
the secondary pressure is less than 4.6 MPa (668 psig) in either SC. This
limits the cooling potential of a steamline break or stuck-open secondary
valve. lf the break was downstream of the main steam isolat ion valves
(MSlVs), an overcooling transient was terminated upon receipt of the
low-pressure signal (calIed the SC isolation signal or SClS). lf the break
was upstream of the MSlVs, the primary overcooling was still limited to the
energy-removal capability of one SC because the other SC was isolated after
SClS.
(2) SC liquid inventory - The SCs at Calvert Cliffs have relatively large
liquid inventories at steady state: ~102000 kg (225000 lb) at HZP and
~3000 kg (138600 lb) at FP. So, even with the capability to isolate one
of the SCs, a steamline break would have severe overcooling potential.
(3) Flow restrictors on the steamlines - Because of a flow restrictor located
in each main steamline, the largest effective break size downstream of this
restrictor (10 m (32.8 ft) from the SC exit) is 0.2 m2 (2.0 ft 2). Hence,
the thermal-hydraulics of a 0.2-m2 main steamline break (MSLB) and a
double-ended MSLB (0.52 m2 (5.6 ft 2» would be virtually the same because
the effective break size would be the same.
(4) Auxiliary feedwater (AFW) control logic - AFW is valved out to the SC at a
lower pressure if apressure differential greater than 0.8 MPa (115 psia)
exists between the SCs. This limits the overcooling potential of a
steamline break to the energy-removal capability of one SC because AFW will
not be supplied to the "broken" SC.
(5) Condenser/hotwell liquid inventory - This determined the overall cooling
capability of the runaway-MFW transients.
FACTORS AFFECTlNC SYSTEM PRESSURE
The system pressure and rate of repressurization (if any) are important in
assessing the risk of PTS. Because of anassumed operator failure to turn off
the charging pumps, all secondary-side-initiated transients repressurized to the
pressurizer power-operated relief valve (PORV) setpoint. Figure 2 shows a
typical pressure history for a secondary-side transient (0.1-m2 (1.0-ft 2 ) MSLB
from HZP). For a potential PTS problem to arise during an SBLOCA, the break
size must be small enough for the system pressure to remain high but large
enough for high-pressure-injection (HPl) flow to be necessary.
Plant features that strongly influenced the system pressure were:
(1) Safety-injection and makeup/letdown (charging) flow - HPl flow is delivered
by centrifugal pumps with a low shutoff head of 8.8 MPa (1285 psia) and
charging flow is delivered by positive-displacement pumps. This means that
while the primary can repressurize to the PORV setpoint , the
repressurization rate would decrease drastically above 8.8 MPa. Also, the
supply of cold water to the downcorner would be limited to charging flow
when the system pressure is above the shutoff head of the HPl pumps. This
feature was important for postulated secondary-side transients when the
primary side repressurized.
Typical primary pressure
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a secondary-side transient.
(2) Bypass flows into the upper head - Liquid enters the upper head via a
controlled flow area through the control-element-assembly (CEA) shrouds and
a small bypass leakage flow at the top of the downcomer. This flow was
important for all transients when the upper head voided because it strongly
affected the condensat ion rate and thus the depressurizat ion and
repressurization rate.
FACTORS AFFECTING LOOP FLOW STAGNATION
Flow stagnation is of particular importance to PTS because no mechanism is
available to cause significant mixing of the cold-leg fluid with injected HPI
fluid and consequently, the HPI fluid may concentrate along the vessel wall.
TRAC-PFl is not designed to predict flows of this nature and hence, calculations
were performed at Purdue Unversit y4 and at Los Alamos S (using SOLA-PTS code) to
resolve the temperature and flow distributions during periods of flow stagnation
during the transients.
Figure 3 illustrates the mechanism for producing loop flow stagnation. The
SG must be in a reverse-heat-transfer mode for the loop flow to cease. When the
driving head (density gradient) produced by heat input from the SG opposed the
driving head produced by the heat input from the core, the net force to drive
the flow was zero. The higher decay heat from FP transients produced a greater
positive driving force for flow than the decay heat at HZP and flow stagnation
was more likely in the HZP transients. Thus, the initial conditions also were
an important factor in flow stagnation.
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Fig. 3.
Mechanism for producing loop flow stagnation.
Many transients produced loop flow stagnat ion in one loop because of
asymmetrie conditions on the secondary side (resulting from a steamline break or
stuck-open valve); however, according to studies at Los Alamos,5 if one loop is
in natural circulat ion while the other loop is stagnant, the HPI fluid will
still mix with the warmer fluid residing in the downcomer. Of the 12 transients
initially specified by ORNL, flow stagnation in both loops did not occur. As
our understanding of the significant phenomena improved, we were able to
identify a transient that produced stagnation in both 100ps. This calculation
is presented in the next section.
Plant features that were significant to flow stagnation were:
(1) SC isolat ion capability - During a steamline break or runaway-feedwater
transient, one SC may be isolated while the other is not. These asymmetrie
secondary conditions can lead to cooling of the primary fluid by one SC and
heating by the other. The flow may stagnate in the loop where heat is
being added by the SC. However, flow stagnation in one loop is currently
judged not to be a PTS problem.
(2) Number of reactor coolant loops - Thorough mixing in the downcomer might
not occur if there are more than two loops. If stagnation were to occur in
all but one loop of a three- or four-loop plant, it might be of PTS
concern.
MOST SICNIFICANT TRANSIENT
The most significant transient (from a thermal-hydraulic standpoint) was
initiated by a stuck-open PORV while the plant was operating at HZP. This
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transient produced stagnation in both loops leading to a low bulk downcomer
temperature with a system pressure of ~7.2 MPa (1058 psia).
The calculated downcomer liquid temperature, as shown in F ig. 4, may be
divided into two phases. Phase 1 (0-260 s) was before the init iat ion of HPI
flow. The system temperature remained constant at its initial value of 552 K
(534 0 F). Because the primary and secondary sides were already in thermal
equilibrium and the decay heat was low, only pressure changes, as shown in
Fig. 5, occurred during this portion of the subcooled blowdown. When the
pressure dropped below 8.8 MPa (1285 psia), HPI flow started and the primary
cooldown began (Phase 2). The entire cooldown was due primarily to the
replacement of the initial primary mass by the HPI and charging flow. After the
top of the U-tubes in the 8Gs voided at ~600 s, the loop flows ceased and
subsequent heat addit ion from the 8Gs and pipe t<alls was small. The system
began refilling when the HPl/charging flow exceeded the break flow. When the
liquid on one side of the U-tubes spilled into the steam volume on the other
side at 1800 s, a rapid condensation process began which caused apressure drop
of ~.8 MPa (117.5 psi). This initiated a small circulation of ~35 kg/s
(77 Ibis) in the loop without the break because a liquid flow path was
re-established.
A minimum pressure of 6.0 MPa (882 psia) was reached before the upper head
voided. The system pressure increased as the void in the upper head was
compressed by the HPl/charging flow. After the steam in the upper head
condensed, the pressure remained relatively constant (1200-2400 s) because of an
approximate balance between the break flow and the HPl/charging flow. After
2400 s, significantly cooler liquid had reached the break, increasing the break
mass flow and decreasing the system pressure. The pressure leveled off to less
than the HPI head as the HPI flow increased and again balanced the break flow.
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This transient demonstrated that flow stagnation in both loops was possible
during an SBLOCA if the postulated transient is initiated from a low decay-heat
level.
CONCLUSIONS
In general, those calculations initiated from FP conditions were
thermal-hydraulically benign. If initiated from HZP, most of these transients
could pose a PTS threat if there was no operator intervention. This is because
of the increased likelihood of flow stagnat ion as well as the reduced heat
content of the fluid and the system metal when the plant was at HZP.
Several plant features were identified as significant to the consequences
of the postulated potential PTS transients:
1. SG isolation capability.
2. SG liquid inventory.
3. Flow restrictors in the steamlines.
4. AFW control logic.
5. Condenser/hotwell liquid inventory.
6. Safety-injection and makeup/letdow~ flow.
7. Bypass flows into the upper head.
8. Number of reactor coolant loops.
Steaml ine breaks possess the largest potent ial to produce rapid cooldown •
If init iated when the SG water' mass is large (as at HZP), the subsequent
pr imary-s ide temperature reduct ion would be more than if the SG was at FP.
SBLOCAs possess a larger potential for overall cooling of the primary system but
the rate of cooldown will not be as large as the rate produced by steamline
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breaks. Runaway-MFW transients can produce a rapid, but short-lived, cooldown
of the primary system.
Simple routine operator actions would have reduced the consequences of any
of these simulated accidents. The operator failure assumptions (particularly
failure to throttle HPl and charging flow to control the system
pressure-temperature relationship prescribed in the operator guidelines) were
the single most important contributors to the generat ion of severe
pressure-temperature conditions in all cases.
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ABSTRACT
Recent evaluations of high fluence induced embrittlements of
some reactor pressure vessel materials have raised the question
of vessel integrity during the occurence of severe pressurized
thermal shock (PTS) events. To resolve the PTS issue, both U.S.
NRC and EPRI have undertaken a cancerted effort to establish a
sound data base from scaled model tests and to develop both tran-
sient, multidimensional codes as well as simple engineering
tools. For Phase 11 of the HDR Safety Programm, aseries of ther-
mal mixing tests, TEMB, in the cold leg and downcorner is planned
to establish accurate thermal boundary conditions for a realistic
pressurized thermal shock test, at the HDR vessel, NOTZ, at a
later point in time. In order to make these efforts most meaning-
ful as weIl as to use the large-scale, operational HDR-vessel and
facility features to the fullest extent, the paper reviews the
available American thermal mixing data and highlights those
aspects thought to the unique only to the forthcoming HDR experi-
ments and their expected additional contributions to the know-
ledge base in this area. Additionally, computer codes and models
for predicting thermal mixing phenomena will be discussed and
their results compared to the available data. Finally, same pre-
test predictions by the multidimensional code SOLA-PTS and
engineering models, JETMIX and VOLMIX are presented for same of
the forthcoming HDR-TEMB experiments.
INTRODUCTION
When high pressure cold emergency core coolant fluid is in-
jected into a PWR cold leg as a consequence of a reactor tran-
sient/accident in the primary/secondary system, the inside reac-
tor vessel wall may experience a severe thermal shock which to-
gether with an accompanying system repressurization can cause
stable crack growth. Given the transient fluid pressure and wall
temperature histories, the analysis of crack growth is performed
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by fracture mechanics codes. The determination of the transient
temperature and pressure histories necessitates the application
of such complex system codes as TRAC, RELAPS throughout the pri-
mary, in most instances even secondary systems. However, these
systems codes can only accommodate very coarse noding, so that
details of thermal mixing in the cold legs and downcomer cannot
be assessed by these methods. Rather, much more refined and
sophisticated computer codes and/or engineering calculational
methods whose input parameters are empirically deduced from a
broad data base must supplement the informations gained from
system codes.
In order to resolve the important PTS issues, both US NRC
and EPRI have undertaken great efforts /1/ for establishing a
broad and sound data base from scaled model tests at CREARE /2-6/
and SAI /7/ in order to evaluate the different characteristics of
the three American PWR designs in terms of mitigating the injec-
tion of high pressure cold emergency coolant.
Parallel to the experimental research, substantial analyti-
cal efforts were put in the application and verification of
existing multidimensional computer codes, such as COMMIX-1A /8/
and TEMPEST /9/, their necessary extensions and improvements,
COMMIX-1B /10-13/ as well as new, special purpose code develop-
ment such as SOLA-PTS /14,15/. These best-estimate efforts were
seconded and supplemented by fast, less expensive engineering
models concentrating either on special phenomena, such as HPI-jet
mixing under cross-flow Kim /16/, or integrated system behavior
based on a control-volume approach supplemented by empirical cor-
relations primarily deduced from the CREARE/SAI-experiments, Sun,
Oh /17,18/ or integrated from first principles, Theofanous et al
/19,20/, REMIX-code. The development of both methodologies, best-
-estimate, multidimensional codes and engineering models, gives
the potential user the opportunity to choose among various
methods according to his needs and resources as well as his
desire for insights into physical phenomena. All of the aforemen-
tioned tools eliminate the need for overly conservative assump-
tions for fluid and wall temperature histories as input to deter-
ministic and/or probabilistic fracture mechanic analyses.
Whereas the only purpose of all of the aforementioned ex-
perimental facilities was to generate a concise thermal-hydraulic
data bank, experimental work on the material and fracture aspects
of PTS under more severe pressure and temperature gradients sepa-
rately goes on at ORNL in the framework of the HSST program.
In contrast to this clearly, separated approach, the inte-
gral facility features of the HDR plant allows to examine both
thermal-hydraulic and materials research aspects in a truely
three-dimensional large vessel under close to real system condi-
tions of 11 MPa and 300 oc. For this purpose a realistic PTS-
test, abbreviated NOTZ, is planned for a naturally grown crack at
the cyclinderical vessel section whose depth of propagation into
the vessel base material will be achieved by a cyclic thermal
shock test series (THEZ) prior to the HDR-PTS event at the end
332
of Phase 11 of the HDR Safety Program sponsored by the BMFT. To
achieve this ambiguous objective, a careful planning and approach
is in order to attack a variety of obstacles, the first of which .
is to establish meaningful, {i.e. maximum achieveable extremes}
reproducible thermal boundary conditions at the cylindrical ves-
sel section under conditions of HPI of 20 0C cold water injection
into the cold leg. Thus, aseries of thermal mixing tests,
abbreviated TEMB, in the cold leg and downcomer is planned /21/
to establish the most extreme downcomer fluid/wall temperature
changes which are achieveable for various injector geometries and
system conditions. In this way, results for the thermal mixing
conditions at the injection position and downstream in the cold
leg as well as in the downcomer are obtained which supplement and
add to the knowledge base established by the American model
experiments. With respect to these results, the TEMB experiments
stand at the end of an appreciable hard- and software effort in
the USA. Therefore, it deemed appropriate to review and assess
those efforts in order to plan the HDR-TEMB experiments with due
considerations of specific German research needs in this area as
well as the feasibility of the NOTZ test in mind. On the other
hand, the forthcoming TEMB experiments, besides of enlarging the
experimental data base, provide an excellent opportunity to test
the validities of the aforementioned analytical tools /8-20/
anew in yet untested more extreme HDR circumstances under truely
pre-test conditions.
OVERVIEW OF AMERICAN THERMAL MIXING MODEL FACILITIES
AND EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
Table I summarizesthe American thermal mixing facilities and
their major characteristics. These facilities have been operated
under combined EPRI/NRC sponsorship. The first series of mixing
tests, MIX1-MIX4 /2-6/ have been performed by CREARE in a 1/5
scale model whose overall geometrical features are shown in
Fig. 1 for the example of the MIX3-facility /5/. In addition to
these tests series, B&W performed separate tests in a 1/10 scale
model /12/. In order to examine any possible effect by the selec-
ted model scale, thermal mixing in a full 1:1 model of cold leg/
downcomer geometry was tested by SAI /7/. All of these facilities
were operated under atmospheric conditions allowing simple faci-
lity constructions with transparent materials and thereby visual
oberservations with dye injections as well as inexpensive and
proven measurement techniques. This approach insures fast and
optimal insights into complex fluid flow phenomena at minimal
costs. However, the disadvantages associated with this approach
are that only low fluid temperature can be employed for simula-
ting the loop flow, leaving only a slim margin in terms öf the
applicable temperature of the HPI-flow. Thus, the tested tempera-
ture differences between the cold/hot flows are relatively small
and so are the density difference ratios, requiring accurate tem-
perature measurements.
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To enlarge the examined spectrum of density difference
ratios Jg/gHPI salt solutions were used as simulating fluids in
order to obtain values up to 20 % which are nearly prototypical.
All of the same principles are also applied in the 1/2-scale
facility operated at the Purdue University /20/. Whereas most of
the aforementioned facilities were used for both natural circu-
lation loop flow conditions as well as limiting conditon of stag-
nant loop flow, Purdue's 1/2-scale model was purposely designed
such as to examine only the latter. Special research objectives
were to study high Froude number flows, examine any possible
effects induced by non-similarities in Re-numbers from strict
Froude number scaling as well as to provide consistent sets of
space-time distribution of temperatures (simulated by concentra-
tions) and local velocities by hot-film/thermocouple and concen-
tration---probes.
Finally, the aforementioned principles were given up for the
1/2-scale facility which is operated by CREARE under a coopera-
tive EPRI/NRC program. It is a non-transparent large scale,
heavily instrumented model operating at pressures up to 1.4 MPa
allowing the loop flow temperatures to be as high as about 195
°C. Thus far, neither data nor analyses have been published.
It is worth mentioned that according to Table I all American
facilities simulated the downcomer as a 90 0 planar section only
with one cold leg penetration. Special attention was given to the
simulations of the vendor-specific cold leg designs, such as
nozzle curvatures, pipe inclination, loop seal, pump etc.
The major results of the data and their evaluations from the
set of the seven American thermal mixing test facilities from
which data have been made public can be summarized as follows:
1. Despite of the wide range of possible flow conditions (density
difference ratios, volumetrie flow ratios, different injector
nozzles with respect to diameters, locations and orientations)
the degree of mixing between the hot primary coolant flow and
cold HPI flow is favourable high.
2. The presentation of the data in terms of the modified Froude-
number FrCL = QHPI /AcL / (gDCL ~ 5' /8HPI) 1/2 leads to
an unique functional relationship over a wide spectrum of the
density difference ratio, AS/SHPI, and differently sized and
oriented HPI injector nozzles. Fig. 2 /2,3/ demonstrates the
primary importance of FrCL for the case of the B&W vent valve
facility MIX1. All other experiments indicated the same
evidence concerning the controlling character of FrCL.
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3. Complete mixing occurs in the downcomer even for very low
large flow and steady-state fluid temperatures are close to
the ideal mixing temperature there. Fig. 3 /2,5/ indicates the
importance of the volumetrie flow"ratio, QL/QHPI' for the
temperature distributions in the cold leg and thus generally
also for downcomer and shows that the steady-state temper-
atures closely cluster around the curves for the ideal mixing
temperatures for water and salt solution conditions even for
changes in FrCL ranging from 0.025 to 0.075. It is evident
from this figure that for a given temperature difference bet-
ween hot primary and cold HPI flows, the temperatures at the
bottom of the cold leg approach the HPI-temperature with
decreasing volumetrie flow ratio. As can be seen, marked
deviations from the hot primary temperature occur only for low
values of QL/QHPI between 0 and 2, with 0 constituting the
limiting stagnant loop condition.
4 The characteristic time constant to reach final steady state
becomes larger for lower loop flow. The lower the cross-flow
effect by the loop flow on the HPI-jet the closer occurs the
mixing region at the HPI-nozzle.
5. Counter-current flow reversal of hot primary fluid enters the
top of the cold leg region in the direction of the HPI-nozzle
for low and stagnant loop flow conditions, enlarging the
transverse temperature difference between bottom and upper
cold leg regions. Under these conditions, the HPI-jet splits
at the bottom and leads to a recirculation pattern upstream.
6. 8maller diameter HPI-nozzles lead to increased mixing because
of higher momentum fluxes and jet reflections at the opposite
cold leg wall.
7. Under stagnant loop conditions the fluid temperature asympto-
tically approach the cold leg HPI temperature with time.
Gravity effects dominate the flow development and the result-
ant temperature transients have a very large time constant as
shown in Fig. 4 for a sample experiment of the MIX4 test
series /6/.
8. The cooldown process can be described in its most simplified
form by an exponential time function /6/ whose characteristic
time constant is reversely proportional to the volumetrie HPI-
flow and proportional to a volume factorT. The size of
volumes participating in the mixing processes differently
affect the cooldown transient.
9. Reynolds number non-similarities induced by strict Froude
number scaling in reduced-scale experiments or mixed scale
facilities such as HDR (see below) seem to be unimportant,
even for distortions as high as two orders of magnitude in the
respective Re-numbers.
The findings were found under the limiting constraints
listed for the American experimental facilities in Table I. Yet,
they constitute the data base on which together with the
analytical tools major decisions for the HDR test matrix were
made.
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OVERVIEW OF AMERICAN ANALYTICAL METHODS
FOR PREDICTING PTS THERMAL MIXING PHENOMENA
There are basically two sub-areas which can be identified in
classifying mthods for computing turbulent buoyant flow and
mixing phenomena. These are the methods by whih turbulent fluct-
uations are modeled and the way in which the spatial resolution
of the flow in the given geometry is handled. In practice both
aspects are coupled. With respect to the problem of turbulence
modeling one can differentiate among the following four classes
of methods:
1. Correlations giving nondimensional quantities as functions of
nondimensional numbers, such as Re, Fr, Gr, Nu. They are
extremely useful but limited especially where geometry affects
the fluid and mixing dynamics. New correlations are required
each time geometries are changed.
2. Integral methods consider equations (mostly those of class 3)
which have been integrated over at least one, mostly over
three coordinate directions. This greatly simplifies the
mathematical problem through reductions in the independent
variables. These methods allow extensive use of experimental
data and provide useful physical insights into major phenom-
ena. Their major drawback rests on the need for reformulations
and re-qualifications when new type of flow situations are to
be computed.
3. Reynolds-Averaged Equations work with averages of the
Navier-Stokes equations. The equations describing the mean
field contain averages of products of fluctuating velocities,
temperatures etc. The averaging procedure leads to fewer
equations than unknowns thereby posing the well-known closure
problems which necessitates the introduction of a more or less
sophisticated turbulence model.
4. Large Eddy Simulation uses equations which are averaged over a
small spatial region. This removes the small turbulent eddies
from the flow field so that an equation for the large eddies
is obtained. The effects of the former on the latter are then
modelIed.
With the exception of the TURBIT-code /22/ using subgrid scale
turbulence modeling with bnoyancy effects, none of the available
methods fall into class 4 methods. Despite of its proven capa-
bilities and highly scientific standard, TURBIT has not yet been
considered for any PTS-thermal mixing application, although it
has already demonstrated its value for a different HDR-mixing
situation in the downcomer. Its application as the highest-level
method available is highly recommended.
Correlations:
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Levels 1 and 2 are frequently termed engineering tools,
whereas levels 3 and 4 are certainly best-estimate methods.
Computations for the latter two levels are limited to
institutions with full access to very large, fast computer
facilities, preferably vector machines of CYBER-20S and CRAY
types.
Worth mentioning is that predictions performed on any level
stated above can be used to generate informations useful on the
lower level. The problem of treating the flow geometry contains
just two categories:
A. Field Methods use the same set of equations everywhere. No
matching is required in the flow interior. However, fine
meshes may be needed in some flow regions (boundaries, jet)
which make costs for the overall analysis extremely high
unlesss previsions are made to handle non-uniform meshes.
B. Zonal (Volume) Methods which consider a collection of
appropriate "modules" or volumes of the geometry under
consideration each of which may be treated by a separate level
of turbulence modeling, i.e. integral method or correlation
for some zones and full partial differential equations for
another. Different solutions in the various zones have to be
matched at common boundaries.
Needless to say that in implementing these major categories
into useable computer codes a multitude of problems and different
solutions arises especially for the combinations of field methods
with Reynolds-averaged equations in order to minimize artificial
mixing due to numerical diffusion and computational efforts.
The published analytical tools and available computer codes can
be classified as foliows:
Stratification criterium by Theofanous et al /18,
20/
Entrainment under stagnant loop flow by Sun, Oh
/18/
Transit time by Fanning, Rothe /6/
Entrainment with loop flow, Kim /16/
Correlation - Integral Method - Zonal Method
Buoyant jet injected into pipe flow by Kim /16/1
basis for the Battelle~Frankfurt code JETMIXI
steady-statel limited to cold leg
Mixing model for transient cooldown in cold leg
downcorner: with heat transfer to structures by Oh
et al /17/: basisfor the Battelle-Frankfurt code
VOLMIX for stagnant loop condition only.
Regional mixing model, RMM and REMIX-code by
Theofanous et al /19,20/, transient with heat
transfer to structures and one-dimensional heat
conduction in vessel wall.
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Reynolds-averaged equations and field methods
• transient, multidimensional code COMMIX-lA /8/ with
zero-equation turbulence model and cartesian
finite-difference mesh
extensions of COMMIX-lA with one-equation turbulence
model, fine mesh, slanted surface modeling etc. /11/
COMMIX-lB with two-equation turbulence model, with
parameters different from the original ones, volume or
mass-flow-weighted skew-upwind differencing scheme,
implicit difference scheme /10,12,13/ to reduce artifical
mixing due to numerical diffusion and allows use for
larger mesh sizes to model the plant geometry
transient, multidimensional code TEMPEST /9/1 treats
incompressibie flow, numerically very effective1 needs
matching conditions at interface between cold leg and
downcomer1 accommodates effectively very fine meshes
transient, multidimensional code SOLA-PTS /14,15/ with 2-
and 3-equations turbulence models applied selectively,
uses the original parameters, differencing scheme of 2nd
order accuracy, use of tensor-viscosity method and Filter-
ing Remedy and Methodology, FRAM, to suppress numerical
dispersion, solves the conjugated convection/conduction
problem without resorting to heat transfer coefficients,
multi-loop capability, partly vectorized for CRAY
This variety of analytical tools provides a broad basis to
choose from to decide upon the best suited method and approach
for the solution of a given problem.
All published numerical calculations are the results of
post-test calculations, thus far. Fig. 5 shows a comparison
between experimental data, the results of the two best-estimate
transient codes COMMIX-lA and SOLA-PTS (TEMPEST results are of
the same quality /9/) as weIl as the result from the steady-state
engineering model JETMIX. Both multidimensional codes show
excellent agreement with the data for the bottom cold leg temper-
ature near the nozzle exit into the downcomer. But also JETMIX
shows a surprisingly close agreement after the initial cooldown
transient phase despite of its simplicity. Wheras PTS-thermal
mixing behaviors with finite loop flows are feasable tobe
calculated with multidimensional codes, the lower the loop flow
is the higher the computational expenses get because of the
increase in time constants of these flows. Thus, best-estimate,
multidimensional calculations for stagnant loop condition are
only feasible for a limited time span of total problem time and
can only be applied for a very limited number of test con-
ditions. Thus, for this most important problem, engineering
methods such as EPRI's /17/, Battelle's VOLMIX or Purdue's REMIX
/19,20/ are of outmost importance and the only economic tool in
the long run.
Fig. 6 demonstrates that integral-zonal methods, such as for
instance VOLMIX /17/ are able to perfectly match the long-term
transient cooldown data once the empirical correlations and the
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fractions of participating volumes have been established by
appropriate tuning of the input parameters. Once tuned, it is not
known yet how powerful these methods really are to forecast re-
sults with the same quality in a different facility and under
changed circumstances. It is thought that higher level field
methods should have a clear edge versus the lower level-zonal
methods in these new situations. To clarify these open points,
all of these methods will be challenged by true pre-test pre-
dictions for the HDR-TEMB experiments.
PLANNING THE HDR THERMAL MIXING TESTS TEMB
Whereas the American test facilities described above have
been developed on the basis of strict geometrie and Froude number
scaling right at the start of the planning stage, the HDR-
facility as shown in Fig. 7 as an already existing integral
large-scaled plant does not comply with the principle of geo-
metrical similarity as compared to real plants. The downcorner gap
width is about half that of the original plant, whereas the cold
leg diameter is only about one-forth. With these distortions in
mind, the TEMB-experiments are solely planned for strict Froude
number scaling. In fact, as shown by the American data, non-
similarities in the Re-numbers should not greatly affect the
major objective of the HDR-experiments because, as Fig. 8 demon-
strates, they concentrate mainly on low volumetrie flow ratios
and stagnant conditions anyhow.
As compared to American test sections reviewed above, the
HDR offers the following advantages:
1) Complete three-dimensional downcorner instead of the planar 900
sections used elsewhere
2) High system pressure of 11 MPa and thus high, realistic cold
leg temperature of 3000 C with HPI-temperatures of 200C result
in the most extreme density difference ratios of 0,29 employed
thus far, without resorting to salt solution technique
3) Participating heat conducting structures such as RPW-wall with
a thickness of 105 mm and a cladding of about 8 mm closely
resemble those of real plants
4) The installed core barrel though not correctly scaled in its
thickness provides a correct thermal boundary opposite to the
RPV-inside surface.
5) The 3-D HDR downcorner is naturally connected to the lower
plenum, which in turn is coupled with the 3-D core region.
6) Prior to the initiation of the HPI-injection uniform or
axially varying temperature gradients in the core and
downcorner regions can be installed simulating as close as
possible realistic PWR conditions.
7) Provisions are made to test multi-loop conditions with the
D2-nozzle operating.
8) Constant supply experiments (mass flows and temperatures) as
weIl as transient mass flows and temperatures for cold leg
and/or HPI flows can be performed at the HDR
9) Besides of the thermal-hydraulic aspects discussed above, the
HDR-facility allows to study structural and fracture behaviors
at the same time in one and the same experimental facility
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with true 3-D thermal-fluiddynamic and structural shell
characteristics under nearly realistic system pressure con-
ditions. In this combination, the HDR ist unique.
This first test series of about 30 experiments is planned
with constant supply fluid boundary conditions. As shown in Fig.
7 three different injector nozzles with the same sizes but dif-
ferent orientations and axial locations will be employed. As
Fig. 8 demonstrates emphasis will be placed en low volumtric flow
ratios and stagnant loop conditions. FrCL will range between
0.00625 an 0.22 with emphasis on 0.05 with AS/&HPI in the range
between 0.08 and 0.29 with major emphasis on the latter. This
HDR-test matrix covers and extends the American test bed as Fig.
8 amplifies.
Measurement techniques /21/ rest on the reliable and tested
sensors which proved excellent in a variety of previous HDR-
experiments. Fluid and wall temperatures across and along the
flow paths as well as strains will be measured. Velocities in the
cold leg and downcomer (7) will be determined by means of
temperature fluctuation correlation. Altogether 90 sensors will
be installed.
A preliminary set of two experiments (OL/OHPI = 2 and 0)
will be performed at the end of November 1984 prior to the RPV-I
experiments in order test facility operation, measurement tech-
niques, data acquisition and reduction procedure as well as to
check the validity of the analytical methods in true pre-test
predictions early on in order to plan the main test series to be
performed in spring 1985 with greater confidence.
Fig. 9 compares SOLA-PTS and VOLMIX pre-test results down-
stream of the HPI-injection for the stagnant loop experiments
early into the transient cooldown. Despite of the 200C HPI-
temperature the opposite cold leg wall experiences a temperature
drop of only 1000C down to 2000C from 3000C hot primary fluid
within the first second. Afterwords a much slower decay sets on.
VOLMIX on the other hand cannot deliver the details of transverse
temperature distributions but fairs favorably overall given its
simplifications and may very well follow the averaged data trend
in the long run.
It is felt, that with the aforementioned features and the
broad analytical scope, the forthcoming HDR thermal mixing tests
will add and supplement the informations obtained from the
American model tests, thus far and will forster the international
cooperation in reactor safety research.
Facility Characteristics Test Parameters
Qpr1m/QHPI Temperature Froude-Number
Name Flow Facility Pressure Range Center Dens.Ratio HPI ( Cl Prim. ( Cl Range Center
M1x1 1/5 Vent Valve FlolII Bend. Cold Leg Atmosph. 0.0 - 20. 5. .02 (.20) 21 65 .0iD - .200 .050
M1x2 1/5 H1gh Loop FlolII Hor1z.Cold Leg Atmosph. 2.0 - 50. 10. .02 (.20) 18 65 .020 - .300 .050
M1x3 1/5 LOIII Loop FlolII Thermal Shlld Atmosph. 0.0 - 10. 1.-5. .02 (.16) 21 65 .025 - .075 .050
M1x4 1/5 Stagn.Loop FlolII LOlller Plenum Atmosph. 0.0 0.0 .02, .16 16 65 .015 - .050 .050
SAI 1/1 Loop FlolII Box Sharpe C.L. Atmosph. 0.6 - 10.7 - .OOB - .02 13.- 26. 40.- 70. .040 - .070 -
B&W 1/10 Vent Valve FlolII Box Sharpe C. L. Atmosph. 1.0-4.4 - .03 6 79 .070 - .170 -
Purd.1/2 Vent Val.! Loop LOlller Plenum Atmosph. 0.0 0.0 .09 15 15 .013, .026 -
-'
CREA.1/2 Vent Val.! Loop Steel-Fac111ty 15 bar 0.0 - 15. 0.- 5. .034, .124 27 95 - 195 .025 - .075 .050
HDR LOIII Loop FlolII Steel-Fac1l1ty 110 bar 0.0 - 15. 0.- 2. . OB - .284 20 300 . .006 - .220 .050
PWR Vent Val.! Loop Steel-Fac1l1ty 110 bar 0.0 - 200. - .284 20 300 .
.050 -
Table 1: Comparison of Facilities and Operation Conditions
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CANDU LOCA ANALYSIS WITH LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER
TO MEET LWR ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA AS APPLIED IN JAPAN
J.Q. Howieson, L.J. Watt, S.D. Grant,
P.G. Hawley, S. Girgis
Atomic Energy of Canada Limited
CANDU Operations
Sheridan Park Research Community
Mississauga, Ontario, Canada L5K IB2
ABSTRACT
The reference CANDU 600, designed under Canadian licensing criteria,
has been evaluated for LüCA, under LWR acceptance criteria as
applied in Japan. Offsite power is assumed unavailable following a
LOCA and reactor trip. .
We show that the 1200°C peak cladding temperature criterion can be
met with modest changes to the mechanical shutoff rods. The second
shutdown system (poison injection), meets the temperature criterion
without change. To speed core refill in the absence of forced cir-
culation, the ECC system uses a directed injection to the unbroken
end of the core.
Other inherent CANDU safety features such as the availablity of the
moderator as a heat sink for LüCA without ECC injection, are
retained.
INTRODUCTION
A safety assessment is being done to investigate the feasibililty of
introducing the CANDU reactor to Japan. This paper reports part of that
assessment which concerns large loss of coolant accident (LOCA) analysis of a
CANDU 600 reactor. This is the single-unit 600 MW(e) model which is operating
in Canada and other countries. Reference.l describes the reference CANDU 600
and the overall safety assessment to meet Japanese licensing regulations.
They have evolved primarily from experience with light water reactor (LWR)
design and operation. The following assumptions derived from these
regulations are made:
i) the reactor iso tripped by mechanical shutoff rods
ii) offsite power is lost at the time of reactor trip
iii) the most effective shutoff rod does not drop
iv) the first reactor trip signal is credited
v) a second shutdown system, poison injection, is not credited.
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A key requirement is that, under these assumptions, the peak cladding
temperature (PCT) must not exceed l200°C.
In Canada, the regulatory agency (the Atomic Energy Control Board)
specifies dose limits for accident analysis. Canadian licensing regulations
do not have a PCT limit - sheath oxidation is evaluated using a physically-
based model. Offsite power is assumed available normally. However, a range
of system impairments is also examined from loss of offsite power to a
complete loss of emergency core cooling (ECC) supply. The reactor is tripped
on the second trip signal of the least effective shutdown system. When that
is the mechanical shutoff rods, the two most effective rods are assumed not to
drop. This report shows how the key Japanese requirements for LOCA analysis
are met, by discussing:
general system response to a large LOCA in CANDU 600
predictions of PCT in a large LOCA
predictions of core refill by the ECC system.
This report considers two representative break locations - the reactor
inlet header (RIH) and the reactor outlet header (ROH). Breaks at other loca-
tions would behave similarly to one or the other case. The approximate break
size in each break location which leads to the highest PCT is identified.
Then the thermalhydraulics and fuel analysis is described for the highest PCT
case. Longer term analysis is described to show the capability of the ECC
system to provide timely refill (within 3 minutes) of the core.
GENERAL SYSTEM RESPONSE TO A LARGE LOCA IN CANDU 600
In this section, the general system behaviour is described for large LOCA
transients. Events are described in chronological order.
CANDU 600 has two loops with only a small connection between loops. A
large break in the primary heat transport (PHT) system causes rapid
depressurization of the broken loop. The u~broken loop depressurizes slowly
aso it loses coolant to the broken loop.
Each PHT loop has two core passes. In the broken loop, the core pass
nominally downstream of the break location sees reduced flows, and therefore
voids quickly. The increase in coolant void tends to raise the reactor power.
The reactor is then tripped, usually within one second of the break. In the
accident analysis for the Japan-CANDU, a loss of offsite power is assumed to
occur when the reactor trips.
The broken loop pressure continues to drop as coolant discharges out the
break. Also, the pressure in the containment building rises due to the cool-
ant discharge. When the combination of low PHT pressure and high containment
pressure both reach their respective setpoints, the LOCA signal is generated.
The LOCA signal initiates three main safety actions:
i) isolates the pressurizer, inventory make-up, and the unbroken loop from
the broken loop,
ii) opens the main steam safety valves (MSSV), and
iii) opens the high pressure ECC isolating valves.
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The LOCA signal isolates the two loops early enough that the unbroken
loop inventory remains high (~ 100% of initial, due to pressurizer make-up).
Therefore, fuel eooling is maintained in that loop.
The MSSV's are opened to eause a rapid depressurization of the boiler
seeondary side. For a large LOCA, this helps to limit the extent to whieh the
boilers are a heat souree to the PHT fluid. For a small LOCA, this is the
major faetor in the broken loop depressurization.
The ECC isolating valves are opened to permit core refill. The first ECC
stage eonsists of high pressure aeeumulator injeetion. ECC injeetion is into
to the headers (RIH/ROH), and flows through the eireuit to the break.
BROKEN LOOP TIlERMALHYDRAULICS FüR PCT
The broken loop thermalhydraulies are simulated with a homogeneous two-
phase model whieh has been modified to inelude eorrelations for slip and
drift [2]. The CANDU 600 has 95 parallel fuel ehannels per eore pass - these
are represented by a single hydraulieally averaged ehannel.
A detailed three-dimensional finite differenee reaetor physies code is
used to generate the reaetor power transient [3]. Power transients are
generated for the voided-half eore (broken loop side), the highest powered
ehannel, and the highest powered bundle (Figure 1). These are used as
boundary eonditions for the thermalhydraulies ealeulations. The seeond
shutdown system (which is even more effeetive than the first) is not
eredited.
VOIDED HALF CORE
HOT CHANNEL
HOT BUNDLE
10.
5.
2.
a: 1.0
w
~ 0.50
"-
0
w
!:i 0.2
'"
"a: 0.10
Z
0.05
0,02
0.01
0.1 0.2
\
~.
0.5 1.0 2. 5.
TIME AFTER LOCA (s)
10. 20. 50.
FIGURE 1 POWER TRANSIENTS FOR 90% ROH BREAK
Following the break (taken as a 90% ROH break), the sequence of events
is:
the broken loop pressure deereases rapidly
eoolant void in the eore immediately downstream of the break inereases
eausing an inerease in reaetor power
the reaetor is tripped at 0.5 seeonds on high log rate power
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at reactor trip, offsite power is assumed lost which causes 10ss of power
to the PHT pumps and secondary side feed water pumps
the LOCA signal occurs at 1 second - the ECC valves start to open
the pressurizer beg ins to isolate at 3 seconds
the boiler secondary side cooldown starts at 11 seconds (there is a
designed 10 second delay before the valves are opened)
by 15 seconds ECC water starts flowing into the broken loop
CHANNEL 1HER}~LHYDRAULICS FOR PCT
The transient header pressures of the core pass downstream of the break
are used as boundary conditions for a single channel simulation. A channel
with the highest integrated reactor power during the large LOCA is chosen.
The PCT is determined for the hottest fuel element in the hot channel. The
channel and element power transients are shown in Figure 1.
Figure 2 shows the hot channel flow for selected ROH break sizes. Breaks
of an area equal to about a 90% ROH cause the lowest flows. For RIH breaks,
the 15% break size causes the lower flow than either a 10% RIH break or a 20%
RIH break. The ROH break which leads to low channel flows is larger in area
than the comparable RIH break. This is because of the added resistance to
back flow (from the downstream core pass to the break for an ROH break) due to
the PHT pump and boiler.
-- 80% ROH BREAK
- - - 90% ROH BREAK
5. 10. 15,
TIME AFTER LOCA (s)
20. 25. 30
FIGURE 2 HOT CHANNEL FLOW FOR ROH BREAKS
The resulting convective heat transfer coefficient from the hot element
clad to the coolant (Figure 3) is small. Even so, about 100 kJ/kg or 2 full
power seconds (FPS*) is removed by the coolant in the first 20 seconds.
* For peak-rated CANDU fuel, 1 FPS is equivalent to about 50 kJ/kg or about
100°C on PCT.
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FUEL RESPONSE' FOR PCT
The PCT is determined by the energy in the fuel initially, and energy added
and lOSt in transient. The energy in the hot element (linear rating of 58.5
KW/m) during a large LOCA is at most:
initial stored energy of 315 kJ/kg (average element temperature 1070·C)
power transient adds 175 kJ/kg (3.5 FPS)
convection heat transfer to the coolant subtracts 100 kJ/kg (2 FPS)
radiation heat transfer to the pressure tube subtracts 50 kJ/kg (1 FPS)
sheath-coolant (metal-water) reaction adds 15 kJ/kg (0.3 FPS)
Fue1 calculations for PCT incorporate the above major components.
Radiation heat transfer is calculated using a two-dimensional (R-0) fuel
bundle segment model coupled to a thermal radiation model describing heat
exchange among the fuel elements and pressure tube. Pressure tube strain and
heat transfer to the moderator in the event of pressure tube/calandria tube
contact are also modelled.
The thermal radiation model calculates the interchange of thermal
radiation among surfaces using the method of Sparrow and Cess [4]. Thermal
radiation from the pressure tube to the calandria tube is calculated
throughout the simulation. The Baker and Just correlation [5] is used to
calculate the heat generated by the metal-water reaction. The gap heat
transfer coefficient between the fuel and the sheath is constant throughout
the simulation. The Hobson and Taylor [6] correlation for UO
z
thermal
conductivity is used.
Boundary conditions for radiation heat transfer and convective heat
transfer (from the channel thermalhydraulics calculation) are next used as
input to the final PCT calculation.
The ELOCA-MK2 version of the ELOCA [7] computer code is used to simulate
fuel element thermal-mechanical behaviour during high temperature transients.
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A single fue1 element is considered and axi-symmetric properties are assumed.
The fue1 mode11ing inc1udes diametral sheath strain, a dynamic fue1-to-sheath
heat transfer coefficient, and the effects of the metal-water reaction on heat
generation (Baker-Just). MATPR09 [8] U0 2 material properties are used.
Initial conditions (for the 58.5 kW/m element) are supp1ied by the steady
state fue1 performance code ELESIM [9].
The sheath temperature transient for the se1ected ROH break sizes is
shown in Figure 4. The highest PCT of all is 1150·C for the 90% ROH break.
The PCT for the 80% ROH break and 100% ROH break is 1090·C and 1110·C
respective1y.
For RIH breaks, the highest PCT of all is 1140·c for the 15% RIH break.
1200-y--------------------,
1000
~ 800
w
a:
::>
~
ffi
a. 800~ --- 80,," ROH BREAK
_. - 90"" ROH BREAK
---- 100,," ROH BREAK
400
2520
200+----,-----,-----,---,..----1
o 10 15
TIME AFTER LOCA (s)
FIGURE 4 HOT ELEMENT SHEATH TEMPERATURE FOR ROH BREAKS
DIRECTED ECC INJECTION FOR CORE REFILL
For the reference CANDU 600 design, in the event of a LOCA with offsite
power avai1ab1e, ECC injection into all headers is effective refi11ing the
core for all 1arge breaks in 1ess than 3 minutes. To ensure optimum use of
emergency core coo1ant, for LOCA with an assumed 10ss of offsite power, the
CANDU design for Japan has a directed injection system for 1arge breaks. The
emergency coolant is injected on1y into the headers at the "unbroken" end of
the core.
The directed ECC injection system has a signal parameter separate from
the LOCA signal. The signal is used to detect the break 10cation before the
LOCA signal is received.
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Figure 5 shows the break deteetion logie. The break deteetion logie
eontinuously looks for a differenee in the header-to-header pressure drops of
the eore passes. Normally this differenee is essentially zero. Immediately
after a LOCA, the upstream eore pass header-to-header pressure drop inereases
and the downstream eore pass pressure drop deereases. The differenee beeomes
positive or negative depending on break loeation.
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FIGURE 5 BREAK DETECTION LOG1C
The break deteetion trip setpoint is chosen so that breaks down to the
equivalent area of a eouple of feeder pipes would initiate direeted ECC
injeetion. For smaller breaks, adefault to all-header injeetion and
all-boiler cooldown (which is adequate for small break sizes) is used.
Onee tripped, and the break loeation identified, the logie waits for the
LOCA signal. When that happens, the direeted ECC injeetion works by:
i) injeetion of water into the "unbroken" end of the eore
ii) bloeking the seeondary side cooldown of the boiler between the points of
injeetion.
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A large ROH break with loss of offsi te power is used to illustrate eore
refill with direeted ECC injeetion. The eore pass downstream of the break
initially has little or no header-to-header pressure drop after blowdown. The
direeted ECC injeetion raises the header pressures on the unbroken end of the
core relative to the broken end, and forees both eore passes to refill
towards the break. This is in the positive direetion for the upstream eore
pass, and negative direetion for the downstream eore pass.
For a RIH break, the seheme reinforces the refill direetion sinee the
downstream pass refills in thenegative direetion even without direeted ECC,
due to the loeation of the break.
Figure 6 shows results from an 80% ROH break transient.
eore pass refills relatively quiekly within 70 seeonds of the
upstream eore pass refills within 130 seeonds of the break.
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FIGURE 6 80% ROH BREAK REFILl MAPS
The boiler between the points of injeetion stays hot sinee the boiler
depressurization is b10eked. This allows little primary flow through that
boiler - most ECC water prefers to go through the downstream eore pass. The
small amount of fluid that does go over the hot boiler mixes with cool
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incoming ECC at the upstream core pass RIH. The warmer incoming water causes
the upstream pass to refill slower. However, the fuel is always weIl cooled
by large two-phase flows during the transient, because the pressure drop is so
high across the upstream core pass.
The transient header pressures of the downstream pass are used in a
channel model to assess two individual channel refill times: a high power
channel, and an orificed, high elevation channel. The high power channel
has the highest internal stored heat. The orificed, high elevation channel
has the highest geometrical resistance to flow.
The refill times for these channels are 88 and 67 seconds, the high
powered channel being quicker. Although at steady state the channels are
designed to give the same exit quality, in the LOCA transient, the higher
resistance due to the orifice is more important for refill than the effect of
channel power.
CONCLUSION
For large loss-of-coolant accident analysis, the 12000C peak fuel
cladding temperature criterion is met for CANDU 600. In addition, timely core
refill is obtained in the absence of forced circulation by a directed ECC
injection system.
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AN ASSESSMENT OF APPENDIX K CONSERVATISM ~OR LARGE BREAK LOCA
IN A WESTINGHOUSE PWR*
U. S. Rohatgi, C. Yuelys-Miksis and P. Saha
Department of Nuclear Energy
Brookhaven National Laboratory
Upton, New York 11973, U.S.A.
ABSTRACT
A 200% cold leg break accident in a Westinghouse four-Ioop RESAR-3S
plant has been analyzed using the best-estimate code TRAC-PD2/MODl.
Two TRAC calculations, one with the best-estimate or realistic ini-
tial and boundary conditions, and the other with the licensing condi-
tions, have been performed. These calculations produced the peak
cladding temperatures of 800 0 K and 1072°K, respectively. Comparison
of these resul ts with the Wes tinghouse licensing calculations per-
formed in accordance with the Appendix K rule, shows an overall safe-
ty margin of 664°K, of which 272°K is due to the conservative initial
and boundary conditions and 392°K is due to the conservative physical
models.
INTRODUCTION
This study was undertaken to estimate the conservatism due to the licens-
ing or evaluation models for various thermohydraulic processes and fuel behav-
ior, boundary and initial conditions, and transient scenarios. These were
prescribed by the U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission in. Appendix K of 10CFRSO
for the prediction of peak clad temperatures in large and small break LOCA and
were based on the understanding of two-phase thermohydraulics and fuel behavior
in the early seventies. Significant progress has been made in the knowledge of
twophase flow and fuel behavior since then and the current best-estimate model1
are quite different from those described in Appendix K. The TRAC-PD2/MODl
code was selected for this study as it was the most assessed best-estimate
large break LOCA code available at this time. This code was applied to a
Westinghouse RESAR-3S four-Ioop plant for the analysis of a 200% cold leg
break.
The first task in this study was to determine the sensitivity of the peak
clad temperature to the nodalization and fuel models. This was accomplished by
performing various best-estimate calculations, one of which was finally select-
ed as the benchmark BNL. best-estimatecalculation. Westinghouse supplied a
licensing calculation for RESAR-3S plants taking into account all of the
evaluation models, boundary and initial conditions, and scenarios prescribed in
Appendix K. The Reactor Coolant Pumps (RCPs) were tripped in the Westinghouse
calculations, while they were kept running in the best-estimate calculation.
These two calculations provided the lower, i.e., best-estimate, and the upper,
Le., Appendix K, limits for the' peak clad temperature and clad temperature
histories during tqe accident.
*This work was performed under the auspices of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission.
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Besides these two bounding calculations, an intermediate calculation was
performed at BNL with the TRAC-PD2/MOD1 code (best-estimate models), but using
the evaluation or licensing type initial and boundary conditions and transient
scenario used in the Hestinghouse licensing calculation. In subsequent
sections, two BNL calculations will be described in detail.
NODALIZATION
A RESAR-3S plant was modeled with TRAC-PD2/MOD1 with 556 one-dimensional
nodes in four loopsand a three-dimensional VESSEL with 224 cells as shown in
Figure 1. The inner 8 cells from the top of Level 3 to the top of Level 8
represented the core. Each of these cells contained an average rod and an
additional hot rod. The average rods had the same axial power peaking but
different radial peaking. The models for each loop contained a cold leg, a
reactor coolant pump (RCP), a steam generator (SG), a hot leg, and a TEE
component connected to safety injection FILLS and accumulator component. The
pressurizer was connected to Loop 2. At the time of LBLOCA, the cold leg of
Loop 4 was replaced by two pipe sections with BREAK models. TRAC-PD2/MOD1,
uses a numericalor self choking model which requires fine nodalizations near
the breaks. The containment pressure was supplied as a boundary condition at
the BREAK components. This nodalization was arrived at after several
calculations and represents the minimum amount of details needed without
sacrificing accuracy.
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Figure 1 Nodalization in the VESSEL Component
BEST-ESTIMATE (BE) CALCULATION
The first calculation performed with TRAC-PD2/MOD1 was
probable boundary and operating conditions as shown in Table
system performed as designed. The AC power was available
transient.
with the most
1. The safety
throughout the
Figure 2 shows the sys tem pressure as predicted by the code. Ini tially
the system pressure rapidly decreased to saturation pressure due to subcooled
blowdown; thereafter, the rate of pressure change slowed down due to choking at
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the breaks. At approximately 2.5 seconds, the rate of pressure change
decreased again as the vapor generation in the core increased due to flow
oscillation at the core inlet as shown in Figure 3. Initially the flow also
reversed at the core inlet due to the breaks, but as the break flow decreased
below the net cold leg flows, the flow into the core was re-established,
enhancing the vapor generation in the core. At approximately 20 seconds the
system pressure was close to the containment pressure, indicating the end of
the blowdown phase.
Table 1 Comparison of BE and EM Conditions and Scenario
Appendix K/lOCFR50
Operating Conditlons
1) Gore Power, 1,02 of
licensed power.
2) Fuel aud clad proper-
ties as functions of
temperature aud other
applicable time de-
pendent variables.
3) Peaking faetar should
be realistic.
4) Decay power J 120% of
1971 ANS.
Boundary Caudi tians
1) Containment pressure
should be conservative
aud should account for
all pressure reducing
devices.
2) Single failure cri-
terion for ECC system
requires that at least
Que equipment with
worst effeet should be
considered.
BE!TRAC-PD2
Licensed power.
Considered
Host probable values
during fuel cyc1e.
100% Of 1979 ANS.
Rea1istic containment
pressure history con-
sidered.
Not considered.
EH! TRAC-PD2
1.02 Licensed Power
Considered
Beginning of fue1
cyc1e.
120% of 1971 ANS.
Host conservative
pressure history
considered.
Disabling one
diesel generator
resu1ts in 10ss
of one HP! pump
(Safety injection)
and one LPI pump
(residual heat re-
mova1). This re-
duces the amount of
net injection to
all the loops.
1) RCP pump will have
locked rotor.
2) Delay in restarting
the safety injection
pumps after the safety
injection signal 1s
activated.
Pump on. Pump coasting down.
1.5 sec for LPI pumps. 25 sec for all
6.5 sec for HPI pumps. pumps.
Figure 4 shows the clad surface temperatures at four axial locations for
the hot rod. There are two temperature peaks in the blowdown phase. The first
peak of 800 0 K at 2.5 seconds represents the peak clad temperature for the
transient. This peak occurred when the initial clad heat up due to flow
stagnation was quenched when the flow at the core inlet was restored as shown
in Figure 3. The second clad heat up was quenched when the flow reversed at
the core outlet generating the second peak. All of the axial locations were
quenched by 45 seconds. Figure 5 shows the liquid fraction in the core, which
increased rapidly during the reflood phase (time> 39 seconds). At the time of
quenching the liquid fraction was around 35%.
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Figure 2 System Pressure in the Best-Estimate Calculation.
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Figure 3 Core Inlet Liquid Mass Flow Rate For Best-Estimate Calculation.
The sequence of these and other events during the transient have been
summarized in Table 2. The accumulators started the water injection at 10.5
seconds while the safety injections started at 2.5 to 7.6 seconds due to
thebuilt-in delay of 1.5 to 6.5 seconds in their initiation. The lower plenum
was full (95%) at 39 seconds indicating the end of refill and the beginning of
the reflood phase.
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Figure 4 C1ad Surface Temperatures for Hot Rods in BE Ca1cu1ation.
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Figure 5 Compar:l.son of Core Liquid Vo1ume Fractions in Two BNL Ca1cu1ations.
EVALUATION MODEL (EM) TYPE CALCULATION
The second BNL ca1cu1ation with TRAC-PD2/110D1 was performed using the
licensing type boundary and operating conditions as shown in Tab1e 1. The
single fai1ure criterion as prescribed in Appendix K was satisfied by
e1iminating one of the two safety injection trains. Furthermore, the 10ss of
AC power was also assumed which resu1ted in tripping the RCPs. Initia11y the
core power was 102% of the licensed power, while the decay power was 120% of
the ANS 1971 Standard.This ca1cu1ation consisted of best-estimate models, but
evaluation model type (licensing) boundary and operating conditions.
Therefore, it is ca11ed the Evaluation Model (EM) type ca1cu1ation.
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The nodalization in this calculation was the same as in the previous
best-estimate calculation. However, there were some changes in the placement
of the rods and their radial peakings. Appendix K requiresat least two chan-
nel analysis, oue of which should be the hot channel and the hot rod should be
placed there. This requirement was satisfied by designating ane of the inner
quadrants as the hot channel as shown in Figure 6. The average rod in this
quadrant had the highest radial peaking (1.38). The hot rods in the other in-
ner quadrants have the same power density. This arrangement brought the condi-
tions in this calculation closer to the Westinghouse licensing calculation2,3.
Table 2 Comparison of Sequence of Events for BE and EH Calculations
EVENTS TIHE (9)
BE/BNL EH/BNL
I, Break 0.0 0.0
2. Safety Injection Signal Generated. 1,1 5.1
3. Broken Loop Accumulator Injection 2.2 N/A
4. lotaet Loop Accumulator Injection 10.5 11,3
5. Pressurizer Empties (Water Level< 0.005 m) 16 17.5
6. Safety Injection (Charging, Residual Reat
Removal , High Head Safety Injection). 2.6 to 7.6 30.1
7. Lower Plenum Refilled (Liquid Fraction 0.95)
and Beginning of Reflood. 39 48.5
8. Peak Clad Temperature. 2.5 65
9. Accumulator Empty. Did Not 86.5
10. Quenching of Hot Spots Begins 44 244
TRACNOOINGSCHEMEFORPWRVESSEL
(TOPVIEW)
HOT LEG HOT lEG
COLD
LEG
CORE
BOU!;ClARY
COLD
LEG
LOOP2(BroKeilloop)
HOT
CHA'INEl
Figure 6 Vessel Cross Section for EM Calculation
Figures 7 and 8 show the rod surface temperatures at four axial locations
for the hot rods in the hot channel and an adjacent channel. The peak clad
temperatures for both rods occurred in the reflood phase and the highest clad
temperature of 1072°K occurred for the hot channel rod at 65 seconds. The
peaks in the blowdown phase were relatively smaller and were governed by the
core inlet and outlet flows as were explained earlier for the BE calculation.
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All the rods were either quenched or close to quenching by 270 seconds. The
long duration between the timings of PCT and quenching was due to smaller
safety injection and accumulator flows, and because they together were of the
same order of magnitude as the break flows. The hot channel did affect the
clad temperature his tory as can be seen from Figures 7 and 8. The difference
between the PCT of the hot channel and the other channels in the blowdown phase
was of the order of 50 o K, and in the reflood phase it varied from 20 0 K to
lOOoK.
HOT CHANNEL RODS, CHÄNNEl 1
E~RLUATION MODEL TRANSmiT IBHl
HOT ROD
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100,0 _ .._~
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300.0-1",.:-,-"",--,,,,...:-,-,.,,~.,.,.......:.""'-,.'-.,-_--1
TIME (51
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Figure 7 Clad Surface Temperatures For Hot Rod in Hot Channel For
EM Calculation.
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Figure 8 Clad Surface Temperatures for Hot Rod in Other Channel
in EM Calculation.
The timings of the sequence of events for this calculation are summarized
in Table 2. The safety injections came on quite late due to the assumption of
25 seconds delay in starting the diesel generators. The lower plenum was full
by 48.5 seconds and the reflood phase began. The core liquid fraction as shown
in Figure 5 was increasing at the termination of calculation indicating that
the core was in the process of complete quenching.
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DISCUSSION
The best-estimate (BE) calculation was performed with the best-estimate
code (TRAC-PD2/MODl) and with all safety systems working as designed. The
evaluation model (EM) type calculation was performed with licensing type
boundary and operating conditions but with the best-estimate code. Besides
these two calculations, results of a third calculation performed by
Westinghouse 3 with licensing or evaluation model type boundary and operating
conditions and physical models were also available. The clad temperatures for
these three calculations have been compared in Figure 9.
HOT PIt~ TEMPERATURE RESA R·JS
PEAKCLAO
TEMPERATURE,'r
WE5T1NGHOUSE 217:; ZOOu,
BElBNL 991,:; l.5!!e
EM/BNl 1470 65 '~e
li 1200
~
~ 1000 I~ .-"
tl f \~~i'- -'"
800 f\
! i"v I
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'--~.- .-..........,
TlME,n<
Figure 9 Comparison of Clad Temperature for Hot Rods for Westinghouse
and Two BNL Calculations.
A comparison between the Westinghouse and the BNL BE calculations indi-
cates that the licensing or Appendix K requirements contribute to a conserva-
tism of 664°K in the PCT prediction. A comparison of the EM type calculation
with these two bounding calculations indicates that the licensing type operat-
ing and boundary conditions and scenarios are responsible for 272°K conserva-
tism in PCT while Appendix K required physical models contribute about 392°K to
the conservatism of PCT estimation. The peak clad temperature in the best-
estimate calculation occurred very early in the transient, and was not affected
by the ECC system. On the other hand, the ECC system did affect the other two
calculations.
CONCLUSIONS
This study indicates that there is a large safety margin in the licens{ng
or Appendix K requirements and most contribution is due to the required physi-
cal models such as subtraction of safety injection fluid collected during the
blowdown phase from coolant inventory and restriction on return of nucleate
boiling or transition regime in the core before the reflood phase, etc. Fur-
thermore, a hot channel analysis is conservative, and if licensing type calcu-
lations are to be performed with TRAC, then one of the quadrants should repre-
sent a hot channel.
365
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
The authors gratefully acknowledge the valuable assistance and advice
provided by Dr. Fuat Odar of USNRC, D. R. Hochreiter and Mr. R. Kemper of
Westinghouse Electric Co., and Dr. K. Wi1liams of LANL in performing this
study. The typing of, Ms. A. Fort is genuinely appreciated.
REFERENCES
1. Liles, D. R. et. a1. , "TRAC-PD2, An Advanced Best Estimate Computer Program
for Pressurized Water Reactor Loss-of-Coolant Accident Analysis," USNRC
Report, NUREO/CR-2054, 1981.
2. Kemper, R., Private Communication.
3. Fujita, R. K, et. a1. , "Comparison Between a Most-Probable and a Licensing
Calculation of a 200% LOCA in a Four Loop 17 x 17 Westinghouse PWR,"
National Heat Transfer Conference, Niagara Falls, NY, August 5-8, 1983.
366
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ABSTRACT
A model, calIed TIlER}IDSS, is developed to compute the duration üf
stagnation in a CANDU reactor fuel channel with subcooled, stagnant
initial conditions. The model solves, in closed form, the one
dimensional, two-fluid conservation equations. In the computation
of the duration of stagnation, the channel water level is an
important intermediate variable because it determines the amount of
steam production. A feature of the model is that water level is
determined by a momentum balance between frictional pressure drop in
the steam phase and hydrostatic head in the liquid phase. This is
in contrast to an earlier model in which the level was determined
from mass balance considerations. A satisfactory agreement between
the predicted and experimentally observed channel water level and
duration of stagnation is obtained.
INTRODUCTION
Following a postulated break in the CANDU reactor, emergency coolant is
injected to refill the horizontal fuel channels and remove the decay heat. As
part of the accident analysis, the effects of loss of forced circulation
during the accident are predicted. A break size exists for which, at the end
of.pump rundown, the break force balances the natural circulation force and
the channel flow is reduced to near zero. This subcooled, stagnant channel
condition is referred to as the standing-start initial condition.
The sequence of events that follows this initial condition is depicted in
Figure 1. The channel coolant boils and stratifies. Eventually the steam
flow from the channel heats up the endfitting to the saturation temperature
and reaches the vertical feeder. The resulting buoyancy-induced flow then
refills the channel.
To compute the duration of channel stagnation and, hence, assess tempera-
ture excursions of the fuel pins and that part of the pressure tube exposed to
steam, the channel water level needs to be known because it determines the
steam generation rate. The level also directly affects the pressure tube cir-
cumferential temperature distribution. The steam generation rate influences
the convective cooling of exposed pins.
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The THERMOSS (THERmohydraulic MOdel of Standing Start) model developed in
this paper solves, in closed form, the one-dimensional, two-fluid conservation
equations and computes the channel water level and duration of stagnation.
The model predictions are compared with test results. THERMOSS differs from
an earlier (IBIF) modell, in that the channel water level is determined from
moment um rather than mass balance, and hence is more physically based.
EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
To study the standing-start phenomena, a large number of tests were con-
ducted in the Cold Water Injection Test (CWIT) facility (Figure 2) at Westing-
house Canada Inc. Gamma densitometers on the vertical feeder pipes measured
the presence of any void. Thermocouples on the channel fuel rods measured rod
surface temperature as weIl as channel water level.
The tests were conducted as folIows: channel power was raised from zero
to the desired value after the loop was brought to the desired subcooled stag-
nant condition in pressure and temperature. It was difficult to achieve per-
fectly stagnant initial conditions but this was attempted by making the confi-
guration as left-right symmetric as possible (Figure 2).
Temperatures in Figure 3 show sequential uncovering of fuel rods (top
first). Turn-around temperatures in Figure 3 coincide with the arrival of
steam at the vertical feeder (Figure 4). The duration of channel stagnation
is the time interval between the start of top pin uncovering and steam arrival
at the vertical feeder.
A typical channel water level transient is shown in Figure 5. Each bar
corresponds to the uncertainty in the location of the thermocouple on the pin
circumference. The level drops rapidly initially and then gradually to its
final position just .before steam vents through the vertical feeder. All test
results have been studied. Results are presented below for a typical test
series covering a wide range of conditions.
Figure 6 shows final fractional water level versus power. The level is
bounded between 0.1 and 0.4 and appears to be independent of subcooling. It
decreases with power and, for a given power, increases with pressure (compare
o with l1li at 100 kW).
Figure 7 shows duration of stagnation versus power. The data show some
scatter attributable to the difficulty in achieving perfectly stagnant initial
condition. Therefore, upper bound curves through the data points at each
subcooling are drawn to show trends. The duration of stagnation decreases
with power for a given subcooling and increases with subcooling for a given
power. For a given power and subcooling, it decreases with pressure. This is
clear from a comparison of the two data points at 100 kW and 90·C subcooling
on Figure 7. These are the only data points of equal subcooling and signifi-
cantly different pressures - 0.2 and 1 MPa. This pressure effect has also
been observed in other test series.
THE IBIF MODEL
This modell envisages the fuel channel as a pot of water: the level
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drops as water is boiled off. It calculates the mass of steam needed to heat
up the endfitting to the saturation temperature. This mass of steam gives the
final channel level. The duration of stagnation is then calculated using a
constant level which is an average of the final and full-channel level. The
level and duration depend primarily on the degree of subcooling in the end-
fitting.
'IHERMOSS: A 'IHERMOHYDRAULIC M:lDEL OF STANDING START
The 'IHERMOSS, model calculates the time interval between the onset of
boiling in the fuel channel and the arrival of steam at the vertical feeder.
During this time the large axial steam flow requires a significant press-
ure gradient to overcome friction. This pressure gradient depresses the water
level in the channel below that in the endfitting. Eventually a quasi-steady
state is reached where the hydrostatic head from the endfitting to the channel
balances the steam pressure gradient. To replace water lost through boiling
and maintain this steady state, water ~lows back to the channel.
For simplicity, the 'IHERMOSS model ignores the initial rapid transient
period. The level is assumed to be in the quasi-steady state from time zero.
In this state, the level is determined from momentum balance between the fric-
tional pressure drop in the steam and hydrostatic head change in the water
phase, noting that volumetric flow rates in the water phase are negligible
compared to those in the steam phase.
The model solves for the level profile in each channel
(Figure 8) and for the steam flow rate out of the channel.
rate and an energy balance is then used to compute the time
channel assembly component.
assembly component
The steam flow
of heat up of each
Water Level Profile
( 1)
diameter, g is
their usual
with
(momentum) equation:
_ fPG
'1=---.
2DgPL
factor, D is the hydraulic
the remaining symbols have
where f is the D'arcy friction
gravitational acceleration and
meaning.
Figure 9 shows a fluid element dz in a channel assembly component. The
balance of frictional pressure drop in the steam and hydrostatic head change
in the water phase gives the
The other equation needed to solve (1) is given by mass balance in the
steam phase:
.L (au) =
dz
where a is the void fraction
{
~(l-a) in fuel channel
o elsewhere
and
(2)
radial power depression.assuming
equation
q
~ :-_.....:...--
PG • hLG • V
axially uniform power q and ignoring
(3) V is the component volume.
In
(3)
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Equations (1) and (2) are solved in each channel assembly component and
the level is matched at the junctions as in Figure 8. For a given level
profile, the steam flow rate Q out of the fuel channel is calculated in closed
form. To obtain closed form solutions, circular cross-sections are replaced
by square ones of equal ares. Detailed derivation of the results is reported
elsewhere 2 •
The channel water level is found to be a function of geometry, power and
pressure but not of subcooling as in IBIF model. The level decreases with
power. It increases with pressure as steam specific volume is smaller at
higher pressure.
Duration of Stagnation
The time ~k (k=1,2,3,4) needed to heat,up each channel assembly compon-
ent to the saturation temperature is computed as foliows:
The interface tip at any point along a channel assembly component
(Figure 10) advances, in time dt, a distance dz as the steam flow from the
channel heats up piping and water within dz. Energy balance on the pipe-water
element in Figure 10 gives:
= CkPG • Q • hLG • dt • 6T • dz2k
where 6T is the subcooling. This equation is integrated to
needed to heat the component to the saturation temperature:
.1 2Ck • 6T d~k = _--'0>.-___ ~
2k • PG • hLG 0 Q
(4)
obtain the time
(5)
The duration of channel stagnation ~ is then the sum of all ~ks:
~ = ~1 + ~2 + ~3 + ~4' where the initial time is taken to be when steam
extends just to the end of the heated channel.
COMPARISON OF MODEL PREDICTIONS WITIl EXPERIMENT
TIlERMOSS predictions have been compared to all tests using a single
friction factor f = 0.02 for the entire channel assembly. Results are pre-
sented below for a typical test series covering a wide range of conditions.
Open circles in Figure 11 show a typical level transient predicted by the
TIlERMOSS model. Figure 12 shows the predicted final water level at the
channel centre for the test series. The predicted level is bounded between
0.2 and 0.5. It decreases with power and for a given power, the level
increases with pressure. TIlERMOSS overpredicts the level but the observed
trends with power, pressure and subcooling in Figure 6 are weIl predicted.
The error in level could easily be improved by a more careful choice of
friction factor.
Figure 13 shows that lHERMOSS overpredicts the durati on of stagnation by
about 20% with a further uncertainty of about ±20%. There is no systematic
effect of power, pressure or subcooling on this error. Note, however, that
the error would increase to about 30% ± 20% if the calculation of level were
improved, for example, with an improved fr1ction factor. The following
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factors contribute to this error:
Test conditions: The tests rare1y have exact standing start conditions.
There is usua11y some asymmetry and this biases steam f10w towards one end or
the other. Thus, the channe1 vents ear1ier than in a comp1ete1y symmetrica1
case. Since the model is symmetric, its tendency to overpredict the duration
is expected.
Steam superheat: There is experimental indication of steam superheat which
has been ignored in the model. Superheat wou1d cause an additional f10w of
energy to the endfitting which wou1d reduce the duration.
A1gebraic simp1ification: Simp1ifications have been made which cause an
overprediction of the duration by about 20%.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
The endfitting in the CWIT faci1ity has a geometry different from that in
the CANDU reactor. THER}IDSS predicts that the level and, hence, the duration
of stagnation depend on the channe1 assemb1y geometry. Thus, THER}IDSS is a
re1iab1e extrapo1atory too1.
The TIlERMOSS model computes the channe1 water level fo110wing refi11 of a
horizontal fue1 channe1 and subsequent f10w stagnation. It predicts and
exp1ains the observed trends:
i) The level behaviour is exp1ained in terms of a simple momentum balance
rather than a mass balance. It fo110ws that the level is independent of
subcoo1ing as water f10ws back to the channe1 to rep1ace that lost
through boi1ing.
ii) The effect of pressure on the level and on the duration of stagnation is
exp1ained in terms of steam specific vo1ume.
The predicted duration of channe1 stagnation shows satisfactory accuracy
being overpredicted by about 20% with no systematic dependence of the error on
the independent variables. This error will increase with an improved
ca1cu1ation of level but will decrease if steam superheat is mode11ed.
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ABSTRACT
Thermosyphoning is defined as the natural convective flow of primary
coolant over the boilers. It is the predicted mode of heat
transport from core to boilers in many postulated scenarios for
CANDU reactor safety analysis.
The scenarios encompass a wide range of boundary conditions in
reactor power, secondary temperature and primary coolant inventory.
Loss of pumping of the primary coolant is a common feature.
Thermosyphoning is single or two-phase depending on the boundary
conditions. The paper describes the important thermohydraulic
characteristics of thermosyphoning in CANDU reactors with emphasis
on two-phase thermosyphoning. It utilizes predictions of a
transient thermohydraulics computer code and describes experiments
done for the purpose of verifying these predicitions. Predictions
are compared with single-phase thermosyphoning tests done during
commissioning of the Gentilly-2 and Point Lepreau CANDU 600
reactors.
INTRODUCTION
The CANDU reactor has several modes of decay heat removal. The boilers
and primary pumps provide the normal mode. The shutdown cooling system has
independent heat exchangers and pumps and can remove decay heat at pressures
up to nominal primary system pressures. Thermosyphoning is the mode of heat
transport to the boilers in the absence of any forced circulation of the
primary coolant, with secondary water being provided by the normal feedwater
system, the auxiliary feedwater pumps or, on depressurization of the secondary
side, by an emergency supply system.
Thermosyphoning is defined as the natural convective flow of primary
coolant over the boilers. It is the predicted mode of heat transport from
core to boilers in many postulated scenarios for CANDU reactor safety
analysis. The scenarios encompass a wide range of boundary conditions in
reactor power, secondary side temperature and primary coolant inventory. Loss
of pumping of the primary coolant is a common feature. Reactor power is
at decay levels.
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Figure 1 is a schematic diagram of one loop of a CANDU primary heat
transport system. It comprises two passes of the coolant past the fuel. Thus
the coolant sees core 1, boiler 1, pump 1, core 2, boiler 2, pump 2, core 1,
etc. Each core pass includes about 100 horizontal fuel channels each of which
is connected by an inlet and an outlet feeder to larger diameter inlet and
outlet headers. Large diameter piping connects the headers to the boilers and
pumps. The tops of the boiler U tubes are located typically 11 m above the
headers and the headers are located typically 7 m above the channels. The
total height is 18 m and density differences in this height provide the
buoyancy force for thermosyphoning.
Thermosyphoning is single-phase or two-phase depending on the boundary
conditions. Two-phase thermosyphoning is predicted for high reactor decay
power, low primary coolant inventory and/or low secondary temperature. For
example, two-phase thermosyphoning is predicted for scenarios without coolant
make up following a secondary depressurization.
CANDU thermosyphoning characteristics have been studied analytically and
experimentally. The basic approach is to use a transient thermohydraulics
computer code for reactor predictions supported by comparison of additional
code predictions with relevant ~xperiments. This approach is supplemented by
algebraic modelling to enhance understanding of specific phenomena.
THERMOHYDRAULIC CHARACTERISTICS
A transient thermohydraulics computer code FIREBIRD [1] has been used to
study the characteristics of thermosyphoning in the CANDU primary heat
transport system as a function of coolant inventory and secondary temperature.
The important characteristics are:
SYSTEM VOID DISTRIBUTION
As system void is increased, the excess void first appears in the outlet
side of the loop. At very high system voids (~ 20%) steam penetrates to the
cold leg of the boiler and eventually to the inlet headers. Phase separation
in a header could result and would be expected to cause steam to accumulate in
and pressurize the header. Thermosyphoning may not continue. Figure 2
indicates the region where the inlet header is subcooled. It extends up to 25
to 40% system void depending on secondary temperature, and covers the
scenarios of interest.
At low secondary temperature (say 100°C), primary pressure is low and the
liquid saturation enthalpy, hL, is a strong function of pressure. Hot waterfrom the core flashes to steam as its pressure reduces en route to the
boilers. Thus the void is located towards the upper part of the
outlet-feeders and the boiler inlet. There is no steady boiling in the core
at relevant system void fractions.
At the,nominal secondary temperature of 260°C, primary pressure is high,
hL is virtually constant, and boiling occurs in the core even at low system
void fraction.
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SYSTEM FLOW
The system flow increases with increasing system void up to a maximum at
about 20% void, see Figure 2. Thereafter steam penetrates past the top of the
boiler reducing the buoyancy head whereas frictional forces continue to
increase, so the flow decreases.
Single phase flows increase slightly with increasing secondary
temperature because density is more sensitive to temperature change. At
given system void, two-phase flows increase with decreasing secondary
temperature, see Figure 2, because with flashing, the void is located more in
vertical than in horizontal components. This enhances the buoyancy force.
CHANNEL FLOW STRATIFICATION
Steady stratified flow is .possible, for the scenarios of interest, only
at high secondary temperature when steady boiling can occur in the fuel
channel.
Full size horizontal channel experiments show that the flow will not be
stratified above a value of 0.8 kg/sec. The tests also show that the Nusselt
number will be at least 4.36 for the heat transfer from the fuel to steam.
These limiting values were used in the following individual-channel studies.
Channel flow depends on channel geometry, header-to-header pressure drop,
coolant inlet subcooling and channel power. We will consider these parameters
in turn.
Upper channels have the most restrictive geometry for thermosyphoning
with the smallest buoyancy head and with more resistive inlet feeders than
central channels.
System calculations show that inlet subcooling ranges up to 20°C,
depending on system void fraction. Reader to header pressure drop is
virtually zero, at high pressure, so channel flow is driven by buoyancy forces
below the headers. Low channel decay power gives low exit quality, low outlet
fee der void fraction, low buoyancy head and flows which could be stratified.
Righer channel decay power gives flows too large to stratify.
Stratified flow exposes fuel elements to steam cooling, but this is
adequate because channel power is low and boiling takes place only near the
channel exit where the heat flux is low.
For a limiting condition of stratified flow in an upper channel an
exposed fuel temperature of 580°C is predicted [2], an increase of only 280°C
above the saturation temperature. Fuel damage is not expected at this
temperature.
FLOW OSCILLATIONS
Channel and system flow oscillations are possible depending on coolant
inventory and secondary temperature. Periods range from 1 to 3 minutes and
are governed by fluid transport time. Amplitudes reach limit cycles where the
channel flow is subcooled during the high-flow part of a cycle but stratified
during the low-flow part of a cycle. The temperature rise of exposed fuel in
each cycle is not large (about 200°C). Even with channel flows that, on
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average, would stratify, oscillations give periodic rewetting and therefore
provide good fuel cooling.
The oscillations themselves have been the subject of separate detailed
studies [3,4]. Channel flow oscillations [3] are caused by the delayed
response of buoyancy force to flow change. During the low flow interval,
steam generated in the horizontal channel is transported to the vertical
feeder. On arrival at the feeder the large buoyancy force induces a large
flow that in turn floods both channel and feeder. The process repeats.
System oscillations [4] can be described as a periodic redistribution of
system void at the two ends of the reactor. An excess of steam between core
and boiler at one end displaces liquid and so reduces the flow in the upstream
core pass and increases the flow in the downstream core pass. Less upstream
flow produces even more steam at this end. More downstream flow produces even
less steam at the other end. At the limit cycle, void collapses completely
but momentarily at one end and then similarly, a half cycle later, at the
other end.
VERIFICATION
The above predictions are supported by comparing code predictions to
full-size horizontal channel tests, reduced-size system tests and reactor
commissioning tests.
Early CANDU 600 reactor predictions with FlREBIRD and a similar code,
HYDRA-3, have been compared to more recent single-phase thermosyphoning
commissioning tests at the Gentilly-2 and Point Lepreau reactors. Tests were
done for a range of powers typical of decay power. Test flows were obtained
by a heat balance using the measured core power and measured temperature rise
from inlet to out let header. Predicted flows were within the measurement
uncertainty for the Gentilly-2 tests, as can be seen in Figure 3. The Point
Lepreau flows are smaller but are consistent with a lower secondary
temperature.
System thermosyphoning experiments were done in a reduced-size
electrically-heated single-channel-per-pass representation of CANDU, called
RD-12. Following pump rundown, flows, pressures and temperatures were
measured as the loop was drained at given secondary temperature. Pass-to-pass
flow oscillations started at low system void and continued to high void.
Thermosyphoning provided good heater cooling up to a very high system void.
Code comparisons have been made with a range of RD-12 tests. All
significant trends and phenomena were captured. The occurrence of
oscillations at the onset of boiling was predicted as was the growth of the
limit cycle with increasing system void. Figure 4 compares predicted to
measured flow in each of the two non-boiling regions (between boiler and core
in each core pass). This particular test had a pressurizer connected to one
out let header so the flow in one pass was not perfectly out of phase with that
in the other pass. The period was somewhat overpredicted.
Single channel and parallel channel tests have been done in another
electrically-heated facility employing full-size components below the headers.
Tests were done by supplying water to the headers usually at a small
header-to-header pressure drop as is characteristic of thermosyphoning. The
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tests showed the flow to be generally oscillatory, converging to steady
two-phase flow at small inlet subcooling and steady non-boiling flow at high
inlet subcooling. The flow stratification threshold was taken directly from
steady two-phase flow tests in this facility.
Figure 5 compares predicted to measured upper-pin temperature for a
channel test which exhibited flow oscillations. This particular test had a
near zero flow or "standing-start" initial condition with a near zero
header-to-header pressure drop boundary condition. Temperatures above
saturation were caused by exposure of upper pins to steam during periods of
flow stratification in the horizontal channel. Rewetting was caused by a
large buoyancy-induced flow which developed when steam from the channel
penetrated to the vertical feeder.
The timing of rewetting is overpredicted. This is caused by a weakness
in modelling the difference in phase velocities in stratified two-phase flow.
The predicted steam flow rate from the channel is too small, delaying the time
of steam penetration to the feeder. This modelling deficiency makes the
FIREBIRD code conservative for application to "standing-start" scenarios.
Instead an algebraic model, calIed , THERMOSS [5] is used for predicting the
timing of the first rewetting.
FlREBIRD overpredicts the time below saturation (predicted 770-560
seconds, measured 470-350 seconds, see Figure 5) because the flow in the
low-flow part of the cycle is overpredicted. However, some uncertainty in
predicting the oscillations can be tolerated because the temperature rise
during an oscillation is small.
CONCLUSION
The effectiveness of single-phase thermosyphoning in CANDU has been
demonstrated in reactor commissioning tests. Code predictions show that
two-phase thermosyphoning is particularly effective at low pressure because
system void is concentrated in vertical components where the buoyancy force
produces flows considerably greater than in single phase. Two-phase
thermosyphoning flows are lower at high pressure and the channel flow can be
stratified but only near the channel exit where heat fluxes are low. Fuel
damage is not expected. Two-phase thermosyphoning may not continue for a
system void fraction greater than 25 to 40% when steam is predicted to
penetrate to the reactor inlet header, but such high void fractions are not
relevant to thermosyphoning scenarios arising from accident analysis.
Code calculations have successfully predicted reactor commissioning
tests and semi-scale system tests, the latter including tests which exhibited
flow oscillations. Code predictions capture the qualitative features of
channel tests but overpredict the period of oscillations. This leads to some
uncertainty when applied to reactors but the temperature rise during
oscillations is small.
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ABSTRACT
Experiments designed to simulate certain types of postulated loss-
of-coolant accidents in CANDU reactors show that, for some con-
ditions, long time delays occur before the injected water is able
to penetrate down the feeders to reach the horizontal fuel chan-
nels. The time delays are identified as a "hot-wall" effect,
caused by countercurrent flow flooding in the feeders, due to the
illteraction between the water downflow and the upflow of steam
generated by release of heat from the feeder pipe walls.
This paper describes results of full-scale tests to measure the
hot-wall delays for the CANDU reactor core geometry. A theoreti-
cal model is described that predicts the measured til00 delays
reasonably weIL.
INTROlJUCTION
The core of a CANDU reactor consists of groups of horizontal fuel
channels connected by individual feeder pipes to headers located above the
core. In a postulated loss-of-coolant accident (LOCA) emergency cooling
water is injected into the headers by pumped or accumulator injection
systems.
In certain LOCAs in CANDUs it is predicted that the pressure difference
between the inlet and outlet headers may remain close to zero for an
extended time period. Experiments in a large-sca1e test faci1ity have shown
that under these conditions a long time delay may occur before the injected
water is able to penetrate down the feeders to reach the heated channel.
The time delay appears to be caused by the occurrence of countercurrent flow
flooding in the feeders, due to the interaction between the liquid downflow
and the upflow of steam generated as water contacts the hot walls of the
feeder pipes. Such "hot-wall delays" have been extensively studied for the
case of vertical tubes and annuli, because of their potential importance in
some LOCAs in PWRs [1,2].
The present paper describes the results of full-scale tests carried out
to study hot-wall delays for the CANDU reactor core geometry. A theoretical
model is described that predicts the measured delays reasonably weIL.
.:HJb
EXPERINENTAL
Test Facility and Test Procedure
Experiments to measure the hot-wall time delays were carried out in the
Cold Water Injection Test (CWIT) facility at Westinghouse Inc. Canada
Systems Test Laboratory. The ClnT facility (shown schematically in Figure
1) simulates a CANDU header/feeder/channel system at full geometrical scale.
The fuel channels are represented by 100 mm diameter b ill long horizontal
pipes containing electrical heater rods simulating CANDU reactor fuel rods.
The channels are connected below the headers by feeders that consist of
sections of horizontal and vertical steel pipe of either ~O rom or 75 mm
internal diameter. For each channel the geometries of the inlet and outlet
feeders are the same; details of the feeder geometries are shown in Figure
2. A pumped injection system is provided to inject cold water into the
headers, to simulate the action of the reactor Emergency Coolant Injection
System.
In the present experiments the penetration of injected water into the
feeders was n~asured using thermocouples strapped to the outside of the
pipes at the locations shown in Figure 2. Further information was provided
by gamma-ray densitometers positioned just above the base of the feeders.
The test procedure was to pre-heat the loop pipework to an initial
temperature in the range 150 - 300°C by circulation of dry pressurized
steam. The steam flow was then shut off and the loop depressurized through
dis charge lines connected to the neaders. When the loop pressure fell below
the injection pressure (which was controlled at a pre-determined value),
cold water entered the headers through the check valve. In order to ensure
that the header-to-header press ure arop was as close as possible to zero
during the refilling of the system, the discharge Une orifice areas and
injection line orifice areas were made equal (so-called symmetric injection
arrangement) •
Tests were carried out with either both channels in circuit (parallel
channel tests) or with the top channel isolated by insertion of blanking
flanges in the feeders just below the header (single channel tests). The
range of test conditions was as foliows:
Feeder pipework initial temperature
Channel power
Injection pressure
Discharge line orifice area
(% of 50 mm i.d. feeder pipe area)
Test Results
150 - 350°C
u - 50 kW/channel
0.5 - 1.5 I1Pa
1 - 100%
Forty-seven tests were carried out, consisting of 26 parallel channel
tests and 21 single channel tests. Because of space limitations it is not
possible to describe the observations from all tests in detail. llowever the
main trends can be summarized as foliows:
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(1) In all tests it was observed that water penetrated preferentially
into one of the feeders of each heated channel (subsequently
referred to as the urefilling feeder U ). In the single channel
tests, the refilling feeder was always the geometrical outlet
feeder; in the parallel channel tests the refilling feeder varied
randomly from test to test. In all but three of the parallel
channel tests, opposite feeders refilled for the top and bottom
channels.
(2) There was an extended time delay (referred to as feeder refill
time delay) before the refilling feeder became completely filled
with subcooled water. Uuring this delay period, which exceeded
6UO s in some tests, no water was observed to enter the heated
channel.
(3) At the end of the feeder refilling period, rewetting of the heated
channel began, starting from the end connected to the feeder that
had refilled. The rewetting was apparently driven by the
hydrostatic pressure imbalance between the refilled feeder and the
opposite feeder, which was still partially voided.
(4) The feeder refilling time delay depended strongly on initial
pipework temperature and on the break orifice size (which
determined the pressure in the loop during the injection phase).
However, the delay did not appear to be sensitive to channel
power, injection pressure, etc.
THEORETICAL MODEL
In this section we describe a theoretical model for calculating the
length of the feeder refill time delay. The main assumption is that during
the time delay period, the inflow of water into both feeders is restricted
by countercurrent flow flooding (CCFL), as a result of the reverse flow of
steam produced by boiling as the water contacts the hot feeder pipe walls.
lilien the stored heat is completely removed, the reverse steam flow, and
hence the flooding restriction, is assumed to cease, so that water can run
freely under gravity to reach the heated channel. Thus, in our model the
feeder refill delay is identified with the time taken for the incoming water
flow, restricted by flooding, to cool the feeder pipework to TSAT '
Calculation of the flooding limit, and the rate of energy extraction
from the pipework, is described below.
Flooding Equation
In the CANDU system the feeder pipework consists of aseries of
horizontal-to-vertical pipe elbows. Experimental and theoretical
investigation of countercurrent flow flooding in an elbow geometry were
described in references [Jj and [4]; in this work it was observed that the
flooding point occurs in the horizontal leg of the elbow. The theoretical
analysis in reference [4] showed that, for the limit of ideal frictionless
flow, the flooding limit for the elbow could be expressed by the equation:
* * *Ijg = 0.447 - U.176 Ij~ - 0.263 j~ (1 )
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*where the j parameters are calculated based on the diameter of the
horizontal leg of the elbow. This convenient equation was adopted for the
present analysis.
Calculation of Rate of Removal of Stored tleat
The rate of extraction of stored heat from the feeder pipework is
determined by performing mass and momentum balance. The situation
considered is shown in Figure 3. When water enters the headers it is
assumed to penetrate both feeders A and B. However a net steam flow in the
channel is established from A to B. A fraction of the steam generated in
feeder A is assumed to flow in the reverse sense, while the remaining
fraction (1 - f) flows in the forward sense. As described above, the liquid
downflow in the feeders is assumed to be limited by CCFL in a horizontal
pipe section below the header. It 1s also assumed that 10UI. of the liquid
flowing downwards past the flooding point is vapourized on contacting the
hot walls of the feeder pipework furt her downstream.
For feeder A the water downflow and the steam upflow are related by:
(2 )
which is the statement of the condition that a fraction f of the incoming
liquid flow is converted into steam that flows in the reverse direction.
For feeder B the water inflow and the steam upflow are related by:
Equation (3) is a statement of the condition that the steam upflow in feeder
B is equal to the steam generated by vapourization of lUUf, of the incoming
water, plus the forward flow fraction generated in feeder A.
During the feeder refill phase we have postulated that steam upflow and
water downflow in both feeders are related by the flooding Equation (1).
Thus, if f is known, WJA' WgA' WRB and WgB can be determined by
simultaneously solving EquaEions (1) and (2), and Equations (1) and (3),
respectively. The PFocedure is shown diagrammatically in Figure 4, which
illustrates the general case where the diameters of feeders A and Bare
different. It is seen by inspection of this figure that WJA > WRB'
indicating a faster rate of heat extraction from feeder A.
Assuming that the removal of stored heat from the feeders is brought
about solely by vapourization of the incoming liquid, the heat removed from
the walls of feeder A in tilDe increment dt is given by:
(4 )
A similar equation can be written for feeder B.
The hot-wall time delay 'HW is defined as the time taken to cool either
feeder wall to TSAT ' Thus 'HW is given when the following equation is
satisfied for either feeder:
t + '1:._.
J
OI1W
dEW (t)
t o
(5 )
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In Equation (5) the left-hand side is the energy reilloved from the feeder
during the time interval t o + t o + ~HW' The right-hand side is the storedheat that must be removed to cool the feeder to the saturation temperature
at time t o + ~W (the sUillmation is taken over all pipe segments comprising
the feeder). 1n applying the model, the integration in Equation (5) is
performed numerically by using the trapezoidal rule.
As in reference [1] the total feeder refill delay time is taken as the
sum of hot-wall delay time and the gravity refill time:
(6 )
~ r is the time taken by water to fall freely through the feeder underg~a~rty, in the limit where the pipe walls are cold.
Determination of Flow Split Factor f
The flow split factor f is determined by performing a momentum balance
for the steam flow during feeder refilling. The presence of liquid in the
feeders is ignored for this calculation. In practice the form of the
equations depends on where in the feeders the steam is generated, which is
not known. For our simplified analysis we have assumed that in each feeder
the steam is generated at a point close to the junction between the base of
the feeder aud the channel end-fitting, as shown in Figure 3.
Now the pressure loss in aseries of N pipe sections is given by the
equation:
(7)
Here (K/~)i refers to the minor loss coefficients due to fittings, elbows,
area changes etc., and f i is the pipe wall friction factor for the ith
pipe segment. In the pr~~ent analysis the pipe wall friction factor is
expressed in terms of the Reyno1ds number and the wall roughness, using
standard correlations. The steam is assumed to be at the saturation
temperature in both the feeders, but at the heater rod temperature inside
the heated channel.
Referring to Figure 3, if Pa denotes the pressure in the headers (the
header pressures are assumed equal) we have:
(8 )
We also note that by mass conservation, since 10010 of the incoming liquid is
assumed to be vapourized:
WJA = WgA + Wgca
W.m = WgB - WgCH
The flow split factor f is defined by:
W
f = gA
WgA + WgCH
Hence, using Equations (8) and (9)
(10 )
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f (11 )
where
<t>= 1 +H.RB =1+ H.RB
HgCH (1 - f) HJA
Numerica1 Solution Procedure
(12 )
A computer program was written to solve the above equations for cases
of interest. The steps in the calcu1ation of ~H are as fol1ows:
(1) Estimate a value for the f10w sp1it factor f at to;
(2) using Equations (2) and (3) and the flooding curve, Equation (1),
calcu1ate HJA' WgA' H.RB and HgB at to;
(3) calculate YA' YB and YCH from Equation (7) (note that these quantities
are functions of HgA' Hg]) and f because of the Reyno1ds number
dependence of the \~all Iriction factors);
(4) ca1culate f from Equation (11);
(5) repeat steps (1) - (4) until a converged va1ue for f is obtained;
(6) advance the tim~ by ~t;
(7) calcu1ate YA' YB and YCH from Equation (7) (by using fluid properties
at current time-step and ve10cities at previous time-step);
(8) ca1culate updated va1ues for f from Equation (11);
(9) ca1culate updated values for HgA' HJA' H.RB using Equations (1), (2) and
(3) ;
(10) update the value of the integral on the left-hand side of Equation (5),
using the old-time and new-time va1ues of the integrand;
(11) repeat steps (6) - (10) until Equation (5) is satisfied for either
feeder.
CONPARISON HITH DATA
Predictions of the model were compared with data from the CHIT tests
described above.
The feeders in the CHIT facility contain multiple horizontal sections,
as shown in Figure 2. The internal diameter of the uppermost horizontal
section is 50 mm, and that of the lower sections is 75 mm. Inspection of
the thermocouple data indicates that, as water penetrates the refilling
feeder, the flooding point moves downward through the feeder, proceeding
from one horizontal section to the next. However, the flooding point in the
"out let" feeder (in the sense of the refi1ling) remains located in the
uppermost horizontal section (50 mm dia.) for a much longer time period. In
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view of thisthe effective diameter of the refilling feeder for use in the
flooding equation (1) was taken as the length-average diameter of all the
horizontal pipe sections above the fee der base (= 71.2 mm). The effective
diameter of the "outlet" feeder was taken as 50 mm. The summation in
Equation (5) was taken over all sections of feeder pipework below the
header, including flanges and valves. Finally the gravity refill time
[~grav in Equation (6)] was taken as 10 s in all cases, based on a single-
phase flow calculation.
Model predictions obtained on this basis are compared in Figure 5 with
all data for pipework initial temperatures above 200°C. Outwardly the
agreement does not appear to be particularly good; in some cases the
measured time delays are a factor of two larger than the predicted values.
The picture alters strikingly, however, when the single channel tests and
the three parallel channel tests, in which refilling of both channels
occurred in the same direction, are removed from the data-set. Figure 6
shows a comparison with the remaining parallel channel test results (14
tests in all). Agreement is now seen to be excellent.
The explanation for the discrepancies in the single channel test cases
is probably that pressurization of the "outlet" header (see Figure 1)
occurred during feeder refilling, as a result of the preferential venting of
steam to this header. A similar asymmetry would have been expected to
develop in the three anomalous parallel channel tests where both channels
refilled in the same sense. Such apressure "imbalance" would tend to
increase the factor f to a value greater than that calculated by our model,
which assurnes equal header pressures. For all remaining parallel channel
cases, opposite feeders refilled in the bottom and tOP channel, so there is
no reason why apressure imbalance should have developed between the
headers. The implication is that the present model predicts the hot-wall
delay time reasonably weIl when the condition of equal header pressures, for
which it was derived, is realised.
CONCLUSIONS
Experiments designed to simulate certain postulated LOCAs in CANDU
reactors have shown that, for some conditions, significant time delays can
occur before the injected water is able to penetrate through the feeder
pipes to reach the horizontal channels. The time delays have been
identified as a "hot-wall" effect, caused by the occurrence of
countercurrent flow flooding in the feeders.
A theoretical model developed on this basis agrees with the measured
time delays reasonably weIl.
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NOTATION
Cw Heat capacity of section of feeder pipework.D Hydraulic diameter.~ Stored heat in feeder walls.
f F10w sp1it factor
f gW Pipe wall friction factor for steam f10w.~g~ Latent heat.
Jk Phase k superficia1 velocity.jk = jk [Ak/gD P~J~; non-dimensional superficia1 velocity.
K Hinor 10ss coeYficient.
~ Length of pipe segment.
MW Nass of section of feeder pipework.P Pressure.
t Time.
T Temperature.
W Mass f10w rate.
r Flow resistance parameter.
$ Parameter defined in Equation (12).
Ak Density of phase k.
~f Feeder refill time.
"HW Hot-wall delay time.
~grav Gravity fi11 time.
Subscripts
g Gas phase.
~ Liquid phase.
SAT Saturation property.
A,B Property of feeder A or B.
CH Property of channel plus channel end fittings.
i Property of ith pipe segment.
o Property at beginning of feeder refilling.
Outlet
header
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Fuel channel simulators:
electrically heated
37-rod bundle
Blowdown
valve
i \-
\
Figure 1: Schematic of Experimental Facility
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Figure 2: Feeder Pipework Geometry
~
CD All pipe length dimensions in mm
~ Numbered stations represent pipe
surfaee thermaeouple laeatlons
® Inlet fuders opposlle hand 10
outlet fuders
G> All pipe work fully Insulated
Feeder A 1
WgA
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1
Feeder B
WgB
WgCH
Channel and End Fittings
Figure 3: Feeder/Channel System During Feeder Refilling, Showing
Direction of Steam and Water Flows
I
I
I
EqUation:
(3) I
I
I
I
I WIB
Equation(2)
Wo ter Downflow I WI
Figure 4: Diagram Showing Liquid Flow Rates Into Feeders A and B
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ABSTRACT
In a CANDU power reactor, failure of emergency coolant
injection (ECI) following a large LOCA will not result in
fuel melting because of heat transfer from the fuel channels
to the separately-cooled moderator in the calandria. This
paper reports the results of a study of a severe accident
sequence in which a large LOCA with failure of ECI is
followed by failure of the moderator cooling system.
Results show that the core debris will be contained in
the calandria vessel, which acts as an effective core
catcher. Implications of the results for CANDU safety and
risks are discussed.
INTRODUCTION
In a CANDU nuclear power reactor, the short (O.Sm long) fuel
bundles, 12 per channel, are supported in horizontal Zircaloy
pressure tubes about 6m long through which the heavy-water coolant
flows. The number of pressure tubes depends on the thermal power
of the reactor; there are 480 in a Bruce-A reactor unit
(~2700 MW(th)). Surrounding each pressure tube is a concentric
calandria tube. A triekle flow of gas (C02 or N2) occurs along
the channel in the annulus between the two tubes. Outside the
calandria tubes is the cool heavy-water moderator contained in
the calandria itself. The purpose of the gas-filled annulus is
to keep heat losses from the coolant to the moderator at accept-
ably low levels during normal operation. The moderator is main-
tained at a low temperature (~80°C) by aseparate cooling circuit.
The cool moderator surrounding the calandria tubes provides a
potential heat sink following a LOCA should the emergency
coolant injection (ECI) fail or be impaired. Studies have shown
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that fuel will not melt in such an accident because of heat transfer to the
moderator [1,2,3,4].
Figure 1 is an isometrie view of a typical CANDU reactor core. It should
be noted that the calandria vessel is surrounded by separately-cooled ordinary
water in the shield tank which is contained within the calandria vault wall
which forms the main concrete shield.
A study has been undertaken for the Atomic Energy Control Board to assess
the behaviour of CANDU reactor cores, in particular, a Bruce-A reactor core,
under accident conditions more severe than those considered in normal licensing
processes. The study was not intended to be a comprehensive risk investigation;
only a limited number of severe accidents was examined, mainly thermo-hydraulic
physical processes wereanalyzed and no calculations of event-sequence probabili-
ties were made. The complete results of the study are given in reference [5].
Certain aspects of the study are described in references [6] and [7].
In this paper, the results of the study are given for an accident sequence
in which the moderator cooling system (~!CS) fails together with failure of ECI
following a large LOCA.
DESCRIPTION OF ACCIDENT SEQUENCE
In the accident sequence considered here, a late-stagnation LOCA with
failure of emergency cooling injection results in the pressure tubes overheating
and sagging onto the calandria tubes, providing an effective heat flow path to
the moderator [1]. The moderator cooling system fails, the moderator heats up
and the c~landria pressure increases until the rupture disks on the calandria
relief ducts break, at about 140kPa(g). See Figure 1. The calandria pressure
drops to that of the reactor vault. Some moderator is lost through the ducts by·
liquid swell and sub-cooled void generation. Themoderator begins to boil. As
boiling develops, liquid moderator is rapidly expelled through the relief ducts
by void formation and additional moderator is lost by vaporization. As the void
fraction near the top of the calandria increases, the top row of calandria tubes
be comes uncovered, causing a rapid temperature rise of these tubes, now cooled
by convection and radiation to steam generated by the boiling moderator. Pressure
tube and fuel temperatures also increase. The exotherrnie reaction between the
zircaloy calandria tubes and the steam causes further increases of fuel channel
temperatures. Eventually, other rows of tubes are also uncovered and similar
subsequent behaviour occurs.
Uncovered fuel channels eventually disintegrate by melting or other
mechanisms and fall to the bottom of the calandria, probably causing disintegra-
tion of any lower uncovered fuel channels as they fall (Cascading failure).
The hot debris from these channels is quenched by moderator remaining in the
calandria. Mixing of molten debris with moderator may result in vapor explosions.
Deuterium gas from the Zircaloy-heavy water reaction excapes to thereactor vault.
The steam and deuterium discharges, and possible deuterium combustion, cause
pressure increases in containment, \~hich may result in containment failure.
Eventually, all the moderator is exPelled from the calandria and the quenched
debris is uncovered and heats up again. The debris melts and forms a molten
pool, supported by the calandria wall, which is cooled by the shield tank water.
The moltenpool may boil. The calandria wall may melt or fail and the molten
material mix with the shield-tank water which may result in a vapor explosion
and which, once again, would quench the debris. The shield tank water may be
expelled andjor boi1 off into containment and the core debris may heat up and
melt once more. Molten material may melt through to the fuelling mabhine duct
and through the floor of the duct into the underlying rock. Interaction of the
molten pool with concrete would generate non-condensible gases which may cause
containment failure, if it has not already occurred. Eventually, molten material
would solidify in the concrete or the underlying rock.
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ANALYTICAL APPROACH
It is recognized that the behaviour of core components under the extreme
conditions of this accident sequence is, in general, quite speculative since
little experimental information on CANDU core component behaviour and physical
phenomena under these conditions is available. The approach used has been to
attempt to model the essential features of the behaviour of core components and
the moderator on a physically-sound basis, as far as possible, and to undertake
sensitivity studies of the effects of the important parameters at the different
stages of the accident sequence. In some cases, bounding analyses have been
used.
~lliTHODS AND RESULTS
Heat Source to Moderator
For the large LOCA considered here, the primary system blowdown lasts about
170 seconds [2,5]. After this time, decay heat, stored heat and heat generated
by the Zircaloy-steam reaction within the fuel channels are tranferred from the
fuel channels to the moderator. The total heat source to the moderator was
determined by grouping fuel channels according to average pOI,ers into four groups
and applying the IMPECC program [2,3,4,5,8], which uses the ANS decay heat source,
to each group to establish the heat flow rate to the moderator, for the case of
pressure tubes sagging onto calandria tubes, at apressure tube temperature of
1000°C [1]. Allowance was made for heat generated within the channels by the
exothermic Zircaloy-steam reaction, using information from the Whiteshell Nuclear
Research Establishment of AECL [9]. The result is shown in Figure 2. The peaks
in the curve during the period that the heat source is increasing represent the
rapid discharges of sotred energy from the pressure tubes as those in each group
sag onto the calandria tubes [10]. The heat source shown in Figure 2 applies
as long as all the calandria tubes are submerged in the moderator.
Expulsion of Moderator and Behaviour of Uncovered Fuel Channels
An explicit, finite-difference computer program, MODBOIL [5,6,7], 'has been
developed to analyze the thermo-hydraulic behaviour of the moderator in this
accident sequence.
In MODBOIL, the moderator is divided into 24 horizontal slices, one for
each row of fuel channels, which are the control volumes in the analysis. The
time-dependent heat source for each slice is pro-rated from the overall heat
source in Figure 3, accounting for the number of fuel channels in each slice
and their average power ratings. Transient heat and mass balances are made on
each slice for non-boiling, sub-cooled boiling and bulk boiling conditions.
Under non-boiling conditions, two options are available, perfect mixing or no
mixing of liquid among slices. No significant differences in overall moderator
behaviour were found for these two extreme cases.
MODBOIL calculates the moderator swell, the pressure over the moderator,
the time to failure of the calandria rupture disks, the initiation and develop-
ment of sub-cooled and bulk boiling of the mdderator, the void fractions in each
slice, the pressure distribution throughout the calandria allowing for static
head effects, two-phase flow-pressure losses and choked flow in the relief ducts
and the rate of moderator expulsion from the calandria. It also determines the
times of effective uncovery of fuel channel rows and allows for heat source re-
distribution from any moderator slice to the bot tom slice to model the disinte-
gration of uncovered fuel channels. Criteria for fuel channel disintegration
were established using IMPECC-UCZ [5,6,7] which models the thermal behaviour of
uncovered fuel channels allowing for radiative and convective heat transfer to
steam flowing over the calandria tubes and for heat generated by the reaction
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between this steam and the Zircaloy calandria tubes. For representative channel
uncovery times, steam flow rates and temperatures, IMPECC-UCZ shows that the
fuel in uncovered channels will still be weIl below the U02 melting temperature
up to the times of channel dis integration [5,6;7], as can be seen in Figure 3.
Same melting of calandria tube Zircaloy may occur in this period, as indicated,
for example, in Figure 4, but the amounts will be limited since most Zircaloy
will have been oxidized be fore its melting temperature is reached and predicted
temperatures da not reach the melting point of Zr02.
The MODBOIL pro gram models the quencing of disintegrated fuel channel de-
bris in the bottom slice of moderator, allowing for stored and decay heat and
assuming film boiling (plus radiation) or nucleate boiling as appropriate.
Moderator Behaviour Before Channel Uncovery Results show that rupture disk
failure occurs at about 9.2 minutes and that liquid begins to spill from the
relief ducts at about 9.4 minutes. Bulk boiling begins in the top slice just
be fore 16 minutes and, propagates downwards rapidly until it becomes fully
developed across the calandria at about 17.6 minutes. The rapid increase in
void fraction in this period results in a large fraction of moderator being
rapidly expelled from the calandria, as can be seen in Figure 5. Moderator is
expelled in surges during this period, as shown in Figure 6, but the accompany-
ing pressure surges are not severe (peaks < 220kPa abs) because of the low
steam qualities at the exit of the relief ducts (~ 4%) during this period.
I
Moderator Behaviour After Channel Uncovery After channel uncovery begins, re-
ference conditions used to define the behaviour of the core are:
a) Delay times between channel uncovery and disintegration established
from IMPECC-UCZ runs, as described in references [5 and 7].
b) Fraction of channel mass disintegrating = 1.0 (FRC~~S=l.O)
c) Fraction of Zircaloy malten at dis integration = 1.0 (FRMELT=l.O)
d) Average temperature of fuel at disintegration = l750°C(TF)
e) Average temperature of Zircaloy (solid or malten) at
disintegration = l750°C(TZIRC)
f) Uncovered channels disintegrate when struck by falling debris
(Cascading failure)
It is judged that these are the most severe conditions for core and mod-
erator behaviour that might occur in this accident sequence. The rationale for
the choice of these reference conditions is discussed in reference [5].
For these conditions, MODBOIL predicts that the top row of channels be comes
uncovered at about 21 minutes and that the initial disintegration of fuel
channels occurs at about 23 minutes, wpen the top three rows collapse simultan-
eously. This and subsequent channel disintegrations cause the later flow rate
surges shown in Figure 6; 'with pressure peaks <470kPa abs. Essentially all the
moderator is expelled from the calandria in about 48 minutes, as shown in
Figure 5.
As the reference condition temperatures, as established from IMPECC-UCZ
[5,7], indicate, the fuel material will not be malten at the times of disinte-
gration and MODBOIL shows that it will be rapidly quenched as it falls into
the moderator. Although the reference conditions assume that all channel
Zircaloy is malten at disintegration, only a fraction of the calandria tube
Zircaloy is likely to be malten at this time since the fuel sheaths and pressure
tubes will have already been oxidized and a significant fraction of the calan-
dria tube Zircaloy will also have been oxidized, as discussed earlier. The
melting point of Zr02 (~2700°C) is well above the anticipated peak temperatures
of the non-fuel materials in the channels. See Figure 4. Thus, almost all of
the non-fuel debris also will fall into the moderator as solid material. MOD-
BOIL shows that, whether malten or not, all non-fuel debris will also be rapidly
quenched in themoderator. Finally for the reference conditions, average debris
temperatures will be about 110°C just before the last of the moderator is
expelled from the calandria at about 48 minutes and only a few fuel channels
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(at an average temperature of ~1750oG) will remain intact at that time.
Results of sensitivity studies, as given in references [5 and 7], show
that the average moderator expulsion rate and time to complete expulsion are
not likely to be much different from those for the reference conditions, even
for the case in which no delay is assumed to occur between calandria tube
uncovery and channel dis integration ("instantaneous disintegration"). The
study has also shown that steam superheated by, and deuterium gas generated
from, the uncovered calandria tubes will not bave any significant effect on
calandria pressure nor on discharge rates from the calandria [5].
The investigation also concluded that no vapor explosion would occur
as the core debris falls into the remaining moderator [5].
Thermal Behaviour of Bed of Gore Debris
Following moderator expulsion, a bed of solid core debris is left at
the bot tom of the calandria. It is not possible to predict the physical and
geometric characteristics of this debris bed with any confidence, so that a
simple one-dimensional thermal model which would facilitate sensitivity studies
was developed.
In the model, it is assumed that the debris forms a uniform porous bed
of U02and Zr02 material \~ith porosity and average pore size to be specified
as inputs to the computer program DEBRIS. Mechanisms of heat transfer considered
are conduction through solid material, allowing for random contact thermal
resistances, and conduction and radiation through the steam-filled pores. Gon-
sidering these mechanisms, an equivalent effective thermal conductivity of the
bed was determined. The volumetric heat source used is based on the ANS decay
heat source, with the dilution effects of structural material and bed porosity
accounted for.
The upper surface of the debris bed is assumed to be cooled by natural
convection to steam and radiation to the calandria walls above the bed, which
are cooled by the shield-tank water. The lower surface of the bed, resting on
the calandria wall, is cooled by conduction through the \~all and natural con-
vection or sub-cooled boiling to the shield-tank water, with the program
selecting the appropriate mechanism, depending on the existing conditions at
any time.
Figure 7 shows maximum, upper and lower surface temperatures of the
debris bed as functions of time for the selected reference conditions. The
maximum temperature in the bed reaches the melting point, ~2700oG, at about
85 minutes after the start of re-heating, or about 135 minutes after the initi-
ation of the accident. The upper and lower surface temperatures of the bed are
weIl below the melting point at this time. The lower surface temperature is
weIl belo~ themelting temperature of the stainless steel calandria wall and
the lower surface heat flux into the shield tank water, 15.5 W/cm2, is weIl be-
low the critical heat flux, estimated at about 280 W/cm2 for these conditions
[5]. Thus, the calandria wall will remain well-cooled and will retain its inte-
grity up to the least the time at which bed melting begins.
The reference conditions used for porosity (E ) and average pore size, 0.5
and 0.03m respectively, are arbitrary, although th~ large pore size selected
reflects a judgement as to the nature of the debris, considering that little or
no melting will have occurred before bed uncovery. However, sensitivity studies
show that predicted results are very insensitive to wide variations, separately
and jointly, in these parameters as weIl as to significant variations in solid
material thermal conductivity and the contact conductance parameter [5]. For
example, Figure 7 shows that the predicted temperatures for bed porosities of
0.1 and 0.8 are only slightly different from those for the reference condition
porosity of 0.5.
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Thermal Behaviour of a Mülten Pool of Core Debris
Once melting begins in the debris bed, some time will be required for
the transition to a completely molten pool. Because of the complexity of this
transition stage [5], no attempt was made to develop an anlytical model for
the debris during this period. Instead, tbe time required for this period and
the accompanying heat source decay were ignored, giving a conservative anlysis.
Thus, for the reference conditions, the earliest time for complete molten pool
conditions was taken as 135 minutes.
A quasi steady-state, modified one-dimensional energy balance is the
basis of the model in the pro gram MOLTENPOOL for the thermal behaviour of the
pool, in which allowance is made for the curvature of the calandria wall
forming the lower surface of the pool.
Internal radiation heat transfer, which is important in high-temper-
ature molten pools [11], is accounted for using the toethod of Anderson [12].
}lolten pool internal heat transfer for non-boiling and boiling conditions was
determined using established correlations and models [5].
A major uncertainty in this analysis is that of liquid and vapor
property values for the molten pool materials. Four different sets of consist-
ent property va lues were used to determine the sensitivity of results to un-
certainties in property values.
Results for the reference conditions were inconclusive as to whether
the pool would boil or not, with two sets predicting no boiling and two sets
predicting boiling. Nevertheless, the maximum predicted downward heat flux,
i.e., the heat flux through the calandria wall into the shield tank water, did
not exceed 20 W/cm 2 for any of the four sets of property values.
Heat fluxes of 20W/cm2 are still weIl below the estimated critical
heat flu~ of 2801v/cm2 for the conditions in the shield tank water [5], so that
the calandria wall will be well-cooled throughout this stage of the accident
sequence, irrespective of the uncertainties in molten pool liquid or vapor
property values and whether the pool boils or not.
Sensitivity analysis showed that even much shorter initial times for
molten pool formation, ~30 minutes, did not result in heat fluxes to the shield
tank water exceeding 30W/em2 , still weIl below the critical heat flux [5].
Interaetion of the Molten Pool \vith the Calandria Wall
Although the calandria wall should remain well-cooled during this stage
of the accident sequence, provided that the shield-tank water eooling system is
operational, the possibility of partial ealandria wall melting and failure
exists.
To investigate this question, the asymptotie behaviour of the molten
pool on the calandria wall under quasi-steady state conditions was anlyzed
using a one-dimensional model. From this analysis, the eonditions for wall
melting were established, as shown in the non-dimensional plot in Figure 8,
where 0 represents a non-dimensional source heat flux from the molten pool and
Bi
a
' the eoolant Biot number, represents the eooling eapability of the shield
tanR water.
For the highest predieted heat flux from the non-boiling molten pool
for the referenee eonditions, the shield tank water will be undergoing sub-
eooled nueleate boiling on the ealandria wall [5]. For these conditions, 0
~ 0.285 and Bi ~ 5.10, so that Figure 8 shows that there will be no melting
of the calandrr~ wall, and that, furthermore, these conditions ensure that the
wall is very far from the melting point. The analysis also showed that a
solidified erust of core material about 2.3em thick would form on the wall,
thus providing a proteetive shield. Further analysis showed that the heat
flux from the pool would have to be about 100 W/cm 2 , about five times the max-
imum predieted value for the referenee eonditions, before any melting of the
calandria wall would begin [5].
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For the property values which predict that the molten pool will boil, the
heat flux into the calandria wall is less than the maximum for non-boiling con-
ditions, so that the calandria wall under the surface of the pool will be also
weIl protected and cooled and far from the initiation of melting in this case
[5]. However, the vaporized core debris will condense on the calandria wall
above the pool surface, and the resulting high heat fluxes may cause melting
of the calandria wall. A simple model of this process was developed and em-
bodied in the computer program CONFILM. The model assurnes that a quasi-
equilibrium state would be established between evaporation of core material
from the surface of the pool and its condensation on the calandria walls above
the pool. The condensation heat transfer coefficient was established assuming
that conventio~al correlations apply and that the condensing film was under
laminar flow conditions. Results show ,hat the average condensation heat flux
for the reference conditions in this case is considerably higher than that from
the molten pool itself, about 50 to 55 W/cm 2 , depending on the property values
used. However, these values are still weIl below the critical heat flux for
these conditions so that the calandria wall above the pool surface will ramain
weIl cooled. Also, the interaction of the condensate film with the calandria
wall was assessed using the quasi-steady state model discussed earlier. This
assessment showed that this portion of the wall would also be far from any
initiation of melting and would be protected by a solidified layer of debris
about 1.Ocm thick [5].
End Point for the Accident Sequence
The analysis of the accident sequence shows that the core material debris,
whether solidified or molten, will not jeopardize the integrity of the calan-
dria vessel, irrespective of whether the molten pool boils or not. Calculations
with MOLTENPOOL show that, eventually, the molten pool would begin to re-
solidify at a time between 10 and 50 hours, depending on the molten material
property values. Thus, we can conclude with good confidence that essentially
the entire mass of core material will be contained within the calandria, as
long as the shield-tank cooling water system functions properly. The calandria,
in effect, acts as an effective inherent core catcher in a CANDU reactor.
Therefore, we also conclude that the subsequent stages of the accident se-
quence, as listed earlier in this paper, would not be experienced should this
accident actually occur:
Containment Pressurization and Effects
A single-node model was developed to estimate additional containment pre-
ssurization resulting from the loss of MCS and was incorporated into a computer
pro gram BLDG. Sensitivity studies with BLDG predicted maximum absolute pressures
in containment in the range of 140 to 165 kPa, weIl within the test pressure.
The additional maximum concentration of deuterium gas in containment resulting
from this accident sequence is about 0.6%, so that there would be no significant
increased probability of deuterium conbustion. Hhen major releases of bound
fission products occur, after debris melting begins, maximum absolute contain-
ment pressure is predicted to be in the range of 123 to 147 kPa.
Thus, we can conclude that this accident sequence will not cause contain-
ment failure and that radioactivity releases would be relatively low because
of low pressure differences across containment boundaries.
CONCLUSIONS
Important conclusions reached in the study of this accident sequence are:
a) The operators would have about 20 minutes to provide an alternate heat
sink for the moderator before channel uncovery and dis integration begin.
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b) The moderator would be completely expelled from the calandria in about
45 to 50 minutes.
c) No gross fuel melting would occur even when fuel channels are uncovered,
and fuel in the core debris in the bot tom of the calandria would not
begin to melt until about 135 minutes after the accident begins.
d) The calandria walls would not melt nor suffer significant damage from
molten core debris, even though boiling of the molten pool may occur,
provided that the shield-tank water cooling system remains operational.
e) Core debris would be contained within the calandria and would begin to
re-solidify in the period of 10 to 50 hours after the initiation of the
accident. The calandria serves as in inherent core catcher in a CANDU
reactor.
f) Pressurization of containment during the accident sequence would not
cause containment failure nor result in excessive releases of fission pro-
ducts outside containment.
Of course, there are considerable uncertainties in the properties and be-
haviour of CANDU core materials under the extreme conditions encountered in
this accident sequence, so that the results must be treated with caution until
such time as work on these topics [e.g., 13,14] yields further information.
It is judged that core debris would also be contained within the calandria
for an early - stagnation LOCA in which the pressure tubes balloon, rather than
sag, onto the calandria tubes [1].
While no assessment of event probabilities was made as part of this study,
rough estimates of the probability of this accident sequence indicate a value
considerably 1ess than 10- 7 per reactor year. With such a low probability, the
recommendations of reference [15] would not require that this accident sequence
be considered in a licensing application.
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FLUID-STRUCTURE INTERACTION IN PRESSURE WATER REACTORS
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ABSTRACT
A leak br a break in the primary system of apressure water
reactor (PWR) generates fluiddynamic loads in the coolant
system and speciallyon the reactor internals. Fluid-structure
interaction (FSI)-codes were developed and validated during
the last years to determine the realistic height, frequency
and location of the maximum load.
The FSI-code DAISY is validated at several Heiß Dampf Reaktor
(HDR)-blowdown experiments and extended by special features
to describe a PWR primary system. The loads and the stresses
are determined in the core barrel of a PWR, initiated by a
0.1 area leak in the cold leg of the coolant system near the
entrance nozzle of the pressure vessel.
INTRODUCTION
During the last years coupled fluid-structure interaction
(FSI)-codes have been developed and validated at the Heiß Dampf
Reaktor (HDR)-blowdown experiments. Today these codes can determine
realistic fluiddynamic loads on the reactor internals. The FSI-
program DAISY, developed by the Gesellschaft für Reaktorsicherheit
(GRS), participated with success in the validation program by pre-
and postshot calculations. In consistent application of the ob-
tained experiences with this program the complete 4 loop primary
circuit of apressure water reactor together with the core inter-
nals is simulated for the first time. This demands possibilities
to model pumps and heatexchangers, the adequate description of the
vessel internals and the thermodynamic states as weil. Consequent-
ly the requirements to the code are much higher as for the simula-
tion of the HDR-experiments.
Comprehensive extensions of the code concerning the behaviour of
pumps under decompression waves and the determination of the sta-
tionary twodimensional flowdistribution in the downcomer region
enable the coupled calculation of the fluiddynamic loads and the
structural response of the vessel internals.
THE DAISY-CODE
The calculations were performed with the GRS-code DAISY, which
consists of a fluid part, the network code DAPSY, a structure part,
the FE-program ASKA and a coupling interface. This interface cal-
culates from the displacements of the structure the new volumina
which are passed to the fluid part. The calculated pressures are
converted into forces which are used in the structure part.
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OAPSY is developed by GRS and is recently used in the licensing pro-
cedures. In the program the onedimensional equations for mass, mo-
mentum and energy are solved in Euler coordinates with the method
of characteristics. The two phase flow is described with a homo-
geneous thermodynamic nonequilibrium model. The slip between the
phases is not regarded but an additional fourth equation describes
the delayed attainment of the thermodynamic equilibrium for fast
dynamic transients. That means the mass equations for liquid and
vapour are connected by the mass transfer rate. The flow.velocity
in discharge orifices or contractions is limited by the local
soundspeed of the two phase mixture. 20 and 30 geometries are simu-
lated in connecting the onedimensional flowchannels by the network-
technique. By this technique the modelling is very flexible and
orifices combined with pressure drops, characteristic in the down-
corner of a PWR, are easy to simulate.
With the FE-code ASKA the structure of the RPV internals are model-
Ied with the appropriate elements (shells and beams) and the stiff-
ness, mass and damping matrices of the complete system are deter-
mined. To optimize the computation time, the number of degrees of
freedom is reduced to the essential one (radial, tangential) by a
static condensation. For the solution of the differential equation
system for the structure an explicit central difference method
without iterations is used. This method requires matrices, which
depend on the time step and are determined prior to the dynamic cal-
culation. With an elastic material behaviour these matrices need
not be changed during the whole calculation.
The coupling interface obtains the displacements of the core barrel
from the structure part, calculates the new volumina for the down-
comerand transfers this to the fluid part where the new pressures
are calculated. These pressures multiplied by the accompanying areas
are the new loadvector for the structure part.
365366
R300
\\-,1br'---=-----4!OJ ROß ROß
FIG, 1: FLUID :~ODEL DF RPV FOR DAISY FIG, 2: FLUID r,oDEL DF LDOP 1 FOR DAISY
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MODELLING AND RESULTS
For the ealeulation of the loading and struetural response of
PWR internals in ease of a blowdown the whole four loop primary
eireuit and the RPV (Fig. 1, 2) is modelled with 1652 fluid disere-
tisation points. Figure 3 shows the 2D-network of the downeomer
region. The blowdown assumption is a O.1A-leak with 15 ms opening
time aeeording to the German Reaktor-Sieherheitskommission (RSK)
gUidelines. The RPV internals (eore barrel, eore shroud, eore sup-
ports) are represented by 656 ASKA elements (Fig. 4). Beeause of
the non-symmetrie position of the blowdown loop and the mutual in-
0' 45' 90' 180 0 215' 270' 315'
273 ZR 275 m m 278 V9 260 28\ 2M 2~ 2~ 2~ 2M Ul 2U
9..,-.,;,@
"
27..,b:,(J)
"
~s \,\,(i)
" ~G 11 81-.,\,,'].0 90 ~@ ,~ ~9 '" ~{! '" ~~b~ r~~5 69266 101266 llho m \~1272~51 11m ~S9 35260 53 262 62 263 7126~ 93 261
'"
211
,
" "
34./43 52 '/61 10
"
.. 97 1"6'/115 ll4/m
'"
1
74' 74'
'"
74' 245 '46
'"
'46 249
'"
25' m 25l 2S4 151 '56
,
"
74 Jl
"
51
" " "
~
"
105
'"
123 112
'"
,
'"
'26 m 218
'"
,~ 231 212 2ll
'"
13'
'"
2ll 2J8 219
'",
"
13 n
"
so 59
"
TI
"
9S 104 '13 122 13'
'"
,
209 "0
'" '"
213
'"
21'
'"
zn ". '"
220 221
'" '" '", 13 22 11
" "
s.
"
16 BI 94 103
'"
121 130
'"
\
'" '" '" '" '" '" '"
100 10' '02 20' 20\ 105
'"
201 2('6
,
"
21
" " "
S1
"
JS
"
9l '02
'"
"0
'" '"
,
177 ". '"
Je'J '81
'" '" '"
'BI
'"
'87 ". '" '" '"
'97
,
"
20
" "
47 56 65 74
"
92 '01 '10 119 ". 131
,
'"
16' 16' 164 '65
'"
16' 16.
'"
'10 171 122 173 17\ "5
'"
~r 19 2537465564 TI 62 9\ m m 18 m
'"
,
\45 146 Hl m 149 150 151 152 151 154 155 156 157 156 159 '60
~ ........m~3M"":339 ';O~l9l-:::\i1ij'~li"'~~'~"'"L ~
Dllkretl1Ier\lnglr"h\~
der Rohre
'"
FIG. 3: FLUID I',DDEL DF THE DDHIICOMER FOR DAISY
"1- ". ,o'~
I
,
~
,,'
,
~
135'
-
~ , , ~
"160' l1S' 270' 315' 360':0'
16~M1,)4 I
, Kr>:lten "\lt tang,ntial~n Fre:~eitsgroden lRelbung;~rö!tel
"l Po~,tJo~ ~M rcd;clen Ans(~\ogen
FIG. 4: STRUCTURE MODEL OF THE CO RE BARREL FOR DAISY
412
I
Ehf--f--
I
--"" ~
h ;,V .~~~. V'~~ I'-
\. 1/ --e- "G-- '"I~.-'"
"
If LEGENDo =DAPSY
I:> =DATSY f-----
-
fluence of the other three loops the whole RPV (360°) and primary
system had to be modelled. A realistic computation of the blowdown
implies an accurate description of the thermodynamic initial con-
ditions. Therefore the correct reproducing of the flowconditions
and pressure losses were considered to be important. The flexibili-
ty of the network technique allows the consideration of the chang-
ing cross-section in the downcomer near the nozzle-region (see
Fig. 1). Furthermore the pump model was adapted to the requirements
of decompression waves and a calculation for stationary flow con-
ditions was carried out to determine the 2D-flow distribution in
the downcomer region.
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Figure 5, 6 and 7 show pressure difference and radial displacements
of the core barrel. The thermodynamic state of this calculation
corresponds to normal operating conditions, i.e. 100 % load. The
comparison between a coupled and uncoupled (DAPSY) calculation
(Fig. 5), i.e. without FSI, shows a slight influence on the pres-
sure difference across the corebarrel opposite to the blowdown
loop. Because of the large stiffness of the core barrel the maximum
pressure difference of 13.0 bar decrease only to 10.5 bar in the
coupled DAISY-calculation. This loading results in a maximum radial
displacement of 2.0 mm at this point (Fig. 7) while the lower core
support hits the core stops at 2.5 mm (Fig. 6). The core barrel
flange slides1.9 mm (gap: 7.5 mm) and stops after ca. 60 ms
because the circumferential pressure field is in equilibrium
(Fig. 7).
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The ealeulated pressure- and displaeement-fields of the eore barrel
at 20 ms and 60 ms are shown in figures 8 and 9. At these times the
highest loeal load (20 ms, see fig. 5) and largest displaeements
(60 ms, see fig. 7) are reaehed.
The struetural response on the fluiddynamie load follows nearly
without delay in the flange region with loeal bulge (right site
fig. 8) and then with sliding. The lower part with the eore mass
moves later. The initially nonuniform pressure field (fig. 8)
reaehes at 60 ms a uniform eireumferential distribution (fig. 9)
while the displaeements due to sliding are strongly asymmetrie.
"-1/ ;:0:+-S':- ::CI ~::i.:::J:,:r;7'::::.B= ::Ci
~:' : .. , ,
I I I:;., I
I 1= - 1 .. ,- "I . ~..... - I
I ---~ - ~. I
I.. I
I 1
I I
I I
I I
I I
I I
I I
I I
U:':_- _c'~·:·W
D~'R -= ?
t LEGEND I----1-1 "=KM AM BST,A(Il = KM AM FLANSCH,I
r1/ \ /;
\ N V
'"
""'-~
~ IV I\-, "hc-,k
-
o
co
1_0 ,01 0,00 0.01 O.OZ 0.03 0.04 0,05 0,06 0.07 0.08 0.09 0,10
ZEIT IN SEC CRS DAISY-3
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AT T = 60 ms
The highest stresses in the eore barrel appear opposite to the
break nozzle and in the flange region (fig. 10) but they are still
in the elastie domain. On the other side (180° from the break
nozzle) the highest axial membran stresses (fig. 11) are ealeulated
at about 40 ms. They result from the global movement of the eore
co
..,.
FIG. 10: PWR, O,lA-LEAK, EQUIVALENT STRESSES IN THE CORE BARREL
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barrel (fig. 6). In this analysis the flange was eonsidered as
fixed in the axial but sliding in the horizontal direetion. In rea-
lity the flange is able to twist if it is axial loaded eaused by an
asymmetrie flange support. Detailed FE analysis were performed by
several institutions. They found a stress amplifieation faetor for
the outer surfaee of the eore barrel wall in dependenee of the art
of flange support (elamped, fixed, loose) whieh varies between 3
and 10. With the highest· faetor a slight loeal plastifieation at
the outer surfaee eannot be exeluded whieh does not affeet the
struetural integrity of the flange.
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FIG, 11: PWR, Q,lA-LEAK, EQUIVALENT STRESSES IN THE CORE BARREL
CONCLUSION
The eoupled FSI-eode DAISY is able to simulate all important
effeets in the primary system of a PWR during a blowdown aeeident.
This analysis ineludes the simulation of eritieal two phase flow in
orifiees, thermodynamie non-equilibrium states near the diseharge
orifiee as weIl as the deseription of pressure wave propagation
with strueture interaetion within the RPV.
The application of the code to areal PVR leads in case of a 0.1
area leak to loads which do not ehallenge the core barrel integrity.
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RETRAN PREDICTIONS FOR PRESSURE TRANSIENTS FOLLOWING
A FEEDWATER LINE BREAK AND CONSEQUENT CHECK VALVE CLOSING
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ABSTRACT
Two subroutines describing the conventional swing type and damped plug type
check valve have been developed and implemented into the thermo-hydraulic
transient code RETRAN. Both models have been used to simulate a postulated
feedwater line rupture of the KKB PWR plant (Kernkraftwerk Beznau) and to ana-
lyse pressure responses following the closing of the check valve. The conven-
tional undamped swing type check valve yields press ure transients that may je-
opardize the integrity of the isolated part of the feedwater system. With a
properly designed damped plug type check valve, the pressure peaks can be sup-
pressed almost totally.
1.0 INTRODUCTION
The main feedwater line supplying a steam generator (SG) usually contains a
check valve (CV). A function of this CV is to prevent the SG from blowing
down during the event of a feedwater pipe rupture upstream of the valve.
In case of a feedwater pipe rupture, the CV should close as soon as possible,
in order to allow a minimal loss of water from the SG only. On the other
hand, a fast closing valve can produce severe pressure transients (water-
hammer) in the feedwater line between the SG and the CV. These pressure tran-
sients can potentially lead to violation of the isolated part of the feedwater
system. To overcome this problem, it has been suggested that the use of a
damped CV can diminish the severity of the pressure transients/1-3/.
Since no models in RETRAN /4/ are available that accurately can predict the
closing time of a CV under reverse flow conditions, two models have been de-
veloped and implemented in RETRAN. The first model describes a conventional
swing type CV that may close and open. The dynamics of this valve is des-
cribed by an inhomogeneous second-order linear differential equation. The
second valve model describes a damped plug type CV. The damping term in the
equations of motion for the valve piston is proportional to the velocity
squared. The proportionality factor may be a function of piston position. It
allows an increased damping when the valve is almost closed. Both CV models
have been tested with aRETRAN model describing a postulated feedline rupture
at one of both Westinghouse designed KKB plants (Kernkraftwerk Beznau) in Do-
ettingen, Switzerland, that is runned by the utility NOK (Nord-Ostschweizeri-
sehe Kraftwerke). The results for the swing type CV have been compared with
earlier NOK results obtained with the ITCH-MULTIFLEX code /5/.
2.0 THE RETRAN SIMULATION MODEL
RETRAN-02 is a thermal hydraulic code that can be used in the best estimate
analysis of light water reactor systems. It is based on a homogeneous one-di-
mensional hydrodynamic model and describes a piping network by dividing the
* present address: Institute of Nuclear Energy Technology, TSjingua Univer-
sity, P.O. Box 1021, Beijing, China
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system into aseries of control volumes. The control volumes are connected by
flow paths called junctions. Components can be placed at either control vo-
lumes or junctions.
Both Beznau PWR plants are almost identical in construction and equiped with
two SG which both are supplied with feedwater (FW) through the main feedwater
line (MFL). The MFL has two loops that meet each other in a mixing section.
In each loop a CV is built in to prevent the SG from blowing down after a MFL
break. For the present analyses a MFL break is postulated in one of the loops
near the mixing section. To analyse the pressure and mass flow transients in
this loop with the RETRAN code, the following assumptions were made.
nodalization scheme for analysing CV closure transients
legend
CD : control volume number i
@ J J : Junction number J
@ : steom generotor
@ @ : leok oreo (mochine house)
@ J28: break oreo
J26
J21 ® CV : check volve
lVi: Isolation valve number i(i. 1,2,3}
FCV: Flow cantrol volve
VI: volve for inlerrupting FW supply
V 2 : valve for simuloling .teom flow
V 3 : volve for simuloting MFL break
• The SG is represented as one control volume with Wilson's bubble rise
model built in and a constant internal heat production ( representing
the'primary system) of 814.2 MW and a constant vapour outflow of
359.33 kg/s. The pressure in the SG is assumed to be 6.89 MPa.
• No heat transfer occurs from the environment during the transient.
• The initial flow rate is 359.33 kgls with a specific enthalpy of
514.2 kJ/kg.
• At the beginning of the transient, a double ended pipe break is as-
sumed. This break is represented as two valves V3 and VI which are
opened/closed with a ramp function with a raising time of 1 ms. The
break cross sectional area is assumed to be equal to 0.114 m2 .
• In the loop, three isolation valves (lVi) and one feedwater control
valve (FCV) are built in. During the transient the IV are assumed to
remain fully open. The FCV remains in a half-open posi tion.
• The total length of the piping between SG and broken end is 60.9 m.
The CV is located at a distance of 21.2 m from the broken end.
Based on above assumptions a proper RETRAN input model has been developed.
The model can be used for calculations for both the conventional swing type CV
and the damped plug type CV when appropriate CV parameters are supplied to the
relevant CV routine. A nodalization scheme of the RETRAN input model is given
in Figure 2-1.
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3.0 MODEL FOR THE GONVENTIONAL SWING TYPE AND THE DAMPED PLUG TYPE GV
A conventional swing type GV consists of a disc (or door) in a flow channel
and can (under influence of gravity and fluid forces) rotate around a rotation
axis to vary the effective flow area in the flow channel. For a flow into the
positive direction the valve disc is raised to enlarge the valve opening area.
Under influence of gravity and of reversed flow forces, the motion of the
valve disc is reversed.
flow chonnel
~ashpot cylinder
dashpot piston
volve disc
Fig.3-1: Gonventional swing type GV Fig. 3-2: Damped plug type GV
With the assumption of decoupling of the dynamical equations for the fluid and
for the valve disc, the influence of the position of the disc on the fluid mo-
tion is fully described by the effective opening area and the pressure drop
across the valve. In principle they can be measured under stationary condi-
tions and may depend on the flow direction. In Figure 3-1 a scheme of the
physical model for the conventional swing type GV is given. The angular form
of Newton's equation of motion is:
valve disc area
distance of geometrica.l center of the disc to its rotation axis
angle of the feedwater line to the vertical
angle of the disc relative to the closed position
linear damping factor
gravitational acceleration
inertial momentum of disc, relative to its rotation axis
mass of the disc
J
where M
and A
r
1jJ
<p
K
g
J
m
M
A . r • IIp v - m ' g . r • cos (<P-1jJ)
(1)
( 2)
The second term in Eq. 1 represents a linear damping term that might be pre-
sent. The first term in Eq. 2 is due to the pressure differential lIPv across
the valve. The second term represents the torque due to the weight.
In Figure 3-2 a model for a (non-linearly) damped plug type valve with dashpot
is given. The allowance (or gap areal between the dashpot cylinder and the
dashpot piston depends on the disc position x. For an almost closed valve (x
small) the gap area is small yielding a strong damping. In case the valve is
almost completely open (x large), the gap area is large, yielding an almost
undamped valve behaviour. The total force on the moved mass (valve disc,
valve shaft and dashpot piston) then has four terms due to the weight, to the
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atmospheric pressure, to the pressure difference across the valve disc and due
to the pressure difference across the dashpot piston. Assuming the fluid in
the dashpot is incompressible, the flow is stationary and the shaft diameter
is neglectibly small, the following equation of motion can be established:
where
m· x = f;
G = lIpv ' AD
f=-G-~.:ic.
2
+ m • g • cos (ß);
licl
(4)
and X
AD
m
g
ß
i;g
position of valve disc, relative to the closed position
valve disc area
total moved mass (shaft, piston and disc)
gravitational acceleration
angle of shaft to the vertical
pressure loss coefficient for flow through the allowance
between dashpot cylinder and piston
density of fluid in dashpot
dashpot piston cross sectional area
internal dashpot cylinder cross sectional area
Based on the Eqs. 1 and 3 two subroutines have been developed and implemented
into the RETRAN code. Assuming M is a constant during aRETRAN time step,
Eq. 1 is solved analytically. Eq. 3 is solved numerically during each RETRAN
time step (see /6/). The coupling between the CV sUbroutines and the RETRAN
code is as foliows. RETRAN provides the subroutine the proper variables to
calculate the torque Mor force f. The subroutine, on the other hand, pro-
vides the value of the angle ~ or lift x to the RETRAN code. This enables RE-
TRAN to calculate the junction area (area-angle or area-lift table) that
enters directly into the momentum equation for the fluid.
4.0 RESULTS FOR THE CONVENTIONAL SWING TYPE CHECK VALVE
For the conventional swing type CV actually built in in the KKB plant, the
following quantities were determined:
maximum opening angle 0.87 rad (=50°)
moment of inertia I = 6.9641 kg m2
area moment A· r = 0.0402 m3
angle of flow channel to the vertical ~ = ~/2 rad (= 90°)
Using these data, the swing type CV model and the RETRAN simulation model of
Figure 2-1, a transient analysis has been performed. The results are summar-
ized as foliows:
After rupture of the feedwater line (upstream of the CV) a decompression wave
propagates from the rupture to the SG. The SG acts as a constant pressure
boundary condition (fixed end), such that the pressure wave reflects at the SG
with an inversion of its phase. The result is a compression wave that travels
back to the break. At the break this wave reflects again to strike the check
valve which closes soon after that (110ms after break).
Simultaneously and parallel to the pressure wave a mass flow wave propagates
from the break into the direction of the SG. This mass flow wave reflects at
the steam generator without phase inversion and travels further with doubled
amplitude into the direction of the break. When the wave hits the CV, the re-
versed mass flow closes it.
After closing of the valve, the mass flow through the valve is stopped abrupt-
ly. As a consequence, the kinetic energy of the flow is transformed into
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pressure energy. The result is a damped standing pressure wave between the
closed CV and the SG. The magnitude of the first pressure peak 1s 16.71 MPa.
The numerical results show a good agreement w1th results obtained with the
ITCH-MULTIFLEX code.
In the Figures 4-1 through 4-3 the disc position, its closing velocity and the
torque on the disc are given as a function of time. The disc position and the
torque on the disc are compared with results from the ITCH-MULTIFLEX code./5/.
For more details see /6/
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5.0 PARAMETRIC STUDIES FOR THE SWING TYPE CHECK VALVE
Some system parameters used in the transient analyses do contain several un-
certaint1es. Therefore parametric studies have been carried out to specify
the influence of these uncertainties on the transient. The results of these
studies are summarized in Table 5-1 and discussed below.
5.1 Inertia and Form Loss Coefficient of the Check Valve
It can easily be demonstrated that the valve dynamic behaviour during a tran-
sient is mainly affected by the form loss coefficient and the inertia of the
valve. Unfortunately, an exact value of the valve inertia could not be ob-
tained from the valve drawings. Furthermore, the reverse form loss coeffi-
cient of the valve remains unknown. Consequently, it is necessary to investi-
gate the influences of these uncertainties on the transient.
Case 1,2,3 and 4 of Table 5-1 show the effects of the valve inertia on the
valve closing time and on the pressure peaks. The influences of the reverse
form loss coefficient of a valve on the transient are given by case 2,5 and 6.
One observes that a larger form loss coefficient and a smaller inertia of a
check valve will cause the valve to close earlier and this, in turn, will more
or 1ess reduce the pressure peak because the reverse flow through the valve
has not fully developed at the moment when the valve closes complete1y. On
the other hand, it is also seen that the form loss coefficient and the inertia
of a CV have greater influence on the valve closing time than on the magnitude
of the pressure peaks. In other words, the pressure peaks following a CV slam
are less sensitive to the form lass coefficient and inertia'of the valve.
5.2 The Pipe Break Time
For safety analyses one usually assurnes an instantaneous double ended guillo-
tine break. For the present analyses, the instantaneous break has been mo-
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delled by assuming a junction area that, up to the full open area, increases
linearly in time. The time passed between the begin of the break and the mo-
ment where the full open area has been achieved - the break time was set
equal to 1 ms. A more realistic value, however, might be 20 ms. In order to
see how sensitive this break time is for the magnitude of the pressure peaks
to be expected after the CV sIam, three different break times have been consi-
dered: 1 ms (case 2), 20 ms (case 7) and 200 ms (case 8). From the results
it is seen that the pipe break time in the given range will affect the valve
closing time, but it has not much influence on the magnitude of the pressure
peaks.
--------------------------------------------------------- --------
Case I* 1;* t br I;f(3) I;r(3) Aeff t cl Pv max
------- ------ --------- --------- ----------
0.5 110 16.71
--------
2 1.0 134 17.37
0.4 12.38 30.95 0.0418 --------
3 2.0 178 17.17
--------
4 4.0 228 1'{ .18
------- ------
5 0.2 150 17.99
6 1.0 115 16.73
7 20 136 17.75
1.0
8 200 144 17 .31
0.4
9 12.38 130 20.62
--------- -------- ---------- ---------------
10 2.27 3.41 0.1143 126 25.52
Legend: I* normalized disc inertia (-)
1;* ratio of reverse and forward form loss coeff. of CV (-)v pipe break time (ms)tbr
I;f(3) : forward form loss coefficient junction 3 (FCV + IV) (-)
I;r(3) : reverse form loss coefficient juncUon 3 (FCV + IV) (-)
Aeff : effective flow area FCV (m2)
tel closing time of CV (ms)
Pmax highest pressure peak after CV closure (MPa)
Table 5-1: Results of parametric studies for the swing type CV
5.3 Flow Restriction on the Feedwater Line
In the KKB plant, a flow control valve (FCV) is fitted into the main feedwater
Une. A quite largepressure drop across. the FCV has been found in the NOK
supplied documents. This suggests that the FCV might playa role of a flow
restriction during a blowdown transient. However, uncertainty in the pressure
10ss across the FCV is encountered once again. In· particular, the reverse
form 10ss coefficient is unknown.
Three cases considered for the FCV flow resistance are shown as cases 2, 9 and
10 in Tab1e 5-1. Case 9 represents the situation where the reverse form loss
coefficient of the.FCV is set equal to the forward form loss coefficient.
Gase 10 represents the situation without FCV fitted into the feed line. For
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both cases the reverse flow will develop more rapidly and reach a higher value
just before the CV closes. As a resul t, the CV will elose earlier and produce
higher pressure peaks.
6.0 RESULTS FüR THE DAMPED PLUG TYPE CHECK VALVE
For the damped plug type CV the following quantities were adopted:
disc area
moved mass
max disc lift
0.1018m2
70 kg
0.13 m
The damping parameter (( as a function of disc position x (damping characteris-
tics) is given in Figure 6-1. The vallIes of ((1' ((2' xl and x2 have been sllb-ject of a parametrie study.
::b----8'1-----x
Xl X2
Figure 6-1: Domplng chorocterl8t1c8 01 the domped plug type CV
A sllrvey of the calculations and the most important results (closing time and
pressure peak) are given in Table 6-1 and discussed below. A graphical repre-
sentation of some of the results is given in Figures 6-2 and 6-3. The calcu-
lation designed as case 1 is considered as the reference case. With the as-
sumed valve data a valve closing time of 350 ms and apressure peak of 9.7 MPa
was found.
6.1 Influence of the Damping Parameter (cases 2,3,4 and 5)
To see the influence of the region of weak damping, one calculation has been
performed for which the damping parameter was taken constant over the entire
range of the disc travel (case 2) and equal to the value for case 1 in the re-
gion of weak damping. The result is an almost undamped fast closing valve. A
closing time of 100 ms and apressure peak of 15.8 MPa was found. This pres-
sure peak is not as high as found for the swing type check valve (section 5,
case 1) due to the faster closing of the valve.
For the calculations indicated as cases 3 and 4, the damping parameter (region
of strong damping) has been decreased. The result is a shorter valve closing
time, and consequently higher presslIre peaks. An increased damping for the
region of weak damping (case 5), on the other hand, enlarges the valve closing
time slightly and consequently slightly higher pressure peaks are predicted.
6.2 Influence of the Damping Characteristic (cases 6,7,8,9 and 10)
The damping characteristic of the damped valve is not only determined by the
values ((1 and ((2' but also by the transition points xland x 2 . With smalleI" va-lues of xland x2 the dashpot piston enters into the region of strong dampinglater. Because the early phase of the valve closing process does not influ-
ence considerably the'mass flow through the valve, an early entering into the
region of strong damping causes a later closing of the valve without diminish-
ing the pressure peaks. On the other hand, if the valve enters into the re-
gion of strong damping too late, the valve will slow down more abruptly. This
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Parameter-Table with : 0 ~ x ~ xl --> a = al : Xz ~ X ~ xmax --> a = aZ
Xmax = 130 mm ; initial pressure = 7.1 MPa
case xl Xz a l a z closing pressure
Nr. time peak
mm mm 106kg/m 103kg/m ms MPa
---- -------- --------- -------- -----------------------------------
40 55 38.7 0.42 350 9.7 reference case
2
3
5
o
--------
40 55 19.3
---- --------
40 55 3.87
--------
40 55 38.7
0.42
0.42
0.42
4.2
100
266
160
358
15.8
11.2
14.7
10.3
almost no damping
decreased SD
decreased SD
increased weak damping
6
7
8
-------- --------- -------- ---------- -------------------------
25 40 38.7 0.42 262 13.9 smaLler region of SD
-------- --------- -------- -----------------------------------
25 40 193.0 0.42 490 12.5 as case 6. increased SD
-------- --------- -------- ---------- -------------------------
50 65 38.7 0.42 424 8.49 larger region of SD
9
10
50 65
60 75
19.3
38.7
0.42
0.42
324
536
9.6
8.48
as 8, decreased SD
very large region of SD
11
12
As Case 1, but no FCV
As Case 8. but no FCV
341
400
12.7
10.7
Table 6-1: Parametrie study for damped plug type CV (SD = strong damping)
in turn might cause higher pressure peaks. The calculations, indicated as
cases 6, 8 and 10 indeed show this behaviour. For case 8. where xl = 50 mm,
obviously an optimal situation has been reached. A closing time of 424 ms and
apressure peak of 8.49 MPa was obtained. A value of xl = 60 mm (case 10) in-
fluences the pressure peak only slightly (8.49 MPa instead of 8.48 MPa) where-
as the closing time is enlarged considerably (536 ms instead of 424 ms).
Smaller values of xl (case 1 and 6 with xl = 40 mm, and xl = 25 mm, respec-
tively) yield higher pressure peaks. The cases 7 and 9 have been calculated
to see, in comparison with case 6 and 8. the influence of the dampingparame-
ter al' As expected a higher/lower value of al yields a largerlshorter clos-
ing time and lower/higher pressure peaks.
6.3 Flow Restrietion on the Feed Water Line (cases 11 and 12)
The aim of the calculation case 11 and 12 was to determine the influence of
the FCV when simulating a damped valve in the feedwater line. The calculation
of the reference case 1 and of the optimal case 8 were repeated with the as-
sumption of no FCV being in the feedline. For case 1 the closing time reduces
slightly from 350 to 341 ms. The pressure peak increases from 9.7 to 12.7
MPa. Similar results were obtained for case 8. The closing time of the CV
reduces from 424 to 400 ms and the pressure peak increases from 8.49 MPa to
10.7 MPa.
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7.0 SUMMARY AND GONGLUSIONS
Two subroutines describing the conventional swing type and damped plug type GV
have been developed and implemented into the thermo-hydralllic transient code
RETRAN. Both models have been used to simulate a postulated feedwater line
rupture of the KKB PWR plant and to analyse pressure responses following the
closing of the GV. The results obtained with the undamped swing type GV have
been compared with results obtained with the ITGH-MULTIFLEX code. The main
conclusions are listed below.
• The RETRAN calculations performed with the conventional swing type
GV, as actually built in in the KKB plant, showa good agreement with
results obtained with the ITGH-MULTIFLEX code.
• For the postlIlated feedwater line rupture both codes predict a valve
closing time of 134 ms and pressure peaks after closing of 17 MPa.
These pressure peaks may jeopardize the integrity of the isolated
part of the feedwater system.
• The assumption of an instantaneous rupture is neither conservative
nor non-conservative. Even with an unrealistic large break time of
200 ms the magnitude of the highest pressure peak remains almost un-
changed.
• For accurately predicting the pressure responses, the reversed mass
flow after the break should be calculated correctly. For that reason
it is inevitable to have reliable values of the pressure 10ss coeffi-
cients of all fitting in the feedwater line for reversed flows.
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The damped plug type CV considered in the present analyses has two different
damping regions. If the valve is almost completely opened (large lift of the
valve piston) there is only a small damping. If the valve is nearly closed
(small lift of the valve piston) the damping is very strong. In both regions
a constant damping parameter is assumed. In the transitional region the damp-
ing parameter is interpolated linearly. The main conclusions that could be
drawn from the analyses with the damped plug type CV can be summarized as fol-
lows:
o During the first phase of closing, whereas the valve damping is
small, the closing process does not influence the mass flow, nor the
pressure peaks after closing.
o There exists an optimal value of the lift of the valve piston at
which the valve enters into the region of strong damping. With this
optimal value, the pressure peaks after closing can be suppressed al-
most completely.
G Larger values of the damping parameter for the region of strong damp-
ing yield longer closing times and lower pressure peaks after clos-
ing.
o When the valve enters into the region of strong damping earlier than
in the optimal situation, longer closing times and unchanged pressure
peaks are predicted.
o When the valve enters into the region of strong damping later than in
the optimal situation, shorter closing times and higher pressure
peaks are expected. These higher pressure peaks cannot or only
scarcely suppressed by higher vallIes of the damping parameter.
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REACTOR FAULT SIMULATION AT TRE CLOSURE OF TRE
WINDSCALE ADVANCED GAS-COOLED REACTOR: ANALYSIS OF TRANSIENT TESTS
J.A.Desoisa and C.P.Greef
Central Electricity Generating Board
Berkeley Nuclear Laboratories, Berkeley,
Gloucestershire, GL13 9PB, ENGLAND
ABSTRACT
The closure of the Windscale prototype advanced gas-cooled reactor
(AGR) offered a unique opportunity to test fault study calculational
methods under extreme conditions, relatively unfettered by economic
constraints. Three major types of experiment were carried out:
fast reactivity transients from very low to near full power, large
amplitude reactivity ramps at power and gas circulator trip experi-
ments. Preliminary modelling of the more extreme tests using the
CAGR fault study code has previously demonstrated agreement to within
5-10% in both power and temperature transients. More refined
analyses have now been completed. These take account of detailed
fuel stringer geometry and certain transient effects, have enabled
uncertainties to be quantified and have led to further increased
confidence in the computer model.
INTRODUCTION
Computer codes to simulate reactor behaviour in a postulated fault play an
important part in the safety cases for Commercial Advanced Gas-Cooled Reactors
(CAGR's) in the U.K. Testing the adequacy of these fault study codes is a
continuing process, helping to increase confidence in the safety case and
potentially enabling increases in power output to be achieved. A great deal
of relevant testing can be carried out with analytical and computer studies and
by comparison with laboratory experiments. However, the direct simulation of
fault sequences on a commercial reactor is clearly excluded on safety grounds
and the scope for any type of measurement on commercial plant is severely re-
stricted by economic constraints.
The closure of the prototype AGR at Windscale (WAGR) therefore offered a
unique opportunity to test fault study methods under conditions weIl beyond
those experimentally and economically achievable on commercial reactors and an
experimental programme which included a comprehensive series of re actor transient
tests was jointly funded and performed by the Central Electricity Generating
Board, the South of Scotland Electricity Board and the Uni ted Kingdom Atomic
Energy Authority.
A detailed description of the execution of these tests and preliminary
analysis has been reported L-l=/. This work demonstrated in general terms the
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adequacy of the fault study code KINAGRAX L-2:1 used in the analysis of the
experimental data. Subsequently a more detailed and comprehensive analysis
has been undertaken in an attempt to quantify the uncertainties in the code.
This has involved the modelling of several features of the experiments not
considered in the ·preliminary analysis and sensitivity studies for the more
important input parameters of the computer code. It is this work that is
reported in this paper.
EXPERIMENTAL MEASUREMENTS
The planning and execution of the experiments have been described in some
detail elsewhere L-l=l: only the main points are given here.
The WAGR has a thermal output of 100 MW compared with about 1500 MW for
CAGR. The reactor cores are very similar, with the same configuration of re-
entrant flow passages and almost identical fuel pins supported in similar grids
and braces. Fuel ratings and temperature distributions throughout the reactor
core are comparable. The major distinction concerns the fuel stringer: the
WAGR stringer has four elements each of nine fuel pins in a single ring whereas
the CAGR stringer has eight elements with 36 pins in three rings.
The experiments were designed to simulate the major characteristics of
CAGR pressurised faults. Three types of transient were investigated to tast
the performance of the computer code over the range of relevant conditions.
Fast symmetric reactor power transients were initiated from low power
(down to 200 watts) up to near full power by withdrawing the bank of 18 in-line
control rods uniformly across the reactor core. Measurements were carried
out at two flow rates, from different power levels and, in successive tests,
with increasing reactivity additions to produce a minimum neutron flux doubling
time of 2.3 seconds in the most extreme case. The objective of these measure-
ments was to simulate the rapid flux rise time associated with uncontrolled
start-up reactivity faults.
At-power reactivity transients were also carried out, starting from a
number of initial power and flow levels. In the most extreme of these tests,
starting from an initial state of 72 MW and 57% flow, peak recorded fuel can
temperatures of 10000C were achieved at apower of 130 MW (i.e. 130% full power).
This was weIl in excess of the corresponding full power operating temperatures
(800 - 8500C) although for economic reasons it was not possible to extend the
tests to the temperatures postulated for the severest CAGR faults (around
11000C).
The third main category of experiment was the gas circulator trip tests.
In these, all four main gas circulators were tripped simultaneously with the
result that the gas flow fell over a timescale of a few tens of seconds to
15% full flow at which level pony motors automatically operated to maintain
that flow. Temperatures initially rose and were ultimately stabilised by the
cornbined effects of the negative fuel temperature reactivity feedback and the
pony motors. In addition to these three major types of test, comprising some
35 transients in all, subsidiary measurements were made to provide values of
control rod slope and fuel temperature coefficient of reactivity required for
the analysis. The rod slope was determined from conventional low-power
doubling and halving measurements, the results being ~sed directly in the
analysis. The fuel temperature coefficient was determined by the dynamic
technique applied successfully to CAGR's L-3:/, the measurements in this case
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being used simply to verify the values derived theoretically from reactor
physics lattice codes.
Extensive reactor instrumentation was available in WAGR for recording
reactor behaviour, including coolant gas and fuel can thermocouples, gas flow
recorders, and in-core and ex-core neutron flux chambers. Arrangements were
made for the computerised logging of all the relevant data at appropriate
sampling rates.
METHOD OF ANALYSIS
The c2mguter code upon which CAGR fault studies are largely based is
KINAGRAX L 2_/ and accordingly it is with this code that the experiments have
been analysed. The KINAGRAX calculation is for a single fuel channel repre-
sentation of average reactor transient behaviour, including fuel and moderator
temperature reactivity feedback. A one-dimensional single energy group
neutron diffusion equation is used to determine the axial rating distribution.
This is coupled to a thermal hydraulic calculation which models the various
heat transfer processes between fuel pins, coolant flows and moderator com-
ponents and provides radial temperature distributions at each axial plane in
the calculation (see Fig. 1). In addition, provision exists for the modelling
of two specific reactor channels in which the thermal hydraulic calculations
are driven by the flux in the average channel enhancedby user specified multi-
pliers to give the required initial channel powers and in which the coolant
flow rates may be different from the average channel.
The thermal hydraulic data used in the analysis have been obtained from
previous WAGR investigations and prepared according to CAGR recommended methods.
This was to ensure that the use of the computer code in the experimental anal-
ysis was fully consistent with its use in CAGR fault studies (except that some
items of data are deliberately pessimised'in fault studies, whereas best
estimate data were used throughout in the WAGR analysis).
The nuclear data were in general obtained from lattice calculations
averaged to a mean core irradiation of 10.5 GWD/Te on the assumptions of fuel
cycle equilibrium and a flat radia1 flux. Where necessary the data were also
axially averaged using the flux shape appropriate to the mean position over fuel
life of'the bank of eighteen in-line control rods.
The fuel temperature coefficient measurements spanned a range of mean fuel
temperatures from 400 - 8000 C and gave agreement to within about 5% (la) Witll
lattice calculations, allowing the use of calculated coefficients for the higher
fuel temperatures reached in some experiments. Likewise, the modelling of the
measured control rod slope in KINAGRAX led to a total uncertainty in rod worth
of 5% (la) for the range of transients of interest. The axial flux shapes
input to KINAGRAX were obtained from an extensive correlation of measured flux
shapes (from wire plots) as a function of rod insertion: the error in this
data was 3% (la) relative to mean.
Certain features of the experiments were not modelled in the preliminary
analyses reported previously L-l=/ but have been included here because they
have a measurable effect on the predictions.
Firstly, it was necessary to modify KINAGRAX to model the central graphite
tie tube (Fig. 1) whose thermal inertia is very large compared with the corres-
ponding CAGR tie bar which is not modelled. The effect of the tie tube, which
is to retard the response of temperatures to power and flow changes, is most
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c1ear1y seen in the circu1ator trip tests (Fig. 2): the initial rate of rise of
temperature is reduced as heat is absorbed in the tie tube and simi1ar1y the
reduction in temperature fo110wing f10w stabi1isation is slowed down, with the
tie tube now acting as a heat source.
Can temperatures were measured by thermocoup1es mounted in thick-wa11ed
cans having the same outer diameter as standard cans and so containing a
sma11er vo1ume of fue1 of higher enrichment in order to maintain linear fue1
rating. The KINAGRAX model was extended to predict dynamic effects associated
with the thicker cans (1.9 mm compared with the standard 0.4 mm) as we11 as the
temperature drop through the can, taking account of the sma11 rating mismatch
that deve10ped with irradiation. In practice, none of these effects a10ne was
greater than about 100C in can temperature and, because of se1f-cance11ing, the
net effect was itse1f 1ess than this.
The coo1ant f10w through the reactor core was significant1y inf1uenced by
gas temperature changes during the transients: in the most extreme case,
a transient from 10w to high power invo1ving a 1arge increase in gas temper-
ature, the f10w reduced by 13% by the peak of the transient. This effect was
not mode11ed in pre1iminary ana1yses, but has been incorporated now, ca1cu1at-
ing the f10w variation from the experimental record of core pressure drop and
coo1ant temperature, and inputting this variation as a boundary condition to
KINAGRAX. In consequence, the ca1cu1ated temperatures have increased but not
as much as in inverse proportion to the f10w decrease because of the negative
fue1 temperature reactivity feedback.
RESULTS OF SIMULATIONS
About one half of the 35 major transients has been simu1ated with KINAGRAX.
In each case ca1cu1ated powers have been compared with measured f1uxes from
10garithmic and linear chambers, and ca1cu1ated can and coo1ant temperatures with
measurements from four different instrumented fue1 stringers, encompassing a
range of power level, f10w rate and axial location of can thermocoup1es. Sens-
itivity studies have also been carried out on a few se1ected transients, varying
the principa1 input parameters of the computer code to assess the effect of
uncertainties in the parameters. The sensitivity studies are presented in the
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next section and here the main results are discussed, using in general the most
extreme transient of each type as an illustration.
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Figures 3 and 4 show results obtained for a transient at full flow,
starting at 38 kW reactor power and rising to a peak of 91.7 MW, with a
reactivity addition of 523 mN ($0.75). The initial reactor power for the
calculation was determined from the log chambers, so the log fluxes in Figure
3 are effectively normalised at the start. The linear power chambers were
reliable only as an indicator of relative power, hence in this case measurement
has been normalised to calculation at the peak to emphasise the shape of the
transient in the region where feedback becomes operative and the control rods
stop, pause and then reinsert. The temperatures in Figure 4 are from one of
the four channels analysed: the flow rate for this channel was determined by
the position of the coolant gag at the channel outlet, and the channel power
was obtained from high power steady state reactor surveys of channel gas
outlet temperatures, assuming that the power distribution did not change
significantly with reactor power.
The excellent agreement in power in the early part of the transient
demonstrates the accuracy of the KINAGRAX model for this type of fast, no-
feedback transient and also shows that the rod slope used in the calculation
has a small error: a 3% change in the rod slope produced a significant
discrepancy towards the peak. The total reactivity feedback is also well
predicted, since the discrepancy in peak power evident from the log flux
comparison is equivalent to only a 1% error in the chamber calibration (com-
pared with ~3% lu assessed uncertainty) or to a 5% reduction in the fuel
temperature reactivity coefficient (~5% lU). That the peak ?ower is predicted
closely is also supported by the temperature comparisons (Fig. 4): for the
eight comparisons available, the average discrepancy (calculation -measurement)
/(measurement) at the peak of the start-up transients is 4.5% ±4.0% for the gas
temperature and 4.4% ±4.7% for the can.
There is an interesting discrepancy occurring towards the peak of the
transient, most apparent in Fig.3. It appears that, although the calculation
is predicting the total reactivity feedback correctly, the rate at which it
operates is different from measurement. Sensitivity studies on the calculation
failed to reveal any phenomenon that could be responsible and so the discrepancy,
although small in magnitude, remains unresolved.
A similar series of start-up transients was also carried out at 44% coolant
flow. The principal difference from those just discussed was that, because of
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the lower flow rate, the fuel temperature rise for a given power rise was
greater. In consequence, the pOl"er tended to overshoot before the fuel
temperature feedback became effective: in the most extreme case the overshoot
in power was 35%. This was weIl modelied by the computer code, with no
evidence of the feedback discrepancy found in the full flow transients.
A third series of start-up transients commenced at subcritical power
levels (and full flow). In the most extreme of these the initial subcritic-
ality was -560 mN (-$0.80) and the reactor power 144 W. Fig.5 shows the
measured and calculated temperatures superimposed on the flux doubling time
throughout the transient. In this case, the main difference from the full
flow critical start-up transients was the lower power at the start (or as the
rods passed through the critical balance point to be precise). This meant
that faster doubling times were achievable (2.3s as opposed to 4.0s for the
transient of Fig.3). Again the KINAGRAX code modelied the reactor behaviour
weIl, demonstrating its ability to handle the transition from subcritical to
supercritical multiplication.
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At-Power Reactivity Transients
Figs.6 and 7 show the results of the most onerous at-power reactivity
test: the reactivity addition was 320 mN ($0.46) and the peak can temperature
achieved in the channel shown was 994°C (the channel inlet temperature was
300oC). The initial reactor power for the calculation was obtained from a flow
and temperature survey and the output from the flux chambers was normalised to
this. The initial power in the individual channels modelied (Fig.7) was
normalised to the channel gas outlet temperature. The results obtained (see
Table) show that peak power is systematically underpredicted for the eight
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transients of this type that have been analysed, but by an amount small com-
pared with data uncertainties.
A tendency towards overprediction of the power at the end of the transient
is apparent both in the at-power and start-up reactivity tests. The effect is
not of direct significance to faults of the types being simulated in the tests
since it is peak powers that are of interest. Nevertheless it is symptomatic
of a deficiency in either modelling and data which might, in principle, be
important in some circumstances. Likely contributors to this effect are there-
fore discussed in the next section.
The gas temperature transient (Fig.7) is essentially a reflection of the
power transient and consequently the errors involved are likewise small. The
can temperature, on the other hand, is influenced not only by the overall
power but also by local rating and heat transfer uncertairities. Any errors due
to these additional factors will result in discrepancies between measurement
and calculation that persist throughout the transient, as is shown in the Figure
and fairly generally in the cases examined (see also the Table, which shows the
errors to be small, typicallya few percent). Can temperature behaviour in a
postulated fault is often crucial (an important safety limit being that the
fuel cans should not melt) and so the capabilities of KINAGRAX in predicting
this parameter are particularly reassuring.
KINAGRAX only calculates a mean can temperature, without cross-channel or
cross pin tilts. The measured temperatures used in the comparisons are the
average from two thermocouples mounted on opposite. sides of the fuel cluster and
on the outward facing surface of the fuel pin. Thus although cross-channel
effects are eliminated, cross-pin effects are not. However, a more detailed
steady state calculation modelling cross-pin tilts indicated these effects to
be small, of order 2-30 C at most, so no correction has been made to the KINAGRAX
values.
Circulator Trip Tests
Figs.2 and 8 show comparisons for a circulator trip test at high flow, the
measured circulator rundown characteristic being superimposed in Fig.2 to show
the operation of the pony motors. The impact of the tie bar modelling is most
pronounced for this type of test, and with its inclusion the quantitative agree-
ment between measured and predicted temperatures is broadly comparable with that
for the reactivity transients. Qualitatively, however, there does appear to be
a small but genuine dynamic discrepancy, unlike the reactivity transients. No
satisfactory explanation of this effect has been forthcoming: the obvious poss-
ibility of an error in the measured flow transient is excluded by the virtually
identical flow estimates obtained from circulator speeds and core pressure drop.
SENSITIVITY STUDIES AND UNCERTAINTIES
The results of analyses carried out using best estimate data are shown in
qualitative terms in the Figures, which demonstrate the close agreement between
experimental data and the KINAGRAX predictions. The Table summarises quantit-
atively the results obtained for the at-power reactivi ty transients , and also
the results from a selection of the sensitivity studies carried out to ascer-
tain the extent to which data uncertainties contribute to the observed discrep-
ancies between experiment and theory.
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TABLE
SENSITIVITY STUDY OF AT-POWER REACTIVITY TRANSIENTs
Fercentage Differences
Pover Gas Temperature Gan Temperature
Time in Transient:" Peak End I Peak End I Start Peak
Base Calculation - 4 Poet Channels Examined
End
Fuel Channel No.l -1.6:1.1 4.0:2.5 -0.3+1.2 1. 4+1. 7 3.1+0.8 3.3+1.5 6.4+2.5
Fuel Channel No.2 0.9+1.4 1. 8+1. 8 2.6+0.6 2.7+1.5 6.4+2.8
Fuel Channel No.3 3.5+2.3 3.6+2.9 4.8+1.5 6.2+2.0 8.7+4.0
Fuel Channel No. 4 3.6~2.4 4. 7~3.6 -o.5~1.5 1.1~2.6 4.4~4.0
Sensi tivi eies Co Parameter Changes
Rod Slope x 1. 05 +3.1 -0.2 +1.6 +0.6 0 +1. 7 +0.9
Fuel Feedback xO.9 +6.2 +1. 6 +3.9 +2.0 0 +4.3 +2.8
Heat Transfer xl.OS +0.5 -0.2 +0.5 -0.1 -1.7 -1.2 -1.8
Moderator Feedback
x 0.5 -1.6 -4.3 -1.5 -3.9 0 -1.3 -3.4
No Xenon -0.9 -3.0 -1.1 -1.7 0 -0.5 -2.1
Caalaot FIOl{ xl,05
-in average channel -0.8 -0.9 -1.5 -0.3 0 -0.9 +0.4
-in driven chBnnel 0 0 -0.1 -0.3 +0.6 +0.2 +0.4
Fuel-eao Conduct-
anee x 0.5 -0.9 -1.0 -1.5 -0.8 0 -1.5 -0.4
Flux Shape Change 0 0 -0.7 +0.6 -0.3 -2.5 +0.4
Note: The normalisation of the comparisons for these tests makes the
differences on power and gas temperature zero .t th. start of
the transient.
. The first part of the Table gives the results from the best estimate cal-
culations. The numbers given are (Theory-Experiment)/(Experiment)% relative
to total power or inlet gas temperature as appropriate. Four fuel channels
have been analysed and the results shown separately. The first two channels
are both weIl removed from the edge of the reactor core, neither is adjacent
to a control rod channel and both have thermocouples in fuel element 3 (i.e. at
about i height): the similarity in results is remarkably close. Channel
number 3 is right on the core-reflector boundary and has element 2 thermocoup-
les, and channel 4 is close to the core edge, immediately adjacent to a control
rod channel and has element 1 thermocouples. The results for these two chann-
eIs show somewhat larger systematic discrepancies and scatter.
The second part of the Table summarises the sensitivity studies, showing
the change in the percentage differences due to the stated parameter variation.
To a first approximation, adequate for the purposes of the present discussion,
the changes are linear in the parameter variation and the same for all fuel
channels and all the at-power reactivity transients.
The first parameter variation considered in the Table is a 5% increase in
rod slope. The change has a direct effect on the peak power and consequently
on peak temperatures and it is clear that the small discrepancy in the peak
power prediction is weIl within the uncertainties in rod slope. By the end of
the transient the rods have returned to their initial position, so clearly the
sensitivity at this stage is very low.
Tge_un~ertainty in the fuel tempera5u:1 coefficient of reactivity is about0.1 mN C 1 ~n a value of -l,Oto -1,5 mN C depending on mean fuel temperature.
The sensitivity at the peak of the transient is, as expected, very similar to
the rod slope sensitivity for the same percentage change in parameter. There
is, however, a greater sensi tivity at the end of the transient'.
The standard deviation of the heat transfer coefficient in this fuel clus-
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ter geometry is about 6%. The principal effect of variations in this parameter
is on can temperature. The uncertainty in heat transfer could be responsible
for a significant part, if not all, of the small systematic can temperature
discrepancy.
The moderator temperature feedback coefficient used in the basic calculat-
ions was 4.8 mN°C- l Because of the large thermal inertia associated with the
moderator, the effect of any change in coefficient becomes more apparent towards
the end of each transient. In fact, the power overprediction observed towards
the end of all the transients investigated would be largely eliminated by halv-
ing the feedback coefficient. However, although there is a significant uncer-
tainty associated with the coefficient, it is unlikely to be this large, and so
the observed discrepancies may be due in part to deficiencies within the KINA-
GRAX bulk moderator temperature model.
Long term behaviour is also influenced by Xenon drift. The calculations
assumed equilibrium Xenon concentration for each transient, although this was
never, in fact, the case. To assess the effect of this assumption a single
calculation was carried out with no Xenon modelling at all. It was deduced
from this that the neglect of Xenon drift leads to only small errors.
The sensitivity of the results to uncertainties in the coolant flow rate in
either the average reactor or driven channel, the fuel-to-can conductance and
axial flux shape was also examined. No significant points emerge.
Sensitivity studies have also been carried out for the start-up and circul-
ator trip tests. Limitations of space preclude their detailed discussion here
but it is sufficient to note that broadly similar results emerge and to quote
the overall errors on the base calculations carried out on all transients
analysed (including at-power tests):
-0.4+2.7%
1.7+4.0%
2.2+2.7%
1.4+5.0%
Error
Error
Error
Error
in peak power prediction ~
in peak gas temperature
in initial can temperature=
in peak can temperature
In summarising the results of the sensitivity studies, it appears that three
minor unresolved systematic discrepancies have been identified. These·are an
anomaly in the operation of fuel temperature feedback in some start-up trans-
ients, an apparent error in long-term bulk moderator modelling and a discrepancy
in transient shape in the flow transients. With these exceptions all of the
errors observed in the comparisons could be explained by identified uncertain-
ties in input data. However, the data uncertainties are small and the errors
in the base calculations themselves are small, as shown above. Consequently,it
may be concluded that the residual uncertainties in KINAGRAX are at a low level.
DISCUSSION
The modelling and data used in KINAGRAX are extensively supported by exper-
imental and theoretical work. However, the severity of the experiments carried
out on WAGR has greatly extended the range of experimental evidence available
for validating fault study codes for AGR's. The high quality of the results of
the comparison with KINAGRAX, therefore, further increases confidence in the
adequacy of the code. In particular the scope for unforeseen effects arising
in large amplitude or fast transients, that would not be apparent from previous
experimental data, must be greatly reduced by the WAGR tests.
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CONCLUSIONS
The reactor transient tests carried out on the Windscale AGR have greatly
extended the range of experimental evidence in support of the safety case for
the CAGR's. Tests of direct relevance to postulated CAGR faults have been
simulated, including fast start-up reactivity transients, at-power reactivity
ramps and circulator trip tests.
A large number of these tests have been simulated with KINAGRAX, a computer
code on which fault studies are based. Agreement with measurement is very good,
and sensitivity studies show that such discrepancies as exist may be due largely
to input data errors. It is concluded that KINAGRAX is able to predict steady
state conditions and transient amplitudes in both power and temperature to with-
in a few percent. This level of agreement greatly increases our confidence in
the CAGR fault study code and significantly reduces the likelihood of unforeseen
effects not apparent in steady state or small amplitude tests.
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ANALYSIS OF A TOTAL LOSS OF AC-POlVER IN A GER}~ PWR
G. Herbold, E.J. Kersting
Gesellschaft für Reaktorsicherheit (GRS) mbH
Köln, Schwertnergasse 1, FRG
ABSTRACT
Risk. studies and the THI -2 accident demonstrated the significance of
events involving multiple equipment failures.
Severe accident analysis are currently performed for a 1300 MW -PWR
using the advanced code DRUFAN-02. Special attention has been f5tused
on the detailed representation of the primary and secondary side. The
purpose of those studies is to simulate postulated accident initiators
including equipment malfunctions and determine primary system respon-
se, timing and significance of events and the adequacy of plant ope-
rator responses. A base calculation was performed, simulating a to-
tal loss of AC-Power. Furthermore an operator controlled primary
depressurization at various times has been studied. With this procedure
it could be possible to mitigate the accident due to accumulator
water injection.
INTRODUCTION
The TMI-2 accident has focused attention on the potential for mul-
tiple equipment failures and their consequences during accidents
beyond the design basis. It has been recognized how important re-
covery procedures and operator responses are to control these
types of accidents and to mitigate their severity. The "Station
Black-out" case as initiating event was selected because of its great
implication to the overall risk of nuclear power plants. This caSe
covers also the total loss of feedwater in an emergency power case.
The main assumptions for our calculation will be described in the
following chapter.
CALCULATIONAL RESULTS
The investigations have been performed using the advanced best esti-
mate Code DRUFAN-02 /1/.
The code DRUFAN has been developed initially for the simulation of the
blowdown and the initial reEll phase of LWR-reactors. The code can
be used for the analysis of large, medium sized and small breaks
/1, 2/ and transients as weIl.
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The numerical method applied in DRUFAN is the "lumped parameter ap-
proach". The physical system is described by "lumped parameter" con-
trol volumes which are connected by flow paths. The ordinary dif-
ferential system of the thermo- and fluiddynamic model is based on
the conservation laws for vapor mass, liquid mass, overall energy
and overall momentum. The liquid and vapor phases are treated as a
homogeneous mixture , or in case of mixture level-tracking as a nonho-
mogeneous mixture.
The nodalization chosen for the following calculations is shown in
Figure 1. The reactor system has been simulated in a very detailed
manner especially the secondary side. In all vertical junctions the
drift flux option was used in order to determine a realistic void
distribution in the system. Typical best estimate assumptions have
been used for all calculations (e. g.: 100 % initial operating power,
simplified DIN 25463 decay heat, etc.)
In the figures 2 to 5 the important results of the Station Black-
out (total loss of AC-Power) without intervention are presented.
After the closure of the main steam valves the pressure on the
secondary side increases from 64 to 86 bar and initiated the
automatic blowdown operation of the relief valves (Fig. 2).
After a short time of depressurization the pressure on the secondary
side is kept at a level of 75 bar. During this period natural
circulation on the primary side is established and the fluid on
the secondary side of the steam generators 'is boiled away through
the relief valves. Due to the decrease of the liquid level on the
secondary side the energy generated by the core cannot completely
be transferred to the secondary side from about 50 min on. This
effect leads to a gradually heatup of the primary system causing
the system pressure to increase and the pressurizer liquid level
to rise (Fig. 2 and 3). After 1 h the pressure setpoint of the pres-
surizer relief valve is reached and the valve opens. During the
first period of about 1000 s only vapor is leaving the pressurizer
causing a rapid increase of the liquid level in the pressurizer. At
about 4700 s the pressurizer is entirely filled with fluid and the
valve flow rate increases due to the loss of two-phase-mixture
(Fig. 3). The second increase of the valve massflow-rate occurs at
5500 s, when flashing begins in the upper plenum of the vessel. This
causes a rapid insurge of fluid into the pressurizer. In order to save
CPU-time the pressurizer relief valve in DRUFAN was modelIed as a
continuous opening valve in connection to atime dependent volume.
For that reason the valve setpoint used in the calculation was the
average value between the opening and closing pressure setpoint.
During the heatup phase of the primary side a constant natural
circulation flow of about 800 kg/s through the core is established.
Just before the complete primary system becomes saturated an in-
crease in natural circulation occurs due to voiding in the core
which causes an increasing density difference. A short time after
boiling of the entire primary system the natural circulation stops.
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At the same time the primary side of the steam generators starts
to empty. The liquid level in the steam generator of the pressurizer
loop drops faster than in the steam generator of the other loops. This
is caused by the suction effects of the surge-line massflow (Fig. 4).
During this period the DRUFAN code determines counter current flow
conditions in the loops.
At about 7000 s the liquid level drops below the top of the active
core and uncovering of the core begins (Fig. 5). The excursion of
cladding temperature occurs at about 7300 s with an average rate of
increase of about 0,6 K/s at the hot spot. At about 8100 s the core
is completely dry and only the IOI'ier plenum and the loop seals are
still filled with liquid.
Due to the lack of adequate models describing the effect of local dis-
turbances of the core geometry in the DRUFAN-Code the calculation was
terminated at about 9000 s. Without additional preventive measures the
core would further heat up followed by core-meltdown.
Calculations with interventions:
Two additional DRUFAN-Calculations of astation black-out-transient
were performed to study possible operator actions which could miti ~
gate or prevent core damage. Among the various existing possibi-
lities to influence the course of this kind of an accident is the
primary depressurization with the objective to make use of the
passive water reservoir stored in the accumulators. Contrary to the
current possibilities in the plants we assumed that the opening of
the safety- and the relief - valves of the pressurizer could be acti-
vated by operator intervention. In the following we investigated the
effectiveness of this measure to prevent or mitigate core uncovery
leading to core melt-down. The beginning of operator intervention was
selected at times after the secondary side has emptied.
In the 2nd calculation, the operator activity is initiated shortly
after the steam generators have emptied (ca. 3500 s) and after the
pressure in the primary system has increased abruptly due to
unavailable heat sink (Fig. 6).
At this time the pressurizer is only half filled with water. This is
the reason for fact that only the steam discharges after opening of
all pressurizer valves. Combined with this process, the high volume
flow leads to a rapid depressurization of the primary system and to
almost simultaneous "flashing" of the liquid in pressurizer and upper
plenum of the Reactor Pressure Vessel (RPV).
These effects cause an expansion of the fluid volume in the RPV. This
acts to slow down the rate of depressurization leading the fluid to
insurge into the pressurizer. In turn this produces a rapid increase
of the already high swell level in the pressurizer (Fig. 8).
Some seconds after the initiation of the operator action the liquid
level in the pressurizer attains the height of the valve lines and the
fluid mixture flows out through the valves (Fig. 7).
The resulting strong reduction of the volume flow combined with the
flashing in the RPV causes an abrupt stop in pressure decrease
(Fig. 6). Simultaneously with the transition from steam to mixture
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essentially more mass will be carried out of the primary system (Fig.
7). As soon the void in the pressurizer increases the mass floll' through
the valves reduces and thus gradually the depressurization in the pri-
mary system increases. Approx. 4400s after the occurence of the accident,
the sll'ell level in the pressurizer be&ins to decrea·se and consequently
steam floll's out of the valves (Fig. 8). At 5300 s the primary pressure
reaches a value 10ll'er than 26 bar and the inj ection from the accumula-
tors starts (Fig. 6). At this time the liquid level has almost fallen
to the bottom of the core (Fig. 10). The lI'ater injection causes the li-
quid level to increase and prevent further heat up of the fuel rods.
DRUFAN calculates for the high powered fuel rods a max. temperature of
900 K (Fig. 11).
In the 3rd calculation, the operator action is initiated at a later
time (ca. 5300 s) and therefore deviates from the other calula-
tion. Up to this time the pressurizer is totally filled with two-
phase mixture and its relief valve has responded to the function of
limiting the pressure in the Primary. Corresponding to the high
swell level in the pressurizer the massflow through the valves is
two phase.
remaining pressurizer valves by the ope-
the opening of pressurizer relief valve)
of loss of coolant (Fig. 7). Compared to
the results show an accelerated decrease of
pressurizer and in the upper region of the
Additional opening of the
rator (safety valves and
causes a large increase
the previous calculation
the liquid level in the
RPV (Fig. 10).
"Flashing" in the RPV (upper plenum) starts already at apressure
level of about 135 bar due to prolonged heat up of the liquid by decay
heat. Contrary to the first calculation the rate of the depressuri-
zation in the primary system is more pronounced (Fig. 6). This is
firstly due to essentially higher energy dis charge through the valves
caused by the higher pressure and enthalpy levels in the RPV.
Because of the specific characteristic of steam properties during
"flashing" at 135 bar about 30 to 40 % less steam volume is produced
than at apressure of 85 bar.
Due to the higher loss of coolant and the resulting lower residual in-
ventory in the Primary compared to the previous case the rate of
depressurization is higher and the injection of the accumulator starts
400 s earlier (Fig. 6).
Inspite of the shorter period of depressurization, the maximum fuel
rod temperature was slightly higher than in the previous case. This is
the result of higher loss of the coolant (Fig. 11).
These last two calculations have shown that by this measure the pri-
mary side can be depressurized effectively without core destruction
down to the pressure level of the accumulator injection. Therefore the
blowdown of the primary side could be initiated by the operator in
the time range between 1 to 1,5 hours after loss of AC-Power.
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It is even possible to select the blowdown at a later time without
causing extensive damage to the core. This conclusion can be drawn by
extrapolation of the calculated fuel rod temperatures.
A depressurization of the primary side before one hour is not ratio-
nal for this case because during this period the steam generator se-
condary side is still available as a heat sink and can transmit almost
the total decay heat. Only after the secondary side of the steam ge-
nerator has almost emptied and accordingly the energy inventory in the
primary system has increased, then the assumptions for the action of
the operator become more favourable. This condition is reached after
50 to 55 min.
It is difficult to comprehend the complex flow situation in the hot
leg and at the entrance of the surgeline. This may lead to uncertain-
ties in the determination of the quality in the pressurizer and sub-
sequently in the calculation of the two-phase discharge flow.
An underestimation
conservative input
entrance. Therefore
this calculation is
orientation.
of the dis charge flow has been ruled out by a
permitting a high entrainment of the surgeline
the upper time limit for blowdown estimated by
pessimistic and can be accepted for a first-hand
If in the other case an overestimation of the discharge flow would
occur, then it would have been caused by the higher quality in the
pressurizer. The result would have been a faster depressurization
in the primary system and an earlier inj ection of the accumulators.
Simultaneously a higher liquid level in the core would exist during
water injection. Under these assumptions the resulting core heat up
would have been lower than in our calculation and would leave more
time for intervention.
Final refilling of the primary system with the water from accumu-
laters is only a preliminary estimation as the quench and condensa-
tion models in DRUFAN are not yet sufficient. Therefore in the figures
they are given with dotted lines. This estimation is based on the as-
sumption that during reflooding the pressure in the primary system
drops to approximately 6 bar as a result of condensation and only steam
is discharged out of the pressurizer valves. After the refilling of
the system it will take 1,5 to 2 h time before uncovery of the core
begins again.
Compared to the course of an accident without any operator interven-
tion one will gain approximately 2 h. This time can be weIl used for
carrying out tasks like reactivation of emergency power supply 01" other
unconventional measures to secure long time cooling.
SillfrlARY
Using the advanced Computer Code DRUFAN-02 a "Total 10ss of AC-power
transient" in a typical German commercial PWR (1300 MW
el ) has been
analysed in a detailed manner.
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The results indicate that in case of no intervention the core would
heat up after 2 h ending in core melt-down. An opening of all the 3
pressurizer valves within a definite time range is sufficient to de-
pressurize the system down to the pressure setpoint (26 bar) for the
ECC-injection in order to make use of the stored reservoir in the
accumulators. By this action the core can be kept undamaged, the
system could be reflooded and additional 2 h could be gained for re-
covery of AC-power supply. Furthermore other unconventional measures
could be undertaken to prevent core melt.
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THERHAL-HYDRAULIC AND CORE DAHAGE ANALYSIS OF THE
STATION BLACKOUT TRANSIENT IN PRESSURIZED WATER REACTORS
C. A. Dobbe, R. Chambers, and P. D. Bayless
EG&G Idaho, Inc., P. O. Box 1625
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83415, U.S.A.
ABSTRACT
Analyses of a Pressurized Water Reactor (PWR) station blackout tran-
sient performed by EG&G Idaho in support of the U.S. Nuclear Reg-
ulatory Commission's Severe Accident Sequence Analysis (SASA) Program
are presented. The RELAPS and SCDAP computer codes were used to
calculate the effects of concurrent loss of off-site power, on-site
power, and emergency feedwater on the Babcock and Wilcox (B&W)
designed Bellefonte PWR and the Westinghouse designed Seabrook PWR.
Results provide insight into the timing of significant events,
severity of core damage, and effect of differences between the two
PWR designs on transient results.
INTRODUCTION
The Severe Accident Sequence Analysis (SASA) Program was formulated by the
United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission (USNRC) to evaluate postulated
reactor accidents over a broad spectrum of accident sequences. These pos tu-
lated sequences may extend beyond the current design basis in terms of core
damage, system failures and release of fission products to the environment.
The objectives of the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory (INEL) sASA
programs are: to evaluate nuclear steam supply system (NSSS) response for
accident sequences that could lead to partial or total core melt; to determine
the timing of significant events; to determine the magnitude and timing of
fission product release from the fuel rodp and the hydrogen generation rate;
and to evaluate the effect of operator actions on accident mitigation. The
INEL pressurized water reactor (PWR) SASA effort is currently directed toward
the evaluation of station blackout transients from accident initiation through
severe co~e darnage.
The station blackout sequence has been identified by the Accident Sequence
Evaluation Program [1] as one of the highest frequency accidents leading to
core melt. The station blackout sequence, designated the THLB' sequence, is
initiated by a loss of off-site power followed by a failure to establish on-site
power with the diesel generators. The scenario further assurnes failure to
provide coolant to the steam generator via the emergency feedwater system and
no operator intervention. The THLB' sequence results in eventual core '
degradation and achallenge to the reactor containment boundaries.
The THLB' sequence was calculated with the RELAPS [2J and SCDAP [3] com-
puter codes. 'The RELAPS computer code was used to evaluate the thermal-
hydraulic response of the NSSS; the SCDAP computer code was used to evaluate
the core thermal-mechanical response following core uncovery. The THLB'
sequence was evaluated for both a Westinghouse and a Babcock and wilcox design
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PWR to determine the significance of design features on the timing and severity
of key events for the TMLB'. This paper briefly describes the computer codes,
PWR plant and input models used, the analytical procedure, the TMLB' transient
sequence, and the calculated results. Detailed discussions of these items are
documented in References 4 and S for the Westinghouse and the Babcock and
Wilcox PWR analyses, respectively.
COMPUTER CODE DESCRIPTION
RELAPS/MOD2 is an advanced one-dimensional, two-fluid, nonequilibrium
computer code utilizing a full six equation hydrodynamic model providing con-
tinuity, momentum and energy equations for each of two phases within a control
volume. The energy equations contain source terms which couple the hydro-
dynamic model to the heat structure conduction model by a convective heat
transfer formulation. The code contains special process models for critical
flow, abrupt area changes, branching, cross-flow junctions, pumps, valves, core
neutronics, and contral systems.
SCDAP/MODI provides the capability to per form phenomenological analysis of
the thermal, mechanical, and chemical behavior of a light water reactor core
during severe accidents where cOre support structure integrity is maintained.
SCDAP simulates COre and vessel plena disruption by modeling heatup, geometry
changes, material relocation, and formation, heatup and melting of debris. A
coolant boiloff model was used to calculate vessel thermal-hydraulic conditions
utilizing RELAPS analytical results for initial and boundary conditions in the
upper plenum, core inlet and core.
NSSS PLANT AND INPUT MODEL DESCRIPTIONS
The TIILB' sequence was analyzed for both a Babcock and wilcox and a West-
inghouse PWR design. The Babcock and Wilcox design selected was Bellefonte, a
3600 MW(t) PWR design with 20S fuel assemblies and raised coolant loops.
Bellefonte has two primary coolant loops connected to the reactor vessel, each
consisting of a hot leg, a once-through steam generator, two pump suction legs,
two reactor coolant pumps, and two cold legs. A pressurizer is connected to
one of the hot legs via a surge line. The RELAPS input model simulated the hot
legs and four cold legs explicitly and represents the primary and secondary
systems with 183 volumes, 190 junctions, and l8S heat structures. The SCDAp
input model used 16 volumes to represent the portion of the core inlet, core,
and upper plenum associated with a single fuel assembly. Three components were
used to model the fuel assembly representing the fuel rods, the control rods
and control rod guide tubes, and the instrument tube.
The Westinghouse design selected was Seabrook, a 3411 ~v(t) four loop PWR
design with 193 fuel assemblies. Seabrook has four primary coolant loops con-
nected in parallel to the reactor vessel. Each loop contains a hot leg, U-tube
steam generator, pump suction leg, reactor coolant pump and cold leg. A pres-
surizer is connected to one of the hot legs via a surge line connection. The
RELAPS input model of Seabrook simulated two coolant loops. The first loop,
representing the primary coolant loop containing the pressurizer, modeled the
volumes and flow areas of a single coolant loop. The second loop modeled was a
composite of the remaining three loops with the volumes and flow areas increased
by a factor of three for correct loop mass and fluid velocities. The Seabrook
RELAPS model utilized 143 volumes, 147 junctions, and l7S heat structures to
represent the primary and secondary systems. The SCDAP input model used 12 vol-
umes to represent the portion of the core inlet, core, and upper plenum
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associated with a single fuel assembly. Components used to model the fuel
assembly represented the fuel rods, and the control rod guide tubes and
instrument tube.
The system conditions at the initiation of the TMLB' sequence are compared
in Table I for the two RELAPS models.
TABLE I. COMPARISON OF COMPUTED STEADY STATE PARAMETERS FOR THE BELLEFONTE AND
SEABROOK NSSS
Parameter
Core thermal power MWa
Pressurizer pressure (MPa)
Hot leg temperature (K)
Cold leg temperature (K)
Total loop flow (kg/s)
Steam generator pressure (MPa)
Steam generator liquid mass (kg)b
Steam generator feedwater flow (kg/s)C
Steam generator feedwater temperature (K)
Bellefonte
3600.
15.2
603.9
574.2
19833.
7.31
29584.
1034.
520.
Seabrook
3411.
15.5
598.5
565.2
17741.
6.53
182340.
474.2
500.
a. Core axial power shape and initial fuel stored energy are based on end of
cycle (460 effective full power days for Bellefonte, 275 effective full power
days for Seabrook).
b. Total for all steam generators.
c. Per steam generator.
The system conditions shown represent best estimate plant operating condi-
tions for the two facilities. Core parameters for both models were based on
end of first cycle to maximize the fission product inventory and therefore the
decay heat. Of particular interest for the TMLB' sequence is the comparison
between the once-through and U-tube steam generator secondary liquid masses.
The total inventory for the Bellefonte once-through steam generator secondaries
is only 16% of that contained in all of the Seabrook U-tube steam generator
secondaries. Since emergency feedwater is unavailable for the TMLB' sequence,
the initial inventory represents the total secondary heat sink for the
transient.
ANALYTICAL PROCEDURE
The evaluation of the TMLB' sequence involved two separate calculational
steps. Appropriate boundary conditions were applied to the RELAPS steady state
NSSS model to simulate the TMLB' sequence. The RELAPS analysis was terminated
when peak fuel rod cladding temperatures were about 1500 K. The SCDAP calcula-
tion was then initiated at a point in the transient where cladding surface
temperatures were about 1000 K, the temperature at which zirconium cladding
oxidation was computed to begin. Coolant temperatures, pressures, and void
fractions from the RELAPS analysis were used to initialize the SCDAP calcula-
tion. The core inlet flow was adjusted to produce a core dryout in SCDAP that
agreed as closely as possible with that calculated by RELAPS. The SCDAP cal-
culations were terminated when significant melting and relocating cf cladding
and fuel had occurred.
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RESULTS
The system therma1-hydrau1ic response to a TMLB' sequence is characterized
initia11y by a comp1ete boi10~f of the steam generator secondary side liquid
mass. The primary system then heats up and, as the coo1ant in the 100ps
expands, pressurizes to the setpoint of the primary coo1ant system relief
va1ves. The primary system saturates and loop voiding terminates natural cir-
cu1ation of coo1ant. The remaining fluid in the 100ps drains into the pump
suctions and reactor vesse1, with the reactor vesse1 fluid being boi1ed off by
fission product decay heat. Fue1 c1adding dryout and heatup produce c1adding
oxidation, deformation and fai1ure, resu1ting in hydrogen generation and fis-
sion product release to the primary coo1ant system. Continued core heatup
resu1ts in core and structura1 material 1iquefaction and re10cation within the
vesse1. Fai1ure of the primary coo1ant system boundary is then high1y probable.
The sequences of significant events for the TMLB' transient are summarized
in Tab1e H.
TABLE 11. TMLB' SEQUENCE OF EVENTS FOR BELLEFONTE AND SEABROOK
Time
(s)
Event
Scram initiation, reactor coo1ant
pump trip, feedwater trip
Loss of effective heat sink
Primary system saturates (hot 1egs)
Loss of natural circu1ation
Fue1 c1adding heatup beg ins
Fue1 c1adding oxidation initiation
Fue1 cladding fai1ure
Steam starvation observed in upper core
C1adding oxide she11 ruptures -
c1ad-fue1 me1t re10cates
Be11efonte
0.0
45.
950.
1100.
1800.
2550.
2840.
3100.
3550.
Seabrook
0.0
4900.
6510.
6800.
8290.
9060.
9820.
9840.
11400.
The 10ss of effective heat sink event refers to the time when core decay heat
transfer to the primary system exceeded the heat removal capacity of the steam
generators. The 1arge difference in the timing of this event for the two NSSS
designs was due to the difference in steam generator secondary side heat capac-
ity, and was direct1y re1ated to the initial secondary side liquid inventory.
The timing differences became even 1arger as the transient progressed due to
the reduced decay heat levels in the Seabrook ca1cu1ation, decay heat being a
decreasing function of time after scram.
The primary system pressure response, ca1cu1ated by RELAP5, is shown in Fig-
ure 1 for the two TMLB' ca1cu1ations. Fo110wing the 10ss of an effective heat
sink, both ca1cu1ations show a primary system repressurization to the respec-
tive power opera ted relief va1ve (PORV) setpoints. For the Seabrook case, the
capacity of the two PORVs was sufficient to re1ieve primary system overpressure
for the remainder of the transient. The Be11efonte PORV was not of sufficient
capacity to re1ieve primary system overpressure and the primary repressurized to
the safety relief va1ves opening pressure of 17.2 MPa by 1000 s. The primary
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Figure 1. RELAPS ealeulated primary system pressure histories for the
Bellefonte and Seabrook TMLB'.
system pressure then eyeled between the safety relief valve opening and elosing
pressure (16.4 MPa) for the remainder of the transient.
The RELAPS ealeulated fuel eladding surfaee temperature response for the
Bellefonte and Seabrook TMLB' analyses are shown in Figure 2 for three repre-
sentative eore loeations. The temperature response shows that the eore dryout
in both eases was from the top down. The heatup rate in the Bellefonte analy-
sis was more rapid than that ealeulated for Seabrook beeause of the higher
deeay power in the transient.
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Figure 2. RELAPS ealeulated fuel eladding surfaee temperature histories
for the Bellefonte and 8eabrook TMLB'.
453
The fuel rod cladding surface temperature histories, calculated by the
SCDAP code, are shown in Figures 3 and 4 for the Bellefonte and Seabrook
nuclear power plants, respectively. The temperatures at three of the ten axial
elevations are given in each figure. The results of the calculations will be
discussed in four areas: cladding ballooning, subsequent cladding failure with
the associated fission gas release, cladding oxidation and the resultant hydro-
gen generation, and rupture of the cladding oxide shell and relocation .of core
materials.
Cladding ballooning was calculated at 2750 s at a temperature of 1230 K in
the Bellefonte plant; the cladding ballooned over only 10% of the rod length.
Because the fuel-cladding gap size increased, the cladding surface temperature
rise slowed, as seen in Figure 3. The effect of the ballooning in the Seabrook
calculation can be seen in Figure 4 in the curves corresponding to nodes 4
and 9 at 9270 s. Ballooning was calculated over 80% of the rod length at
temperatures of 1290 - 1670 K. This sausage-type ballooning is calculated at
higher temperatures, after lower temperature increase rates, than the localized
ballooning that was calculated for the Bellefonte plant. The lower temperature
increase rate resulted from the lower decay power in the Seabrook calculation
than in the Bellefonte calculation. Ballooning caused partial flow blockage
corresponding to a 90% flow area reduction in both calculations.
The cladding failed shortly after ballooning at the 2.8 m elevation in both
calculations, at a lower temperature for the Bellefonte plant (1370 K) than for
the Seabrook plant (1710 K). When the cladding failed, fission products were
released to the coolant. Fission product release is highly temperature
dependent. As temperatures increased, fission products were continuously
released from the fuel to the fuel-cladding gap and from the gap to the cool-
ant. Very little difference between the calculated fission product release
rates for the two plants at any given temperature was s~en. The accuracy of
SCDAP calculations at temperatures in excess of 2400 K has not been established
because of an insufficient data base. When that temperature was calculated (at
3900 s in Bellefonte and 12000 s in Seabrook), a total of about 0.3 kg of solu-
ble fission products (csr and CsOH) had been released from the rods in the COre
in both cases. At the completion of the Bellefonte calculation, maximum fuel
and cladding temperatures were about 2900 K, and 0.6 kg of soluble fission
products had been released from the cladding in the core. At the same tempera-
ture, a similar amount had been released in the Seabrook calculation. However,
when the Seabrook calculation was terminated, fuel and cladding temperatures
had exceeded 3000 K and fuel melting had occurred. At liquefaction, all fis-
sion products are calculated to be released instantaneously from the fuel.
Consequently, the total soluble fission product release from the cladding for
the Seabrook plant was much higher - 9.8 kg.
Zircaloy oxidation was calculated by SCDAP when temperatures reached 1000 K
(at 2550 sand 9060 s for the Bellefonte and Seabrook plants, respectively).
The heat resulting from cladding oxidation was about 20% of the heat from rod
decay power at 2750 s in the Bellefonte calculation and 25% at 9500 s in the
Seabrook calculation. However, because the water level had decreased consi-
derably, very little steam was being genera ted by 3100 s in the Bellefonte
calculation, and by 9840 s in the Seabrook calculation. All of this steam was
being used in the oxidation reaction at lower elevations. Consequently, no
steam was flowing past the cladding in the upper half of the rod. Oxidation
ceased in these nodes as a result of steam starvation and no heat was genera ted
by the oxidation reaction. The temperature rise slowed and the fuel rods did
not form a thick oxide shell. When dryout at the bottom of the fuel was cal-
culated, oxidation ceased completely. Because of the steam starved environ-
ment, only about 40 kg of hydrogen were generated in the Bellefonte core and
30 kg in Seabrook. About 4% of the cladding was oxidized in both cases.
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When temperatures increased to 2125 K (3500 s at node 7 in the Be11efonte
ca1cu1ation, 11200 s at node 9 in the Seabrook ca1cu1ation), the zirca10y inside
the oxide she11 began to 1iquefy and disso1ve the outer portion of the fue1
pellets. Short1y thereafter (3550 sand 11400 s) the re1ative1y thin Zr02
she11 ruptured because of increased stress and decreased strength at a tempera-
ture of about2200 K. A hot mixture of 1iquefied fue1 and c1adding re10cated
downward. As a resu1t, a step change in the c1adding surface temperature can
be seen in Figure 3 at 3550 s at the 0.2 m elevation, and in Figure 4 at 11400 s
at the 1.3 m elevation, where the 1iquefied mixtures solidified again. At
3900 sand 12000 s, the 1atest times at wh ich accuracy in SCDAP has .been docu-
mented, 60% and 25% of the Zr and 0.6% and 1.0% of the D02 in the core had
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relocated below the bot tom of the core in the Bellefonte and Seabrook calcula-
tions, respectively. At the end of both calculations, 84% of the zircaloy had
dripped below the bottom of the fuel rod. Of the original U0 2 in the
Bellefonte calculation, 0.8% had dripped below the bottom of the COre while,
because of the higher temperatures, 4.6% of U02 in the Seabrook core had
relocated below the fuel rods.
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The results presented here represent calculations of a TMLB' sequence
through the core damage phase of the transient. The analysis assumed no inter-
action between the core damage activity and loop thermal-hydraulics. Cladding
oxidation and the resultant hydrogen production and heatup rate were severely
limited by a lack of available steam. If early oxidation-induced hydrogen
production were accounted ~or in the loop thermal-hydraulic analysis, the steam
supply to the core could be altered. Additionally, the heatup rate affected
the extent of the rod ballooning which in turn, changed core geometry and cool-
ability. In fact, the slower heatup rate computed for Seabrook resulted in a
larger percentage of the rod length ballooning which could result in co-planar
flow blockage.
The linking of the thermal-hydraulic analysis to the fuel damage analysis
is particularly important for future analysis of fission product transport
through the primary coolant system (PCS), and for estimation of the most proba-
ble failure point in the PCS boundary. Heating of ex-vessel structures (hot
legs, steam generator tubes, pressurizer surge lines, for instance) by super-
heated steam-hydrogen mixtures may result in failure in the coolant loops prior
to lower plenum melt-through of molten core material. These two scenarios
could provide radically different containment loadings and fission product
transport activity. Analyses are currently underway to evaluate phenomena
which affect source term tracking in the system. Plant models incorporating
parallel flow paths through the core and upper plenum are being used to eval-
uate the effect of recirculatory flows on the heatup of the core and vessel
structure. Evaluation of loop piping penetrations and fittings is also planned
to identify potential weaknesses in the PCS boundary.
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ABSTRACT
The codes RELAPS and TRAC-PFI have been applied to accident scena-
rios with incipient-to-complete loss of primary system water in-
ventory. Under such conditions the fuel rods in the steam covered
regions within the cor.e will heat up and degrade. The results of
the analyses performed have been compared against water boil-off
experiments. The paper describes the limitations of the codes
in view of the high temperatures and the experiences in the code
applications.
With respect to the temperature development and water boil-off, the
influence of the nodalization has been assessed.
RELAPS has b~en applied to risk relevant scenarios. Especially in
the high temperature range, the code has been coupled with the core
heatup and slumping code HELSIM3 of the core melt system KESS-2,
which is recently under development. Results of the codes appli-
cation show the necessity of the coupled analysis as weIl as the
required code improvements.
INTRODUCTION
Several computer codes have been developed which allow the analysis of
the thermalhydraulics behavior of fluid and structures during reactor acci-
dents. The objective of the advanced best estimate codes RELAPS/ModI/I/ and
TRAC-PFI /2/ ls to provide a capability for the analysis of loss-of-coolant
accidents (LOCA) and non-LOCA transients.
At elevated temperatures, severe accident codes like MELSIH3 /3/ treat
the core heatup and slumping under water boil-off conrlitions. In order to
prove the applicability of the codes with respect to accident scenarios with
incipient-to-complete loss of primary system inventory and temperatures far
beyond the regulatory guidelines up to core melt situations, model as weIl
as program capabilities have been analyzed.
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In order to allow a detailed analysis of severe accident conditions the
thermal hydraulic codes may be coupled with fuel/core behavior or structural
mechanics codes within the Plant §imulation and ~nalysis System (SASYST) of
the IKE /4/ (s. Fig. 1). Interfaces exist also between the RELAPS or TRAC
codes and the RSYST graphie system /S/. The codes run on a CRAY-IM machine.
SEVERE ACCIDENT SCENARIOS
During the course of severe accidents in light water reactors, the heat
transfer conditions between the fuel rods or steam generator tubes and the
fluid are mainly affected by the uncovery of the fuel rods, tubes or the
dry out of the flow channels. For the case of the uncovery transients a
relevant parameter is the level of the' two-phase mixture. The height of the
so called mixture level is generally marked as a sharp increase of the void
fraction and the surface temperature.
After uncovery, the fuel rods will heat-up because of the relatively
low heat transfer rates between rod and steam. At temperatures above approx.
ISOO K the metal-water reaction predominates the fuel rod behavior. It also
reduces the steam to hydrogen, which possibly may limit the chemical
reaction /3/.
The processes described below are typical for the situations analyzed
in the frame of risk studies (/6/, /7/). Especially in small break accidents
and transients the system response on core behavior is substantial.
The codes are applied in order to contribute to the following questionsl
• Find out the minimum availability of safety components to avoid uncoolable
conditions.
Calculations with the severe accident code MELSIM3 have found the degree
of core uncovery which lead to coolable core conditions /8/, /9/. The core
temperatures of the TMI-2 reactor were much higher than theregulatory
limits.
• Provide a better understanding of the plant behavior leading to severe
core damage conditions.
• Reduce the conservativism in the risk assessment.
THERMALHYDRAULIC MODELING USING RELAPS AND TRAC
With respect to modeling capabilities of the entire system behavior,
both codes predict the fluid flow with similar accuracy.
RELAPS and TRAC are based on a nonhomogeneous, nonequilibrium hydrodynamic
model. The models include component process models for pipes, branches or
tees, pumps, control system and heat structures, for example. Whereas RELAPS
has a one-dimensional vessel model, TRAC-PFl allows a three dimensional
discretization.
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The main weaknesses with respect to the severe core damage application
are the lack in
• fuel rod deformation modeling
• metal-water reaction modeling in RELAPS
• consideration of slumping phenomena
• modeling of fission product release
• structural mechanics response.
CORE MELT CODE MELSIM3
With respect to the elevated temperature range, the core melt code
system MELSIM3 has been developed in order to allow the analysis of core
melt phenomena in light water reactors.
MELSIM3 treats the core behavior in a two dimensional (r,z) geometry
including representative fuel rods, fluid channels and surrounding structu-
res.
However, the thermalhydraulic conditions, e.g. inlet mass flow and
temperature, as well as pressure, have to be provided by the thermalhydrau-
lic codes.
MELSIM3 is also part of SASYST and represents the best-estimate part of
the German core melt system KESS-2, which has been reported elsewhere /10/.
APPLICATIONS OF RELAPS AND TRAC-PFl
The codes have been applied to a core uncovery experiment which was
performed in 1975 in the Westinghouse Laboratory in Forest Hills /11/.
Twenty-two constant pressure boiloff, or core uncovery tests were per-
formed in the G-2-loop test facility using a bundle of 336 full length hea-
ter rods witn different power classes. The test number 718 has been modeled
with RELAPS and TRAC-PF1. The test section consisting of the bundle, down-
corner, upper and lower plenum, was filled with water through a feedwater
line up to a predefined level (s. Fig. 2). Then, the valve was closed and
the heater rod power was switched on. Fig. 3 represents the calculated mix-
ture level versus time compared with the experimental data. During the
first 100 s the mixture level as predicted by RELAPS decreases faster than
observed in the experiment. This may be due to more complicated initial
conditions. However, after 200 s the results match each other. The cladding
temperature his tory at the 3.7S m level agrees quite well (Fig. 4).
In order to assess the sensitivity of the chosen axial nodalization,
the number ofaxial marks in the RELAPS calculation has been reduced from 20
to 6. The initial void fraction and the power shape were adjusted according
to the finer mesh case. Fig. S demonstrates, that the finer nodalization
leads to higher temperatures. This is due to a different boiloff rate and
varying heat transfer modes as predicted by RELAPS.
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At 500 s the difference is approx. 100 K. This effect demonstrates,
that the analysis of core uncovery transients, such as small break LOCA's,
requires a finer mesh instead of a coarse one, which usually is applied for
large break LOCA's. This holds especially for the RELAPS code, because it
does not predict the fuel rod behavior with a finer mesh than used for the
fluid behavior.
APPLICATION OF RELAPS WITHIN THE FRAME OF THE GERMAN RISK STUDY, PHASE B
The RELAPS code has been applied in order to simulate the thermal hy-
draulics response of severe accident conditions. In this paper calculational
results for the primary system of a typical pressurized water reactor shall
be presented which have been performed with RELAPS.
Fig. 6 represents the pressure histories in the upper plenum and the
steam generator socondary eide. In order to achieve steady-state conditions
within the entire system, the code had to run until 100 s. At that time a 80
cm 2 break has been opened in the primary system. Simultanieously, station
black-out and a failure of the safety pumps on the secondary side is assu-
med. Additionally only one high pressure injection system is active. Accor-
dingly to the opening of the break the primary pressure decreases rapidly.
After reaching 132 bar the reactor scrams and the turbines are turned
off. Consequently, the secondary pressure increases until 88 bar, when the
safety valves open and close again. This pressure level -is held until 1000 s
and decreases further on. After approx. 1000 s the secondary pressure is
higher than th~ primary one.
Fig. 7 shows the cladding temperature histories in the upper half of
the core. Approx. 700 s after initiation of the accident the fuel rads were
partly reflooded because of the water flow from the steam generator to the
core. Afterwards the water inventory in the core boils down, the fuel rads
are cooled only by steam flow and th~refore their temperature increases
continuously.
Another calculation was performed considering a 20 cm 2 cold leg break.
Again it is assumed, that the reactor scrams due to the pressure drop. Si-
mUltaneously, station black out is anticipated, which causes a primary coo-
lant and main secondary feedwater pump trip. Neither the primary sided high
pressure injection systems nor the secondary sided auxiliary feedwater sy-
stems are taken into account in this calcul&tion.
The primary pressure history 1s shown in Fig. 8. A rapid pressure drop
occurs immediate17 after break opening. Further on, a slow approach to the
level of 80 bar is reached, which i5 govered by the operation of the safety
relief valves on the secondary side.
Appr. 4000 s after break opening, the ateam-generators are dried out.
As a result, the primary pressure rises slightly. The pressure drops again,
after the stagnant water in the pressurizer is evaporated totally.
Total dryout of the core is reached appr. 4000 s after break opening.
The core begins to heat up (Fig. 9). The temperature rise, calculated with
RELAPS is appr. 0,6 K/s. In the coupled calculation, which combines the
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thermo hydraulics from RELAPS with the more sophisticated core behaviour
modeling of MELSIM3, core heat up is more rapid, mainly due to consideration
of metal-water reaction.
CONCLUSIONS
The analyses performed demonstrate the necessity of a detailed coupling
of thermal hydraulics codes with severe accident codes. The SASYST concept
is shown to be an appropriate tool for the analysis of severe accident
phenomena.
However, in order to allow an adequate coupling, the codes applied need
yet to be improved further.
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ABSTRACT
The Three Mile Island-Z (TMI-Z) scenario in a Westinghouse (W)
type four loop pressurized water reactor (PWR) was studied in
preparation for upcoming tests in the ROSA-IV Program's Large
Scale Test Facility (LSTF). The LSTF is a 1/48 scale simulator of
a W type four loop PWR with full scale component elevation
differences.
TMI-Z scenario simulation analyses were conducted to establish a
pretest prediction data base for RELAPS code evaluation purposes
and to furnish a means of evaluating the LSTF's capability to
simulate the reference PWR. The basis for such RELAPS
calculations and the similarities between the LSTF and reference
PWR thermal-hydraulic behavior during a TMI-Z scenario are
presented.
INTRODUCTION AND APPROACH
The Rig of Safety Assessment (ROSA)-IV Program was initiated by the
Japan Atomic Energy Research Institute (JAERI) in 1980. The ROSA-IV
Program was formed in response to the need for data characterizing small
break loss-of-coolant accidents (SBLOCAs), abnormal and operational
transients in Westinghouse (~) type pressurized water reactors (PWRs).
The ROSA-IV Program is international in scope. The Uni ted States
Nuclear Regulatory Commission (USNRC) joined informally in 1981 and as a
participant by cooperative agreement in 1984.
The Large Scale Test Facility (LSTF) is the heart of the ROSA IV
Program. The LSTF has two loops and has the same component elevation
differences as a W type four loop PWR (the reference PWR) to simulate
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natural circulation (1). The LSTF hot and cold leg pipe sizes, i.e., 207mm
inner diameter, were constructed to have the same length to root diameter
(L/IO) ratio as the reference PWR to simulate f10w regime transitions
isochronously (2). Further, the LSTF is operational at representative
primary pressure levels, i.e., 16 MPa, and plant power levels sufficient to
simulate the core decay heat several seconds after scram. The LSTF volumes
were sca1ed at 1/48 of the reference PWR.
The objective of the present study was to construct a portion of the
LSTF test matrix relating to the TMI-2 scenario. In summary, the incident
at TMI-2 was characterized by: (1) Continuous primary system mass loss
through a stuck open power operated relief valve (PORV) and letdown valves.
(2) Reduction of the emergency core cooling system (ECCS) injection mass
flow by the operator following misinterpretation of high pressurizer water
level. (3) Continuous operation of the reactor coolant pumps (RCPs). (4)
The loss of main and auxiliary feedwater systems. (Althöugh the auxiliary
feedwater system was restored after 8 minutes, the flow was throttled by the
operator.)
However, several significant differences between the Babcock & Wilcox
(B&W) TMI-2 plant and the reference PWR assure that a W type plant will have
dissimilar behavior to the TMI-2 plant. Perhaps the most significant
difference between W type reactors and the B&W TMI-2 class reactors is in
the steam generator-(SG) design (3). The once-through B&W SG design
contains much less secondary fluid than the ~ U-tube design.
Another significant difference centers on the reactor coolant pump
(RCP) trip logic. All the Japanese built W type plants trip their RCPs on
low primary system pressure, whereas B&W plants did not in 1979.
Because of major differences between the teference PWR and the TMI-2
plant, the approach taken in the following analyses was to study reference
PWR transients of a similar nature to the TMI-2 accident in the sense that
analogous primary thermal-hydraulic conditions were obtained. Thus,
transient variations which are peculiar to the TMI-2 plant characteristics
will not be examined herein.
THE CODE, MODELS AND CALCULATIONAL MATRIX
The pre-core uncovery portion of the TMI-2 scenario (peculiar to a W
four loop plant) was simulated using the RELAPS/MOD 1 Cy 18 (4) computer-
code. Calculations were conducted assuming the initiating event to be a
main feedwater system trip concurrent with a failed open PORV or a break in
the PORV manifold. The auxiliary feedwater system was assumed inoperative.
Thereafter, plant boundary conditions were determined by combining reference
PWR automatic trip conditions with the known events at the TMI-2 plant to
obtain thermal-hydraulic phenomena similar to those present in the TMI-2
accident.
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RELAPS Code/Model Development
The LSTF calculations were conducted using the RELAPS model shown in
Figure 1. The reference PWR model noda1ization is not shown; the LSTF and
reference PWR model noda1izations are similar [3].
HEADER
\!\LVE
Fig. 1 LSTF nodalization
The reference PWR models and the LSTF model were assumed to be at 100%
rated power, i.e. 3423 MWt: reference PWR and 10 MWt: LSTF, as the transient
began (Note that 100% rated power for the LSTF is 14% of 1/48 scaled
reference PWR rated power).
Calculational Matrix
The calculational matrix (see Table I) was constructed to examine the
effect of an open PORV (or break flow area variations in the pressurizer
manifold) i.e., junction 989, combined with variations in the available
emergency core cooling system (ECCS) flow i.e., junctions 589 and 689. All
these calculations assumed the PORV to fail open (or a break to occur) at
the beginning of the transient. In addition, the main and auxiliary
feedwater systems were assumed to fail.
The effect of the high pressure injection pump's (HPIPs) ECCS flow was
examined by assuming one of four HPI pumps (shutoff head = 10.7 MPa) was
available in one calculation and no HPI pumps in the remaining calculations.
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The zero HPI pump flow calculations were conducted to simulate the thermal-
hydraulic conditions in the TMI-2 accident which resulted from an operator
who responded to a full pressurizer, i.e. an apparently "solid-system" by
reducing the ECCS flow.
The baseline transient (No 1) has no HPI pumps and one stuck-open PORV.
Transients No 2 and 3 assume break areas in the PORV manifold line midway
between one stuck-open PORV and a fully severed PORV manifold line.
Transient No 4 assumes a fully severed PORV manifold line, i.e. roughly a
flow area equivalent to 13 stuck-open PORVs.
Transient 5 was the only case examined assuming HPI pumps were
available. This transient was examined assuming a flow area equivalent to
two stuck-open PORVs and with one available HPI pump.
BASELlNE TRANSIENT: REFERENCE PWR THERMAL-HYDRAULIC BEHAVIOR
Loss of the main feedwater system concurrent with a stuck-open PORV
caused an immediate decrease in the secondary (Fig. 2) and primary (Fig. 3)
inventories. The secondary inventory decreased to the 25% (narrow range)
water level scram setpoint in 4.6s. Thus, at 4.6s the turbine throttle
valve began to close and the turbine bypass valves were tripped to open as
the primary system hot/cold leg average temperature exceeded 567.7K.
TABLE I: TMI-2 SCENARIO SEQUENCE MATRIX
TRANSIENT
1(1)
2
3
4(2)
5
EQUIVALENT No
of FAILED PORVs
1
2
6
13
2
AVAILABLE
ECCS EQUIPMENT
Accumulators (Ac), low pressure injection
pumps (LPIP)
Ac, LPIP
Ac, LPIP
Ac, LPIP
1 high pressure injection pump (HPIP), Ac,
LPIP
(1) Baseline calculation.
(2) The flow area of a fully severed PORV manifold is roughly equivalent to
13 stuck-open PORVs.
Concurrently the primary system pressure decreased (Fig. 4) as primary
system mass was exhausted through the PORV. Following scram, the
depressurization rate increased as the core power decreased. In addition,
the turbine bypass valve opened, increasing the primary to secondary heat
transfer. Thus, the primary system fluid shrank as the primary system
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The secondary inventory
continued to decrease (Fig. 2)
even after the turbine bypass
valves were shut, due to the
action of the atmospheric
relief valves (ARVs) which
opened at 75s on high
secondary pressure (greater
than 7.72 MPa). The secondary
pressure remained between 7.72
and 7.9 MPa from 75s until the
end of the calculation.
average temperature decreased.
Consequently, the pressurizer
water level decreased (Fig~
5).
Following closure of the
turbine bypass val ve, the
primary system average
temperature slowly began to
increase. At the same time,
the primary system
depressurization continued.
The reactor coolant pumps
(RCPs) were tripped off at
53.4s as the primary pressure
became less than 12.27 MPa,
i.e. the safety injection (SI)
setpoint pressure. The SI
signal also deactivated the
turbine bypass valves.
3200 4800
TIME (s I
1600
0
- REF. PWR x';'
,
--- LSTF
01-- --~~0
---..........
'-0
~
4800
560
o
o
>-~ 240
"~ 1600
800
~ 400
<n
:1 320
Fig. 3 Primary mass inventory
18
so I--
.t 15 ORYS UT~ I Vw
---
'" 12:0 /!a ---.-'
'"
90- ~ ~--
"
.;.,..... SEC, ARV
:0 SETPOINT
z 6 (7.7 MPo)i
- REF. PWR
ffi
--- LSTF0-g, 0
0 1600 3200 4800 6400
TIME (sI
Fig. 4 Primary system pressure
As the primary
depressurization continued,
voids began forming at the
core upper elevations at 190s
as the saturation pressure was
reached. Thus, liquid mass
began to move from the hot leg
into the pressurizer causing
the pressurizer level to
increase (Fig. 5). The
primary pressure reached a
quasi-equilibrium value at
400s (Fig. 4) as an energy
transfer balance was achieved
between the core decay power,
the primary to secondary heat
transfer and the PORV exhaust
flow.
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The pressurizer collapsed
water level behavior is of
great interest, since the TMI-
2 plant operator's
misinterpretation of the
pressurizer water level [5]
resulted in premature ECCS
flow reduction during the TMI-
2 accident. The reference PWR
pressurizer water level
reached 86% fu11 by 610s (Fig.
5) ·and peaked at 93% full at
980s.
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The primary system
pressure remained relatively
constant (Fig. 4) from 400s
until 3240s. However, as SG
dryout became imminent (Fig.
2) the primary to secondary
heat transfer decreased and
the primary pressure began to
increase. Following SG dryout
at 3580s, the primary
repressurization rate
increased. Along with the
increasing primary pressure,
the core fuel rod temperatures
also increased (Fig. 6). At
4l20s intermittent fuel rod
heatup was calculated to
begin. The primary pressure
reached the setpoint (1~2
MPa) of the two operational
PORVs at 5300s. The primary
pressure remained at or near
that value for the remainder
The core was fully dried out at 6320s and a sustained
calculated throughout the core.
Core temperatures:
upper elevations.
Pressurizer collapsed
water level
1600
1600
Fig. 6
Fig. 5
- REF. PWR
--- LSTF
/ -I0 IJ/ Iso rufORYSI0 üQf (V
050
0
1500
;;:
;;:; 1250
~
t;
f5 100~
I-
~ 75
8
of the calculation.
heatup (Fig. 6) was
BASELINE TRANSIENT: LSTF THERMAL-HYDRAULIC BEHAVIOR
The LSTF initial conditions were set to have the same primary system
energy distribution as the reference PWR. However, since the LSTF rated
power was limited to 10 MW, i.e.; 14% of the scaled reference PWR power, the
LSTF primary loop flow rates were also limited to 14% of the reference PWR.
In addition, since the LSTF's SGs are geometrically scaled, the LSTF steady-
state secondary pressure was maintained at 7.1 MPa (instead of the reference
PWR value: 5.7 MPa) to limit the primary to secondary heat transfer to 10
MW.
These differences caused the LSTF to have a different thermal-hydraulic
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behavior from the reference PWR early in the calculated transient. For
instance, the SG water level, used to trip the PWR core power, behaved
differently. Consequently, the LSTF's core power was programmed to trip off
at the same time as the reference PHR.
As the transient began, the secondary (Fig. 2) and primary (Fig. 3)
inventories began to decrease. The core power began to decay at 7.4s, when
the reference PWR core power had decayed to 10 NI' (scaled val ue). The LSTF
turbine throttle valve began to shut at 7.4s and the turbine bypass valve
opened. However, because the LSTF primary loop flows were a factor of seven
less than the reference PHR and the LSTF secondary pressure was at 7.1 NPa,
the LSTF primary to secondary heat transfer at scram was lower than the
reference PWR. As a result, the LSTF turbine bypass valve remained open
longer and depressurized the LSTF secondary below that of the reference PWR.
Hhen the primary pressure reached the SI signal setpoint (at 54.58), the
turbine bypass valve was shut. The RCPs were programmed to begin to
coastdown at 62.5s in conjunction with the reference PHR.
The LSTF primary system
pressure (Fig. 4) and
pressurizer water level (Fig.
5) behaved very similar to
that of the reference PWR.
However, the A and B loop
(F ig. 1) f lows pr ior to
stagnation (at 1800s) showed a
manometric loop to loop
oscillation (Fig. 7) believed
to be induced by the rapidly
in upstream quality).
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o
~ 10
changing PORV mass f1ux (due to rapid change8
The primary inventory decreased at much the same rate as the reference
PHR. However, the secondary inventory decreased more rapidly than the
reference PWR initially. No
secondary inventory was lost
from the LSTF after 54.5s
until 300s when the secondary
30 pressure reached the ARV
setpoint. Thereafter, the
LSTF secondary inventory also
20 decreased at the same r.ate as
~ the reference PHR.
As the transient progressed, the LSTF SGs began to dry out and the
primary pressure began to climb at 3640s. The LSTF SGs dried out at 4060s.
However, the LSTF primary pressure did not climb at the same rate as the
reference PWR since the LSTF PORV flow had a higher quality than the
reference PWR. Core dryout occurred at 4500s and the heater rods began a
sustained heatup.
Discounting the LSTF/reference PHR hydraulic behavior mismatch ear1y in
the transient, i.e. prior to 300s (resu1ting from the power/1oop flow
mismatch), the LSTF/reference PHR correspondence was exce1lent. Both the
LSTF and the reference PWR ca1culations predicted the onset of extended core
heatup in the same time period.
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SYSTEM BEHAVIOR WITH LARGER PRESSURIZER BREAK SIZES
The exce11ent correspondence between the reference PWR and the LSTF,
observed in the base1ine ca1cu1ation, was also observed for transient Nos 2
through 5 (see Tab1e I). All the ca1cu1ations are shown in Figures 8, 9 and
10 and are summarized in Tab1e 11.
Transient No 2, assuming
a pressurizer 1eak size
equiva1ent to two stuck-open
PORVs, depressurized ,more
rapid1y to a primary quasi-
equi1ibrium pressure (7.8 MPa)
than the base1ine (Fig. 8). A
1arger primary system mass
10ss rate (Fig. 9) resu1ted in
the time of core dryout
occurring before SG dryout.
Consequent1y, core heatup
(Fig. 10) began at 2600s
(1500s ear1ier than the
base1ine). The reference PWR
and LSTF showed good agreement
and both predicted extended
core heatup.
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Transient No 3 showed the
primary to depressurize much
more rapid1y than the
base1ine. The primary
pressure remained at a quasi-
equi1ibrium va1ue for on1y
1000s before the primary mass
10ss was sufficient to a110w
higher qua1ity PORV eff1uent
and rapid depressurization.
Dryout at 1700s (Fig. 10)
caused the core to rapid1y
heatup. However, by 2100s the
system had depressurized to
the accumu1ator injection
pressure (4.5 MPa). Thus, 10w
pressure recovery was
achieved.
Fig. 9 Primary mass inventory
was reached before core dryout occurred.
achieved.
Transient No 4 behaved
very simi1ar to No 3, but the
accumu1ator injection pressure
Again 10w pressure recovery was
The resu1ts of transient No 5, with one avai1ab1e HPI pump, indicated
i l
3
~2
I
J" -REF.PWR
- l --- LSTFI iA
J y.r .,
,1'4
Core temperatures:
upper e1evations.
1500
~ 1300
w
"'r= 1100
~ 900
~ 700
8
Fig. 10
2000 4000 6000
TIME Isl
8000
475
system conditiona1 recovery.
The primary pressure, with
initial behavior the same as
that of transient No 2,
remained at a quasi-
equilibrium value until 7450s.
Although the primary mass was
still decreasing at 8000s, the
core collapsed liquid level
was increasing (and the
primary pressure decreasing)
as the HPI flow moved from the
cold leg into the core region.
By 8300s the primary mass
began to slowly increase as
the core steaming rate
continued to decrease. Thus,
full system recovery was
likely (conditional recovery).
Again good correspondence
between the reference PWR and
the LSTF were observed.
TRANSIENT
1
2
3
4
5
TAßLE 11: Calculation Summary
CHARACTERISTICS
Core dryout occurred; SG dryout time (tSG) < core dryout
(tCD); primary repressurization prior to core heatup;
extended core heatup (ECH).
Core dryout occurred; tCD < tSG; ECH.
Core dryout occurred; tCD < tSG; accumulator injection;
recovery.
Accumu1ator injection; recovery.
Conditional recovery.
CONCLUSIONS AND OBSERVATIONS
Conclusions and observations resulting from the obove calculations are:
1. The basic characteristics of aTMI-2 type scenario in a W type four
loop plant may best be simu1ated with a loss of feedwater in
conjunction with an open PORV using transient No 1 (see Tab1e I) or a
variation of transient No 1 with partial high pressure ECCS. Although
transient No 1 repressurized (uncharacteristic of the TMI-2 accident),
the "high" pressurizer water level fol10wing core dryout (even with no
high pressure ECCS present) was characteristic of the accident. Test
boundary conditions would include failure or partial failure of the
high pressure ECCS. The test would proceed until core temperatures
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reached a specified value.
2. The transient No 5 calculation has demonstrated that the reference PWR
ECCS have sufficient capacity to allow conditional recovery of the
system with a pressurizer leak equivalent to two stuck-open PORVs,
even when only one HPI pump is operative.
3. Transient Nos 3 and 4 have demonstrated that core heatup during PORV
manifold break sizes equivalent to six or more PORVs will be mitigated
by the low pressure ECCS.
4. The loop to loop oscillations observed in the LSTF RELAPS analyses (see
Fig. 7) are thought to be characteristic of the symmetrical two loop
construction. Thus, early test data must be carefully monitored to
determine whether such behavior is present in the LSTF.
5. The TMI-2 sequence calculations discussed herein have shown the LSTF to
have the same qualitative thermal-hydraulic response as a W type four
loop plant for such transients.
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ABSTRACT
Four in-reactor transient tests with maximum fuel sheath temperatures
up to about lOOO°C have been performed at Chalk River Nuclear
Laboratories (CRNL) to measure fission product releases and verify
sheath deformation calculations in the transient fuel performance code
ELOCA. The two Zircaloy-sheathed elements survived the test
transients intact and post-irradiation sheath strain measurements
campare favourably with code predictions using measured fuel sheath
temperature and coolant pressure transients. Sweep gas measurements
of activity release to the fuel-sheath gap during high temperature
transients with stainless steel-sheath fuel rads indicated increased
release rates during high temperature operation. However, the largest
releases were associated with rapid heatup and rewet quench.
INTRODUCTION
Transient fuel performance codes such as ELOCA [1,2], which are capable of
predicting the amount of sheath deformation, the occurrence and timing of fuel
sheath rupture, and the inventory of short-lived fission products in the fuel/
sheath gap at rupture, can be used to assess the development and consequences
of fuel damage resulting from hypothetical accidents. Individual ELOCA sub-
models, such as that for deformation of Zircaloy during high temperature
transients in steam, are based on extensive out-reactor test data [3].
Although data describing the release of short lived fission products during
steady state operation has been obtained at CRNL [4] and elsewhere [5,6],
in-reactor data on transient release required for model verification are less
common. This paper describes four in-reactor tests performed at CRNL to
provide data at sheath temperatures up to lOOO°C for:
(1) verification of ELOCA sheath deformation predictions, and
(2) development of a transient fission product release model to be
incorporated in ELOCA.
FUEL DESIGN AND TEST PARAMETERS
Because the primary test objectives were development and verification of
our models, fuel design parameters were chosen for experimental convenience and
were not typical of CANDU fuel. All tests were performed using single 20 mm
diameter fuel elements instrumented to measure fuel and sheath temperatures,
and when appropriate, interna! element pressures. Fuel element details and
major test parameters are presented in Tables 1 and 2.
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In the two tests designed to produce sheath deformation (FIO-130, 131) the
elements were sheathed in Zircaloy-4 and contained interna! element gas
pressures relevant to CANDU fuel. The larger diameter fuel and sheathing,
interna! clearances for fuel thermocouples, and volume associated with
capillary tubing and pressure transducers resulted in an internal volume about
three times larger than for CANDU fuel. Sheath strain would not therefore be
expected to reduce internal pressures as effectively as in CANDU fuel with
smaller internal volume [7].
The two fission product release test elements (FIO-133, 138) were sheathed
in 304L stainless steel and connected to an in-reactor sweep gas system.
During normal and transient operation, short-lived fission products were swept
from the element by a carrier gas and measured on-line by gamma ray
spectrometry [4,8].
The high temperature fuel sheath transients were produced in three of the
tests by depressurizing the test section while the reactor was at power, to
simulate a LOCA condition. As in previous LOCA tests [8,9] the amount of
fission heat produced between blowdown initiation and reactor shutdown was used
to control the magnitude of temperature rise in the fuel and sheath. The
blowdown transients were terminated automatically by cold water injection
(rewet) at apre-set test section pressure. The time between blowdown
initiation and rewet was 'therefore controlled by the rate of depressurization
and the selected rewet initiation pressure.
Transients in the remaining test (FIO-133) were obtained by increasing the
quality in two-phase coolant flow to induce sheath dryout during full power
operation of the fuel element. Rewet was achieved by reversing the procedure
and reintroducing hot water into the steam flow. The rates of dryout and rewet
were increased from the first to the third dryout transient.
TEST RESULTS
Thermo-mechanical Response
Fuel and sheath temperatures, together with reactor power and coolant and
interna! element pressures are shown in Figure 1 for the two Zircaloy-sheathed
tests. Although the two elements contained different pre-transient internal
gas pressures, a positive driving force for sheath strain existed during the
high temperature portion of the transient for both tests. Both elements
survived the transient without experiencing sheath rupture.
Resulting sheath strains were measured by post-irradiation profilometry
and typica! axial profiles of diametral strain for both tests are shown in
Figure 2. As expected, the average strain experienced in the FIO-130 fuel
element with the lower internal pressure was much less. The distinct ridges on
the sheath at pellet interface locations indicated that strang pellet-sheath
mechanical interaction (PCMI) had occurred. The arrest in the periphera! fuel
temperature rise and the coincident sharp rise in sheath temperatures as shown
in Figures 1 and 2 suggests that much of this PCMI occurred during the early
part of the high temperature transients.
The comparison in Table 3 of the post-transient measured sheath strains at
each sheath thermocouple position with those calculated by ELOCA shows good
agreement. The maximum measured strain was 3.3% to 4.1% at the bottom
thermocouple location (875°C) of the FIO-13l element compared with the
predicted value of 4%.
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The single element test geometry resu1ted in eireumferentia1 temperature
variations 1ess than 35°C and eireumferential variations in measured strain
were 1ess than 1.5%, even at the loeation of the thermoeoup1es. However, the
axial variation in average diametral strain was more signifieant, eonsistent
with the 1arge axial variation in measured sheath temperature (240°C).
Figure 3 shows the ELOCA predietions of interna1 gas pressure and sheath
strain at the bot tom thermoeoup1e loeation during the FIO-131 transient, and
the eomparison with measured va1ues. Again the agreement is good. The smal1
overpredietion of gas pressure ear1y in the transient is due primari1y to the
existenee ofaxial variations of temperature and sheath strain whieh were not
taken into aeeount .by ELOCA. Both the ea1eu1ations and measurements show that
the interna1 element pressure deereases rapid1y onee the 'sheath begins to
strain. For a pre-transient interna1 pressure of 8 MPa, the driving foree for
sheath strain is lost after about 4.5% sheath strain and the rate of strain
drops to zero before rewet oeeurs. This sensitivity of interna1 pressure to
sheath strain is a eonsequenee of the re1ative1y sma11 internal vo1ume in these
test elements.
'CANDU power reaetor fue1 elements eontain an even sma11er interna1
vo1ume. Using the ELOCA eode to app1y the measured sheath temperature and
eoo1ant pressure transients for the FIO-131 test to a regular CANDU fue1
element with the same starting interna1 gas pressure therefore resu1ted in a
sma11er ea1eu1ated sheath strain of about 2%, as shown in Tab1e 3. Further
ELOCA ea1eu1ations showed that even for the higher temperature transient of the
FIO-130 test, CANDU fue1 elements wou1d remain intaet for pre-transient
interna1 pressures up to about 9 MPa.
Fission Produet Release
Dryout Conditions
Figure 4a shows release of Kr-88 during the seeond dryout transient of the
FIO-133 test. During normal operation we measured fue1 peripheral aud sheath
temperatures of 800°C and 300°C, respeetive1y; during the transient the maximum
eorresponding temperatures were 1365°C and 695°C respeetive1y. Integrated
release of Kr-88, an examp1e of the short-1ived fission produets, during the
transient, was 0.5%. Figure 4b shows release for Xe-133 during the more severe
third transient. with maximum temperatures simi1ar to those for Figure 4a, but
aehieved in a shorter time. Integrated release in this ease was 1.4%. The
data in Figures 4a and b show simi1ar features:
i) an initial burst of release aeeompanying run-up to maximum temperatures,
ii) a steady release period at the maximum transient temperature where release
was eharaeterized by a A-1 relationship, and
iii) a major burst of release during rewet.
For the third transient (Figure 4b) rewet was aeeompanied by a reaetor trip.
In both eases, about 80% of the release aeeompanied rewet or rewet/reaetor
trip, and is eonsistent with enhaneed transport and release of fission' produets
aeeompanying fue1 eraeking due to thermal shoek. We previous1y reported [10]
that no iodine exited from the fue1 element during the transient. None was
deteeted at the speetrometer, and the piping downstream of the test seetion
showed a maximum of on1y 0.026 Bq (500 ~Ci). Also, despite the severe thermal
shoek of the final rewet and trip, the fue1 maintained good integrity; there
was no sign of powdering.
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Blowdown Conditions
Figure 5 gives initial release results for FIO-138 Blowdown #3, .in which
the maximum sheath temperature of 850°C was reached 21 s after the blowdown was
initiated. Gross gamma activity in the exit sweep gas stream, corrected for
transport time to the element, is plotted against time; corresponding reactor
power, coolant pressure, and fuel peripheral and sheath temperatures are also
shown. The gamma activity is directly proportional to the short-lived fission
product release. Activity begins to increase about 15 sinto the transient,
corresponding with the increase in sheath temperature, and continues to a value
about 30% above the pre-transient level. The increased release continues for
about 1 min, then falls off as temperatures decrease with the introduction of
rewet. An interesting contrast in behaviour with the dryout testing is that
there is no significant release during rewet in the blowdown transient. Also,
release remained constant during the high temperature periods. The heatup rate
is more severe in the blowdown case, and we postulate that fuel cracking
permits release during this period. The cracks which form remain open and
subsequent release is due to enhanced diffusion of the short-lived species to
the fresh surfaces. Radial temperature gradients in the fuel are decreasing
during this period but there is insufficient time for crack healing. There is
little additional eracking , and thus release, during rewet. In contrast,
during the dryout experiment, the fuel temperature distribution is similar to
that under normal operating conditions, and crack-healing occurs during the
high temperature excursion. Also plotted in Figure 5 is the increase in sweep
gas activity accompanying the reactor trip in which there was no temperature
increase. This will permit us to determine the release due to the temperature
transient alone. Data analysis is being performed to produce integrated
release for individual short-lived isotopes.
CONCLUSIONS
The Zircaloy-sheathed LOCA tests have shown that the transient fuel
performance code ELOCA is able to predict sheath strain adequately in
superheated steam cooling conditions up to about lOOO°C for single element
geometry in fresh or irradiated fuel elements.
A small amount of sheath strain reduces the internal element pressure
rapidly because of the relatively small internal volume in CANDU fuel
elements.
Application of the measured temperature transients (970°C sheath
temperature for 40 seconds) to a single CANDU geometry fuel element using the
fuel code indicates that the element would survive intact with starting
internal pressures up to about 9 MPa.
Under dryout conditions, release of short-lived fission gases is dependent
on transient temperature, but most release occurs during rewet, probably caused
by fuel cracking.
Under blowdown conditions, most release occurs during the high temperature
portion of the transient, prior to rewet.
No iodines were detected at the spectrometer under dryout or blowdown
conditions.
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TABLE 1
Fun ELEMENT DETAilS
TEST OBJECTIVE SHEATH STRAIN FISSION PRODUCT
RELEASE
TEST DESIGNATION FIO·130. 131 FIO·133, 13B CANDU FUEL
UO, FUEL
Diameter (mm) 18 18 12
Length (mm) 462 379 480
Enrichment 1.38 1.38 0.7
(Wl% U·235)
FUEL SHEATH
Material Zircaloy 304L S. Staal Zircaloy
Diameter (mm) 20 20 13
Thickness (mm) 0,8 0,8 0.4
TABLE 2
MAJOR TEST PARAMETERS
TEST OBJECTIVE SHEATH STRAIN FISSION PRODUCT
RElEASE
Test Designation FIo-1JO FIo-131 Flo-133 FID-138
Pre·TrllnsientConditions
Coolant Type PW PW ZPhase PW
Temperature("C) 260-288 260--285 260-350 260--290
Pressufe (MPaJ 9.7 9,8 8,5 9,8
Flow(kg/s) 0.8 0.9 0,24-0.15 0,8
Fuel
Power (kW/m) 65 65 60 60
Burnup(MW.h/kgU) 35 3 55 50 (1)
Central ternperature{'C} 1975(2) 1900 1700 (2) 1900(2)
Peripheraltemp.("C) 860 785 800 725
Sheathtamperature('C) 300--320 288-326 300 280--320
Intemal pressurn (MPe) 1,5 8.1
Trensient Conditions
MfllI.eentraltemp.("C) 2276(2) 2200 2300 (2) 2300(1)
Peripheraltemp. ("C) 1450 1398 1365 1300
Sheath tempo ("Cl 971 875 695 1000
No.ofTrllflsients
Time at Maximum Temp. (si 46 2400 56
Differential Pressure 0--1.5 2t03
Aeross Fuel Sheath(MPa)
(1) Nomlnalvalues.
(21 Celeulatedvaluas.
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TABLE 3
TEST
FIO·130
FIO·131
CANDU FUEL
POST - LOCA SHEATH STRAIN
STRAIN (%)
LOCATION TEMP ('C) MAXIMUM MINIMUM PREOICTED
Top 704 0.75 0.3 0
Sattom 971 0.80 0.30 2.0
Top 690 0.7 0.2
Mid 860 2.5 1.8 3.2
Bottom 875 4.1 3.3 4.0
875 2.0
FIO-1l1
MEASURED 4.8
PREDICTED 4.4
11.0 T 4.0
I
10.2 I 3.6
~ I ~9.4 J.~ 3.2 z
w ~'" 8.6 2.8=>
'"~ 7.8 ------ 2.4 '"...
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Figure 3 Comparison of measured interna! pressure during tran8ient and p08t-
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HIGH TEMPERATURE OXIDATION OF CANDU FUEL DURING LOCA
V.I. Nath and E. Kohn
Atomic Energy of Canada Limited
Sheridan Park, Mississauga, Canada
ABSTRACT
Oxidation effects on CANDU fue1 after a 10ss of coo1ant accident
(LOCA) are significant on1y if the fue1 ~ladding temperature exceeds
about 1000·C. To reach such temperatures effective1y requires the
f10w to stagnate in the reactor core. This requires a specific
break size. The. duration of 10w f10w depends on the thermohydrau1ic
characteristics of the circuit. The stagnation inf1uences fue1 c1ad
temperatures, but to first order, the temperature is determined by
the operating temperature, hence power, of the fue1. For the CANDU
reactor second order effects on the c1adding temperature arise from
the power transient, meta1 water reaction, b10wdown heat removal and
radiation. The high temperature duration is short, i.e. 1ess than a
minute.
We show that radiative heat transfer from the fue1 to the pressure
tube is an important inherent mechanism for 1imiting meta1 water
reaction rates. Further, we estab1ish that the duration and
temperature of the transient is we11 within estab1ished
embritt1ement criteria.
1.0 INTRODUCTION
With water coo1ed reactors, a 10ss of coo1ant accident causes a c1adding
temperature rise. If unchecked, this will lead to oxidation of the c1adding
and eventual embritt1ement. Various criteria have been advanced to determine
if embritt1ement has occurred which wou1d resu1t in fue1 fai1ure and/or 10ss
of fue1 geometry especia11y when the c1adding rewets at the end of the
transient.
The basic purpose of the present work is two-fo1d:
(a) to eva1uate the importance of radiative heat transfer from the fue1 to
the pressure tube as a se1f-1imiting mechanism for meta1 water reaction
(MWR) rates in a CANDU reactor, and
(b) to derive therefrom the time to c1adding embritt1ement for various linear
bund1e powers in order to show that rea1istic fue1 transients wou1d not
cause embr1tt1ement.
To accomp1ish this, a sensitivity study is performed at various bund1e
powers.
2.0
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MODELS, ASSUMPTIONS AND BOUNDARY CONDITIONS
The study is performed under artificial undercooling assumptions for a 37
element bundle (Figure 1) used in CANDU 600 reactors. The cladding
temperatures, the heat generated by the }lliR and the heat transferred to the
pressure tube (PT) are calculated by a transient 2-dime'nsional, thermal model
;f the bu;dle with the following assumptions:
(1) The GE correlation [1] is used to evaluate the heat genera ted due to
}illR. The GE correlation applies up to 1577°C or the range of appli-
cation in this study. The reacted metal, w, measured in weight/unit
area is assumed to be of the form:
where t is the time of reaction and k, referred to as rate constant,
depends upon the universal gas constant (cal/mole K), absolute temp-
erature (K) and activation energy (cal/mole). The method of Sparrow
and Cess [2] is used to calculate the thermal radiation. This
thermal model of a CANDU fuel bundle was developed by Ontario Hydro
and is known as HOTSPOT.
(2)
(3)
(4)
The power transient, the heat transfer coefficient (HTC) between the
cladding and the coolant,-the coolant pressure, and the coolant
temperature are boundary conditions for these calculations. The
last three variables are obtained from thermohydraulic predictions.
The power transient used in the present study, sho~m in Figure 2, is
based on a fast-voiding LOCA and the slower shutdown system (solid
rods). (The CANDU 600 reactor has two independent shutdown
systems.)
The contribution of UOZ/zircaloy interaction to the total heat
produced is insignificant and, therefore, not considered. The
effect of such an interaction on the phenomenon of embrittlement is
discussed in the next section.
Typical CANDU fuel cladding LOCA temperature transients have a
duration of less than aminute (Figure 3).
The cladding heatup duration was artificially prolonged to show the
tolerance of the CANDU design to conditions much more severe than
those expected in a large LOCA, and therefore to give some idea of
the available margins to embrittlement. The boundary conditions are
fixed as follows.
For the first ten seconds, the boundary conditions were taken from
the thermohydraulic predictions which are in themselves pessimistic
due to assumptions such as not crediting the faster shutdown system
(liquid poison injection into the moderator). Convection cooling
was then artificially minimized as follows: The heat transfer
coefficient was instantanteously decreased to 0.1 kW/m Z K
(appropriate for dry steam at low flow) and kept constant for the
rest of the calculation. The coolant temperature was conservatively
kept constant at 900°C. These conditions were chosen from
thermohydraulic predictions as the minimum value of heat transfer
coefficient and a high coolant temperature chosen during the
stagnation period in the channel. The transients are run to 100
seconds; going further is meaningless since best estimate
predictions show clad temperature turnaround by about 50 seconds.
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It is assumed that the pressure tube (PT) does not strain to contact the
calandria tube (CT) which is surrounded by subcooled moderator. This is not
real for the prolonged transients but keeps the pressure tube temperature
higher and the resulting heat loss from the fuel lowet. Even without contact,
heat from the fuel will still be radiated to the CT via the PT and thus goto
the moderator - an inherent heat sink.
The resulting boundary conditions thus form an envelope to the expected
behaviour during a LOCA.
We studied four bundles with powers ranging from 1560 to 2140 kW/m. In
the reactor at any given time, most of the fuel bundles have power less than
1450 kW/m, with peak powers not expected to exceed 1870 kW/m.
3.0 EMBRITTLEMENT CRITERION
Embrittlement of Zircaloy-4 fuel cladding has been a concern since Hobson
and Rittenhouse [3] observed ·that a specimen exposed at 1315'C in steam for
two minutes (and then cooled) fractured when tested in slow compression, while
one held at 1200'C did not. Hesson et al [4] heated U02 fuel clad in
Zircaloy-2 at high temperatures in steam for short times and then quenched it
with water. Only those claddings failed which had oxidized more than 0.17
times the total cladding thickness before quenching. This led to the estab-
lishment of the 1200'C/0.17 oxidation embrittlement criterion.
It is weIl recognized (Hobson [5], Pawel [6], Sawatzky [7], Tong [8]),
that ductility of the cladding after oxidation is determined by the oxygen
concentration in the ß-phase. Embrittlement is, therefore, a function of
temperature and time. In this assessment, we use the embrittlement criterion
developed by Sawatzky [7], from which can be derived a time at temperature
relationship sh~wn in Figure 4.
The fuel sheath has the potential to interact with the fuel pellets and
thus be oxidized. The rate at which this occurs has been studied by Hofmann
[9] and Rosinger [10]. Rosinger's study included the effect of CANLUB
graphite deposited on the inner surface of the CANDU fuel sheath. At 1373 K
and 1473 K at times up to 7200s no interaction occurred. Therefore, the U0 2/-
zircaloy interaction is unimportant for the short transients we are consider-
ing here.
4.0 RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
Zero to one hundred second temperature histories of the fuel cladding for
the 1790 and 2140 kW/m power bundle are shown in part (a) of Figures 5 and 6.
Part (b) of these figures show the heat genera ted by the MWR as compared to
the heat removed by radiation to the PT. There is significant heat storage in
both the fuel and the pressure tube which reduces the rate of cladding temp-
erature increase.
The heat removed from the fuel bundle by radiation is always greater than
the heat genera ted by metal water reaction. The cooler pressure tube is a
significant "brake" on the fuel cladding heatup rate, even without crediting
significant heat transfer to the moderator via the PT/CT. Even at a high
cladding temperature of approximately 1450'C (Figure 6), the }MR amounts to
only about one-fourth the decay power (Table 1). Table 1 gives the power
generation and heat losses from the fuel, and the time to embrittlement at the
peak cladding temperature (PCT) for the four bundle powers studied.
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The neutron flux gradient across the CANDU bundle acts as a significant
equalizer to element temperatures. The outermost elements, which have the
highest ratings, are most affected by radiation to the pressure tube while the
centre element, which has the lowest rating, is almost unaffected. Thus the
temperatures of all elements after about 100 seconds are within 125°C of each
other (Table 11).
For the maximum power CANDU bundle (1870 kW/m), time to embrittlement at
the peak cladding temperature under the arbitrary undercooling assumptions
presented, is of the order of 100 seconds; the actual period of overheating is
~ 50 seconds (Figure 3), and at lower temperatures. For powers well above the
maximum, the time decreases, but not drastically. For lower powers, the time
to embrittlement grows to 200 seconds for 1790 kW/m and 950 seconds for
1560 kW/m bundle. The peak cladding temperatures for the four bundles are
1443°C, 1353°C, 1293°C, 1204°c.
Thus CANDU fuel is tolerant to severe LOCA transients which are
terminated in the short times expected when the emergency coolant injection
system operates. Rowever, even if the transients were so severe as to cause
embrittlement of the fuel, for example if the ECC system were impaired, it
would still be maintained inside the fuel channel [11), so that core geometry
would be preserved.
5.0 CONCLUSIONS
The radiative heat transferred to the pressure tube is significantly more
than the heat generated by the metal water reaction. This slows significantly
the temperature escalation due to exothermic rea~tion.
Even with convection cooling artificially minimized, so that temperatures
1300°C result, the times at such temperature for CANDU fuel bundles are
factors of 2 or greater below physically-based embrittlement criteria.
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TABLE I
EFFECTS OF DIFFERENT BUNDLE POWERS
at 100 SECONDS
Bund1e Outer Element Decay MWR Radiation Power to 'Time to
Linear Power Linear Power Power to PT Coo1ant Embritt1ement
(kW/m) (kW/m) (kW/m) (kW/m) (kW/m) (kW/m) at PCT(s)
1560. 48. 64. 11. 19.5 39.5 950
1790. 55. 73. 15. 22. 51. 200
1935. 59. 79. 18. 23.5 59. 90
2140. 65. 87.5 22.5 27. 71. 20
TABLE II
TEMPERATURE DISTRIBUTION IN BUNDLES AT
DIFFERENT TIMES
1790 kw/m 2140 kw/m
ELEMENT Bundle Temp.(OC) Bundle Temp. (OC)
at at
- -
5 20 100 5 20 100
s s s s s s
OUTER 1012 1118 1198 1152 1256 1322
INTERMEDIATE 911 1106 1287 1038 1278 1429
INNER 841 1005 1280 926 1146 1435
CENTRE 809 956 1255 890 1081 1413
End vlew
Outer element
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1 Zircaloy bearlng pads
2 Zircaloy tuel sheath
3 Zircaloy end cap
4 Zircaloy end support plate
5 Uranium dioxide pellets
G Canlub graphite Interlayer
7 Inter element spacers
8 Pressure tube
180uter
elements
(Power = Po)
6 Inner
elements,
(0.712 Po)
Pressure tube, calandria tube, bundle configuration
Pressure
tube
centre element
(0.673 Po)
12 intermediate
(0.814 Po)
Calandria
tube
FIGURE 1 600 MW(e) 37·ELEMENT FUEL BUNDLE
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THE IMPORTANCE OF END-OF-BLOWDOWN PHASE ON
REFILL/REFLOOD FOR THE CASE OF
COMBINED ECC INJECTION. RESULTS FROM PKL TESTS
R.M. Mandl, B. Brand, H. Schmidt
Kraftwerk Union AG, Erlangen
ABSTRACT
To simulate the latter stage of a large break loss of
Coolant Accident (LOCA) more realistically the end phase
of blowdown (EOB) has to preced the refill/reflood.
The appropriate tests were carried out in the PKL
(Primärkreisläufe) facility. The results, confirming TRAC
(Transient Reactor Analysis Code) calculations show that
the EOB phase has a considerable influence on the course of
a large break LOCA in case of combined ECC-injection.
Residual water as well as the water injected into the hot
legs effect good co re cooling, lead to early rewetting
and energy transport out of the core and thus speed up
core reflooding.
1. INTRODUCTION
Design basis criteria as well as licensing procedures call
for proof of core coolability during postulated loss of coolant
accidents (LOCA). To this purpose complex computer codes capable
of predicting the thermohydraulic co re behaviour have been
developed. These codes have to be verified by their correctly
predicting the course of a LOCA simulated in test facilities. These
facilities, called System Test Facilities must in turn, be capable
of simulating, normallyon a reduced scale, the behaviour of a PWR
under LOCA conditions.
From technical point of view (e.g. fuel rod simulation) it
is extremely difficult to build a test facility capable of
simulating the full pressure and power of a PWR and at the same
time having sufficiently large dimensions to correctly model
phenomena which occur in the refill and reflood phase of a LOCA.
The time (at the end of blowdown) of pressure equalization with
containment - about 4 bar - appeared to be a natural dividing line
between the predominantly homogeneous flow during blowdown and the
refill/reflood characterized by a pronounced separation of the
liquid and vapour phases of the coolant. The acceptance of this
dividing line enabled the simulation of blowdown and refill/reflood
in two kinds of test facilities. Full pressure, full-power scaled
test facilities with 25 - 70 fuel rod simulators modelled
successfully the blowdown conditions whereas test facilities with
low pressure capabilities, decay power smaller than ten percent
and scaled with 300 - 2000 fuel rods, simulated under conservative
assumptions the low pressure refill/reflood phase. Conservative
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assumptions were applied where uncertainties were encountered -
one of them being that at the beginning of refill (4 bar) the
primary side was devoid of water and filled with stagnant steam.
This and conservatively predicted clad temperatures
constituted the initial conditions for all previous refill/reflood
tests. No credit was taken for the presence of either blowdown
residual water or for ECC water already injected in the latter
phase of blowdown by accumulators (p'26 bar). To bridge the gap
in modelling blowdown and refill/reflood phase the Primärkreis-
läufe (PKL) test facility, Fig. 1, designed for 40 bar, was
adapted to simulate refill/reflood preceded by End-of-Blowdown
(EOB) thereby creating more realistic boundary conditions.
This presentation describes the logical basis for and way
of performing these tests. The first results confirming the
influence of EOB are presented.
2. PKL 11 TEST OBJECTIVES
In order to simulate the latter stage of large break LOCA
more realistically it is necessary to relax some of the
conservative assumptions applied up till now. More representative
boundary conditions are achieved by preceding refill/reflood with
End-of-Blowdown (EOB) and simultaneously applying the so called
'Best Estimate' (BE) conditions.
Some of the important differences between licensing and Best-
Estimate assumptions are the following:
- power level and power density distribution
- decay power
- stored energy in core
- availability of emergency core cooling systems.
In case of a combined injection ECC-system however, the most
significant contribution is made by considering the cooling effect
of accumulator water in the EOB phase. This water, injected in the
latter phase of blowdown and largely ignored in the conservative
analysis, assists in early cooling of fuel rods especially in core
of large sized cold leg breaks. Calculations made using theAmerican
TRAC PF 1 Code, developed for Best-Estimate analysis, showed for
the case of a KWU-line PWR (combined injection) that taking into
account the cooling effect of the accumulator water not only
reduces the maximum fuel rod temperatures by several hundred
degrees K but also prevents the usually expected second temperature
peak during the refill and reflood phase Fig. 2.
It is the objective of the current PKL test series to perform
refill/reflood experiments under Best-Estimate conditions as
described above and initiated before End-of-Blowdown. For this
purpose the PKL facility was modified and a new test procedure
introduced.
3. TEST FACILITY
The PKL (Primärkreisläufe) test facility in which the EOB
tests are carried out represents a typical KWU 1300 MW(e) four
loop PWR on a scale of 1 : 145. It was designed to simulate the
behaviour of the entire primary system during the refill and
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reflood phase of a LOCA. In view of the importance of the driving
gravity forces during reflood all elevations correspond to actual
reactor dimensions (1 :1)
The test facility is designed for a maximum pressure of
40 bar. In Fig. 1 the PKL test facility is shown as modified for
EOB tests. The test bundle simulating the core consists of 314
electrically heated rods. These are subdivided into 3
independently heated zones. 25 heater rods are instrumented with
over 150 thermocouples.
The three loops (one of them of double capacity simulating
two loops) contain steam generators with original-size tubes.
Their secondary sides are also volume-scaled and are filled during
the test with water at 55 bar and its corresponding saturation
temperature in order to simulate the energy transfer to the primary
side and the resulting pressure drop.
In addition to the scaled components PKL is eq~ipped witha
separator (mass flow rate downstream of break) and three
conditioning-water tanks which inject water into the system during
the conditioning phase (26 bar<. p< 40 bar).
The facility is instrumented with over 600 measuring points.
Apart from the conventional measurement of temperature, pressure
and single-phase mass flow two-phase flow instrumentation also
exists. The test da ta are recorded at sampling frequencies of
25 Hz (pressure, diff. pressure, mass flow) and 5 Hz (temperature).
4. TEST PROCEDURE
The so called I Condi tioning Phase I (Fig.· 3) is started at
40 bar with stagnant-steam filled system by opening the break
and injecting hot water into the pipes to the left and right of
the break as well as into the upper plenum for cold leg break and
into downcomer for hot leg break.
The objective is to achieve, on reaching 26 bar
- pressure gradient
- core mass flow rate
- fluid density distribution
- clad temperature
- containment backpressure
identical to what these would be if the facility had experienced
a complete blowdown starting at 160 bar. The prevailing conditions
at 26 bar are precalculated by system codes TRAC and DRUFAN.
For a specified break size and location three calculations
are made:
1. A prototype PWR transient starting from normal operating
conditions, i.e. 160 bar, full power.
2. A PKL transient starting from normal operating conditions
assuming PKL were designed for 160 bar and full power.
3. A PKL transient starting at 40 bar with a steam-filled system
and simultaneous injection of hot ,water to the left and right of
the break as well as into the upper plenum or downcomer.
The first two calculations are made in order to demonstrate the
suitability of the PKL test facility for the proposed tests.
The amount of 'injected' water which causes calculations 2 and 3
to be identical is the amount to be used for the conditioning of
the specified test.
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5. RESULTS
According to the original schedule it was intended to complete
the current End-of-Blowaown test series (PKL IIB) by JUly 1984.
Due to unexpected multiple failure of heater rods repairs had to
be carried out and the test series was delayed. For this reason
the results shown are limited to the first test in the test matrix
i.e. double ended guillotine break in the cold leg between the
pump and reactor pressure vessel inlet. The initial and boundary
conditions, Fig. 4, were those of a Best Estimate case as described
in chapter 3. The resultR and conclusionsare consistent with
several shakedown test runs under similar conditions.
It can be said that the conditioning procedure consisting of
injecting water to the left and right of the break to control the
pressure gradient and simultaneously injecting water into the
upper plenum to effect the correct mass flow direction and
distribution is practicable and was successfully carried out.
The rate of change of pressure during EOB is identical to
that predicted by TRAC calculations, the absolute values differ
only slightly, Fig. 5. The maximum velocity indicated in the
downcomer is of the order of 70 m/s which compares favourably
with the predicted value of 80 m/s. There is no velocity
measurement available in the core but correct velocity in the
downcomer allows the assumption of correct velocity in the core.
The mass distribution at these high velocities will be more or
less homogeneous.
As expected from,!precalculations a large number (about 30 %) of
the heater rod thermocouples quench in the EOB-phase (0 - 30s)
confirming the fact that presence of water in the co re ( 1.0)
particularly at elevated pressure produces considerable cooling
effect in the unwetted region leading to faster quenching. The
temperature rise is limited to ca. 50 K, Fig. 6.
Comparing the flow pattern in the system with the predictions
it can be seen that during EOB hot leg oscillations take place
only in the broken loop. The hot leg of the single intact loop
experiences high negative flow due to surge line depressurization,
during this phase the flow in the double loop is almost negligible.
D~ring reflood all three hot legs show periodic oscillations. The
highest amplitude is recorded in the broken loop where subcooled
water penetrates into the steam generator tubes (Fig. 7) and partly
evaporates thereby reinforcing the oscillations. The single and
double loops show similar oscillations in horizontal sections of
their respective hot legs, however hardly any water enters the
steam generators.
Oscillation in the hot legs are transmitted through the upper
plenum and influence, among others, a periodic breaktrough cf
subcooled water into the core. In certain regions the subcooled
water penetrates the whole length of the core (Fig. 8).
During EOB the downcomer and core are exposed to negative flow
at high velocities. In the reflood phase downcomer oscillations
(typically - 1.0 m/s + 0.6 m/s) can be correlated with oscillations
in core and hot legs.
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The overall system behaviour during cold-Ieg-break reflood is
typical of combined injection experiments i.e.
- net negative flow through core and downcomer
- penetration of subcooled water through the upper tie plate
- no significant steam flow through steam generators.
6. FUTURE WORK
The results discussed here are based on a 200 % cold leg
guillotine break and combined ECC injection. The PKL 11 test matrix
contains five additional cold leg break tests as weIl as two with
break in the hot leg. Parameters are amount and location ofinjected
water i.e. cold leg only, hot leg only or combined injection.
7. CONCLUSIONS
Realistic initial and boundary conditions in refill/reflood
tests are achieved by preceding these tests with End-of-Blowdown.
This procedure together with Best-Estimate conditions for decay
power, ECC rates and core temperatures form the basis for PKL IIB
test matrix.
The first test (200 %double-ended cold leg break, combined
injection) proved that the envisaged conditioning procedure can be
realized in practice. By injection of a specified amount of hot
water the depressurization gradient (p~ 26 bar) was effectively
controlled. The ECC water injected into the hot legs penetrated
the co re be fore refill/reflood causing efficient fuel rod pre-
cooling during the EOB phase. This in turn led to limited
temperature rise (ca. 50 K) and rapid core quenching.
References:
Brand B., Sarkar J.: "Wiederauffüll- und Flutversuche mit Berück-
sichtigung der Primärkreisläufe (PKL)lIjBand 1 Ergebnisse der
Versuchsserien PKL IB + IE, Abschlußbericht Förderungsvorhaben
BMFT 1500 287
503
2
1 Pressure Vessel
2 Downcomer
3 Steam Generator 1 (Broken Loop)
4 Steam Generator 2 (Intact Loop)
5 Steam Generator 3 (Double Loop)
6 Pressurizer
7 Cold Leg ECC Injection
8 Hot Leg ECC Injection
9 Cold Leg break ,
10 Conditioning-Water Storage Tank
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No. Break Coolant Injection Comments Required Calculations
(8/8 Ace. +Pumps)
Location Size Cold Leg Hot Leg
Shake· Cold Leg 200% 3/8 4/8 R=Reactor calculations
down
Test K=Condilioning calcolations
1 Cold Leg 200% 3/8 4/8 Best Estimate, EOB.Base Test R,K
2 Cold Leg 200% 2/8 3/8 Licensing Conditions R,K
Ace.
3/8 P
3 Hot Leg 200%
--
2/8 R, K
Ace.
3/8 P
4 Hot Leg 200% 3/8 P 3/8 Reference Values
Ace.
3/8 P
5 Cold Leg 200% W
--
ECC·Rates according to
Yf. K·factors
6 Cold Leg 100% 3/8 4/8 Best Estimate with R,K
7 Col.d Leg 200% 3/8 4/8 Best Estimate K
Alternative Conditioning
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HEAT TRANSFER IN PWR U-TUBE STEAM GENERATORS
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ABSTRACT
A non linear multinode computer code used for
steady state modelling of verticalnatural cir-
culation U-tube steam generators, for pressurized
water reactor plants, is described. The methods
employed for the physical and mathematical repre-
sentation of steam generator performance, numeri-
cal solution techniques and empirical correlations
for two phase flow and heat transfer are related.
Aim of the paper is the determination of pressure,
temperature and steam quality for the fluids in
,both primary and secondary $ides. Particular at-
tention is devoted to the analysis of the heat
transfer coefficients in the boiling region. The
method proposed is very simple and has the merit
of predicting reliable results with very small
computational time.
INTRODUCTION
A deep knowledge of the steam generator thermal-hydraulic
behaviour is essential in the analysis of PWR plants, since this
component provides a dynamic link between the core and the turbo-
generator system. In licensing new power plants several steady
state and perturbation situations are to be considered to assure
the safe and reliable running of the plants; it is necessary the-
refore to predict accurately the steady state and transient heat
transfer in the steam generator.
Within the reactor safety research, the interest in steam
generator_beJ.1aviour has consider~bl.Y increased [{], leading itonu-
merical Ij-3J and experimental I!t-~ works. However there are re-
latively few computer codes developed specifically for steam gene-
rator analysis; presently this analysis is performed using a wide
variety of general purpose codes, describing the entire nuclear
steam supply system and including the steam generator as only one
component of the whole system. Such codes (RELAP, TRANFLO, SATAN,
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TRAP ... ) can be flexible enough to be applicable to the same gene-
rator analysis in a stand-alone fashion, but they require an ex-
tremely large computational time and their adaptation is far from
trivial.
The paper presents a simple one-dimensional non-linear mo-
del to predict the steady state behaviour of U-tube steam genera-
tors; the numerical solution requires a very smal1 computer time,
hence this model can give the designer an immediate and inexpensi-
ve tool for the system benchmark. The one-dimensional approach,
justified by the high degree of turbulence, is very useful as a
first approximation; at the last stage eventually the designer can
res ort to the ~ore detailed but onerous three-dimensional codes.
MODEL DESCRIPTION
U-Tube steam generators, used in Westinghouse and Combustion
Engineering PWR plants, are vertical tube-and-shell heat exchan-
gers. In the primary side the reactor coolant enters the inlet
plenum, flowing inside the U-tubes upward first and then downward,
and exits from the outlet plenum. On the secondary side, a wrap-
per divides the shell region into tube bundle and downcomer. Feed~
water is introduced into the downcomer through an annular ring to
mix the recirculating water returning from the steam-water separa-
tion devices. The water flows downward in the downcomer, at its
bottom this flow enters the tube bundle region upward.
The mathematical model here proposed does not consider the
separation devices, so the system boundaries are formed by the
water inlet and steam out let (at the top of the U-tubes) on the
secondary side (Fig. 1).
In the secondary fluid exchanges of mass, momentum and ener-
gy occur between the parallel and counter flow sections due to the
considerable radial gradients in thermodynamic properties; mixing
effects are properly considered in the mathematical model.
In the one dimensional approach, for every section all pa-
rallel tubes are represented by a single tube. For the primary
single-phase flow only the energy equation is considered, since in
steady state the influence of pressure and compressibility are
quite negligible. In the secondary side a distinction is made be-
tween single and two phase flow regions; in the latter the momen-
tum and energy transfer processes require a distributed parameter
description; in this model complete separation of the phases is
assumed (slip flow). The wall tube is modelIed as a single resis-
tance (including fouling) with zero axial heat conduction; the
thermophysical properties of water and wall are considered depend-
ing on temperature.
The conservati?n equations (mass, momentum, energy) for the
secondary two phase flow are:
FEED
WATER
PUMP
Fig. 1 - U-tube steam
generator.
the head loss; the friction
tion. The local steam void
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d {Pl(1-0:)v l + } 0 (1)dz P o:vv v
d (pV~ + p) dP 0 (2)+ P g +dz dz
d w(pVIh) s (3)dz qs A
s
where p is the mean density of the
thermal equilibrium mixture:
and VI' Vz are mean velocities de-
fined as:
The term dP/dz appearing in the
equation (2), as usual, represents
factor is given by empirical correla-
fraction is
being the quality
x = (h - h ) / (h - h )
1 v 1
and the slip ratio S given by the Bankoff-Jones correlation
S = (1 - 0:) / (kb j - 0:)
with:
k b = 0.71 + 0.29 p /p c
a = 3.53+2.66 10- 8 p+1.18 10- I4 pZ (p in Pa)
Of course the equations (1-3) describe the behaviour of the secon-
dary single phase in the subcooled region, setting 0: = 0 .
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The energy balance for the primary fluid leads to an equa-
tion ana10gous to the equation (3), in which the temperature ap-
pears direct1y.
At last the energy exchange between the primary and secon-
dary f10w is simp1y given by the steady state a1gebraic conditions
(in cy1indrica1 geometry) depending on the heat transfer coeffi-
cients (water (or steam)-wa11) and the tube thermal conductivity.
In the preheat region the heat transfer coefficient for the
secondary fluid is corrected [~ to take account of the triangular
or square tube bund1e arrangement; effects of U-tube bending on
heat transfer are neg1ected.
EMPIRICAL CORRELATIONS
Some empirica1 corre1ations are incorporated in the model
for heat transfer and pressure drop. In the subcoo1ed region the
water Nusse1t number is given by the Bugger corre1ation
Nu ~ 0.02 ReO. 83 PrO. 4 (Re> 10 4 )
whi1e in the nuc1eate boi1ing region the fluid temperature is gi-
ven by the Jens Lottes corre1ation:
being q in IUm 2 , p in Pa, T in °c (3.4'10 6 < P < 13.8.10 6 Pa).
The model inc1udes also corre1ations for DNB and post dry
out analysis (which cou1d be used in a future transient version of
the model for accident analysis).
For the friction factor in the single phase fluid the Co1e-
brook corre1ation is app1ied
ii
(~-4 Log +
Re /"f
1
3.71
~)
D
To obtain the frictiona1 pressure 10ss for two phase f10w
the single phase factor is corrected by a two-phase multiplier
(function of steam qua1ity, pressure and mass f10'~ rate) [7J.
NUMERICAL SOLUTION AND RESULTS
The equations (1-3) constitute a set of ordinary non linear diffe-
rential equations; together with the energy balance for the prima-
ry fluid and the wall exchange condition, they a110w to determine
the velocity, pressure and entha1py for the secondary fluid and
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the temperature for the primary one. The temperature of the se-
condary fluid is found by a function Ta (h s ' ps) given in [7J.
The tube bundle length is spatially discretized and the dif-
ferential equations are solved by means of a finite difference
method; the code provides optionally for the Runge Kutta or the
Merson integration rule. The cold and the hot leg of the bundle
are analysed independently; they are coupled only by a mixing con-
dition for the secondary flow (in every discretized section) and
by a congruence relation at the top of the bundle).
For the hot leg, the input data are the inlet enthalpy of
the primary side and a trial inlet enthalpy of the secondary fluid
(together with both mass flow rates and.pressures).
For the cold leg, the input data' are the enthalpy of the
secondary fluid at the top of the U-tubes (obtained as output in
the hot leg) and a trialoutlet enthalpy of the primary fluid.
Applying the congruence principle for the primary fluid at
the -top of the U-tubes, the exact enthalpy of the inlet primary
water is found. Analogously, with few iterations, the temperature
of the inlet secondary water is found, taking account that satur-
ated water (from the separator devices) is recirculated and mixed
with the feedwater entering the bottom of the tube bundle. The
model validation has been performed comp~i~ the numerical results
with the experimental data available in LS-<U, related to the
steady state inlet and out let conditions for the fluids in the U-
tube steam generator of the Robinson nuclear plant. The agreement
is very good, in particular the steam quality at the top of the
U-tubes and the outlet temperature of the primary water are quite
coinciding.
In figure 2 the pressure and steam quality for the seconda-
ry flow are shown versus the axial coordinate, in the tube bundle;
the term dpp/dz decreases in the boiling region because of the
buoyancy effects.
5.62 %
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Figure 2
Pressure and steam
quality for the se-
condary flow.
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Figure 3 - Temperature distribution for fluids and walls in the
steam generator.
In figure 3 the temperature profiles are shown for the pri-
mary water, the inner tube wall (primary side), the outer tube
wall (secondary side), the secoudary fluid. The discontinuities
of the tube wall temperature are amenable to the sudden heat trans-
fer coefficient variations (from the single phase region to the
boiling one); these discontinuities can be eliminated modifying
the heat transfer coefficient with an interpolation in the trans-
ition (single phase-two phase) region.
These results are obtained using the input data shown in
table 1 and assuming that the tube is made of AISI 304 stainless
steel.
The computational time required (resorting to the Runge
Kutta numerical solution) is about 12 seconds on a CDC Cyber 76
computer.
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TABLE 1
IV
P
A
P
5.255 Cm IV
s
A
s
6.0 cm
7.58 cm 2
0.9058 kg/s
inlet T 259.45°C
s
mixing factor = 1 279.85°C
15.51 HPa
311.89°C
0.3826 kg/s
inlet Pp
in let T
p
out let T
p
spatial step = 10 cm
m
s
5.619 HPa
m
p
in let Ps
L 8.2 m
NOHENCLATURE
A cross sectional area
D tube diameter
f friction factor
g acceleration of gravity
h specific enthalpy
L tube length
m mass flow rate
Nu Nusselt number
p pressure
Pe critical pressure (22.12 HPa)
Pr Prandtl number
q heat flux
R two phase multiplier
Re Reynolds number
S slip ratio
T temperature
v velocity
IV watted perimeter
x steam quality
z axial co-ordinate (z = 0 at the bottom of the tube
bundle)
a volumetrie void fraction
s absolute surface roughness
P density
Subscripts
I
p
s
v
w
saturated liquid
primary
secondary
saturated steam
wall
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ABSTRACT
In the HALDEN program it has been shown that the thermal behavior
of REBEKA fuel rod simulators is representative of nuclear fuel
rods.
In the SEFLEX program of KfK it has been found that the quench
velocity in a LOCA transient is higher and the maximum cladding
temperature in the unwetted portion of the rod bundle is lower
for fuel rod simulators with a gap between the heat source and
the cladding compared to gapless heater rods.
In the REBEKA program of KfK it has been shown that burst Zirca-
loy cladding tubes quench earlier than non-deformed claddings. It
was found that premature local quench fronts are genera ted at the
bursts long before the regular quench front had reached these
axial elevations, they propagate in the axial and lateral direc-
tions and cause a fast quenching of the hot fuel rod bundle re-
gions around burst claddings.
These new findings indicate a higher safety margin of coolability
in a LOCA of a PWR. They have not yet been modeled in existing
computer codes.
PROBLEMS
In the refilling and reflooding phases of a loss-of-coolant accident (LOCA)
in a pressurized water reactor (PWR) Zircaloy fuel rod claddings, depending on
the size and location of the rupture in the primary system may reach temperatu-
res which cause them to balloon under the impact of internal overpressure.
In thermal-hydraulic experiments i.e. FEBA, PKL, FLECHT, THETIS, CCTF and
SCTF the temperature and quenching behavior has been investigated using electri-
cal solid heater rods without gap inside the cladding. Ballooned fuel rod cladd-
ings have been simulated by sleeves fixed on the outer surface of such heater
rods.
The development of computer codes was based mainly on experimental data
obtained from tests performed with such gapless heater rods. However, the appli-
cation for the prediction of the quenching of the fuel rod claddings in in-pile
experiments showed large discrepancies, i.e. the fuel rods quenched much ear-
lier than the codes had predicted.
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OßJECTIVES
A comparison oE the behavior oE a nuclear fuel rod with that oE fuel rod
simulators of different design during the reflood phase of a LOCA will be dis-
cussed. Emphasis is placed on the overall and local quench phenomena and the
peak cladding temperatures. The main features and the corresponding programs are
shown in Fig. 1.
Zireatoy - 4 c1adding
gas filled gap
NiC, 80/20 c1adding
no gap
Q)
REBEKA-
program
<D
HALDEN-program
IFA 541151f ~~-rßr7
Fig. 1 Experimental approach to investigate the temperature - and quenching
behavior of nuclear fuel rods and different fuel rod simulators
(schematic)
EXPERIMENTS
HALDEN-pro gram
In the HALDEN-program IFA 541 and 511 rod bundle experiments with 5 and 7
rods, respectively, with controlled forced feed reflooding have been performed
in the Halden reactor [1]. In these experiments nuclear fuel rods and REBEKA-
fuel rod simulators, respectively, have been used. The heated length of both the
types of rods was about 1.5 m. The test series were carried out under comparable
operational procedures and boundary conditions in order to compare the thermal
behavior of such simulators with nuclear rods.
SEFLEX-program
(Fuel Rod ~imulator ~ffects in Flooding Experiments)
The aim of the SEFLEX-program [2] is to quantify the influence of the
design of different fuel rod simulators on quench front progression and heat
transfer in rod bundles during the reflood phase of a LOCA.
For thermal-hydraulic reflood experiments usually electrically heated rods
are used which are characterized by a close thermal contact between the stain-
less steel cladding tube and the electrical insulation containing the embedded
heating coil. lIowever, nuclear fuel rods are characterized by heat generating
fuel pellets stacked in a Zircaloy tube with a specified radial gap between the
cladding tube and the pellets. For transient cooling conditions the thermal
behavior is different for the different design of the rods described.
Experimental data from FEBA reflood tests using heater rods without gap
serve as a data base [3]. For comparison forced feed bot tom reflood tests have
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been perfonned uslng a 5x5 REB8KA rod bundle in the FEßA test facility to mini-
mize the influence of the boundary conditions of different test rigs. The R8BEKA
fuel rod simulators consist of'a Zircaloy cladding of U.72 mm wall thickness
containing A1 203-pellets. The gap between the pellets and the cladding is filled
Hitb either helium (fresh fuel) or argon (high burnup). An electrically heated
rod of 6 mm diameter is placed in the center of the pellets. The cross sections
of a FEBA rod and a RE8EKA rod are shOlm in Fie. 2. The remaining characteri-
stics are the same for both types of rads used for the comparison of the reflood
behavior: lIeated length: 3.9 m, eosine shaped axial pOl,er profile approximated
by 7 power steps, peak to average rod pmler: 1.19, rod diameter: 10.75 mm, rod
pitch: 14.3 mm, 7 original P\oIR grid spacers Hithaut mixing vanes.
Annular pellets IAI,o,}
REBEKA
1-----10.75 --------l
DimensIons are in millimeters
Fig. Fuel rod simulator cross sections
10.15
80th test series using bundles of 5x5 FEßA rods or 5x5 REBEKA rods have
been carried out under the same operational procedures, e.g. initial bundle
power of 200 kW folloHed by a 120 % ANS standard decay heat transient for system
pressures of 2 bar and 4 bar, and flooding velocities of 3.8 cm/s and 5.8 crn/s.
REBEKA-program
(Reactor typical ~undle ~xperiments Karlsruhe)
In the REBEKA-program the plastic deformation behavior of pressurized Zir-
caloy-4-cladded fuel rod simulators in 7x7 rod bundles has been investigated
under thermohydraulic conditions of the refilling and reflooding phases of a
LOCA [4]. The flooding conditions were simulated by forced feed bottom flooding.
The REBEKA fuel rod simulator of the 2nd generation used in the test REBEKA 6
has the same design as described in the SEFLEX-program except a continuous eo-
sine shaped power profile. In these experiments among others the initiation and
the progression of additional quench fronts on ballooned and burst claddings
have been investigated.
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RESlJl.TS
HAl. DEt\-program
Figure 3 shows a comparison of nuclear Euel rods and electrically heated
REßEKA fuel rod simulators. The good simulation qual ity of the REßEKA-simulators
in respect to the temperature and quenching behavior can be seen. Therefore, it
can be concluded that results obt"ined wLth REßEKA Euel rod simulators are re-
presentative oE nuclear fuel rods.
100
o
o 60 120 180
time [sI
240 300
Fig. 3 Comparison of nuclear fuel rods vs. REßEKA fuel rod simulators
SEFLEX-program
The reflooding behavioi of both the bundles consisting of either 5x5 FE BA rods
or 5x5 REßEKA rods is significantly different. The main effects are evident
using results of tests performed with a system pressure of 2 bar, a flooding
velocity of 3.8 cm/s in the cold bundle, and a feed water temperature of 40 °c.
The quench front progression in the REBEKA rod bundles is faster than that in
the FEBA rod bundle (see Fig. 4). For the upper bundle portion it even in-
creases again for the bundle of REBEKA rods with argon filling.
The corresponding cladding and housing temperatures measured at the bundle
elevation indicated in the sketch are shown in Fig. 5. The peak cladding tempe-
ratures are lower for the REBEKA rod bundles as a result of increased precursory
cooling compared with the conditions in the FEBA rod bundle. The maximum cladd-
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Fig. 4 Quench front progression in FEBA and REBEKA rod bundles
ing temperatures again are lower for the case of argon in the REBEKA rods. The
temperature transients of the bundle housing which is identical for all of the
tests proves that the precursory cooling is influenced by the different radial
design of the rods applied.
The reasons for the lower cladding temperatures and the faster quench front
progression at the REBEKA rod bundles are the lower heat capacity of the Zirca-
loy claddings and the more pronounced decoupling of the cladding from the heat
source. The same effect can be observed for ballooned claddings as weIl as for
blockage sleeves simulating ballooned claddings. The consequences of the diffe-
rent reflooding behavior of the individual rod bundles on the fluid conditions
within the bundle subchannels are indicated by the different water carry over
rates.
Figure 6 shows the water carry over collected downstream of the bundle exit
versus reflood time. A higher amount of water entrained by the steam is being
evaporated within the REBEKA rod bundle subchannels removing more heat per unit
of time. Less water is carried over.
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Fig. 5 Cladding and housing temperatures in 5x5 FEBA and REßEKA rod bundles
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REBEKA-program
The highest degree of the decoup1ing of a c1adding will be reached when the
c1adding had hurst. Then the gas has escaped and rep1aced or mixed by steam with
its much poorer heat conductivity and burst 1ips are penetrating into the coo-
1ant channe1s. The two-phase f10w coo1ant is able to coo1ing down the c1adding
in the region of the hurst very fast and the water droplets will quench it. Two
new quench fronts hegin to propagate from the burst. One of them moves relative1y
fast upwards in flow direction, the other downwards opposite to the direction of
flow. This is illustrated schematically in Fig. 7, the experimental results are
plotted in Fig. 8. The axial quench front propagation initiated by a burst
cladding is evident. In comparison to the cladding temperature of the burst rod
at 1850 mm, the temperature history of an undeformed cladding at the same axial
position is plot ted. It shows that the regular quench front has a time delay of
135 seconds.
Figure 9 demonstrates the lateral quench front propagation initiated by a
burst cladding. The axial position of 1850 mm of the non-deformed rod 14
quenched earlier than the axial midplane of 1950 mm (TC positions are measured
in mm from top). The reason for that off-normal behavior is the touch of a hurst
c1adding of the neighbouring rod 36 with its early quenchin~ In that way a
lateral propagation will occur. - Fig. 10 illustrates the quench sequence•
..c:
+-
cn
c: t~ burst
.L
plane l····
t
t
t
t3 t4 time t5 t6 t1 t2 t3 t4
Fig. 7 Premature quenching oE burst Zircaloy c1addings (schematic)
quench f;lti,",mm,1000 100 burst start of flooding sequence
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Fig. 8 Cladding temperatures and interna1 rod pressure of a burst rod
(REBEKA 6)
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SUHNARY AND CONCLUSION
The short quench times of nuclar fuel rods ,observed in in-pile tests can be
explained,
- they can not be simulated with solid heater rods,
- however, REBEKA fuel rod simulators represent a good simulation.
- REBEKA fuel rod simulators exhibit lower peak cladding temperatures and ear-
lier quenching compared to solid heater rods.
- This is the result of the lower heat capacity of the cladding and of the
heat resistance in the gap between pellet and cladding.
- Burst cladding tubes quench earlier compared to intact cladding tubes and gene-
rate secondary queoch fronts.
The secondary quench fronts propagate relatively fast in the axial direction
and have also effects in the lateral direction.
This leads to a fast cooling of the hot zones in a fuel element.
- All these favorable effects have not yet been modeled in existing computer
codes.
They suggest a higher safety margin in assessing the coolability oL a
pressurized water reactor in a loss-of-coolant accident.
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A STUDY OF ROD BOWING EFFECT ON CRITICAL HEAT FLUX
IN PWR ROD BUNDLES
D.G. Reddy and C.F. Fighetti
Heat Transfer Research Facility
Columbia University
New York, NY 10027, U.S.A.
ABSTRACT
A broad overview of the experimental and analytical results of several
experimental programs to determine the effect of rod bowing on critical
heat flux (CHF) conducted at Columbia University are presented. First,
an accurate generalized subchannel CHF correlation, which covers both PWR
and BWR operating conditions as well as postulated loss-of-coolant
accident (LOCA) conditions, developed at Columbia University based on the
local conditions obtained with the COBRA IIIC subchannel code from
heretofore unpublished rod bundles CHF data is presented. Second, the
results of a comprehensive study of rod bowing effect on CHF in PWR type
rod bundles using CHF data points from seven bowed rod tests with various
degrees of reduced clearance between heated rods are discussed.
INTRODUCTI ON
Boiling crisis in nuclear reactor fuel elements is characterized by sudden drop
in the heat transfer rate due to change of heat transfer mechani sm and a
temperature excursion of the fuel rod surface. The heat flux just before the
occurrence of boil ing crisis is called Critical Heat Flux (CHF). Since the
operating criteria for nuclear reactors specify that they must operate under
conditions below critical heat flux, the prediction of CHF is a subject of
vital importance in nuclear reactor design. Because of the complexity of the
CHF phenomenon in fue 1 rod array geometry and 1ack of analyt ica1 methods for
the prediction of CHF in rod bundles, the understanding of the CHF in rod
bundles depend upon interpreting correctly the vast amount of data obtained in
electrically simulated reactor fuel elements. The research work presented in
this paper is a step in this direction. Two topics of interest related to CHF
are presented in this paper are: the prediction of CHF in rod bundles; and the
effect of rod bow on CHF PWR rod bundles
At present a general ized critical heat flux (CHF) correlation based on local
conditions obtained with a non-proprietary subchannel code is not available in
the open literature. Experience has shown that existing CHF correlations such
as W-3, B&W-2, CE-I, and WSC-2 developed with proprietary subchannel codes are
not very accurate when used with subchannel codes available in the open
1iterature, such as COBRA. Therefore, a need exists for the development of a
CHF correlation using experimental data obtained in fuel assemblies
representat i ve of nuc 1ear reactor rod bundl es and 1oca1 cond i t ions obtai ned
with a subchannel code available in the open literature. Such an objective can
be accomplished because of the availability of the following two items:
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- A large data base of about 11 000 CHF data points obtained in fuel
assembly models is available at the Heat Transfer Research Facility of
Columbia University.
- A widely used and well documented subchannel code COBRA ;s available in
the open literature.
The second objective of the present study is to evaluate the effect of one of
the fuel abnormalities, that of a bowed rod on Critical Heat Flux (CHF) in PWR
type rod bundles. Results of several experimental programs to determine the
effect of rod bowing on CHF conducted at the Heat Transfer Research Facility of
Columbia University are presented in this paper. These tests were performed in
4X4 and 5X5 rod bundles simulating a section of a full sized PWR fuel assembly
by electrically heating the test sections. The CHF data from seven bowed rod
tests with various degrees of reduced clearance between heated rods were used
in this study.
TEST FACILITIES
There are two major thermal-hydraulic facilities for CHF testing at the Heat
Transfer Research Facility. They are known as the Medium Pressure and the High
Pressure Heat Transfer Loops. The operating limits of these loops are given in
Table land schematic drawings of these flow loops are shown Figures 1 and 2
respectively.
Flow was maintained by a centrifugal pump in the Medium Pressure Loop and by a
set of four canned rotor pumps in the High Pressure Loop. A throttle valve
upstream of the test section automatically controlled the flow, and also
maintained its stability during the tests. A turbine flow meter, a calibrated
platinum resistance thermometer (RTO) and thermocouples located at the inlet of
the test sect i on measured flow and temperature, and a 1arge-sca1e Bourdon
press ure gauge with transducers monitored the outlet pressure. All of these
measurements were recorded continuously during the tests.
Heating to test sections was provided by six motor-generator sets operated in
parallel for a maximum OC output of 50,000 Amps at 230 Volts (i .e., 12
Megawatts). Heat rejection in both loops was accompl i shed by shell-and-tube
heat exchangers with constant temperature water as the cool ant. A detail ed
description of the power system is provided in Reference 1.
TEST PROCEDURE
Each of the test sections had a different configuration, but all tests were
performed in the same fashion. The test section outlet pressure, inlet
temperature and mass flow rate was established and maintained constant. The
total power to the test section was then increased in small increments and the
loop brought to the correspondi ng equil i bri um conditi ons each time. Thi s
process was continued until a temperature excursion was observed to start in
one or more of the rods in the bundle. The temperature increase varied
depending on system conditions, from a minimum of 5 Oeg. C to 50 Oeg. C or
more. When the indication was judged to be sufficient to have established the
presence of CHF, the power to the test sect i on was reduced and the test
conditions prior to the temperature excursion were recorded both manually and
by a computer controlled data acquisition system.
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TAßlE I Heat Transfer loop Operational limits.
(a) Medium Pressure loop (b) High Pressure loop
(a) (b)
Maximum Pressure, X 106 N/m2 16.5 17.2
Maximum test section flow, m3/hr 125 115
Total head developed by pump, m of water 180 160
Test section housing length, cm 510 500
Test section housing 1.0., cm 16.6 17.8
Heat exchanger capacity. kw 6000 4000
Maximun secondary water Flow. m3/hr 150 150
Maximum well water temperature, OEG. C. 15 15
HIIING TEE
CI RCUlA TI HG
PUMP
fLO~
HETER
flllIT
(XCHANG(RS
TEST SEClION
fLO~
HETER
FIGURE 1. Medium Pressure Heat Transfer loop.
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FIGURE 2. High Pressure Heat Transfer loop.
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THE COLUMBIA CHF CORRELATION
An accurate generalized subchannel CHF correlation, which covers both the PWR
and BWR operating conditions as well as postulated loss-of-coolant conditions,
was developed at, Columbia University based on the local conditions obtained
with the COBRA IIIC subchannel code from heretofore unpublished rod bundle CHF
data. The basic form of the Columbia.CHF correlation [2,3] is
where,
A = PI Pr P2 (Gk"){P5 + P7 Pr)
C = k' P3 Pr P4 (Gk"){P6 + P8 Pr)
(1)
(2)
(3)
and
C'G 1. 3 - 0.3 CG (4)
L" = (Xl - Xin)/ql" (5)
q " andql" are the critical and local heat fluxes (W/m2), Xi is the inlet
qUality, Xl is the local quality, Pr is t~ reduced press ure (pr~ssure/critical
pressure), G is the local mass flux (Kg/m s), CG is the grid loss coefficient,k' &k" and PI through P8 are constants.
The coefficients PI through P8 were optimized using non-linear regression
analysis. The optimized values of the coefficients PI through P8 are 0.5328,
0.1212, 1.6151, 1.4066, -0.3040, 0.4843, -0.3285, and_12.0749 respectivel~4The values of constants k' and k" are 3.1706 X 10 and 7.3659 X 10
respectively.
The Co1umb,i a CHF corre1at ion ut il i zen 3607 CHF data poi nts from 65 fue1
assembly test sections. The data cover a wide range of rod bundle geometries
(Rod di ameter: 9.7 to 17.3 mm, and Heatez! 1ength : 76 to 427 cm) and o~erat i ng
parameters (Pressure: 1.4 to 16.9 M. N/m , Mass flux: 270 to 5600 Kg/m .s, and
Quality: -0.25 to 0.75).
The accuracy of the correlation was ascertained by evaluating the average ratio
of predicted to experimental CHF, standard deviation (STO), and root mean
square error (RMS). Also distribution of residuals within error bands of 5%,
10%, 15%, and 20% was determined. The correlation predicts the source data of
3607 data points from 65 test sections with an average ratio of 0.995. The
standard deviation is 7.20% and the RMS error is 7.20%. The distribution of
residuals is as follows: 51% of CHF data are correlated within 5% error band,
82% of the points within 10%, 97% of the points within 15% and 99.9% of the
points within 20%.
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Res i dua1 an al ys i s was performed by p1ott i ng the rat i 0 of predi cted CHF to
experimental CHF versus parameters appearing in the correlation, such as, mass
flux, pressure, average exit quality, inlet quality, and average heat flux.
Examination of these residual plots (not presented here) shows that the ratios
of predicted to experimental CHF are more or less evenly distributed within the
error band of 20%, thus confirming the adequacy of the general form of the
correlation and its dependence on various parameters.
EFFECT OF GRID SPACERS ON CHF
In nuclear reactor fuel bundles, the basic purpose of grid spacers is to
maintain relative position of rods (rod-to-rod clearances) fixed through-out
the core length. The grid spacer in a rod bundle increases flow resistance
(pressure drop) and turbulence, which in turn promote mixing, thus reducing any
flow and enthalpy imbalance between· subchannels. Simple grids, in general, do
not, significantly increase flow resistance or promote mixing. However, in
certain instances, grid spacers with mixing vanes are used whose purpose is not
only to keep relative rod positions fixed but also promote mixing by
selectively diverting flow from hot subchannels to cold subchannels and vice
versa. This type of spacers increase flow mixing and thus reduce enthalpy rise
in hot channe1s . They also pee1 off the bubb1e 1ayer of the rods to some
degree. The combi ned effect of the above two act ions i s i ncrease in CHF
limits. From the above discussion, it is clear that a grid spacer correction
factor is required to account for the flow mixing effect of the spacers on CHF.
One of the.major tasks of developing a unified CHF correlation with data from
different fuel bundles is to characterize the grids of various types of
reactors. Any transverse momentum exchange due to the presence of grids should
result in an increase in the bundle overall pressure drop. Based on this
assumption, one could use the pressure drop due to grids in the evaluation of
the effectiveness of the grids in mixing and thus enhancing the CHF limits. In
general, the grid loss coefficient, which is a measure of the pressure drop due
a grid, is higher for mixing vane grids than for simple grids. Therefore the
effect of grid spacers on CHF was accounted for in the CHF correlation in terms
grid loss coefficient (C6).
The grid loss coefficient is defined as,
(6)
where, OP is the pressure drop due to grid spacers, 6 is the mass flux, n is
the numbeP of grids, v is the specific volume, and 9 is the Newton constant.
c
The spacer coefficients used in this work were calculated using isothermal
pressure drop data. The pressure drop due to grid spacers is,
(7)
where, OPt is the total frictional pressure drop, f is the McAdams single phasefriction factor, L is the length of the bundle, and Oe is the equivalent
diameter of the bundle.
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EFFECT OF ROD BOWING ON CHF
The effect of rod bowi ng on CHF i s of i nterest for the des ign of PWR fue1
assemblies. In order to achieve a higher level of reliability of reactor
components several CHF tests with bowed rods were carried by various reactor
vendors. The results of three series of experimental programs to determine the
effect of rod bowing on CHF conducted at the Heat Transfer Research Facility of
Columbia University are discussed in this paper.
Markowski et al. [4J evaluated the results of the first series of tests using
the TORC subchannel code and the CE-1 CHF correlation. The second series of
tests were studied by Hill et al. [5J using THINC computer code and modified
W-3 CHF corre1at ion. Some of the data from the th i rd seri es of tests were
analyzed by Nagini et al. [6J with the aid of COBRA IIIC subchannel code and
mod ifi ed W-3 corre1at ion. In the present study, a comprehens ive study of a11
these data was carried out with one set of subchannel code and CHF correlation
to evaluate the rod bowing effect on CHF.
TEST SECTION DESCRIPTION
The first series of bowed rod tests were conducted with electrically heated rod
bundles representative of a portion of a Combustion Engineering (CE) 14X14 fuel
assembly. Three bundles were tested (Test sections 58, 67, and 69). These test
sections consisted of 21 heated rods of diameter 11.18 mm and one unheated rod
of diameter 28.32 mm in a 5X5 sraure rod array with a rod pitch of 14.73 mm.
The heated length of the bundl es was 3.81 m. The rods were supported by 9
reinforced CE standard grid spacers with a grid spacing of 336 mm. The rod
bundles had uniform radial and non-uniform axial heat flux distribution. The
radial geometry is presented in Fig. 3 and the axial heat flux distribution is
given in Fig. 4. Details of the radial and axial geometry parameters are given
in Reference 4.
Test section 58 had all the rods straight. The bowed rod test sections 67 and
69 were identical to test section 58 except for the rod bow. In test section
67, the heated rod in position 17 was bowed towards rod 21 to contact rods 16
and 18 at 3.36 m elevation. The point of maximum bow was located 203 mm
upstream of the last grid. In test section 69, the heated rod in position 18
was bowed away from rod 6, reducing the gap between rod 21 and the guide tube
from 3.55 mm to 1.65 mm. The point of maximum bow was the same as in test
section 65.
The second series of bowed rod tests consists of three bundles (test sections
131, 148 and 151), representative of Westinghouse 15X15 fuel assemblies, all of
which had top skewed axial heat flux profile and were 4.27 m long. These rod
bundles consisted of 16 heated rods of diameter 10.72 mm arranged in a 4X4
square array with a pitch of 14.1 mm. These rods were supported by mixing vane
grid spacers placed 660 mm apart, with simple support grids in the middle of
the mixing vane grids. These test sections had non-uniform radial heat flux
distribution with inner four rods at about 18% higher power level than twelve
outer heater rods. Figures 5 and 6 show radial geometry of the test sections
and the axial heat flux distribution respectively. Additional details of these
test sections are given in Reference 5.
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Test seetions 131 and 148 had all the rods straight. Test seetion 151 was
identieal in all respeets to these tests exeept for a bowed rod. The rod in
pos i t ion 16 was bowed towards rod 14 to eontaet rods 15 and 13 at the 345 mm
el evat ion.
The third series of bowed rod tests (test seetions 166, 167, 168, 169, and 170)
were also representative of the Westinghouse 15X15 fuel assemblies (10.7 mm rod
diameter, 14.1 mm rod pi teh, and 4.27 m heated 1ength) . The heater rod in
position 14 was replaeed with an unheated rod of diameter 13.8 mm. The radial
geometry of these test seetions is shown in Fig. 7 and the axial heat flux
distribution is given in Fig. 6.
Test seetion 166 was a straight rod bundle. In test seetion 167, the rod in
position 16 is bowed towards rod 14 to eontaet rods 15 and 13 at 345 mm
elevation, as in test seetion 151. In test seetion 168, heated rod loeated in
position 15 was bowed towards rod 13 to eontaet rod 16 and the thimble tube
loeated in position 14. The point of maximum bow is the same as in test seetion
167. In test seetion 169, rod in position ,15 was bowed towards rod 13, redueing
the gap between rods 15 and 16, and 15 and the thimble tube in position 14 to
15% of the normal gap. The point of the maximum bow is the sameas in test
seetion 168. Test seetion 170 is identieal to test seetion 169, exeept that the
gap at the point of maximum bow was redueed to only 50% of the normal gap.
ANALYSIS OF BOWED ROD DATA
The bowed rod effeet was quantified by evaluating matehing experiments with all
rods straight and with one rod bowed. Analysis of these data was earried out
pairing bowed and unbowed runs taken at the same flow eonditions. Sinee in
praetiee it is diffieult to mateh test seetion inlet eonditions exaetly, the
measured heat fluxes were normalized by their eorresponding heat flux at
eritieal power as predieted by a eorrelation. The COBRA IIIC eomputer eode was
used to determine the loeal fluid eonditions. The measured-to-predieted
eritieal power ratio was then ealeulated by using the Columbia CHF
eorrelation. The differenees between the bowed and the unbowed
measured-to-predieted ratios were furt her normalized by the
measured-to-predieted ratios for the unbowed runs to obtain the rod bow effeet
parameters.
The dependenee of bow parameter on pressure, mass flux and loeal quality was
evaluated by dividing the data into several groups and eompiling bow parameter
statisties. Table 11 gives eompilation of number of points in eaeh group and
the average bow parameter of that group at different pressures. Similarly,
statisties for mass flux and loeal quality are given in Tables III and IV
respeetively.
A eareful study of the statisties lead to the following important eonelusions:
1. The rod bow parameter is strangly dependent on pressure and loeal quality
but shows little or no dependenee on mass flux. The adverse effeet of
rod bow on CHF inereases monotonieally with ~nereasing pressure. The
effeet is signifieantly high at 16.5 M. N/m . The rod bow parameter
inereases with deereasing loeal quality.
2. These results also demonstrate that if small gap exists between rods the
adverse effeet of rod bow on CHF deereases eonsiderably. The bow effeet
ea1eul ated by i nterpo1at ing the data between no bow and rod bowed to
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Fig. 3 Radial geometry of test· series I Fig. 4 Axial geometry of test series
Fig. 5 Radial geometry of test series Ir Fig. 6 Axial geometry of test series 11
3~9 MM
AP)
Fig. 7 Radial geometry of test series 111
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Table II Number of data points (NPTS) and Average Bo~ Parameter(A.BP) broken down by pressure (Million N/m )
Test Sections
Pressure 65 67 151 167 168 169 170
------------------------------------------------------------------
10.3 NPTS 14 8 8 8 7
A.BP 1.7 0.0 -1. 7 -1. 3 3.5
12.1 NPTS 11 7
A.BP 2.3 -2.2
12.4 NPTS 3 5 5 5 4
A.BP -0.7 3.0 0.2 1.0 5.4
13.8 NPTS 12 9
A.BP 5.2 -2.3
14.5 NPTS 13 11 12 11 11
A.BP 2.9 11.4 6.3 1.8 2.7
15.2 NPTS 16 14
A.BP 4.9 -2.8
16.5 NPTS 9 11 10 12 13 11 11
A.BP 10.4 -1.8 5.7 19.2 15.6 -1.5 0.7
------------------------------------------------------------------
Table III Number of data points (NPTS) and Aver2ge Bow Parameter
(A.BP) broken down by mass flux (Kg/m .s)
Test Sections
Mass Flux 65 67 151 167 168 169 170
------------------------------------------------------------------
1350 NPTS 13 10
A.BP 10.8 -1.6
2025 NPTS 2 1 8 4 7 7 4
A.BP 0.9 0.8 1.1 6.6 9.8 2.9 4.0
2700 NPTS 19 18 15 12 11 7 10
A.BP 3.3 -3.2 2.9 10.8 7.1 2.5 6.8
3375 NPTS 2 1 8 7 8 8 7
A.BP -0.3 -1.6 3.7 13.2 6.8 -1.1 1.9
4050 NPTS 12 11 6 6 5 5 5
A.BP 4.6 -1.8 3.0 11.6 6.3 -3.6 -1. 5
4725 NPTS 3 7 7 8 7
A.BP 5.7 7.7 4.7 -1.6 -0.9
------------------------------------------------------------------
Table IV Number of data points (NPTS) and Average Bow Parameter
(A.BP) broken down by local quality range
Test Sections
Quality 65 67 151 167 168 169 170
------------------------------------------------------------------
-.1
-
NPTS 8 7 5 5 5 4
0.0 A.BP 10.5 -3.3 15.1 11.9 -6.2 -6.4
0.0 - NPTS 12 21 13 23 24 21 24
0.1 A.BP 5.4 -3.1 5.4 12.6 8.5 1.1 4.3
0.1 - NPTS 16 12 22 8 9 9 5
0.2 A.BP 3.1 -1.1 1.5 0.9 0.2 0.7 1.4
0.3 A.BP 3.8 4.8 2.7
------------------------------------------------------------------
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contact overestimates the degradation of CHF due to partial bow closure.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
- An accurate general i zed subchanne1 CHF corre1at ion based on 1oca1
conditions obtained with the COBRA IIIC code, developed utilizing over
3600 CHF data points from 65 test sections simulating PWR and BWR fuel
assemblies is presented.
- The effect of grid spacers on CHF was investigated and this effect was
accounted for 'in the CHF correlation in terms of grid loss coefficient.
- The rod bowing effect on CHF was studied. The results of this study lead
to the following conclusions:
1. There was no adverse effect on CHF of a heater rod bowed to contact
at low pressures and at high pressures the degradation of CHF due to
rod bow was singnificant.
2. The rod bow effect increases with decreasing quality.
3. When a small gap exists between the rods the adverse effect of rod
bow on CHF decreases significantly.
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ENHANCE~lliNT OF REAT TRANSFER IN DISPERSE
FLOW AND DOWNSTREAM OF BLOCKAGES IN ROD BUNDLES[l]
R. Kianjah, V. K. Dhir and A. Singh[2]
School of Engineering and Applied Science
University of California, Los Angeles
Los Angeles, CA 90024
ABSTRACT
Results of experiments conducted to study the effect of a discontinuous
phase and blockages in rod bundles on heat transfer are presented. The
test section consists of a 4-rod bundle with the rod diameter and pitch
of typical PWR fuel elements housed in a plexiglass tube. The rod bundle
is 184 cm tall and is heated electrically. The blockages are of sleeve
type and they block 60% of the inner flow channel area while leaving a
virtually infinite flow bypass region. In the experiments the disconti-
nuous phase is simulated with 30 and 100 ~M spherical glass particles
entrained in air. The mass flow rate ratio of particles to air was
varied from 0 to about 4 or the volume fraction, ß, of particles to
air was varied from 0 to about 2 x 10-3 .
The results indicate significant enhancement in heat transfer in the pre-
sence of particles. The enllancement is also appreciable downstream of
blockages. Rowever the relative enhancement under two phase flow conditions
is smaller than that for the single phase.
INTRODUCTION
During reflood phase of a loss of coolant accident in light water reactors,
entrained flow conditions exist over a large extent of the rod bundles down-
stream of the quench front. The maximum temperature attained by the rods prior
to complete cooling significantly depends on heat transfer rate under entrained
flow condition. In certain instances, prior to flooding the overheated cladding
may swell as a result of large pressure in the fuel pins. The swollen cladding
may block the flow channels between the fuel pins. The resultant flow distri-
bution will affect the local heat transfer coefficient. Knowledge of heat trans-
fer mechanisms in the vicinity of blockages in rod bundles is essential to des-
cribe the thermal-hydraulic response of the core during the reflood phase of the
accident. The purpose of this work is to determine experimentally under simu-
lated conditions the enhancement in heat transfer resulting from agitation or
turbulence created by the presence of droplets in steam flow in both undeformed
and deformed rod bundles.
Several studies documenting the two phase gas-liquid heat transfer co-
efficients have been reported in the literature. These studies which have been
reviewed by Drucker et al [3] among others unequivocally show that the presence
of small amounts of gas-Yn a flowing liquid can significantly enhance the heat
transfer from the wall. It is found that the magnitude of the ratio of two
phase to single phase heat transfer coefficient for bubbly and slug flow in-
creases with the cross-sectionally averaged void fraction. The enhancement in
536
heat transfer coefficient however decreases with an increase in the liquid
Reynolds number. Drucker et al correlated most of the two phase flow heat trans-
fer data available in the literature as weIl as their own rod bundle data as
Nu
1jJ =: --.!:E. = 1 +Nu
sp
1/2
(1)
where a is the void fraction and Gr is the Grashof number defined as
Gr . (2)
(3)
In equation (2), Pd and P are the densities of the discontinuous phase and the
continuous phase respecti~ely, v is the kinematic viscosity of the continuous
phase, g is the gravitational acgeleration and Dh is the hydraulic diameter.The Nusselt numbers and Reynolds numbers in equaEion (1) are defined in the
usual fashion with a characteristic length given by the hydraulic diameter. The
constant Cl was found to be 2.5 for flow in tub es and 3.25 for flow over a four
rod bundle. Drucker et al proposed that similar enhancement mechanism and a
correlation similar t;-equation (1) should be valid when solid particles are
entrained in agas. Theofanous and Sullivan [4] have also made similar obser-
vations.
~Iany studies of heat transfer in flowing solid-gas mixtures have also been
reported in the literature. The earliest quantitative study out of these is
that of Farbar and Morley [5]. In their experiments Farbar and Morley en-
trained alumina-silica catalyst particles in air and passed the mixture through
a 17.5 mm I.D. tube with its wall maintained at a nearly constant temperature.
They observed that the heat transfer coefficient increased with 'the ratio of
mass flow rate of solids and air and with the flow velocity. However for tur-
bulent flow of air, the enhancement in heat transfer was found to decrease with
flow Reynolds number. For mixtures of particles lying in the size range
20-210 ~m, they correlated their data as
0.14" 0.6 (::) 0.45
In equation (3), \f and \f are the mass flow rates of solids (discontinuous phase)
and air (continuou~ phase1 respectively.
Subsequently Farbar and Depew [6] conducted experiments on nearly uniform
particle sizes of 30, 70, 140 and 200 ~m. In these experiments they observed
that the smallest particles resulted in highest enhancement in heat transfer
whereas the largest size particles had no appreciable effect. The thermal
entry length was found to increase with particles and Depew and Farbar [7] re-
port, it could be three times higher than that for flow with no particles. A
very comprehensive review of heat transfer in solid gas flows has been pre-
sented by Depew and Kramer [8].
Studies related to effects of blockages in tubes and rod bundles on heat
transfer have shown that considerable enhancement in heat transfer coefficient
537
occurs just downstream of blockages. Experiments of Koram and Sparrow [9] for
an unsymmetric blockage in a tube indicated that the increase in heat transfer
downstream of the blockage could be attributed to the flow's reattachment to
the tube wall. Murakami, Kikuchi and Michiyoshi [10] observed the same effect
in a rectangular channel. They concluded that the downstream enhancement is a
function of the ratio of blocked to unblocked area in the channel. Experimental
Results of Drucker et al [3] for single phase flow agreed qualitatively with the
aforementioned results~However, two phase bubbly and slug flow results showed
much smaller relative enhancement.
The purpose of this study is to quantify for both blocked and unblocked rod
bundles the enhancement in heat transfer as would occur in disperse flow regime
due to the turbulence generated by the droplets. During reflood phase of a.
LOCA the droplets continue to evaporate as a result of heat transfer from the
wall and from the steam. The continuous evaporation coupled with different
modes in which heat can be transferred to the droplets, makes it difficult to
discern in a real system the role the droplets play in improving the heat trans-
fer from the wall. Thus in this study experiments are conducted by entraining
glass particles in air. The density ratio of glass to air is about the same as
of water to steam at expected system pressure during a LOCA.
EXPERIMENTAL APPARATUS AND PROCEDURE
Apparatus: The main components of the test apparatus are: the test section, a
mixing chamber, variable area nozzle for metering flow of particles and a fil-
tering system. Figure 1 shows a schematic diagram of the apparatus. The glass
particles are stored in the feeder tank which is placed on a weighing machine.
The variable area nozzle connects the feeder tank to a horizontal plexiglass
tube which acts as a mixing chamber. One end of the mixing chamber is connected
to utility air supply via a rotameter. The other end is connected to a flow
establishing section preceding the test section. The flow establishing section
is 77 cm long and is a 5.08 cm I.D. plexiglass tube. To re-establish the flow
soon after it leaves the mixing chamber, a secondary air supply line is con-
nected to the flow restablishing section at the bot tom. After passing through
the test section, the mixture of particles and air is fed into a dust collector.
The test section consists of 4 rods arranged in a square grid and housed
in a 5.08 cm I.D. plexiglass tube. The rods are 1.1 cm O.D. stainless steel
tubes with a wall thickness of 0.84 mrn and a length of 184.2 cm. The rods are
held together with spot welding at discrete locations with wire I.raps made out of
0.6 mm diameter stainless steel wire. For blocked rod bundle experiments,
sleeve type blockages are placed in the mid plane of each rod. The diameter of
the blockages is chosen such that with the same rod spacing as the unblocked
case the blockages would barely touch each other. The orientation of the rods
is secured by soldering the blockages together. For both set of bundles two of
the four rods are instrumented with 30 gage chromel-alumel thermocouples. The
thermocouples are spotwelded on the inner wall of the stainless steel tubes.
Figure 2 shows the location of these thermocouples and a cross-sectional view of
the test section. The rods are positioned such that the thermocouples on one
of the ins trumented rods face the inner channel while those on the other rod
face the outer channel. The rod thermocouples and the thermocouple placed at
the inlet of the test section to measure the incoming fluid temperature are
connected to a data logger.
Procedure: Prior to initiation of experiments with a new rod bundle, the
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thermocouples mounted on the rods are calibrated with respect to the thermocouple
placed at inlet of the test section. Thereafter the flow rate of air is adjusted
to a desired value and the elctrical heating of the rods is initiated by main-
taining a constant AC voltage across the rod bundle. The voltage is adjusted
with the help of a variac and current and voltage are noted with a multimeter.
During initial heating period and after steady state conditions are achieved,
the data are scanned every fifteen seconds from all the thermocouples. To allow
for any variation in the inlet temperature of air, an average of three sets of
steady state data is used for calculations.
The solid particles are then entrained by opening the valve connecting the
mixing chamber with the feeder tank. The choice of a particular nozzle is made
apriori depending on the desired flow rate of the particles. The reduction in
the weight of the feeder tank is recorded every ten minutes. In a manner simi-
lar to the single phase experiments, the thermocouple output is continuously re-
corded on the data logger. Because of the fluctuations in wall temperature due
to the turbulence created by the particles, the instability of the flow and the
electrostatic charge developing between glass particle, an average of 6 to 12
data sets is taken.
Data Reduction: The thermocouple output recorded in millivolts was converted
into temperature by using appropriate conversion factor. The evaluation of heat
transfer coefficient requires outer wall temperature rather than the inner wall
temperature as noted from the thermocouple output. Therefore assuming axial
symmetry, no axial conduction and insulated inner wall, the steady state one
dimensional conduction equation with heat generation was solved. For the high-
est heating rates employed in the present experiments, the maximum temperature
difference between inner and outer wall was found to be O.OlK. This difference
is extremely small in comparison to the temperature difference between the wall
and the fluid. Thus the thermocouples can be considered tO'give the outer sur-
face temperature.
Knowing the current, the voltage, the inlet temperature of the mixture, the
total length of the rods and the masS flow rate of solids and air, the bulk mix-
ture temperature at any axial location was calculated as
EITi +---=---
(W c + W c ) L
a pa s ps
(4)
In writing equation (4), it is assumed that the fluid and the particles are at
the same temperature. In equation (4) T. and Tb are the inlet and bulk tem-
peratures respectively; E is the voltageldifference, I is the current, z is the
axial distance measured from inlet, L is the total height of the rods, c and
c are the specific heats of air and solid respectively. Knowing at a ~1ven
19~ation the wall temperature, T , and the bulk temperature from equation (4),
the local heat transfer coeffici~nt, h, is calculated as
h EI (5)
In equation (5), A
s
is the outer surface area of one rod.
While developing the correlation for enhancement in heat transfer, the
volumetrie fraction of particles rather than ratio of mass flow rate of solids
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to air is used. With the assumption that the partic1es attain their terminal
velocity very quick1y and that Stoke's drag 1aw is valid, a relation between
mass f10w rate ratio and volumetrie fraction of solids was found.
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
The single and two phase entrained f10w experiments for heat transfer from
a four rod bund1e were conducted with Reyno1ds number varying from 14,500 to
21,000. In the experiments partic1es of 30 ~m and 100 ~m nominal size were
used with mass f10w rate ratio of partic1es to air varying from 0 to about 4.
These mass f10w rate ratios resu1ted in the variation of solid vo1ume fraction,
ß from 0 to 2 x 10-3 • All of the resu1ts presented here pertain to the inner
channe1 of the rod bund1e.
Disperse F10w Heat Transfer in the Unb10cked Rod Bund1e: The Nusse1t numbers
obtained with various ratios of mass f10w rates of 30 ~m partic1es and air and
for f10w Reyno1ds number of 20,500 are plotted in Figure 3 as a function of num-
ber of hydrau1ic diameters from in1et. The plotted data are for the inner
channe1. The arrows on the abscissa indicate the location of wire wraps. With
increase in mass f10w rate of solids the heat transfer coefficient is seen to
increase all a10ng the rod bund1e. At higher mass loadings of partic1es a sud-
den increase in heat transfer coefficient is observed downstream of the wire
wraps. This is probab1y due to separation and re-attachment of the f1ow. In
the presense of the partic1es the distance from in1et at which the f10w fu11y
deve10ps therma11y is observed to increase somewhat. Figure 4 shows the de-
pendence of Nusse1t number on axial distance from in1et for 100 ~m partic1es.
Again with increase in the ratio of mass f10w rate of partic1es to air, the
Nusse1t number is found to increase. In comparison to the data plotted in
Figure 3 for 30 ~m partic1es, the enhancement for the same Re and Ws/Wa , is
found to be sma11er with 100 ~m partic1es. Also with bigger partic1es no sig-
nificant increase in heat transfer just downstream of the wire-wraps is observed.
The relative enhancement, ~-1, in heat transfer obtained from the data such
as that plotted in Figures 3 and 4 was found to be near1y independent of the
axial distance from in1et. This observation is in contradiction to the con-
c1usion drawn by Depew and Farber from their data [ 7] in which they found en-
hancement to die down with distance from in1et. The f10w became fu11y deve10ped
at about 50 hydrau1ic diameters from in1et. The present data also show that the
relative enhancement decreases with increase in Reyno1ds number but increases
with increase in the loading ratio, Ws/Wa . For the same Reyno1ds number and theloading ratio, the relative enhancement is 1arger with 30~m partic1es as com-
pared to that with 100 ~m partic1es.
Corre1ation of the Heat Transfer Data: The functiona1 form of the corre1ation
equation (1) deve10ped by Drucker, Dhir and Duffey [3] based on bubb1y and slug
f10w data shou1d be valid for solid partic1es entrained in air when the void
fraction, a, is rep1aced by, ß, the vo1ume fraction of the solids. The vo1ume
fraction, ß, can be easi1y re1ated to the mass f10w rate of the partic1es if the
partic1e velocity relative to the fluid is known. In the present work the va1ue
of ß is eva1uated by assuming that the partic1es attain their terminal velocity
very quick1y. For the range of Re studied in this work, {t is found that for
100 ~m partic1es
540
x 10-3
W
-4ß ~ 0.558 (~ - 1.3) + 7.19 x 10W
a
and for 30 ~m particles
x 10-3
W
-3ß ~ 0.538 (WS - 2.8) + 1.51 x 10
a
(6)
(7)
In Figure 5 the relative enhancement20btained with 30 ~m and 100 ~m par-ticles is plotted as a function of ßGr/Re2. The 30 ~ data covering more than
an order of magnitude variation in ßGr/Re are correlated within ± 40% as
The large variability of the data with respect to the best fit through the data
results from the significant uncertainty associated with the data for which the
enhanczment is only 10-15%. The 30 ~m data show a much stronger dependence on
ßGr/Re in cOTIlparison to the bubbly flow data of Drucker et al [3]'2 The en-
hancement with 100 ~m particles for a rather narrow range of ßGr/Re is cor-
related as
(9)
The correlation (9) shows a similar dependence of relative enhancement on ßGr/Re2
as was obtained in reference [3] with bubbly flow. However the relative enhance-
ment obtained with bigger particles is about 25% lower than that found in the
bubbly flow.
Disperse Flow Heat Transfer in the Blocked Rod Bundle: The enhancement in heat
transfer in the vicinity of blockages located at the mid plane of the rod bundle
are plotted in Figure 6 for a flow Reynolds member of 16700. The plotted data
are for pure air flow and for the cases when the ratio of mass flow rate of 30~m
particles to air is 1.7 and 4.4 respectively. The dotted and chain lines re-
present the enhancement in the absence of the blockages. In cases for which the
data for the unblocked bundle at the same loading was not available, equation (8)
was used. Referring to the case of lvs/Wa = 0, a significant enhancement in heat
transfer rate is observed downstream of the blockage. As has been discussed by
Koram and Sparrow [ 9] and Drucker et al [3], this enhancement is attributed to
the separation and reattachment of floW-in the downstream wake of the blockages.
Immediately downstream of the blockages i8 the separation region featuring high
turbulance which enhances the heat transfer rate. The heat transfer coefficient
reac~es a maximum value when the flow reattaches to the surface of the rod.
Following the peak an exponential decay of heat transfer coefficient character-
izes the flow redevelopment region. The undisturbed value of the heat transfer
coefficient is seen to occur within about 10 hydraulic diameters. The maximum
enhancement in heat transfer rate downstream of the blockages is about 35%. This
value is significantly lower than an increase of about 135% predicted from the
correlation of Drucker et al developed with water data. In the reattachment
region, the boundary layer-rust begins to form and conditions closer an invis-
cid flow exist. For this case the heat transfer rate is probably limited by
Peclet number rather than Prandtland Reynolds numbers. This observation needs
to be substantiated with data obtained with fluids other than water and air.
With particles an abrupt increase in heat transfer just upstream of the
blockages is observedo This increase in heat transfer is caused by the cross
flow conditions that develop as the flow trying to avoid the high resistance
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region in the inner channe1 diverts to the outer channe1. Downstream of the
b10ckage, the enhancement attains a maximum va1ue and then exponentia11y de-
creases to the undisturbed va1ue for the unb10cked bund1e. For a 10ading of
1.7, the maximum enhancement is about 20% where as it decreases to about 15%
when W /W is increased to 4.40 Both these va1ues are 10wer than the maximum
enhanc~me~t observed with air a10ne. This indicates that increase in turbu1ence
in the separated and reattachment regions do,~stream of the b10ckage is sma11er
when the main f10w turbu1ence is a1ready augmented because of presence of par-
tic1es. This inference is reinforced by the observed reduction in enhancement
as the 10ading ratio, Ws/Wa' or turbu1ence of the main f10w is increased.
Figure 7 shows the relative enhancement in heat transfer in the vicinity of
b10ckages for a f10w Reyno1ds number of 14500. The observed enhancement for
both the single and two phase f10w conditions is simi1ar to that observed in
Figure 6. The maximum enhancement downstream of the b10ckages is sma11er under
two phase f10w conditions than that for the single phase f10w and is consistent
with the ear1ier observation of Drucker ~ a1.
The presence of droplets in the steam region far downstream of the quench
front during ref100ding will thus definite1y enhance heat transfer. The sma11er
partic1es in the size range of about 30 ~m will main1y contribute to this en-
hancement. Though the mass fraction of the sma11er partic1es under entrained
f10w conditions during ref100ding may be sma11 , the number density of these par-
tic1es can be easi1y 1arger. As observed in FLECHT SEASET [11] experiments, an
enhancement of 70-80% above the single phase f10w conditions is easi1y possib1e.
In order to precise1y quantify the enhancement,data with different distributions
of partic1es are needed. It shou1d also be pointed out that the effect of eva-
poration of droplets on the 10ca1 temperature profile need to be inc1uded when
using the corre1ation deve10ped with the partic1es.
If b10ckages are present, heat transfer downstream of b10ckages will be
augmented beyond that caused by the droplet created turbu1ence. Some drop lets
may shatter as they hit the b10ckages. The present data do not inc1ude the
effect of droplet shattering and subsequent change in the droplet size distri-
bution on heat transfer downstream of the b10ckages.
CONCLUSIONS
1 0 The presence of a discontinuous phase in a continuous phase leads to
enhancement in heat transfer. The enhancement is found to increase with the
10ading ratio or the vo1ume fraction of the discontinuous phase and decrease
with increase in the base f10w Reyno1ds number o For the same f10w and 10ading
conditions, the enhancement is higher with 30 ~m partic1es than with 100 ~m par-
tic1es.
22 The enhancement data has been corre1ated with the dimension1ess ~30uPßGr/Re For a base f10w Reyno1ds number of 16700, and ß of about 2 x 10 an
enhancement of 120-150% has been observed in the four rod bund1e.
3.
rate of
su1t of
In addition to the enhancement created by the discontinuous phase, the
heat transfer is further augmented downstream of the b10ckages as a re-
separation and reattachment of f10w.
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ABSTRACT
This article presents an analysis of the transient behaviour
at a high temperature gas cooled reactor plant. The analysis
has been performed by means of simulation programs which are
generated by the DSNP program system (UDynamic Simulator for
Nuclear Power Plants U). The simulation includes the reactor
core, the heat removal system comprising several heat removal
loops with different design and the turbine/generator set.
Several perturbations of the heat removal balance caused by
different types of initiating events are investigated.
1. INTRODUCTION
DSNP is a special purpose program system for the simulation of the
dynamic behaviour of the heat generation and heat removal system of nuclear
power plants.
The dominant feature of DSNP is its ability to trans form the flow chart
or a block diagram of a heat removal system directly to a simulation program
by means of a relatively small amount of DSNP instructions. The programming
effort required for the development of a simulation program for a new or a
modified design of a power plant is thus drastically reduced. The inherent
flexibility of the DSNP system permits the simulation of a large variety
of different designs within short times so that plant optimization can be
achieved with improved efficiency.
The DSNP includes several libraries containing program modules which
model particular components or subsystems of the heat generation and heat
removal system. The libraries contain in addition a large variety of
auxiliary routines such as materials properties functions and engineering
correlations for two-phase flow and heat transfer. Materials properties
functions, for instance, are available for water and steam, for helium,
graphite and most of the metals used in reactor design.
DSNP statements are available to include an arbitrary number of
component modules into a simulation program and to link them together in
such a way that their mutual dependence is taken into account. Other
statements serve to define the components design by assigning geometrical
data, materials and boundary conditions.
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The simulation program generated in this way consists of a system of
coupled and (normally) nonlinear differential equations supplemented by a
set of additional algebraic relations. Different numerical algorithmus are
available in the DSNP library which can be assigned to the program by
choice.
The DSNP control language is a higher level programming language which
requires a special "precompiler". This precompiler translates the DSNP
statements into FORTRAN and searches the libraries for the requested com-
ponent modules, auxiliary routines and design data. Finally it generates
the simulation program together with the requested output routines for
the display of results.
2. PLANT DESCRIPTION
The system underlying the present analysis resembles a projected power
plant of the high temperature gas cooled type containing a pebble bed
graphite core and a heat removal system designed to supply partly process
heat for chemical processes such as coal gasification and partly heat for
electricity generation. This plant which has a much more complicated heat
removal system than that of a plant designed for electricity generation
only, has been selected to demonstrate the capabilities of DSNP.
The core of the reactor is a packed bed of spherical fuel elements
consisting of graphite with fuel enbedded in form of small coated particles.
Heat is removed from the core by forced flow of helium through the bed in
downward direction.
Fig. 2.1: Schematic flow chart of the analyzed HTGR plant
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The heat removal system includes several loops of different design
in order to meet the different tasks simultaneously. A simplified flow
diagram of the system is shown in Fig. 2.1. The loop shown on the left
of the reactor core includes a steam reformer and a steam generator in
series. The loop on the right is separated from the primary circuit by
an intermediate gas-gas-heat exchanger. ~10 loops of this type exist
with the same performance. The total number of heat removal loops, there-
fore, is three.
The plant is designed for a nominal power of 500 MWth with core dimen-
sions chosen such that the average core power density is 4.0 MW/m 3 • The
average helium pressure in the primary circuit is 4.0 MPa.
The core inlet temperature is chosen to be 300°C and the gas mass flow
through the core such that the outlet temperature attains 950°C. Half of
the generated power is carried away via the loop of type 1 while the other
half is removed via the two loops of type 2 by equal parts.
3. SIMULATION OF THE HTGR PLANT
DSNP was originally developed for the simulation of water and sodium
cooled reactors /1/, /2/. Since 1980 new component modules have been
developed and included into the DSNP library which extend the applicability
to the simulation of gas cooled reactors /3/, /4/.
Essential differences with regard to modelling assumptions arise from
the compressibility of the coolant and from the modelling of the pebble
bed core. Considerable simplifications, in turn, arise from the fact that
normally phase changes of the primary coolant have not to be considered.
The secondary water-steam cycle in HTGR plants may operate under
different conditions compared with that in a liquid cooled reactor but
from the modelling standpoint it does not exhibit essential new aspects.
Host of the modules describing components in the secondary circuit of LWR
and PWR/ therefore, can be used for HTGR plants too.
4. MODELLING OF THE HTGR PEBBLE BED CORE
The HTGR-core is modelled in the present study by means of the follo·
wing set of DSNP library modules:
The core thermohydraulics module CORPB2,
the core power distribution module TPOWR1,
the neutron kinetics module NEUTRi,
the reactivity feedback module FDBEK1,
the decay heat module GAMAR1.
CORPB2 models the thermohydraulics of the pebble bed in a spatial one
dimensional approach.
TPOWRl provides the axial distribution of the power generation density
in the core. (For the plant under consideration the distribution has a
distinct maximum in the upper half of the core.)
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NEUTR1 calculates the instantaneous reactor power as a function of re-
activity from the point reactor kinetics equations with one prompt neutron
group and six delayed groups.
FDBEK1 calculates the feedback effects resulting from temperature
coefficients of reactivity. Fuel und moderator temperature coefficients
related to average temperatures inside the active part of the core can be
taken into account. This module is normally directly linked to the kinetics
module NEUTR1.
GAMAR1 evaluates the decay heat generation after shutdown. The
empirical ANS-standard function is used with this module.
Fig. 4.1 shows this complex of core modules with their mutual inter-
actions. Included in addition are the modules SAFTY1 and CONTR1 which act
directly on the core complex. SAFTY1 simulates the plant protection system.
This module may receive several prescribed variables of the heat removal
system and will initiate a scram at precribed trip settings. Scram initiation
acts on the module CONTR1 which generates the reactivity transient associated
with the movement of control and shut down rods.
The core thermohydraulics module CORPB2 models the interaction of
a gasflow with a packed bed of heated- spheres. The equations for continuity,
energy and momentum of the gas flow together with the equation for the
heat diffusion inside the fuel sphere form a coupled set of differential
equations.
The module is based on an approach which is commonly used in simulation
codes for agas flow in a packed beds. This approach is based on the
customary gas dynamic equations with the real gas density p replaced by the
effective density p = a p where a is the void fraction of the bed. The
continuity and the ~~~rgy equation, therefore, can be written in the form
Fig. 4.1: DSNP moaules used to simulate the HTGR core
ap
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- div (apv) (1)
a (pcvT)
a --a-\- - div (apvcpT) + div (ke grad Tl + Q (2)
where T is the gas temperature, Cv and cp the specific heat capacities for
constant volume and constant pressure respectively, ke an effective gas
conductivity and Q the heat generation density.
The effective gas conductivity is evaluated from a correlation which,
in addition to the molecular conductivity of the gas, takes the radiative
energy exchange between neighbouring spheres into account.
The thermal coupling between the gas flow and the fuels spheres is
achieved by a heat transfer coefficient which is calculated from existing
correlations. The differential equation governing the heat diffusion inside
the fuel spheres is solved by a commonly used implicit finite difference
algorithm. The core is subdivided into a prescribed number ofaxial sections
as shown in Fig. 4.1 in order to account for the axial variation of the
heat generation density inside the core. For each section the heat diffusion
is evaluated for a representative sphere with a sphere power corresponding
to the local nuclear power generation density.
5. ANALYSIS OF SYSTEMS PERTURBATIONS
Three types of initiating events which cause aperturbation of the
plant energy balance have been analysed by means of DSNP simulation pro-
grams with different degrees of complexity. These events are
1. a stepwise increase of the reactivity from zero to a constant value of
p.l. The imposed reactivity pulse is terminated after 4.5 s,
2. a depressurisation of the primary circuit by an anticipated leak to the
atmosphere with a free flow area of 0.012 m',
3. a 25 % decrease in turbine power demand.
All programs included the complex of core modules described in section
4. Heat exchangers, steam generators, blowers, valves and other components
are represented by modules available from the DSNP library. The primary
circuit is represented by aseries of gas cavities and pipe segments which
form the gas flow paths between the cavities.
Two programs have been used for this purpose. The first program (PRPL6)
includes the core and all heat exchanging equipment of the three loops. The
secondary steam-water circuits are not included and replaced by constant
inlet conditions at the secondary side of the heat exchangers and steam
generators. The second program (PRPLB) comprised the total heat removal
system as shown in Fig. 2.1. The corresponding DSNP flow chart representing
the interconnection of DSNP-modules is shown in Fig. 5.1. Steam generators
and heat exchangers, for instance, are represented by more than one module.
Gas cavities representing the entrance and exit plenum of these components
are additionally included into the simulation network.
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Fig. 5.1:' DSNP-flowchart showing DSNP-modules required for a full
scale simulation of the plant shown in Fig. 2.1
5.1 REACTIVITY TRANSIENTS
The response of the reactor power is determined by the imposed reac-
tivity pulse modified by the temperature feedback. During the time interval
shown in Fig. 5.2, however, this feedback effect is rather small because
the core temperature follows the power transient with considerable delay.
This slow response is typical for HTGR reactors and results from the large
heat storage capacity of the core. The temperature feedback becomes visible
after termination of the pulse. Since the imposed reactivity is reduced
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Fig. 5.3: Change of reactor power and average fuel temperature
resulting from a reactivity perturbation. Long term range.
Left: simplified simulation, right: full scale simulation.
to zero the temperature induced self-shutdo\1n mechanism becomes immediately
effective at this time point. Fig. 5.3 displaying on the left side the tran-
sient over a larger time interval shows that the reactor power is forced
down while the fuel temperature passes after the initial increase through
a maximum about 260 s after initiation of the perturbation.
The corresponding transient obtained with the full scale program PRLP8
is shown in Fig. 5.3 on the right side. The imposed reactivity pulse is the
same as before, but after termination of the pulse a small amount of posi-
tive reactivity is left and kept constant throughout the transient. The short
term behaviour during the reactivity pulse does not exhibit any essential
difference compared with the previous case. The long term behaviour, however,
shows deviating features. The reactor power drops initially at the instant
of termination of the reactivity pulse in the same manner as before but
rises again to a maximum which is attained after 120 s. This is a conse-
quence of the delayed response of the core average temperature. At the in-
stant of termination of the reactivity pulse the temperature feedback is
not yet sufficient to compensate completely the small amount of imposed
reactivity being left. About 120 s of temperature rise are needed to attain
this compensation. In the course of the long term behaviour, which is
governed by the self-shutdown mechanism, power and temperature show some
minor damped oscillations which are caused by the lag of the temperature
response. The core temperature as well as the other temperatures in the
primary circuit stabilize at much higher level than in the previous case.
This results from the thermodynamic response of the intermediate and the
steam-water loops. While in the previous case all temperatures on the
secondary side of the heat exchanging devices are kept constant they rise
in the present transient thus counteracting the acceptance of heat from
the primary circuits.
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5.2 DEPRESSURIZATION
The leak was presumed to be located in the cold gas plenum above the
top reflector of the core. It was further assumed that the gas blowers
continue operation and that no reactor scram is initiated. The analysis
has been performed with the full scale program PRPLB but no external per-
turbation to the secondary circuits has been imposed. With the anticipated
leak size an initial relief mass flow of about 32 kg/s results. The pressure
equilization is practically obtained after about 720 s. Fig. 5.4 shows
different gas flows within the first 20 s after initiation of the depressuri-
zation.
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Fig. 5.4: Gas flow
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The flows from the heat removalloops to the cold gas plenum experience
a sudden increase while the flow from the hot gas plenum to the heat ex-
changers show a corresponding decrease. This indicates that the gas mass in
the hot gas plenum is discharged essentially via the heat removal loops
which have a much lower flow resistance than the pebble bed core.
The flow rate for the hot gas plenum shown in Fig. 5.4 is essentially
that of the core flow. The decrease of this flow results in an increase of
core temperatures which, in turn, cause a "self shut-down" of the reactor
by the negative reactivity feedback. The long term behaviour of the reactor
power and the average fuel temperature is shown in Fig. 5.5. The fuel
temperature increases within the first 1000 sand decreases afterwards
monotonically.
The transients of the gas temperature in the cold gas plenum and in
the core inlet cavity as well as the temperature of the top-reflector
(situated between the two gas cavities) are shown in Fig. 5.6. These tempe-
ratures decrease initially due to gas expansion and rise again after passing
through a minimum at about 300 s. In the long term range they follow a
moderate increase.
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5.3 CHANGE OF TURBINE LOAD
The turbine response has been analyzed with a simulation program which
includes all heat exchanging equipment of the heat removal system and the
components of the secondary circuits as shown in Fig. 2.1. The steam tempe-
rature control chamber is represented by a two-phase control volurne which
allows water injection.
The turbine admission valve was assumed to be operational. All other
valves, including the turbine bypass valve, are kept in their initial state.
The turbine admission valve is assumed to be actuated by a PI controller
which is designed to maintain constant turbine speed under various load
conditions. The reduction of power demand with simultaneous failure of
the bypass valve has the effect that the secondary system will, at least
temporarily, not be able to accept the full power generated by the reactor.
The resulting increase of temperature in the primary circuit in connection
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Fig. 5.8: Transients of the
steam enthalpy of the exit at
the steam generator and at the
turbine chest
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with the negative temperature feedback of reactivity determines the plant
behaviour in the long term range. A safe and stable power plant should
readjust itself to a new steady state power level without excessive tempe-
rature and pressure changes in the system.
Fig. 5.7 shows the response of the turbine power to a stepwise re-
duction of power demand by 25 % together with the corresponding pressure
rise in the exit plena of the steam generators. The turbine power undergoes
a damped oscillation and stabilizes at the new level of 75 % of the initial
power within about 20 s. This transient is strongly determined by the
setting of the PI controller acting on the turbine admission valve. The
long term transients of the plant involve considerable changes in pressure
and temperatures but do not affect the turbine significantly because it is
isolated by the fast acting admission valve. The initial pressure transient
as shown in Fig. 5.7 exhibits a significant increase. Under normal operating
conditions arelief valve would limit this pressure increase. Fig. 5.8
shows the enthalpy transient at the steam generator exit and at the turbine
ehest. The enthalpy in the turbine ehest drops initially due to the decrease
of pressure and flow but then follows the same transient as the enthalpy
leaving the steam generator.
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SAFEGUARD PUMPS QUALIFICATION FOR FRENCH
NUCLEAR PLANTS
THE EPEC TEST LOOP
R. MARTIN - H. GUESNON
EDF and FRAMATOME - FRANCE
SUMMARY
Because of their size, it has 'not been practical to qualify full safeguard
pump assemblies, by testing alone. Recourse to other methods, such as qualifi-
cation by analysis (mathematical proof, operating experience) and individual
qualification of pump components, has been necessary.
Nevertheless, tests run on a specially-design full-train pump test loop have
given a good indication of the ability of pumps to perform as required,
particularlyduring thermal transients and with high-solids-content fluid. The
loop, known as EPEC, was financed jointly by Framatome and the French state-
owned utility EDF.
This paper reviews the specifications to which nuclear power plant safeguard
pumps must be qualified, and surveys the qualification methods and program
used in France to verify operability of the pump assembly and major pump
components. The EPEC test loop is described along with loop capabilities and
achievements up to now. It is demonstrated that qualification by testing could
be given greater prominence, provided that significant investments in new test
facilities are made.
INTRODUCTION
Safeguard pumps perform the essential function of ensuring safe reactor shutdown
after an incident or an accident. It is essential that pump design guarantee
utmost reliability.
As active components, these pumps must be qualified as a unit, i.e. all auxi-
liaries necessary to pump operation (motor, lube system, seal system, coupling,
etc .• ) must be considered together with the pump.
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It is common industry practice to use computer codes and design standards to
guarantee the mechanical strength of the pump equipment, while overall system
operability under various operating conditions is generally verified by
qualification testing.
For particularly complex equipment, such as electronics assemblies and valves,
comprehensive qualification tests can be run systematically on the entire unit.
For these assemblies, qualification by analysis, when used, is sometimes of
secondary importance.
Until now, however, safeguard pump size and the inadequacy of existing test
facilities has made it impractical - from both a time and cost standpoint - to
qualify safeguard pumps by full - train testing.
Nevertheless and as faras possible,qualification testing of pump assemblies does
give a good indication of pump operability,particularly during thermal transients
and in heavily-Iaden fluid service as will be shown below.
The present paper describes the qualification procedure adopted for French nuclear
power plant safeguard pumps. The paper presents the EPEC test facility built
specially for this purpose, and sho\qs, through results from tests performed on a
number ofpumps (including the Medium Head Safety Injection (MHSI) Pump designed
for service in 1300 MW nuclear power stations), the interesting possibilities
offeredby full-train qualification testing.
2. Safeguard pump specifications for PWR plants
Safeguard pumps are intended to function under upset, faulted and emergency
conditions. Each of these conditions corresponds to a specific operating
environment which is substantially different from that encountered during normal
service ; these pumps must be capable of reliably performing their intended
function under these extreme operating conditions, and off normal operating
requirements must thus be integrated into pump design bases.
Typical safeguard pump specifications are shown in the table below. These
specifications are for a 1300 MW 4 Loop Medium Head Safety Injection (MHSI)
pumps.
Flow Rate Value (CM/hr) Capacity as % of BEP
BEP (1)
minimum
design flow
runout
300
56
245
490
100
19
82
163
The MHSI is a multistage horizontal-shaft pump running at4300 rpm and with
Power Input 1400 KW. Weight is approximately 16,000 kg and dimensions (I+w+h)
are 7,3 x 2,5 x 1,9 m.
(1) BEP Best Efficiency Point
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The pump takes suction from :
the refueling water storage tank (during periodic tests and initial safety
injection phase). Pumpage is cold borated water having the following
characteristics :
- boric acid concentration
- ph :
- solid suspended particles :
2000-2250 ppm
4,7
0,5 ppm
reactor containment sumps (recirculation safety injection phase) .
Pumpage is hot and heavily laden with particles.
It is required that the MHSI pump ensure its design flow rate within 5 seconds
from receipt of the startup signal. This means that the pump must start up
without waiting for its auxiliary oil pump to cut in and without allowing
s~fficient time for it to come up to temperature.
In addition, the pump must be capable of remaining operable during a seismic
event and under the effects of irradiation from pumped fluid.
3. Qualification principle applied to safeguard pumps
Qualification of equipment is the demonstration that the equipment
canperrorm as required under the most severe operating conditions that are
likely to be encountered.
Two main methods may be employed for qualification purpose
- qualification by analysis
- qualification by testing
Qualification by analysis consists in furnishing mathematical or logical proof,
or demonstrating from past experience with similar equipment, that the equipment
will work as required. This method is only valid if themathematical model or
other input data are representative of actual equipment operating conditions. If
operating parameters are known and measurable, the method is termed quantitative.
Otherwise, it is considered qualitative.
Qualification by testing requires that one or more sampIes (generally one is
sufficient)of the equipment be subjected to aseries of tests representative of
service conditions under which the equipment is expected to operate.
Combined gualification combines these two methods. It is employed especially
when qualification by testing alone is impractical.
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When qualification by testing is employed, it must be borne in mind
that equipment may be subjected to more than one influence factor at the
same time.
It is difficult if not impossible to precisely reproduce all accident
conditions simultaneously without employing large, costly test setups For
this reason, a test sequence comprising a number of different tests is
employed, Each test is intended to verify operability under a given set of
environmental conditions.
Although certain equipment, e.g. valves and electric actuators, can be
qualification-tested as a whole, this is not always practical with large
components. The MHSI pump assembly, for example, is 7,3 m long and 1,9 m
high and weighs 16.000 kg. Placing a unit this size on a shake table or
inside an irradiation chamber would require extremely large test rigs and
considerable capital outlay.
For this reason seismic, irradiation agin& and other tests are often run
on individual pump components. This is also done when testing highly sensitive
components or equipment subjected to particularly severe service, e.g. bearings
and mechanical seals. Such subsystem-testing may employ a full or partial test
sequence.
For one particular Equipment, and in order to prove his qualification, any or
all of the above methods may be used in qualifying safeguard pumps. Both full-
train and individual component testing may be employed. The exact method
utilized in each case depends on the characteristic to be qualified, the size
of existing test facilities, and representativity and exhaustivity criteria.
Prior to qualification by testing, test conditions, control parameters, and
components to be tested are determined. At the completion of testing, test
results may serve to validate the test or calculation methods used.
The table below shows the qualification program for a typical safeguard pump
tested at the EPEC facility, the MHSI pump •
TABLE 1
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Typical qualification program
(MSHI pump)
characteristic qualification Equipement qualified
method
resistance to pressure combined (math proof + pressure-retaining parts
hydrostatic test) main pump
booster pump
sealwater heater
hydraulic performance testing (supplier rig+ motor-pump assembly
(w. cold water) EpEC loop) on provisional test-loop
(H, NPSHR OUtpUt for
specified flow-rates)
hydraulic performance testing (EPEC loop) motor pump assembly
(hot water) on provisional test-loop
seismic resistance analysis (math proof) - rotor assembly
- pump supportage
- lube and cooling system
resistance to tempera- testing (bench + - mechanical seal assy.
ture of mechanical seals EPEC 1001') - cooling and filtration
(I) system
resistance to tempera- testing (EPEC loop) motor-pump assembly on
ture transients provisional test-loop
Rapid startup with and testing (EPEC loop) motor pump assembly
wlo startup of aux. lub. on provisional test-loop
pump
startup time testing (EPEC loop) motor pump assembly on
provisional test-loop
(1) Loop test was performed on mechanical seal provided by usual supplier.
Bench test was run to qualify seal from alternate supplier.
TABLE 1
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(continued)
Characteristic qualification Equipment qualified
method
dynamic behavior analysis (math and - rotor assy.
(e.g. cri tical speed) logical proof) - bearings
- coupling
shaft mechanical strengh analysis (math + proof) shafting
(e.g. fatigue resist.)
operation in heavily testing (EPEC loop) full train
particle-laden water
radiation resistance analysis (logical proof gaskets, oil, grease
+ testing)
dynamic behavior (e.g. combined (logical proof full train
natural freq. search) + Held test)
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An important secondary objective of the test program has been to prove
the validity of computer codes and analytical methods used in qualifi-
cation. Tests conducted on the low Head Safety Injection (LHSI) Pump
at the Tournesol Test facility located in the CEA DEMT Research Center
at Saclay, have demonstrated the validity of calculation models employed.
The tests were run on a 2-axis shake table and conducted under the auspices
of the Research and Development agreement among CEA, EDF, FRAMATOME and
WESTINGHOUSE.
Note : the MHSI pump discussed in this paper served as the 1300 MW plant
series model. Tests run on the pump at the EPEC facility were thus
type (first off) tests, and therefore more comprehensive than standard
duplicate tests run on other pumps which are already in service or
plants.
4. EPEC TEST LOOP
Qualification methods and programs are, of course, considered valid only
if tests and calculations are shown to be representative of site equipment
operating conditions.
Generally speaking, existing acceptance test loops at supplier facilities
are not adequate to reproduce accident conditions. And then acceptance tests
cannot be considered as representative. The EPEC test loop was devised
specifically to aff01tL a representative test setup for safeguard pumps under
site environmental conditions and particulary hot conditions. This facility
which has rapidly become an essential link in the qualification process, is
briefly described below.
The following safeguard pump functions are capable of being simulated on
the EPEC loop
Normal operation
- reactor coolant charging and makeup
- unit cooldown at low pressure startup and shutdown.
- filling of accumulators and other vessels
Upset, faul ted and accident conditions
- high pressure and low pressure safety injection of boric acid to prevent
uncovering and to ensure proper residual core cooling
- containment spray to counteract release of steam during a loss of coolant
accident (LOCA) or steam line break (SLB)
566
- auxiliary feedwater flow to the steam generators.
The EPEC test loop is the result of a joint effort by Framatome and EDF.
It was engineered and built by "les Etablissements des Constructions et
Armes Navales (ECAN)" in Indret, France.
The EPEC facility contains a number of capabilities which are not
provided on standard pump supplier test loops, e.g.<
- hydraulic and mechanical characteristics measurement under hot and cold
conditions (see footnote, p. 10).
- thermal shock simulation under hot and cold conditions
- startup and shut down transient simulation with fast-response recording
system
- simulation of process flow heavily laden with suspended solid particles.
The test loop comprises
- the main loop with pump to be tested. Pressure is controlled by a
pressurizer and temperature is kept in the range of 20-140°C by means of
a cooler. Orifices with a range of 4 to 1500 CM/hr are provided to measure
system flows.
- 12 CM transfer tank and 3 way valve for simulation of rapid thermal
transients
- suspended particles injection system for simulation of recirculation phase
of safety injection or containment spray
- vacuum pump for simulation of pump cavitation tests and determination of
NPSH
- central data acquisition system for recording and display of operating
parameters and fully automatie operation of the lest loop.
The recording system is aesigned for extra-fast acquisition of startup,
shutdown and thermal shock transient data.
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EPEC TEST LOOP CHARACTERISTICS
4 - 1500 m3/h
flowrate
temperature ambient·140°C continuous
(180°C MAX.)
Pressure BP 12 bar
HP 200 bar
Reactor coolant pipe dia. 273 - 355 mm
transfer tank volume 12 m3
pressurizer volume 2 m3
cooler output 6MW
Pump power input 1, 4 Ml~ (provis ionnal)
Pump type which can be tested - multis tage
- horizontal
- vertical
- wet-pit
All instrumentation and associated equipment installed on the EPEC
test loop (flowmeter, primary elements, pressure gauges, etc .•. )
were designed, built anderected to French standards, in particular
NF X 10-602.
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A typical EPEC qualification test program includes :
- verification of pump hot and cold hydraulic and mechanical
characteristics (I)
- NPSH test, hot and cold conditions
- low-flow test (temp. vibration, steady-state performance)
- performance during startup and shutdown transients, with and without
startup of auxiliary lube pump ; fast-response recording hydraulic
and mechanical characteristics.
pump performance during rapid temperature transients (steep front
thermal shock gradients from 20 to 140°C or cold shock from 140 to
70°C over several min)
- endurance tests, steady state conditions (200 - 400 h)
- verification of pump performance in heavily-laden fluid service,
with or without shutdown/restart
- vibration measurement(integrated into other tests).
(I) cold
hot
room temperature
140°C, occasionally up to 180°C
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5. EXPERIENCE Ta DATE USING EPEC TEST LOOP
The EPEC test loop was commissioned in 1981. Ta date, 3 pumps have
been tested on the EPEC loop, two low capacity high head units and
one high capacity low head assembly.
- charging pump for 900 W~ 3-loop pIants (this pump being also used
as High Head Safety Injection (HHSI) pump)
- MHSI pump for 1300 W~ 4-loop plants
- containment spray pump for 1300 W~ 4-loop plants
In all, the current qualification program is scheduled to cover 6
safeguard pumps intended for service in French 3 and 4-loop power
plants.
A number of improvements have been made in the EPEC test loop to enhance
performance. In particular, steps have been taken to ameliorate
measurement accuracy and to improve control of particle injection for
closer simulation of mixing conditions at pump suction and closer
representativity.
An extra-fast recording system has been installed to monitor major pump
parameters (speed, motor current draw, etc.). This makes it possible
to check with greater accuracy that there are no friction lasses during
transients.
5.2. - Main test results
-----------------
The EPEC loop has enabled a number of critical pump criteria to be
verified. In particular, it has demonstrated that safeguard pumps can
function as required in conditions of severe service such as steep
temperature gradients and heavily particle-laden water. Also, additional
pump data concerning the way pumps operate has been obtained.
Main test results can be summarized as follows
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- pump hydraulic and mechanical characteristics such as NPSH and
efficiency were not influenced by temperature.
- pumps showed good behaviour while running hot. Steady-state
performance and vibration were satisfactory
- thermal isolation of bearings and mechanical seals and cooling
system efficiency were found to be adequate
- understanding of pump behaviour during startup and shutdown
transients was improved. No instability was detected at st~rtup,and
startup time was 'vithin specified values in all cases.
Emergency startup without help of the auxiliary pump did not in any
way impair pump performance. Lube circuit pressurization time for
different operating conditions (startup, switchover to standby pump,
restart following diesel generator startup) was found to be adequate
- pumps proved to be insensitive to thermal transients (positive or
negative gradients). No vibration or instability was observed
- good extreme flow (minimum flow and runout) capabilities were
evidenced (1). Vibration and internal temperature rise levelswere
acceptable
- pumps did not exhibit evidence of malfunction in the presence of solid
particles suspended in pumped fluid, either during steady-state or
transient (startup/shutdown) operation. Particle dilution, segregation
and dis integration phenomena were observed. There was no sign of
binding at the impeller wearing ring clearances . Areas particularly
sensitive to wear were identified and some progress was made in
evaluating ring wearing rate. Influence of solid s~spended particles
on pump hydraulic characteristics was studied.
- no solid-particle-induced hydrostatic line bearing malfunction was
observed
Other tests
The EPEC test loop is a versatile facility, and can be utilized for tests
which are not normally included in qualification test programs. High
temperature tests are one example.
The facility can be useful not only to verify equipment operability, but
to test unit design as weIl. Faulty thermohydraulkisolation at the
mechanical seal is one major design error discovered using the EPEC loop.
(1) minimum flow was 0,04 x BEP
runout flow was 1,5 x BEP
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6. CONCLUSION
We are convinced that comprehensive full-train qualification tests
are essential to determine pump operability under extreme conditions
of high-temperature and heavily-particle-laden water service. Although
full-train test facilities are expensive, their cost can be justified
if the number of pumps in the series to be qualified is sufficiently
high.
The results of qualification tests run on test loops such as EPEC can
serve as major factors (albeit not the sole ones) in qualification
programs.
By combining full-train testing with qualification by analysis and bench
testing of selected individual components, real assurance that nuclear
safeguard pumps will function as required in the event of an incident
or accident can be provided.
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APPENDIX 1
CHARACTERISTICS OF SUSPENDED PARTICLES
- max. size of partieles
passing through filters
- coneentration
- partiele makeup
sereened erushed eonerete
thermal insulation (wet
shredded rock wool)
paint flakes
sand
erushed glass
- injeetion method
2,5 x 2,5 mm
500 ppm
300 ppm
50 ppm
40 ppm
10 ppm
gradual until 500 ppm eoneentration
is obtained (pump in operation)
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HYDRODYNAMICAL TESTS WITH AN ORIGINAL PWR HEAT REMOVAL PUMP
p. Wietstock
GKSS-Forschungszentrum Geesthacht GmbH
Institut für Anlagentechnik
2054 Geesthacht, Federal Republic of Germany
ABSTRACT
GKSS-Forschungszentrum performes hydrodynamical tests with an
original PWR heat removal pump to analyse the influences of fluid
parameters on the capacity and cavitation behavior of the pump in
order to get further improvements of the quantification of the
reached safety-level.
It can be concluded, that in case of the tested heat removal pump
the additional loads during transition from cavitation free
operation into fully cavitation for the investigated operation
point with 980 m3 /h will be smaller than the alteration of loads
during passing through the total characteristic.
The results from cavitation tests for other operation points
indicate, that this very important consequence especially for
acciident operation will be valid for the total specified pump
flow areal
INTRODUCTION
The normal decay heat and emergency heat removal system represents an
essential part of the safety system of a PWR-plant. The heat removal pumps,
being part of this system, must fulfil different tasks with manifold
operation conditions. Some of these operation conditions are characterized by
a very small distance of the NPSH-value of the system from the required
NPSH-value of the pump. For this reason disturbances in the pump suction area
may initiate cavitation within the pump with consequences on the c2.pacity of
the pump and possible additional loads on the pump unit.
GKSS-Forschungszentrum carries out hydrodynamical tests with a heat
removal pump simulating operation conditions similar to those in a PWR. The
pump unit is an original pump as operated in german PWR-plants at present.
Tests are made to analyse the influences of fluid parameters on the capacity
and cavitation behavior of the pump in order to get further improvements of
the quantification of the reached safety-level.
TEST-PROGRAM
The investigations are subdivided in three main phases, from which two
phases refer to stationary tests and the third phase enlarges instationary
investigations of the pump /1/. Main points of the experimental program are
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especially
- Investigation of the total head of the pump as function of the NPSH
when full cavitation has developed (total pressure head against
zero). Parameters are load, fluid-temperature and gas content.
- Determination of the mentioned NPSH-characteristics as function of
impurities within the fluid.
- Determination of instationary capacity and cavitation behavior and
investigation of failure-reducing operation modes.
The tests should enable an evaluation of the hydraulic and vibration
behavior of the system, At first the field of test parameters is similar with
normal operation conditions of the reactor plant and independent from antici-
pated accident procedures. For evaluation of test results however some anti-
cipated reference accident procedures will be considered in the test-program.
The test program \1ith the original heat removal pump on the NKP-test
rig of the GKSS-Forschungszentrum in parallel will be supported by basis in-
vestigations with a low pressure test rig of glas material, especially ana-
lysing problems of cavitation and transport of impurities within the fluid,
PWR HEAT REMOVAL PUMP
The technical development in
different PWR heat removal pump-types
of the emergency heat removal system.
German PWR-plants had lead to three
with the same principle of construction
The first stage of development represents a horizontal single-stage
volute pump. The speed of this standard chemical pump is about 1490 rpm. For
the several PWR-plants the hydraulic data could be different,
The second stage of development are single-stage pumps with circu-
lar-space casings and vaned diffusers. The motor is a four-pole-motor with a
speed of about 1490 rpm.
In the case of the third stage of development it is a single-stage pump
with circular-space casing and vaned diffuser. The motor is a six-pole motor
with a speed of about 980 rpm. The reduction of speed to 980 rpm was
necessary by reason of a recomrnendation of the German Reaktor-Sicherheitskom-
mission /3/.
For the GKSS tests an original pump according to the first stage of
development was selected. This pump-type is in operation at present in most
of the German PWR power plants.
EXPERIMENTAL FACILITIES
For the investigation of the above mentioned problems a pump test rig
is operated (Fig. 9) at pressures up to 21 bar and temperatures up to 180°C
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The pipe
at the
special
with fully desalinated vlater \'Iith or vlithout defined impurity.
diameter of the loop is 400 mm at the suction side and 300 mm
discharge side of the pump. The test pump is an original unit with
additional measuring equipment /2/.
Separate studies regarding the phenomenology of the cavitation and
transport of impurities within pipes including the pump are performed in a
model glass loop vlith a pipe diameter of 100 mm (Fig. 10). This loop is
operated at atmospharic pressure up to 90°C. Furthermore, this loop is used
to test measuring equipment.
EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
In the following some examples of test results will be presented, which
give an information about load variations on the pump initiated by flow
alterations or cavitation alternatively.
Fig. 1-4 give for stationary and cavitation-free operation over the
total pump flow rate characteristics for head, radial deflection, radial
amplitude of vibration and axial deflection as function of pump flo\'l for
basis and comparison. The fluid in the test rig is clean. It is water from
the communal supply with an air content lower than 3 ml/l.
These characteristics are compared with results from a cavitation test
with a flow rate of 980 m3 /h, speed of 1500 rpm and 30°C water temperature
from the same quality and gas content (Fig. 5-8).
- Fig. 1 shows anormal Q-H-characteristic.
Fig. 5 shows the total head as function of the NPSH-value for the
above mentioned cavitation test. The cavitation test was charac-
terized by decreasing NPSH-values - starting with high value - by
reduction of the pressure in the suction vessel step by step. There
is no throttle valve installed in the suction pipe.
- Fig. 2 shows the radial deflection of the impeller against the pump
casing in the front split ring area as function of the pump flovl
measured at two positions displaced by 90°. The test value of 0 mm
correspcnds \1ith an original split width of 1.68 mm resp. 1.43 mm.
Negative values in the figures represent an increase of the original
split width. The alteration of the pump flow from 1400 m3 /h down to
100 m3 /h results in an enlargement of the split to 0.4 mm in one
measuring position.
Fig. 6 shows relevant values for the cavitation test given in Fig. 5.
During transition to fully cavitation the alteration of the split
ring width amounts to 0.15 mm in maximum.
- Fig.
flow
flow
3 shows the radial amplitude of vibration as function of the
for mentioned measuring position. During alteration of the pump
the maximum change of this parameter amounts to 150 ~m.
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Fig. 7 shows again the conditions for the
alteration of the amplitude of vibration
cavitation amounts about 50 ~m.
cavitations tests I
during transition
the
into
- Finally fig. 4 represents the axial deflection of the impeller back-
side against the pump casing in a special measuring position as
function of the pump flovl. With start conditions of 2.15 mm the
maximum alteration amounts to about 0.8 mm for a pump flow variation
from 1400 to 0 m'/h.
The conditions for
alteration of the
transition in fully
the cavitation tests shows fig. 8,
deflection results in less than
cavitation.
the maximum
0.15 mm for
Finally it can be concluded, that in case of the tested neat removal
pump the additional loads during transition from cavitation free operation in
fully cavitation for the investigated operation point with·980 m'/h will be
smaller than the alteration of loads during passing through the total
Q-H-characteristic.
The results from cavitation tests for other operation points confirm,
that this very important consequence especially for accident operation will
be valid for the total specified pump flow area.
It might be still mentioned, that these results are test results with
the GKSS test facility. The flow on the suction side of the pump passes
before entering the pump a straightener and after that a contracting channel.
Therefore the flow is a full developed turbulent flow with very small
variation in axial direction (bulb-shaped flow).
It is expected, that a disturbed flow after abend or a valve will have
an influence on the above mentioned results. Tests in next time will quantify
this influence.
Test results relative to determination of the mentioned NPSH charac-
teristics show, that the required NPSH-value (3% head decrease) will be in-
fluenced by temperature and gas content. For nominal capacity a reduction of
the required NPSH-value of about 0.5 meter or 11% by increasing the tempera-
ture from 90°C to 125°C was measured. In this case the gas content was less
than 2 ml/i. The determination of the influence of gas content lead to more
scatting tests results. But the tendency shows, that an increasing gas con-
tent leads to an increasing required NPSH-value.
A more detailed description of these NPSH-characteristic-tests will be
presented at the Pumpentagung Karlsruhe '84 /4/.
Results of tests relative to instationary pump flow and cavitation be-
havior were presented at the Jahrestagung Kerntechnik '84 /5/.
REFERENCES
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STEAM GENERATOR TUBE RUPTURE RISK IMPACT ON DESIGN AND
OPERATION OF FRENCH PWR PLANTS
G. DEPOND, H. SUREAU
ELECTRICITE DE FRANCE
Service Etudes et Projets
Thermiques et Nucleaires
12-14, avenue Dutrievoz
69628 VILLEURBANNE Cedex
ABSTRACT
The experience of steam generator tube leaks incidents in PWR plants has
resulted in an increase of EDF analysis leading to improvements in design
and post-accidental operation for new projects and operating plants.
The accident consequences are minimized for each of the NSSS three
barriers :
-' first barrier safeguard systems design and operating procedures
relying upon core safety allow to maintain a low level of primary radio-
activity,
- second barrier : steam generator design and periodic inspection allow
to reduce tube ruptures risks,
- third barrier : atmospheric releases are reduced as a result of optimal
recovery procedures, detection improvements and atmospheric steam valves
design improvements.
INTRODUCTION : STEAM GENERATOR TUBE RUPTURES CONSEQUENCES
The experience of steam generator tube leaks incidents in PWR plants has
resulted in an increase of EDF analysis and developments to improve steam
generator tube rupture accident treatment. The paper presents this analysis
which leads to an evolution in design ant post-accidental operations for new
projects and operating plants.
The EDF approach can be summarized as follow
• a steam generator tube rupture consists of a second and third barrier
simultaneous failures resulting in radiological releases of RCS fluid,
• automatisms and safety devices designed to cope with the LOCA are able
to maintain clad and core integrity even in the case of multiple tube ruptures,
• to recover third barrier 'integrity and to stop the leak, manuel inter-
vention is necessary,
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. if initial primary aetivity is low (aeeording to severe operating
speeifieations) and if primary aetivity remains low during aeeidental transient
(aeeording to emergeney proeedure relying upon eore safety priority) radio-
logieal eonsequenees are low and leakage termination delay time has a low
eontribution to the amount of releases provided steam and not liquid is re-
leased to the environement.
Nevertheless too long recovery transient eould result in filling up the
faul ted steam generator and in releasing secondary liquid leading to atmos-
pherie PORV (power-operated relief valve) failure risks. This risk emphasizes
the benefit or recovery time minimization and atmospherie PORV design impro-
vements.
IMPACT ON DESIGN AND OPERATION
These improvements will mainly apply to nuelear plant projeet under
development (N4 projeet) but some of them will too be used on operating and
starting plants in a near future.
Design and operating procedures are optimised for design basis aecident
one tube rupture for operating plants, two tubes rupture for N4 projeet ;
but "beyond the design basis situations" are also investigated in order to
mitigate their conseq1J p nces in any case.
The purpose of the presentation is to show how these improvements suceeed
in minimizing aecident eonsequenees for eaeh of the three barriers :
I) first barrier :
The objeetive is to minimize primary fluid aetivity. This ean be obtained
using the following measures ~orresponding to :
- safety systems design : high head safety injeetion pumps maximum outlet
pressure is maintained higher than steam valve automatie operating set point ;
this ehoiee allows a safe automatie behaviour of NSSS during any kind of LOCA.
- operating guide-lines eoneeption : safety injeetion operating guide-
line does not rely upon event diagnosis (steam generator tube rupture
diagnosis) but is based on physieal states diagnosis (ReS inventory) ; this
provides suffieient eore eooling in any ease.
- complementary instrumentation : water level in reaetor vessel for
example allows to define more aeeurate eriteria for safety injeetion termina-
tion resulting in leakage termination without redueing safety level.
2) seeond barrier
Measures are taken to reduce steam generator tube ruptures risk
occurence :
- steam generator design
possible stagnation zones
- seeondary water ehemistry
seleetion of tube material, reduetion of
583
- periodie inspeetion.
3) third barrier
- Deteetion
Existing instrumentation eonsists of a eontinuous aetivity measurement
in eondenser and of steam generator b10wdown-system (one measurement per
steam generator) whieh ean deteet sma11 1eaks (a few 1iters/hour). Otherwise
faisabi1ity studies have been performed to set up redundant safety deviee based
on N 16 deteetion through steam 1ines ; this additional deviee eou1d deteet
10wer 1eaks.
- Post-aeeidenta1 operating guide-1ines :
In the beginning of the aeeidenta1 transient, eore integrity in ensured
by automatie safety systems aetuation. There is no risk of eore uneovery, even
in ease of multiple tubes ruptures, as far as no fai1ure of the faulted steam
generator seeondary side is taken into aeeount.
Then operator aetions must be optimised to mitigate the situation as
we11 as possib1e. For that purpose, numerous steam generator tube ruptures
transients ea1eu1ations have been performed with EDF's eode AXEL (I). This
code has a speeifie mode1isation to deseribe steam generator rea1istie
behaviour ; aetivity transfers and releases are also ea1eu1ated by this eode,
using :
- a global evaluation on RCS
- an evaluation of eaeh vo1ume element of the steam generator seeondary
side.
Two kinds of hypo thesis are used
Tab1e 1 : Hypothesis used for aetivity releases ea1eu1ations
Hypothesis "Realistic" Conservative
RCS aetivity (113 il 0.06 ci/ t 11 ci/t
Souree inerease after scram S/So = 500 S/So = I
(peak of iodine (peak of iodine
at seram) before aeeident}
Fraetion of water exhausted 1 % 10 %into the atmosphere with steam
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The optimisation allows to define one or two emergency procedures to cover
all possible steam generator tube ruptures situations with following aims
a) core safety (safety injection actuation and termination on RCS inven-
tory criteria)
b) activity releases reduction (faulted steam generator isolation)
c) leakage termination as quick as possible (by reduction of primary
temperature and pressure).
One example of a calculated transient is given figures 1 to 6 : two
ruptured tubes without coolant pumps after scram according to the use of single
failure criterion (2) :
- scram and safety injection actuation occur automatically'nearly 400 s
after transient beginning ; important part of the releases (as far as the
faulted steam generator is not filled up) occurs at that moment, because
turbine steam by-pass is supposed to be unavailable.
- operator intervention takes place 900 s after safety injection
actuation : faulted steam generator isolation, opening of its blowdown-system
and beginnin~ of RCS cooling, using the other steam generators (56' c/h)
- 2100 s after transient beginning,safety injection termination occurs
on RCS inventory criteria (subcooling margin greater than 40' C and pres-
surizer level greater than 50 %)which leads to leakage termination 2750 s
after transient beginning.
In order to be relevant, this steam generator tube ruptures emergency
procedure requires a sufficient redundancy level and safety qualification for
the steam generator atmospheric PORV, so the non faulted steam generator
atmospheric PORV must be available to cool down RCS quickly enough in all
situations and the faulted steam generator atmospheric PORV must be available
to open and close for steam or/and liquid operating conditions to prevent
any failure (PORV stuck open for example).
Table 2 gives mass and activity releases in following cases
- design basis situations
class 3
class 4
ruptured tube with blowdown system failure
2 ruptured tubes without coolant pumps
- "beyond design basis situations" :
10 ruptured tubes
2 ruptured tubes with a stuck open and not isolated PORV on the
faulted steam generator.
Furthermore the following "beyond the design basis situations" steam-
line break outside containment without isolation, with multiple steam generator
tube ruptures (one to ten ruptured tubes) are studied to define an operating
procedure which avoids core uncovery and mitigates radioactive releases.
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2 SG RUPTURED TUBES WITHOUT COOLANT PUMPS
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TABLE 2 S G T R RESULTS
DESIGN BASIS SITUATIONS
3rd CLASS 4th CLASS
"BEYOND THE DESIGN"
BASIS SITUATIONS
1 tube
without blow-
down system
2 tube!
without
coolant pumps
JO tubes
2 tubes
with a stuck
open PORV
1018 396 55 396
3440 2097 1475 2341
3810 2750 1700 3 h 15 mn
-------------- -------------- ----------- --------------
TIME
SCRAM(S)
SI TERMINATION(S)
LEAKAGE TERM. (S)
sec + atm (t) 9 steam 9 steam 9 steam
66 liquid
Mass transfers
prim + sec (t) 79 104 188 282
J49 steam
33 liquid
Activity transfers
with "realistic"
hypothesis
prim + sec (r.iI31)
sec + atm (Ci l31 )
Dose (rem at
thyroid 500 m)
59
0.006
71
0.006
0.12 10- 3
110
13.5
0.27
296
47
0.94
Activity transfers
with conservative
hypothesis
prim + sec (Ci ill ) 370 1143
sec + atm (Ci 111) 3.5 3.5
Dose (rem at
thyroid 500 m) 0.07 0.07
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CONCLUSION
Taking into account all precedent measures and optimal recovery procedures,
the consequences of any type of steam generator tube rupture accident fulfill
safety requirements concerning activity releases.
- For the design basis situations : a maximum of two ruptured tubes with
single failure assumption on all required systems ; the secondary side of the
faulted steam generator does not get full during accidental transient, there
is only steam discharge to the environment. ,.The dose to the thyroid is eva-
luated lower than 70 millirem to the maximaliy exposed individual (at 500
meters from the site) with Final Safety Analysis Report assumptions and lower
than 0,1 millirem with more realistic assumptions.
- For "beyond the design basis situations" : more than two ruptured
tubes simultaneously or not with a steam break; it is not,possible to avoid
filling up the secondary side of the faul ted steam generator and liquid dis-
charge to the environment. In these cases the doses are ten to thousand
times greater than those calculated for design basis.
REFERENCES
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ABSTRACT
A Value/Impact assessment for several alternative decay heat removal
systems has been carried out using several measures. The assessment
is based on an extension of the methodology presented in the Value/Impact
Handbook and includes the effects of uncertainty. The assessment
was carried out as a function of site population density, existing plant
features, and new plant features. Value/Impact measures based on
population dose are shown to be sensitive to site, while measures which
monetize and aggregate risk are less so. The latter are dominated by
on-site costs such as replacement power costs.
INTRODUCTION
A survey of core-melt accidents found in the Reactor Safety Study for Pres-
surized Water Reactors (PWRs), shows that about 75% of the sequences considered
are attributable to loss of the decay heat removal (DHR) function and about 25%
to others. More recent probabilistic risk assessments (PRAs) support the general
conclusion that loss of DHR is a dominant contributor to core melt frequency for
both PWRs and Boiling Water Reactors (BWRs). This result has led to increased
interest in the study of alternative decay heat removal systems for various com-
binations of plant configuration and concepts.
A study of alternative decay heat removal concepts for Light Water Reactors
(LWRs) has been conducted by Berry and Sanders [1]. Their results, based on an
evaluation of nine alternative DHR concepts, shows that for PWRs an add-on auxi-
liary feedwater (AFW) train, or an add-on high pressure injection (HPI) feed-
and-bleed train are, in general, the most favorable alternatives based on their
reduction of core-melt frequency. However, more recent studies have shown that
in some cases, correction of a minor design error (e.g. inadequate fire protec-
tion of a vital cable route) may achieve a substantial decrease in the probabil-
ity of core melt.
The main purpose of this paper is to develop a methoAology to determine
whether or not such improvements in DHR systems as described above, or anti ci-
pated in the future, are "cost-effective" with respect to various crHeria. Such
criteria might include a limit on population dose/dollar spent or a net benefit
which is positive. The methodology presented here is based in part on the
recently published Value/Impact (V/I) Handbook [2]. It extends the methodology
for the treatment of uncertainty, both in the V/I assessment and in the use of
the assessment by the decision maker.
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Improvements such as alternative DHR systems, which are intended to reduce
core melt frequency (and hence risk) fall under the general category of "preven-
tion", rather than "mitigation", wherein improvements are aimed at ameliorating
the consequences of core-melt once it has occurred. It should be noted then,
that the V/I methodology presented here, as weIl as the conclusions drawn from
the examples treated, have as their focus accident prevention.
METHODOLOGY
Value/Impact (V/I) assessment is a general approach used by decision makers '
as an aid in determining whether or not an action should be undertaken. The '
Handbook mentioned above lists a number of "decisioil attributes", Le. the
"values" (or benefits) and the "Impacts" (or costs) which can be considered in a
V/I assessment. These include public health effects, occupational exposures
(routine and accidental), off-site and on-site property damage, regulatory effi-
ciency, improvements in knowledge, industry development and implementation costs,
and NRC development and implementation costs. The methods for quantifying these
attributes, so that values can be compared with impacts within the DHR context
have been proposed by Cave and Kastenberg [3].
There are two principal methods for displaying the results of a V/I assess-
ment [2]:
1. Ratio Method. In this method the result is presented as the ratio:
value/ impact. In this context, "value" may be expressed simply in terms of the
expected re~uction of radiation dose to the public within some specified radius
of the plant and impact is the expected cost pf the proposed action. This ratio
could have mixed units (e.g. person-rem averted/$M) or if the value were
expressed in monetary terms, the resulting ratio would be dimensionless.
2. Net Benefit Method. In this method all attributes are quantified in
monetary terms to the extent possible, and if the difference (value minus impact)
is positive, there is a net benefit from the proposed action.
In this paper, a third method is introduced:
3. Complex Ratio Method. To the extent possible, all attributes are quan-
tified in monetary terms and the result is presented as the ratio: value/impact.
In this context "value" is expressed as the sum of health effects averted and
off-site costs averted; on-site costs averted mayaiso be included in the value
term. In the regulatory context, there is disagreement over whether or not on-
site costs should be included. Pending resolution, these can be treated
separately.
The relative advantages and disadvantages of these methods are summarized
in the Handbook, but the main ones can be summarizes as foliows:
1. In its simplest form, the rati~ method has the major advantage that it
can be compared with some "decision value", (e.g. $1,000/ person-rem averted, or
1,000 person-rem averted per $ M) to provide a perspective on the action. It has
the disadvantage that only one form of the "value attribute" can be accommodated
in the numerator. Thus, a benefit such as the monetary value of an averted
accident has to be treated as a negative cost, or the population dose has to be
considered a surrogate for all benefits.
2. The net-benefit method has the advantage that any attribute which can
be expressed in monetary terms can be introduced. Because the net-benefit may be
the difference between two large and nearly equal numbers, each ßubject to large
uncertainty, presentation of uncertainties in the overall result requires special
consideration. This is developed in the next section.
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3. The complex ratio method has the same advantages as the net-benefit
method. When the uncertainty is given by log-normal distributions, it is easy to
express the uncertainty in simple terms.
Two other points should be noted. First, population dose and latent
(cancer) fatalities lire related and would be considered "double counting" if both
attributes were considered in the same equation. Second, none of the numerical
values obtained by the three methods should be used as the sole basis for regula-
tory decision making. These, along with other considerations such as uncer-
tainty, unquantifiable attributes and other "engineering" and "societal" judge-
ments should be used in arriving at adecision.
UNCERTAINTIES
As noted above, the presence of potentially large uncertainties in the
various attributes must be taken into account by the decision maker. These
uncertainties fall into three broad classes:
Class 1. Systematic errors, due to lack of agreement as to the most
appropriate value for a specific parameter, e.g. the monetary value which should
be placed on a latent cancer death averted.
Class 1. Systematic errors dua to the difficulty in quantifying soma of
the values and or impacts (e.g. the time, mode and location of containment
failure) •
Class 3. Random errors, due to the statistical nature of the data, (e.g.
failure rate-data).
Class 1 uncertainties are best treated by a sensitivity analysis, while
those of Class 3 can be handled statistically if there is sufficient data, or
subjectively, to establish bounding values. Class 2 are the most difficult
(defined as "unquantified residuals" in the Handbook), and can have a profound
effect on any value-impact margin. It is these unquantified residuals which are
considered further in this paper.
The impact or cost term has five major components, 1) capital expenditure,
2) replacement power during modification, 3) health costs incurred during modif-
ication, 4) changes in operating costs as a result of the modification and 5)
changes in operating health costs as a result of the modification. Items 1-3
must be positive, but items 4 and 5 could be negative. Items 1,2 and 4 can be
calculated directly in dollars, while for decision making, items 3) and 5) are
usually given as $1,000/ man-rem (occupational). As shown in Reference [3], the
uncertainty in the impact term can be represented by an error factor of about 3
if the underlying distribution is regarded as log-normal, provided the costs are
estimated on a plant specific basis.
The value or benefit term has several major Components, depending upon the
attribute considered. On-site costs averted are a function of initial and
improved core-melt frequency, the present worth of the capital investment (which
includes replacement power costs) and the accident clean-up costs. As shown in
Reference [3], an error factor of about 6 would result if a log-normal distribu-
tion were assumed.
Off-site costs averted are a function of initial and improved core-melt
frequency, containment failure, fission product behavior (pre-and post-
containment failure), evacuation, interdiction and decontamination procedures,
dose-response relationships, and dollar costs of medical treatment. Public
health effects averted (population dose and/or early and latent deaths) are
closely related to off-site costs because they depend on nearly the same
591
functions. There are however, severa1 other important considerations. Most PRAs
emp10y the CRAC computer code to determine both off-site economic and pub1ic
hea1th risks. In particu1ar, the population dose and the latent cancer deaths
are attributab1e to doses received from radioactive fall-out on the ground. Most
ca1cu1ations assume a 25 REM or 1ess who1e body dose over 30 years fo110wing
interdiciton; i.e. all land producing a dose greater than 25 REM will be inter-
dicted. If this cutoff dose is 10wered, interdiction costs go up and hea1th
effect go down; and converse1y, if this dose is raised, interdiction costs go
down and hea1th effects increase. Hence the va1ue of this interdiction dose can
also have a profound effect on the va1ue/impact margin. In asense, interdiction
(and for that matter decontamination) is a form of mitigation, and hence a
"preemptive" decision has been made with respect to the va1ue term.
For the illustrative purpose of this paper, it is assumed that the error
factor is the same for off-site costs and hea1th effects, and is assumed to have
an error factor ranging between 30 and 100, using a 10gnormal distribution. To
account for uncertainty, point or best estimate va1ues can be used to determine
the initial ratio or net benefit. Uncertainty is then inc1uded in the fo110wing
way. Based on the discussion above, uncertainty in the "impact" or cost term is
so smaH relative to that in the "va1ue" term that it can be considered a point
or best estimate va1ue. The I va1ue" on the other hand, is considered distri-
buted. The risk at the C-thconfidence level R: , is defined by:
:L
(1)
o
In this definition, R. is a random variable, p(R i ) is a density distributionfunction. The sUbscrfpt i denotes the consequence of interest (e.g. ear1y death,
p~rson-rem, etc.). C is then the probability that the expected risk is 1ess than
R:L
c •
The "va1ue" or benefit can also be expressed in simi1ar terms:
I"., d.
o
(2)
where V is the total benefit in terms of ßRi ' and each change in risk is
expressed in equiva1ent dollars (e.g. $1000/person-rem, or $lM/acute fata1ity
averted, etc).
If the total "impact" or cost is Co ,and L the "effective" remaining
1ife of the plant (e.g. may or may not inc1ude disoounting, present worth, etc.)
then the probability there is a net benefit given by:
00J p(v) dv
C IL
o
(3)
Equation (3) is particu1ar1y usefu1 when the point estimates Va and ColL
are c10se together. In practice, when Va is ama11 (because the initial best
estimate risk Ra is ama11 or ßR is sma11) and ColL is sma11, Pr tends to be
1arge because the upper confidence level risk (say R~5 ) is 1arge (the tai1
:L
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effect). Conversely, when Vo and Co/L are large, Pr tends to be small because
there tends to be an upper cut-off on risk and hence risk reduction. That is,
according to Strip [4], on-site costs tend to dominate, are less uncertain, and
are limited in dollar cost.
EXAMPLES
As an example of the methodology presented above, an analysis was performed
for three different power plant configurations, on three population sites [5].
The first was a model of the 886 MWe Unit 3 Oconee Plant, with two steam genera-
tors and four generator loops. The Oconee plant is unique in that it has a three
train AC dependent AFWS and a High Head Auxiliary Service System (HHASWS) with
its own AC and DC power supplies, to remove residual heat from the steam genera-
tors following a plant trip. Other unique features of the Oconee No. 3 Unit
include (a) emergency on-site AC hydro-power generators, and (h) feed-and-bleed
capability. The system would remove decay heat by a process of direct injection
of cool water (i.e. feed) into the reactor coolant system, and remove the hot
water (i.e. bleed) from the reactor coolant system V1a pressurizer relief valves.
To perform a value assessment for a less reliable PWR, the Oconee model was
first reconfigured to incorporate several Crystal River features while retaining
the ability to feed and bleed. The three trains for auxiliary feedwater were
reduced to two trains and the HHASWS was eliminated. The Oconee hydrogenerators
were also replaced by two trains of diesel electrical power. This is the second
plant configuration (i.e. Crystal River Simulation). The feed-and-bleed capabil-
ity of the second configuration was then removed to provide the third PWR plant
configuration.
In the examples, the Oconee model and two simulations of the Crystal River
Power Plant (with or without feed-and-bleed capability) are provided with "per-
fect" (failure proof) AFW systems or HPI systems. A further analysis for Crystal
River (without feed-and-bleed) using estimated unavailabilities [1,5] for both
add-on systems are done as the fourth example. The data used in the examples is
given by Lin [5], system costs and reductions in core melt frequencies are given
by Berry and Sanders [1], and financial data by Strip [4].
Table I shows the ratio of system: cost to man-rem averted for the high
and low population sites, which can be compared to the $lOOO/man-rem averted cri-
terion. Table 11 compares this ratio to the complex ratio: system
cost/monetized benefit, which can be compared to unity. There is "net benefit"
when Ratio 1 is less than $lOOO/man-rem and Ratio 2 is less than 1.
Table I shows several interesting trends. For the cases where it can be
demonstrated that the plants have feed-and-bleed capability, none of the improved
decay heat removal fixes are cost effective using the $l,OOO/man-rem criterion.
Where feed-and-bleed cannot be demonstrated, both improved decay heat removal
systems are cost effective at the high population site, but not on the low popu-
lation site (when using the $l,OOO/man-rem criterion).
Table 11 confirms the results above whenexamining the effect of feed-and-
bleed capability, i.e. with this capability neither ratio gives a cost effective
result. The results are different however, for the case without feed and bleed
capability. At the low population site, Ratio 2 (system costs/monetized benefit)
gives a cost effective result because it includes on-site costs averted.
Table 111 shows the probability that the value exceeds the impact for the
Crystal River Simulation, with add-on AFW train, and with and without feed-and-
bleed. Tbe cases without feed-and-bleed capability, show a high confidence
(above 75%) that value exceeds benefit, while those with feed-and-bleed capabil-
ity show a low confidence (less than 5%). Hence the results shown in Table 111
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confirm those in Tab1e 11 for Ratio 2. This is not necessari1y the case for
Ratio 1, because on-site costs are particu1ar1y dominant at low population sites.
CONCLUSIONS
Using an extension of the methodo1ogy.presented in the Va1ue/Impact Hand-
book [2], an assessment of alternative decay heat removal systems was presented.
The resu1ts were presented by two ratios:
Ratio 1: System Cost (do11ars)/popu1ation dose averted (man-rem).
Ratio 2: System Cost (do11ars)/tota1 risk averted (equiva1ent dollars).
and supp1emented with Pr(V > I), the probabi1iti·that the va1ue exceeds the
impact, where va1ue is treated as total risk averted (equiva1ent dollars).
It was found that Ratio 1 is sensitive to population density. Ratio 2 is
somewhat independent of population because on-site costs are 1ess sensitive to
plant site. Note that system add-on costs inc1ude rep1acement power costs during
an installation outage. Under the conditions of summary evacuation and man-rem
averted in a 50 mi1e radius the fo11owing conc1usions can be drawn:
(1) For those cases which have feed-and-b1eed capabi1ity to begin with,
neither of the cost/benefit criteria are satisfied.
(2) For those cases where there is no feed-and-b1eed capabi1ity to beg in
with, both cost benefit ratios are satisfied.
Two considerations are important in drawing general conc1usions from this
work:
(a) These examp1es are given for the Crysta1 River Plant on three sites
(high, medium and low population). The Crysta1 River Plant simulation has a high
core me1t frequency to begin with. Hence the benefit in terms of risk
averted/year will be 1arger than for most p1ants.
(b) The work presented here is based on the WASH-1400 release categories
and source terms. As term data becomes avai1ab1e, these measures will change in
va1ue.
Severa1 important insights beyond those considered in the Va1ue/Impact
Handbook were gained in this study. Because of the controversy focused on the
inc1usion of on-site costs averted, they can be treated separate1y when using the
comp1ex ratio method. Second1y, there is an important need to recognize the
inter-re1ationship between interdiction po1icy, population dose and off-site
costs (interdiction and decontamination). The extensions presented in this paper
inc1ude these considerations.
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TABLE I
Impact/Value Ratio Based on Dollars per Man-rem Averted out to SO miles.
Item Add-on Feed-and-Bleed with Small LOCA
Makeup Capability
Add-on AFW Train With Small
LOCA Makeup Capability
System Cost $ 78.35 x 106 $87.81 x 106
Population HIGH LOW HIGH LOW
Oconee Model $ 2800/man-rem $ l40,000/man-rem $ 4000/man-rem $ 200,000/man-rem
Crystal River
Simulation
(w. Feed-&-Bleed) $ 1100/man-rem $ 53,000/man-rem $ l300/man-rem $ 65,000/man-rem
Crystal River
Simulation $ 39/man-rem $ 2,000/man-rem $ 46/man-rem $ 2,300/man-rem
(w/o Feed-&-Bleed)
Crystal River
Simulation (w/o
F-&-B) real case $ 42/man-rem $ 2,100/man-rem $ 48/man-rem $ 2,400/man-rem
lJ1
\D
lJ1
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TABLE U
Impact/Va1ue Ratios For Crysta1 River Simulation
Add-on AFW Train with Sma11 LOCA
Makeup Capabi1ity
with Feed and B1eed without Feed and B1eed
Population
Ratio 1
Ratio 2
HIGH
1,300
6.3
MED
12,000
15
LOW
65,000
15
HIGH
46
0.22
MEDIUM
410
0.51
LOW
2,300
0.53
Ratio 1
Ratio 2
system costs/man-rem averted in $/man-rem averted
system costs/monitized benefit in $/$
monitized benefit = ear1y death + latent death + onsite
cast + offsite cast
TABLE UI
Probability that Va1ue Exceeds Impact
Add-on AFW Train with Sma11
LOCA Makeup Capabi1ity
Crysta1 River Simulation
with Feed and B1eed without Feed and B1eed
Population
P (V > I) *
r
HIGH
0.05
MED
0.006
LOW
0.005
HIGH
0.96
MED
0.77
LOW
0.75
* based on log-normal distribution
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COST BENEFIT ANALYSIS OF REACTOR SAFETY SYSTEMS
by H.A. Maurer
Commission of the European Communities, BrusseLs
ABSTRACT
Cost/benefit anaLysis of reactor safety systems is a possibiLity
appropriate to deaL with reactor safety. The Commission of the
European Communities supported a study on the cost-benefit or
cost effectiveness of safety systems instaLLed in modern PWR
nucLear power pLants. The foLLowing systems and their cooperation
in emergency cases were in particuLar investigated in this study:
- the containment system (doubLe containment)
- the Leakage exhaust and controL system
- the annuLus reLease exhaust system and
- the containment spray system.
The benefit of a safety system is defined according to its
contribution to the reduction of the radioLogicaL consequences
for the environment after a Loss-of~cooLant accident.
The anaLysis is so far performed in two different steps:
- the emergency core cooLing system is considered to
function properLy
- faiLure of the emergency core cooLing system is assumed
(with the possibLe consequence of co re meLt-down).
It is envisaged to investigate Later the optimization of design
and cooperation of reactor safety systems.
The results may demonstrate the evidence that striving for cost-
effectiveness can produce a safer end resuLt than the phiLosophy
of safety at any cost.
INTRODUCTION
To guarantee safe operation of nucLear power plants regardLess of costs
is a phiLosophy which was folLowed in the past at Least in European countries
by almost aLL safety organisations. But since the instaLLation of reactor
safety systems amounts to almost 10 % of the totaL construction costs of a
nucLear power pLant, it is evident that this money should be spent in the
construction and improvement of those systems which are most effective in the
reduction of radioactive reLeases during normaL operation and in accident
situations.
The philosophy of ALARA - as Low as reasonabLy achievabLe - (as far as
the radioactive releases are concerned) is another possibiLity appropriate to
deaL with reactor safety. If, consequentLy, we cannot Longer foLLow the
phi Losophy of safety at any cost, shouLd ALARA dominate and what is reasonabLy
achievabLe? The study tries to ans wer this quest ion.
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The safety systems of European nuclear power plants (and in particular of
PWR plants) are of different design (e.g. singLe or doubLe containment; with
or without containment spray system; with or without concrete protection of
primary system etc.) and the safety assessment of nucLear power pLants is
performed differently according to different national criteria.
In the course of this study it became obvious that different criteria
based on different philosophies may have led to different designs.
In view of a possible harmonization of the already existing national
criteria and in view of a possible optimization in the design of the differ*nt
safety systems and their cooperation in emergency cases it was investigated
under study contract by the Commission of the European Communities how the
different safety systems contribute to the overall safety of the pLant and at
which costs.
The basis for the cost/benefit analysis of the safety systems of nuclear
power plan~ is a PWR plant of 1300 MWe. Methodology and application of a cost-
benefit analysis are demonstrated by a loss-of-coolant accident with the
emergency core cooling functioning as an example. In order to compare the
benefit of different safety systems, the dimension of the environmental
poLlutions was chosen to be the quantity of air necessary to dilute a released
quantity of nuclides to concentrations permitted according to radiation
protection regulations. The quantities of air necessary for several classes
of a loss-of-coolant accident were calculated with the help of a computer
programme. After determination of benefit and expenses for different systems
of the containment a cost/benefit analysis is made. The results allow a
judgement on the counterbalance of safety systems by comparing the remaining
risks of different systems with the benefit of others. Thus the methodology
given offers the possibility to develop bases to decide on the harmonization
of safety requirements in the EC member count ries.
BASIC CONSIDERATIONS
The following systems and their cooperation in emergency cases were
investigated in the study:
- the containment system (double containment)
- the leakage exhaust and control system
- the annulus release exhaust system and
- the containment spray system.
In order to simplify the analysis and to avoid in a first step of the
analysis the discussion on possible co re melt-down, the emergency core cooling
system was considered to function properly (an assumption which could possibly
no longer be accepted after the Harrisburg experience and which was revised
in the following steps of the analysis).
The basic data of design and costs were derived from a 1300 MWe PWR plant
of German design. The benefit of a safety system is defined according to its
contribution to the reduction of the radiological consequences for the
environment af~er a loss-of-coolant accident. In the results the benefit is
expressed in m air necessary to reduce the radioactive releases below the
allowable limits.
-*-- .
the study was performed by LAHMEYER Internatlonal, Francfort
in cooperation with Professor Röper, Technical University of Aachen.
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The reliability data were first based on the report WASH 1400 (Rasmussen
report) and in a later stage of the analysis the German Risk study was
considered. Possibly it would have been simpler to express the benefit in
reduction of ci released but it was the intention to avoid extensive
discussion on human effects.
In genera~ reactor safety systems are installed to reduce the risk of an
accident and its consequences to an acceptable level. For a certain accident
(x) the risk R. (x) is described by the following equation under the condition
that a safety ~ystem is available: .
R. (x) = (S. (x) NV. (x) + So. (x) (1 - NV. (x» \oJ (x)
1 1 1 1 1
when
S. (x) environmental pollution after an accident (x) when the
1
safety system is out of operation
So. (x) environmental pollution after an accident (x) when the
1
safety system is operating
NV. (x) non availability of the safety system i after an
1
accident (x)
W (x) probability of the occurrence of an accident (x).
The benefit of a reactor safety system N. is the sum of the differences
in accident risks with or without safety systJms installed (or operating) in
the power plant.
x [m3/aJN. =2- (s*. (x) • W (x) - R. (x»1 1 1
=2 (s. (x) - So. (x» (1 - NV. (x» W (x)1 1 1
~
when <:::1
*S environmental pollution after accident (x)
~Ihen a safety system is not available;
In a first approximation it can be considered that the availability of a
safety system equals 1 that me ans (1 - NV i (x» ~ 1.
The benefit/cost relationship Mi
This means the quantity of air per year not required for delution by the
effect of 1 DM invested in a safety system.
FIRST INVESTIGATION (ECCS FUNCTIONS PROPERLY)
On the basis of these general considerations the cost/benefit relation-
ship of the four different safety systems were evaluated and the following
results obtained:
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TABlE 1. COST BENEFIT OF REACTOR SAFETY SYSTEMS
(ECCS FUNCTIONING)
InstaLLation b'3nefit Ni c~st bene fi t M.
System costs K. m Ja m Ja 1
E6 DM 1
----oM
cont ai nment system 35,0 1,24 E14 3,5 E6
Leakage exhaust and
controL system 0,55 5,17 E8 9,4 E2
annu Lus reLease
exhaust system 0,65 1,04 E9 1,6 E3
cont ai nment spray
sys~em 0,6 3,09 E7 5,2 E1
COST BENEFIT ANALYSIS, SECOND INVESTIGATION
(ECCS FAllS TO OPERATE)
This second step of the investigation considers core meLt-down. The two
accidents of core meLt-down examined are described by the foLLowing events.
Accident of core meLt-down 1:
important Leakage in the main cooLant pipe
- high pressure and Low pressure injection systems are functioning
- switch to sump operation faiLs.
Accident of core meLt-down 2:
- important Leakage in the main cooLant pipe
- high pressure injection functioning
- faiLure of Low pressure injection.
By accident of core meLt-down 1 aLL accident sequences with faiLing of
proLonged heat removal and by accident of core meLt-down 2 those with faiLing
of active safety systems are covered.
It is assumed that with these events accidents of core meLt-down wiLL
happen unavoidabLy.
After Loss-of-cooLant accidents the containment is the Last tight barrier
to the environment for the activity encLosed. Under the assumption of this
study, this barrier wiLL be, in any case, destroyed in accidents of core meLt-
down if it does not faiL by itseLf. The two in principLe possibLe faiLures are
consequentLy:
1. FaiLure of the incLusive function when the containment is charged within
design vaLues.
2. Destruction of the containment by events for which it is not designed
(faiLure by overpressure).
In the present study the maLfunction of the containment with a Leakage of
300 mm diamete~ was described as weLL as faiLure by overpressure with a
Leakage of 1 m (e.g. steam expLosion).
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The diagram of event sequences (fig. 1) contains in the upper half the
loss-of-coolant accident under control with containment failure. In the lower
half the event sequences of core melt-down can be found the beginning of which
is always failure of emergency core cooling.
In spite of the fact that in most cases failure of emergency core cooling
has as a consequence failure of the containment, a branch is foreseen in the
event sequence diagram which me ans malfunction of the containment.
After failure of the containment the inefficacy of other systems within
the containment is assumed in a conservative way. The activity in the reactor
core was calculated on the basis of an average.highest burn-up of 33 500 MWd/t
for 54 nuclides which are combined to seven groups in the beginning and to
three groups considering deposition.
The accident sequences are essentially fixed by input data. In order to
determine the benefit of the systems in the containment several sequences of
each accident are investigated which are the result of combination of correct
functioning of these systems.
A special position has to be assigned to the containment since already for
the accident sequences a difference is made whether the containment fails by
malfunction or by excessive demand.
Is there imperfection of the containment in the beginning of an accident,
the difference of combinations of correct functioning can be dropped since the
inefficacy of the other systems of the containment must be taken for granted.
Activities reLeased during accident sequences wiLL be diLuted to the Limit
vaLue for activity inhaLation per year according to the Regulations for
Radiation Protection and the quantity of air necessary represents, as it was
defined, the damage caused by this nucLide. By summation of the quantity of air
of aLL nucLides considered finaLLy the damage of the sequence which is examined
can be defined.
These infLuences are most evident for the example of the spray system. In
the beginning phase of core melt-down activity in the containment is biggest
so that a spray system is very efficient for the decreasing of activity. It has
to be considered most effective for the accident sequence which is most
frequent, .faiLure by overpressure of the containment after about one day.
Conservative assumptions with regard to source terms of the activity may
give the impression of a bigger benefit of the retaining systems since these
systems, when functioning, keep away from the environment more activity.
Conservative assumptions as regards the sequence in time of accidents are
essentiaLLy equivaLent to an earLier faiLure of the containment by over-
pressure. They herewith curtaiL the benefit of the containment.
On the contrary the benefit of the spray system increases in a shorter
period of time since the reduction of activity in the containment atmosphere
by a spray system during the earLy faiLure of the containment is more effective
than during a late faiLure.
In order to avoid erroneous estimation of the cost/benefit relationship of
systems all conservative assumptions are to be repLaced by "best-estimate"
caLcuLations.
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RESUlTS OF THE COST ßENEFIT ANALYSIS
(ECCS FAllS TO OPERATE)
The most important benefit is gained by the containment, followed by the
leakage retention system. Evidently, the results would have been different for
a single containment where especially the annulus release exhaust system is
inexistent and the spray system therefore differently designed.
When the benefits are compared to the installation costs of the different
safety systems a cost/benefit relationship can be deduced.
The study arrived at the following results indicating the benefit ga!ned
in relation to 1 DM of installation costs. (The benefit is expressed in m of
air volume to reduce the activity release to the allowable limit):
TAßlE 11. COST ßENEFIT OF REACTOR SAFETY SYSTEMS
(ECCS FAILING)
Installation bene!it c~st/benefit
System costs in m /a m /a
E6 DM li"i'i1
containment system 35,0 1,2 E14 3,4 E6
leakage exhaust and
control system 0,55 6,2 E9 1,1 E4
annulus release exhaust 0,65 3,4 E9 5,2 E3
system
cont ai nme nt spray 0,60 2,4 E11 4,0 ES
system
*on the basis of the costs in 1976.
Compared to the first analysis (emergency core cooling system functions
properly) the most important difference concerns the benefit of the containment
spray system. According to the calculation the cost/benefit relationship of
this system was improved by several orders of magnitude.
(Mi = 5,1 E1 resp. 4,0 ES).
The methodology used allows to quantify
- the technological importance of a safety system judged according to the
benefit for the environment
- the order of priority of necessary investments for different safety systems
judged according to cost/benefit relationship.
The expenses to be made are less variable than the benefit, therefore, the
benefit in most cases lays down the order of priority for the relation cost/
benefit.
Another important information to make evident the relationship between a
better benefit and the means used is given by the possibilities of still
existing improvements to reduce the remaining risk by a certain system.
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These remalnlng possibilities of benefit as to the retaining of radio-
active material are twofold:
- the possibility of damage due to permeability of the containment
the possibility of damage due to non-availability of safety systems in case
of demand.
Technological safety can be considered in balance if the remalnlng risk
of systems with high benefit is not bigger than the benefit of other systems.
The relationship cost/benefit of the considered systems depends always on
the choice of accident and incident sequences. By considering accidents of
co re melt-down this relationship was displaced. The benefit per DM invested is
several hundred times bigger for the containment than for the leakage exhaust
system and the annulus exhaust system. The cost/benefit relationship of the
spray system is one order of magnitude smaller than that of the containment.
ENVISAGED INVESTIGATIONS
The study is continued in order to supplement the static analysis -
analysis of the different systems without any technical modification - by a
dynamic analysis. This means comparison of modified safety systems in order to
1. investigate whether and to what extent the individual components of the
safety systems can be modified to decrease the instaLLation costs by
increasing at the same time the system effectiveness, and
2. investigate whether and to wh at extent the safety systems can be
substituted or are compLementary to each other.
This Leads to the appLication of marginaL analysis which may finaLLy
answer the question whether it is possibLe to define the point at which the
design of a safety device has attained a cost/benefit LeveL at which any
additionaL measure would onLy constitute a negLigibLe additionaL benefit, or
even, going above an optimum design, a negative benefit couLd be the resuLt.
The totaL utiLity of safety devices and the increased benefit derived
from an additionaL investment unit can therefore be examined. ConverseLy, it
is aLso possibLe to determine the decrease in benefit resuLting from a
reduction of investment on safety by one unit.
An economist or theorist, however, couLd aLso ask whether variation of
the different systems or their components would produce more favourabLe
combinations. Assuming, for simpLicity's sake, that onLy devices A and B
exist, is it possibLe that an eLargement of device A and a reduction of
device B wouLd produce the same totaL utility at a Lower cost?
In this context, totaL utiLity must be regarded as equivalent with the
design, since no more than the permissibLe radioactivity must escape from the
containment. Optimum pLant design is attained when the relationship between
marginal cost is equivaLent in devices A and B.
The benefit derived from a safety device can aLso be regarded as the
yieLd from the amount of money invested. This proposition can be clarified by
assuming that there are onLy two safety devices.
of paraLLeL isocost Lines are
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The "quantities" of safety devices i and i are plotted on the axis of
figure 2. The isoquants shown (R1, R , R j are t~e geometrie Location of the
combinations which produce the same §enefits or the same yieLd. Each isoquant
corresponds to a certain benefit or yieLd LeveL, in this case a certain
residuaL risk exists, where R3 < R2 and R2 < R1•
A reduction in radioactivity reLeased during a maLfunction couLd aLso be
regarded as a yieLd.
A certain required safety LeveL, to be attained at the Lowest possibLe
cost, is a given factor. The costs per "quantity unit" empLoyed in the
individuaL safety devices are designated k1, k2 •
The foLLowing considerations are reLevant to derivation of the minimum
cost combination at a given safety LeveL:
If, for exampLe, aLL avaiLabLe resources are utiLized for safety device 1,
i 2 = 0, and i 1 = Ktot • The ratio 4 k2 determines the curve of the isocost
~ /1 k1
Lines. Fig. 2 shows lhat a Large number
produced for aLternative Ktot •
In the case of various totaL sums, Kt t 1, Kt t 2 and Kt t 3, the
maximum possibLe yieLd is aLways obtained ßnere theOl~ocost Ling is
tangentiaL with an i~oquant.
This tangentiaL point can be interpreted in two ways:
1. At the tangentiaL point a maximum degree of safety is obtained for a given
budget, or
2. At the tangentiaL point a target (predetermined) safety LeveL is obtained
at a minimum cost.
The second aspect is reLevant to the present study since certain safety
requirements, e.g. those Laid down by Law, must be met at the Lowest possibLe
cost.
The resuLts of this envisaged investigation may demonstrate the evidence
that striving for cost-effectiveness can Lead to more efficiency of safety
systems than the phi Losophy of safety at any cost.
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SAFETY ASSESSMENT FROM STUDIES OF LWR's BURNING PLUTONIUM FUEL
A. Renard*, R. Holzer**, J. Basselier*, K. Hnilica**, Cl. Vandenberg*
*BELGONUCLEAIRE (Brussels) - **N.I.S. (Hanau)
ABSTRACT
The introduction of mixed-oxide fuel assemblies was theoretically
studied for seven light water reactors by several contributors. A
synthesis of typical accident studies is presented including the com-
parative investigations of the reactor behaviour under the dynamic
conditions for Rod Cluster Control Ej ection and Steam Line Break in
PWR and rod drop accident, main heat sink failure, mass flow transient
and LOCA-heatup phase in BWR. The reactor fuelled only with Uranium
is taken as the reference. The studies were performed under CEC con-
tracts and connected with a steady-state physical parameter research.
Trends and general conclusions are deduced. The recycling of 30 %of
mixed-oxide fuel in large LWR cores should not induce special safety
problems nor system modifications when some cautions are taken in
loading patterns.
1. INTRODUCTION
Theoretical studies Were performed on the control and safety of LWR I S
burning Plutonium fuel by several contributors under contracts with the
Commission of the European Communities (CEC) in the frame of a programme on
"Pu recycle in LWR", and followed by a synthesis of the resul ts. The com-
parative investigations for a selection of typical accidents refer to the
reactors BIBLIS-B, BUGEY-2, TIHANGE-1, TRINO VERCELLESE, in five PWR
studies (KWU, UKAEA, CEA/EdF, BELGONUCLEAIRE, CNEN/ENEL) and to the reac-
tors KKI (ISAR), GARIGLIANO and CAORSO in BWR studies from two contributors
(KWU, CNEN/ENEL). For each, the same reactor fuelled with Uranium assem-
blies only is taken as the standard reference. The dynamic analyses are
connected with a steady-state analysis including research on reload strate-
gy and physics characteristics, namely core power peaking, reactivity coef-
ficients, control rod worth, reactivity balance, kinetic parameters [1].
In all cases, equilibrium (or near to equilibrium) cores have been defined
for U and MOX fuel loading.
The accident analyses use various levels of sophistication for the
whole plant and core modelling as weIl as in the computing methods. The
philosophy of analysis is either a "best estimate" or a conservative ap-
proach, and sometimes a mixed one. A comparison and a synthesis of the
detailed results are given in [1] ; essential trends are deduced here.
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2. PWR ACCIDENT SITUATIONS
The considered accidents are a rod cluster control ejection (RCCE) and
a steam line break (SLB). Table 1 gives for each reference plant and both
accidents, the name of the computer codes used and the conditions of the
investigated cores. The fraction of core with mixed-oxide assemblies (HOX)
is inc1uded between 30 % (P30) and 100 % (P100) and a range of critical
initial conditions is adopted, so that general conclusions can be obtained
from the set of results.
2.1. Rod Cluster Control Ejection
As the most reactive control rod to be ejected is not necessarily
located at core centre, a fitting of the geometrical model and of the as-
sumptions is generally needed to simulate the real situation with symmetry
conditions reducing computer storage space or cost.
The large hot channel factors around the ejected rod and the important
flux redistribution during the transient are obviously better simulated
with 3D or 2D-space-dependent-kinetics models.
A wide spectrum of initial conditions is represented, being justified
on the basis of pessimistic data or results for what concerns the power ex-
cursion severity, or the smaller delayed neutron fraction, or the maximum
rod worth, or the maximum clad transient temperature, and its higher pro-
bability.
The time needed for a complete ejection of a fully inserted rod is
assumed to be 0.1 second at constant velocity (as prescribed in the NRC
Regulatory Guide 1,77) ; one "best estimate" case considers a total ejec-
tion in 0.23 s under constant pressure.
Fig. 1 gives the maximum relative power (p/p Nominal) reached during
the transient as a function of the ej ected rod worth (R) for 14 calcula-
tions. Due to different core-loading patterns, initial conditions and
conservatism degrees, the ejected rod worths vary between 0.15 and
2.26 dollars (indeed, the rod efficiency is highly sensitive to the reload-
ing strategy). The range of the five contributors is indicated by letters
A to E ; a circle marks the U-core results. Hot-Full-Power and Hot-Zero-
Power cases are distributed respectively along two straight lines on the
semi-logarithmic graph.
For the "best estimate" analyses, the ejected rod worth is fairly less
than 1 $ and the power excursion induces a very modest temperature in-
crease, without damage risk for fuel, owing to temperature feedbacks, even
for one 100 % plutonium burner core option.
For the conservative evaluations with rod worth higher than 1 $, the
limit criteria for absence of catastrophic fuel pin failures are fulfilled
(no fUElI melting, maximum fuel average enthalpy at hot spot < 836 J/g,
maximum clad temperature below the Zircaloy alpha-beta phase transition
point), although the minimum DNB ratio margin (= 1,3) is exceeded in a
limited core fraction.
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Depending on specific assumptions, the MOX core behaviour is slightly
worse or better than the Uranium core ; the higher cross-sections for fis-
sion and absorption of thermal neutrons in the core regions with Plutonium
are mainly responsible of the better behaviour of a Plutonium core for
rather severe power excursions.
2.2. Steam Line Break
Multiloop models of the primary and secondary coolant systems are
needed to evaluate the thermal-hydraulic boundary conditions of the core,
for which a detailed analysis is made separately.
The simulations differ essentially for the secondary side of heat
exchangers and the connected secondary loop as weIl as for the safety sys-
tem action, e.g.
the most sophisticated models consider the intact steam-generator blow-
down through the break until isolation valve closure ;
the reactivity his tory of the safety injection system is either intro-
duced as input data using a constant boron reactivity worth at constant
rate, or calculated by specialized modules.
Each primary system code represents the core by a point-kinetics mod-
ule, but some associated core analyses are made by a space-dependent kinet-
ics code.
All contributing studies use "End-of-Cycle" conditions, because the
absence (or low concentration) of boron in the coolant gives the maximum
absolute value of the moderator temperature coefficient, which is a crucial
parameter. This reactivity coefficient is generally higher in absolute
value for the cores including MOX assemblies ; for one contribution, a
particular loading of MOX assemblies at core periphery is the origin of a
reverse feature.
Hot-shutdown conditions are adopted by most with the most reactive
control rod stuck out of the core , but with different. time intervals be-
tween scram and steam-line-break occurrence ; this illustrates the influ-
ence of the accident sequence. This control rod aspect may induce high
local power-peaking factors, depending also on fuel loading patterns.
Fig. 2 shows the maximum normalized power level P/PN as a function
of the moderator temperature reactivity coefficient M (varying between - 40
and - 75 pcm/oC) for 11 calculations. The results of each of the five
contributors are located in separated parts of the graph. A circle marks
the Uranium core cases.
Except for one "best estimate" case of an Uranium core, all the cores
return to criticality during the transient. The recriticality durations
are included between 6 and 80 seconds. The subsequent power excursion is
always modest (the maximum normalized power level is less than 0.22) and
the minimum DNB ratio is higher than 1.3. Some "best estimate" evaluations
with the safety injection failure show that the situation can be mastered
without higher failure risk, thanks to the dry-out of the steam generator
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in the breached loop and the permanent operations of the main coolant
pumps. For the conservative studies, the boron injeetion is the long-term
decisive factor which guarantees that the risk of core damage is extremely
small.
For the SLB, the behaviour of MOX cores is generally slightly worse
than for U eores, but the differences of consequenees ar~ not very signifi-
cant due to high margin to safety limits.
2.3. Conelusive Remarks
One rema1.n1.ng problem refers to the eredible upper limit of the rod
worths in any condition of the loading pattern with a not necessarily opti-
mized strategy. The relevant uncertainty concerns the ejected rod worth in
the RCCE as weIl as the stuck-rod worth at seram in the SLB.
Nevertheless, the consequenees of plutonium recyling in 30 % of the
MOX assemblies are not severe in those typical aecidents and well-adapted
methods of analysis are available. Each study has concluded that the
introduction of MOX assemblies in a large PWR eore does not lead to special
problems.
3. BWR ACCIDENTAL SITUATIONS
The BWR MOX-fuelled cores have been designed similar to the Uranium
referenee cores (cycle length, power peaking). Island design has been used
for the MOX fuel assemblies, so that the relative proportion of MOX fuel
rods is 12 % for one-MOX reload cores in GARIGLIANO and CAORSO, and for
full-MOX reloads, 35 % in KKI eore and 51 % in GARIGLIANO eore.
For CAORSO, only a eore with one-MOX reload has been defined ; in the
KKI case, only the full-MOX reload eore was used in the eomparative
studies.
For the BWR studies, as shown in Table 2, the "best estimate" approach
is represented by the GARIGLIANO/CAORSO studies, whereas the KKI studies
use more conservative boundary conditions.
3.1. Main Heat Sink Failure (Turbine Trip)
As a result of a turbine trip, apressure and mass flow transient
occurs in the primary system of a reactor. The gradient of the pressure/
mass flow ramp is determined by the global system design.
The integral power production evolution for the U and MOX cores has
been studied for all three reactors and for various amounts of MOX reloads
in the core.
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A typical power his tory is shown in Fig. 3 for the KKI case. Two
maxima in power occur during the transient. The first peak is caused by
the reactivity ramp due to void reduction by the increasing pressure and is
counteracted by the (prompt) void increase due to the power increase. The
second peak is dominated by the delayed void and Doppler feedback effects
initiated during the early phase of the transient.
At the end of the transient, as soon as pressure and mass flow have
stabilized, the power stabilizes as weIl at a level determined by the
static (void and Doppler) feedback coefficients.
As can be seen from Fig. 3 (KKI EOG case), MOX cores show a more pro-
nounced power increase during the transient. This is a result of the more
negative (approximately 20 %) void coefficient.
The following trends are deduced from that set of studies :
- for one-MOX reload core , only insignificant changes in power histories
have been observed ;
- full-MOX recycling-cores show power transients up to 10 % higher than
Uranium cores ;
- in all cases studied, the power transient, due to
mastered by the existing core design features.
limit) will be caused by the power transient.
the turbine trip can be
No fuel damage (MGHFR
In addition, it has been shown that such global transients as turbine
trip or global mass flow transients (see next section) can be described by
1-D (axial) calculational models.
3.2. Trip of Recirculation Pumps (Mass Flow Transient)
The core power response to such aglobaI mass flow transient initiated
by a trip of the recirculation pumps has been studied for the KKI core.
This transient is characterized by a mass flow reduction and therefore a
void increase with a decrease in power. Again the power variation is
slightly more pronounced in MOX loaded cores due to the enhanced void coef-
ficient and the power response is slightly faster.
However, the difference between the U and MOX core behaviour is quite
small (10 %).
3.3. Rod Drop Accident
In contrast to the global transients mentioned above the rod drop
accident is a very local transient. Its dynamic behaviour can be described
with sufficient accuracy only by 3D dynamic codes.
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The driving force for the power excursion,
of the transient when Doppler feedback is
reactivity release of the dropping rod.
especially at the beginning
still negligible, is the
This reactivity release depends very sensitivelyon the following
parameters
- location of the dropping rod ;
- critical control rod insertion depth at the beginning of the transient
(in this study : BOC, cold conditions) ;
- critical control rod pattern, which is a result of the control rod with-
drawal sequence.
The following static dropping rod reactivities have been calculated
GARIGLIANO CAORSO
Uranium core 680 pcm 324 pcm
One MOX Reload 480 pcm 343 pcm
All MOX Reload 250 pcm ---
Hence subsequent dynamic calculation for the GARIGLIANO Uranium
reference case showed a prompt critical behaviour whereas the MOX core
power excursion was much less severe. For the CAORSO case, the difference
between U and one MOX reload core behaviour was negligible.
Especially for this accident, it can be concluded that the effects of
the MOX island loading of the core are small compared to the normal range
of uncertainties associated with core loading.
3.4. Heat-Up Phase of a LOCA
Typical LOCA boundary conditions have been taken from the original
reactor licensing reports of the CAORSO and the GARIGLIANO plants. They
refer to :
- pressure vs time ;
- sequence of the accident (beginning of blowdown, beginning of the rewet-
ting phase, etc) ;
- radial and axial core power peakings.
The design dependent fuel assembly characteristics affect the behav-
iour of the fuel rods under LOCA conditions, especially the differences in:
- material properties ;
- power production after shutdown due to delayed neutrons and fission prod-
uct decay heat ;
- fuel-assembly pin power-density distribution (this is not necessarily a
property specific to MOX fuel but strongly depends on fuel-assembly de-
sign) •
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The calculations show that the maximum cladding temperatures during
LOCA, respectively for U and HOX cores, are 951°C and 964°C for GARI-
GLIANO as weIl as 1007 °c and 1010 °c for CAORSO.
These values are far below the 1200 °c limit which is the criterion
for severe cladding damage. Horeover, the difference between the U and HOX
fuel assemblies is practically zero.
This case too shows that fuel assembly design effects playa much more
important role than the specific U/HOX difference.
4. CONCLUSION
First, it should be mentioned that anormal U-fuelled LHR core at
End-of-Cycle (32000 HHd/t) generates more than 40 %of its power out of the
fission of Plutonium isotopes. So it is to some extent a Pu-recycling
system.
On the other hand, Pu-recycling on a greater scale has already been
performed in several power reactors without serious problems for normal
operation. Previous steady-state fuel management studies have shown that
similar core parameters can be reached in HOX and Uranium assemblies owing
to an appropriate fuel assembly and core design.
For accidental conditions, the situation was not so obvious, so that
the interest was very large for an international comparative analysis of
typical accidents in several power reactors assumed to burn Plutonium fuel
in a large amount of the core.
Even if the various approaches are somewhat different, the general
conclusions converge : the recycling of about 30 % of HOX fuel in large LWR
cores should not induce safety problems, if some cautions are taken in core
and fuel assembly design and if an adequate margin of uncertainty is kept
for some important core parameters.
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TABLE 1 PWR Accidental Investigations
Reference Plant
AI BIBLIS-B
B/ BUGEY-2 (l)
C/ BUGEY-2 (2)
D/ TIHANGE-1
E/ TRINO-VERCELLESE
Accident
RCCE
SLB
RCCE
SLB
RCCE
SLB
RCCE
SLB
RCCE
SLB
Code Used
IQSBOX
(3D-2g)
BRUSEK
+ IQSBOX
MEKIN
(3D-2g)
RELAP-UK
+ MEKIN
CINTAX
(lDax-2g)
+ FLICA
FLICA-PREF
COSTANZA-RZ
(2D-2g)
+ COBRA III-C
RETRAN
SYNTH-C
(3D-3g)
RELAP4/MOD2
+ LEUCIPPO
Core Initial
Conditions
EOC/HFP
EOC/HFP
BOC/HFP
EOC/HZP
BOC/HZP
EOC/HZP
EOC/HZP
EOC/HZP
EOC/HZP
EOC/HZP
Core
Investigated
P37
U
P100
U
P100
U
P100
U
P100
U
P30
U
P30
U
P30
U
p30
P70
U
P32
U
P32
Some Specific Features
(h.w.r. = highest worth rod)
- h.w.r. at core centre, 1/8 symmetry core
model
- HFP with scram just after the SLB ini-
tiation
- h.w.r. at edge, two symmetrical rods,
1/4 model of 1/2 real reactor core
- starts at 12 seconds after scram from
full power
- one average channel for whole core,
same control rod worth for both cases
- steam-flow on steam generator secondary
side imposed as a function of time, by
input
- 1/2 core macrocell centred around the
h.w.r. located at periphery
- non equilibrium initial kinetic conditions
(95 seconds after reactor trip)
- h.w.r. at periphery,
whole core without symmetry
- colder core quadrant associated to the
loop with SLB and including stuck control
rod
'"
..,.
TABLE 2 BWR Accidental Investigations
Transient Ref. Plant Gore Boundary Gonditions Operation State Godes Used
of eq .-core
Turbine trip (EOG) KKI Pressure ramp (25 %/s) EOG-full power IQS-BWR for U
(dm/dt = 0) Gonstant mass flow GOS-BWR for U
and MOX
Turbine trip (EOG) KKI ~ '<"••"<" '0' mo,' fl0. <.m" ; <.," EOG-full power IQS-BWR(dm/dt < 0) GOS-BWR
of change = 25 %/s pressure and
Turbine trip (BOG) KKI - - 10 %/s mass flow BOG-full power IQS-BWR
(dm/dt < 0) GOS-BWR
Trip of recircula- KKI Gonstant pressure, mass flow varies EOG-full power GOS-BWR
tion pumps IQS-BWR
Main heat sink GARIGLIANO Mass flow and pressure curves given
failure (turbine (pressure ramp : 3 %/s)
trip) EOG-full power DlREBO
GAORSO Mass flow and pressure curves given
(respective ramps ::: 7%/s and 5 %/s)
Rod drop accident GARIGLIANO Rod G8 drops BOG-cold SQUID
SYNTH-G
GAORSO Zero-power SYNTH-Trans
LOGA heat-up phase GARIGLIANO Pressure transient and core power Full power ARIEL
density distribution given,
burnup : 9000 MWd/t (MOX)
- 10000 MWd/t (U)
GAORSO Pressure transient and core power Full power ARIEL
density distribution given,
burnup : 12000 MWd/t (U and MOX)
m
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PERIODIC (INSERVICE) INSPECTION OF NUCLEAR STATION PIPING WELDS,
FOR THE MINIMUM OVERALL RADIATION RISK
J.L. Platten
Atomie Energy of Canada Limited
Sheridan Park, Mississauga, Canada
ABSTRACT
Periodie (Inserviee) Inspeetion of pressure-retaining eomponents is a
requirement in all nuelear stations.
A method is presented for determining the optimal number of piping welds
to inspeet whieh results in the minimum overall radiation risk. This
risk has two parts, a) that ineurred by inspeetion personnel, and b) the
"expeeted" risk to the publie due to piping system failure.
The probability of system failure may be quantified in terms of the
number of welds inspeeted. Radiation exposures are evaluated by a method
based on radiation detriment optimization measures advoeated in the
revised (1977) ALARA eoneept. Knowing the release to the publie due to
failure, it is possible to quantify the overall radiation risk in terms
of the number of welds inspeeted. Optimization methods allow
determination of the optimal number of welds to inspeet, to minimize this
overall radiation risk.
The method was applied to the example of a typieal p1p1ng system in a
CANDU station, with the apparent eonelusion that no weld Periodie
Inspeetion would be required for the purposes of safety. Further review
of the speeifie assumptions involved would be neeessary to eonfirm this
result.
1.0 INTRODUCTION
All nuelear stations require Inserviee Inspeetion of eomponents in
nuelear systems, to assure their safety and integrity. In CANDU stations this
is termed Periodie Inspeetion.
Periodie Inspeetion in a CANDU station is the mandatory inspeetion of
eomponents whose failure eould result in radioaetive releases to the publie,
and is governed by National Standard of Canada CAN3-N285.4-M83, "Periodie
Inspeetion of CANDU Nuelear Power Plant Components" [1], hereafter ealled "the
Standard".
Among components to be inspeeted are the piping welds of heat transport
eireuits in whieh failure eould result in radioaetive releases. The number of
welds to be inspeeted in a piping eireuit, and the inspeetion intervals, are
determined by rules in the Standard.
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The intent of the Standard is proteetion of the publie from radioaetive
releases. However, Periodie Inspeetion itself results in radiation exposure
to the personnel earrying out inspeetions, due to the residual radioaetive
fields around nuelear station systems during shutdown.
This paper examines Periodie Inspeetion of piping welds from an
optimization point of view with respeet to radiation exposure. The paper
quantifies the overall radiation risk, whieh has two parts a) that ineurred by
inspeetion personneI, and b) the "expeeted" risk to the publie due to piping
system failure. By minimizing this overall radiation risk, the optimal number
of welds to inspeet is determined.
2.0
2.1
OPTnlIZATION MODEL
MODEL FO~IULATION
Consider a piping system with a total of N welds, where D welds are in a
deteriorated state and I are Periodieally Inspeeted. There are five
inspeetion intervals during the assumed 40-year station life, and so eaeh of
the I welds is inspeeted five times. The same I welds are inspeeted in eaeh
interval, sinee abasie premise is that Periodie Inspeetion will deteet
deterioration by eomparison of inspeetion results with those previously
obtained for the same weId.
We assurne that system deterioration is deteeted if the inspeetion sampIe
I ineludes at least~ of the D deteriorated welds. Henee the deterioration
remains undeteeted if the sampIe I ineludes exaetly zero of the D welds. The
probability that the I welds inspeeted inelude exaetly zero of the D welds is
derived from the hypergeometrie distribution [2J;
P(O) (N-D)! (N-I)!(N-D-I)! N! (1)
This is the probability of undeteeted system deterioration, given that
deterioration does exist.
The emphasis of Periodie Inspeetion is on deteetion of "generie"
d~terioration due to unantieipated meehanisms, whieh eould affeet several or
many of the system welds. Henee, generie deterioration is assumed to affeet
at least two and as many as all of the system welds. Then D is in the
range;
2 ~ D ~ N (2)
Of course, it is not eertain that generie deterioration does exist in the
system. Henee, we assurne P(GD) to be the average value over the station life
of the probability that generie deterioration does exist.
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The crucial assumption is then made, that the system will definitely fail
if generic deterioration exists and if this deterioration is not detected by
inspection. Then the probability-Df system failure is:
P(F) = P(GD) x P(O) (3)
We now define CA as the radiation exposure "consequence" of piping system
failure, and CI as the radiation exposure "consequence" of Periodic Inspection
of one weId over the station life.
The risk due to Inspection over the station life is then;
I x CI
The "expected" risk to the public due to possible failure of the piping
system is;
CA x P(F) = CA x P(GD) x P(O)
Then the overall radiation risk over the station life is the sum of
contributions (4) and (5);
(4)
(5)
I x CI + CA x P(GD) x (N-D)! (N-I) I (6)
(N-D-I) I NI
Expression (6) is a minimum when the expression divided by CI is also a
minimum. This results in an expression with the ratio CA = CR, defined as
the Consequence Ratio. Hence, the final expression to gInimize is:
I + CR x P(GD) x (N-D)I(N-I)I (7)
(N-D-I) INI
For a given piping system, CR and N are fixed and P(GD) will equal an
assumed value. Hence, expression (7) is a function of land D.
Note that D is defined only as being within the range, 2 , D 'N. The
approach taken during the minimization of expression (7) was to find the
maximum value of I which results in this minimization, over all values of D in
the range 2 , D , N-I.
Several of the assumptions used for the model are simplifications of more
rigorous descriptions; for example equation (3). These were chosen to give
conservative(maximum)values of 10 t' the number of system welds to beinspected. p
2.2 MODEL RESULTS
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Figure 1 shows the resu1ts of minimizing expression (7), in the form
I opt versus N with P(GD) x CR as parameter, for N in the range 100
to 400. For each value of N and P(GD) x CR, there was found to be a unique
I opt which gave the minimum.
An Atomic Energy of Canada Limited internal study was used to establish a
realistic upper bound for P(GD). The study reviewed U.S. nuclear station
experience, and categorized piping system problems into "severances", "leaks"
and "defects". It is assumed that "severan';es" is the relevant category.
Under the assumption of a Poisson failure process, an upper limit failure rate
A = 1x10- 3 severances per stat!~n-year was recommended. For astation life of
40 years, the increase of (l-e t) which is the probability of at least
one failure up to time t, is nearly linear with time. Hence we may think of
this "probability of at least one fai1ure" as increasing linear1y with time to
a value of ~0.04 at 40 years. The average value over the station life is then
~0.02. Since the data used in the study covered all failure mechanisms,
"generic" and "non-generic", and there is in fact no evidence of "generic"
weId deterioration due to unanticipated mechanisms, it is assumed that 0.02 is
a realistic upper bound on P(GD).
3.0 APPLICATION OF MODEL RESULTS
The results have been applied for N = 290 welds, relevant to the Primary
Heat Transport (PHT) piping system in a specific CANDU Station.
3.1 CONSIDERING RADIATION EXPOSURE CONSEQUENCES
Safety analyses for the specific CANDU station give information on the
exposure consequences of piping failure. Failure of the PHT piping system is
a "single-failure" accident in CANDU terminDIogy.
Reference [3] provides a method of evaluating the "detriment" of
radiation exposures under different conditions, to satisfy exposures being "AS
~OW ~ ~EASONABLY !CHIEVABLE, ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL FACTORS BEING TAKEN INTO
ACCOUNT known as the "Revised (1977) ALARA Concept". It accounts for the
economic and social climate, administrative/legal exposure limits and the
actual magnitude of risk. The upper bound on occupational detriment is
obtained from the "cost of replacement manpower" which occurs at the limiting
level of exposure. For the upper bound on detriment to the public, a similar
relationshipis used. The method incorporates a quadratic relationship for
the dose-response curve for the response of humans to radiation.
3.1.1 OCCUPATIONAL RISK TO INSPECTION PERSONNEL
Using the terminology and equations of reference [3]; and relevant
assumptions;
-R
1
-L
e
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average exposure rate to Periodie Inspeetion Personnel
1 x 10- 2 person-Sv/year-person (based on station operating
experienee)
oeeupational exposure limit to inspeetion personnel
5 x 10-2 person-Sv/year-person
annual labour eost = 60,000 $/year-person
Then the "detriment value" of this exposure is;
R(_1 )
ELIM
0.5
537,000 $/person-Sv (8 )
The estimated radiation exposure to personnei, for piping Periodie
Inspeetion in the station, is 1.6 x 10-2 person-Sv per PHT weId over the five
inspeetions.
The value of CI, the radiation exposure eonsequenee of Periodie
Inspeetion of one weId, is the produet of the exposure in person-Sv per weId
and the detriment per person-Sv;
CI = 1.6 x 10-2 person-Sv x 537,000 $
weId person-Sv
8590 -$-
weId
3.1.2 PUBLIC RISK DUE TO AN ACCIDENT
From the station safety analyses, the single-failure exposure to an
individual whieh results in the maximum detriment is 1.6 x 10-3 person-Sv.
Using the terminology of referenee [3] and making eertain assumptions;
maximum exposure to a member of the publie = 1.6 x 10-3
person-Sv
-E*
LIM
-L *e
radiation limit to an individual member of the publie for
single-failure aeeident = 5 x 10- 3 Person-Sv
= per-eapita ineome = 6000 $/year-person
Then the detriment value of publie radiation exposure is:
L *e
E*LIM
R2 0.5(--)
E*LIM
679,000 $/person-Sv (9)
622
From the safety analyses the maximum single-failure population exposure
is 0.71 person-Sv. Finally, the value of CA is the produet of this population
exposure and the detriment value of the exposure;
CA 0.71 person-Sv x 679,000 $ = $482,000
person-Sv
3.1.3 OPTIMAL LEVEL OF PERIODIC INSPECTION
Sinee we had earlier established CI = 8590 $
---'W:-:-"e-=-l""':"d-' then
0.02,Using the assumption that P(GD)56.1 ~ 56.$482,000$ 8,590
CACR
CI
P(GD) x CR = 0.02 x 56 = 1.1.
Figure 1 shows that Iopt=O for P(GD)xCR of 1.1 and N=290. The
result that no Periodie Inspeetion of welds ean be justified for safety
purposes runs counter to aeeepted belief on this subjeet; a further review of
the assumptions used is neeessary in order to eonfirm these results.
We note that, for this speeifie PHT main eireuit piping system with
N = 290 welds, the Standard requires Periodie Inspeetion of 43 welds, 15% of
the total.
3.2 CONSIDERING ALL CONSEQUENCES INCLUDING ECONOMIC
Periodie Inspeetion as defined by the Standard is intended only for
safety, and so the eeonomie eonsequenees of system failure are not within its
seope. However, those consequenees eould be very large.
3.2.1 TOTAL CONSEQUENCE OF SYSTEM FÄlLURE
The economie consequenees of system failure would inelude a) eost of
replaeement eleetrieal power, b) eosts of repair and eleanup, and e) indireet
but likely signifieant eosts due to the reaetion of the publie and regulatory
authorities. It is diffieult to put accurate eosts on these effeets. For the
eost of replaeement power, an estimate is 250,000$ per day. If we assume the
station to be shut down for 6 months following a failure, the total eost of
lost power is ~ $4.6 x 107• The other costs identified would result in a
total consequenee of failure CA, ineluding publie radiation detriment, in the
order of $5.0 x 107•
3.2.2
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TOTAL CONSEQUENCE OF PIPING INSPECTION
The other eosts ineurred in piping inspeetion, due to equipment eosts and
straight labour eosts, are believed to be about 20% of the radiation
detriment. Henee the estimated total detriment per pipe weId inspeetion is:
CI = $8590 x 1.2 = 10,300 $/Weld.
3.2.3 OPTIMAL LEVEL OF INSPECTION
CA $5.0 x 107In this ease CR = __ = ~ 4900 and P(GD) x CR = 0.02 x 4900=98.
CI $10,300
Figure 1 shows that inspeetion of ~ 40 welds may be justified, in this ease
where all the eonsequenees of system failure and of weId inspeetion have been
eonsidered. This eompares with 43 welds, whieh the Standard requires for
Periodie Inspeetion.
This suggests that the Standard may require exeessive piping inspeetion
in terms of proteetion of the publie from the radiation eonsequenees of system
failure, subjeet to the further review as diseussed in seetion 3.1.3.
However, based on the assumptions used, the required level of inspeetion
appears realistie when all the eonsequenees of system failure and piping
inspeetion are eonsidered.
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SYMBOLS
CA
CI
CR
D
eonsequenee of piping system failure
eonsequenee of Periodie Inspeetion of one piping weId, over the
station life
CA/CI, the Consequenee Ratio
number of system welds with deterioration
IL
e
L* C
N
pe)
P(F)
P(GD)
P(o)
t
tt
oee
$
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oeeupational radiation exposure limit to inspeetion personnel
(person-Sv/year)
radiation limit to an individual member of the publie, due to an
aeeident (person-Sv)
number of system welds whieh are Periodieally Inspeeted
optimal number of welds to inspeet, to minimize radiation risk
J faetorial = J(J-1) (J-2) .•••• (2)(1), where J is any integral
number
annual labour eost ($ /year-person)
per-eapita ineome for publie ($ /year-person)
total number of piping welds in system
probability of (an event)
probability of piping system failure
average value over station life, of probability that piping system
has generie deterioration
probability that deterioration is not deteeted by inspeetion, given
that deterioration exists.
average exposure rate to Periodie Inspeetion personnel
(person-Sv/year-person)
maximum radiation exposure to a member of the publie due to an
aeeident (person-Sv)
station age (years)
detriment value of oeeupational radiation exposure to inspeetion
personnel ($/person-Sv)
detriment value of publie radiation exposure due to an aeeident
($/person-Sv)
piping system failure rate (severanees/station-year)
$ (1982)
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PARAMETRIC STUDIES ON THE REACTIVITY OF SPENT FUEL
STORAGE POOLS
P. Grimm, J.M. Paratte, K. Foskolos, C. Maeder
Swiss Federal Institute for Reactor Research (EIR)
CH-5303 Würenlingen, Switzerland
ABSTRACT
The dependence of the multiplication factor of spent fuel
storage pools without absorbing channels and with steel and
Boral absorbers on assembly pitch, water density, and absorber
thickness is investigated. The results show that the reacti-
vity of the Boral pool is more sensitive to the assembly pitch
than that of the other two pools. It is demonstrated that the
keff of the pools without absorber and with steel channels has
its maximum value at low water density. The multiplication
factor of the Boral pool passes through a minimum as a
function of absorber thickness if the assembly pitch is kept
constant.
INTRODUCTION
For a safe storage of nuclear fuel it is essential that the pools
used for this purpose remain subcritical under all conceivable conditions.
As the spent fuel assemblies discharged from a reactor usually have to be
stored on site for several years a high storage density is desirable from
an economic point of view. Carefuland accurate criticality calculations
are therefore required in order to guarantee the criticality safety of a
storage pool as well as an economic construction.
In the present paper we want to show some important criticality
characteristics of storage pools as well as the differences in sensitivity
to various parameters for the three types of pools most commonly used, viz.
pools without neutron absorbers and with steel or Boral absorbing channels.
It is however not the intention of this paper to show the complete optimi-
zation of a storage pool.
DESCRIPTION OF THE CALCULATED STORAGE POOLS
The calculations were performed for PWR spent fuel storage pools with
a typical 15 x 15 rods fuel assembly. The characteristics of the fuel
assembly are given in Table I. These data were taken from Ref. L-l~ as far
as possible and realistic values were assumed for the remaining quantities.
Table I
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Dimensions and material densities
of the fuel assembly
Number of fuel rods 204
Number of control rod guide tubes 21
Fuel U0 2
Density 10.4 g/cm3
Pellet diameter 0.911 cm
Clad Zircaloy
Density 6.55 g/cm3
Outside diameter 1.07 cm
Thickness 0.072 cm
Rod pitch 1.43 cm
Guide tubes 88-304
Density 7.91 g/cm3
Outside diameter 1.40 cm
Thickness 0.05 cm
The fuel was assumed to be fresh with a 235u enrichment of 3.5 % by
weight. The geometry of a lattice cell of the storage pool and the details
of the absorbing channels are shown in Figure 1. The thickness of the Boral
plate is variable; instead of Boral thickness we will usually give the
boron content in grams of lOB per cm 2 of plate surface. The relation be-
tween boron content and Boral thickness is also given in Figure 1, these
data are taken from the manufacturer's publicity. The storage pools were
assumed to be infinite in the x- and y-directions. The axial leakage was
taken into account by means of an axial buckling of 0.8 m- 2 which corre-
sponds to an extrapolated height of 3.5 m.
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Figure 1 Geometry of fuel assembly and absorbing channel
10.725 cm 0.525cm 0
1.43cm
'~'-o-...-,"'W" .......... .~
~ • • • • i • = fuel rod
~ • • • • I 0 control rodi guide tubep • • • •
~ • • • • I Detail of Boralabsorbing channel
~ • 0 • • i
~ • • • • i S5 - 304 0.2cm0.031 cm84 C + AL c~ • • • • I 0.031 cm55 - 304 0.2 cm
I I
I lOB conlenl Borallhi ck-(g/cm2) ness c (ern)
._._.~ 0.01 0.068250.02 0.1365
0.03 0.20475
refleclive absorbing channel 0.04 0.273
boundaries ( if present) 0.05 0.34125
0.06 0.4095
Dimensions: a: 0.5 cm for steel channel (55-304) 0.08 0.546
for Boral channel see detail.5 above 0.10 0.6825
b: variable (dependent on assembly pitch)
CALCULATIONS AND RESULTS
All the calculations were_pe~formed by means of the two-dimensional
LWR fuel assembly code BOXER {2,1I. This code was developed at EIR and
successfully validated against critical experiments and benchmark problems
which have similar characteristics to storage pools {-3~.
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Keff as a Function of Assembly Pitch
The dependence of the multiplication factor on the assembly pitch is
calculated for all three pools at normal water density (i.e. 1.0 g/cm3).
A lOB content of the Boral channel of 0.04 g/cm2 is chosen for this inves-
tigation. The results are shown in Figure 2.
Figure 2 Keff of the three types of storage pools at a water density
of 1.0 g/cm3 as a function of assembly pitch
1.05....-----r----,.------,-----,
1.00
....
....
CI)
..)I.
0.85
kaff Limit
454035
Piteh (em)
30
Assembly
0.801..------1-----&.-----'--------'
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It can be seen that the keff of the pool without absorbing channel tends
to an asymptotic value on the order of 0.85. The reactivity of the steel
pool has a similar behaviour but with a smaller asymptotic keff ' In most
countries an upper limit of 0.95 for the keff at normal conditions is
imposed by the authorities. Assembly pitches for which keff is around 0.9
to 0.95 are therefore of practical interest for actual pool designs. In
this range the reactivity of the Boral pool is more sensitive to changes
in assembly pitch than that of the other two pools: a 1 cm reduction of the
assernbly pitch increases the keff by 5 % for the Boral pool, by 2 % for
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the steel pool, and by about 1 % for the pool without absorbing channel.
From these results it follows that Boral pools require special care in
criticality calculations and high precision in manufacturing.
Keff as a Function of Water Density
For the investigation of the dependence of the multiplication factor
on the water density we choose a value of the assembly pitch for which
keff at normal water density is just below 0.95 for each pool. These
values are 25.2 cm for the Boral pool, 31 cm for the steel pool, and 35 cm
Figure 3 Kef f of the three types of storage pools as a function of
water density
1.4~---.------.------.----r-----'
1.2
1.0
0.8
0.6
0.40L---~0.-::"2----:0:A..4:-----::0:L:.6:-----=0.'=8--~1.0
Woter Density (g/cm3 )
----keff Limit (0.95)
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for the pool without absorbing channel (see Figure 2). The calculated keff's
are shown in Figure 3. It can be seen that the dependence of keff on the
water density is significantly different for the three pools: The keff of the
Boral pool falls monotonously with decreasing water density, for the steel.
pool keff has a maximum value of approximately 1.02 at a water density of
0.23 g/cm3 whereas the keff of the pool without absorbing channel rises
drastically at low water density and reaches a peak value of 1.26 at a den-
sity of 0.18 g/cm3 .
The maximum of keff at low water density can be explained as follows:
The production to absorption ratio of the fuel assembly is almost constant
for water densities greater than 0.2 to 0.3 g/cm3 and not equal to the k
oo
of the assembly (from a calculation of the assembly alone). This is due to
the moderating effect of the large quantities of water in the gaps between
the assemblies. On the other hand, as the water density decreases, a neutron
leaving a fuel assembly has a greater probability to reach another assembly
rather than being absorbed in the water, or in other words, the coupling
between the assemblies improves. This is the reason for the increase of keff .
At water densities below 0.2 g/cm3 keff falls with decreasing water density
because the production to absorption ratio of the fuel assembly decreases.
The leakage, which is practically negligible at higher water densities,
contributes also to the reduction of keff at low densities.
From these results it follows that for the design of a storage pool
without absorbing channels or with steel channels it is not sufficient to
compute keff at normal water density, but the maximum of keff has to be
searched for. For the steel pool the increase in assembly pitch necessary
to reduce keff to an acceptable value can be estimated as follows: Figure 2
shows that an increase of the assembly pitch by 1 cm reduces k
eff by approx-
imately 2 %. If we assurne that the curve of the multiplication factor versus
assembly pitch at a water density of 0.2 g/cm3 has the same gradient as at
1.0 g/cm3 (in fact the curve at 0.2 g/cm3 can be expected to be steeper,
see below) we can conclude that an increase of the assernbly pitch by 2 cm to
33 cm reduces the maximum keff to 0.98 (the limit for keff at accidental
conditions in the US regulations). For the pool without absorbing channels
a greater increase of the assernbly pitch would be necessary for an accept-
able design. It must not be concluded however from Figure 2 that it is im-
possible to reduce the maximum keff of this pool below 1.0. Since the leakage
at low water density increases strongly with the volume of the water zones
and consequently with the assembly pitch the curve for the maximum keff versus
assembly pitch would be steeper than the one in Figure 2.
Keff of the Boral Pool as a Function of Absorber Thickness
For this investigation we use again an assembly pitch of 25.2 cm. This
dimension and the inside width of the absorbing channel are kept constant.
An increase of the Boral thickness (or of the boron content, which means the
same) is compensated by a reduction of the width of the water gap outside the
absorbing channel. The calculated multiplication factors are shown in Figure 4.
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It can be seen that the keff has a minimum value for a lOB content of
0.05 g/cm2 and increases slightly for higher absorber thicknesses. This
may be surprising but it can easily be explained: As the width of the
water gap between neighbouring channels is reduced the neutron spectrum
at the outer edge of the Boral plate hardens and the absorption rate per
unit volume of the Boral decreases rapidly. The absorption of the Boral
plate (integrated OVer its volume) at a lOB content of 0.06 g/cm2 is only
20 % higher than at 0.01 g/cm2 and decreases for higher boron contents.
The lOB content of 0.04 g/cm2 which was arbitrarily chosen for the previous
sections was therefore not optimal from an economic point of view. For
example a reduction of the lOB content to 0.02 g/cm2 would cause an
increase of keff of 1.2 % (see Figure 4). From Figure 2 it can be seen that
this teactivity increase can be compensated by a 0.2 cm increase of the
assembly pitch. For a pool designed to contain several hundred assemblies
this corresponds to an increase of the rack side length of a few cm which is
small compared to the pool dimensions of several meters.
Figure 4 Keff ofthe Boral pool as a funetion of the boron'content of the
absorbing channel for a constant assembly pitch of 25.2 cm
1.0o...------,r-----.,.-----,----......------,
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CONCLUSIONS
The present work, although it was not intended to show the complete
optimization of a storage pool design, shows some characteristic problems
which must be taken into account in criticality calculations for the
different types of storage pools. The multiplication factor of a pool with
Boral channels 'is more sensitive to the assembly pitch than that of the
pools with steel channels or without neutron absorbers. For the latter two
types of storage pools the maximum of keff does usually not occur at
normal water density but it is normally rea~hed at densities around 0.2 g/cm3
and must be searched for in the criticality calculations. The reactivity
of the Boral pool has its maximum at a water density of 1.0 g/cm3 • This is
a safety advantage of the use of Boral channels besides the economic benefit
of the high storage density. On the other hand the keff cannot be reduced
to arbitrarily low values by increasing the Boral thickness while keeping
the assembly pitch constant.
REFERENCES
Power Reactors 1983
Nuclear Engineering International, ~, Supplement, August 1983
C. Maeder, J.M. Paratte
Calculation of LWR Fuel Elements Containing Burnable Poison and
Plutonium
TANS - 20, p. 359, 1975
K. Foskolos, P. Grimm, C. Maeder, J.M. Paratte
Qualification des methodes LWR - EIR pour l'evaluation des bassins
compacts
EIR-Report Nr. 497, 1983
634
THE CEC SHARED COST ACTION RESEARCH PROGRAMME
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ABSTRACT
The structure and intentions of subject area B of the
CEC cost sharing programme for LWR safety research are
outlined. Area B is devoted to the study of external
explosions of combustible heavy gas clouds due to acci-
dental releases of hydrocarbons during transportation,
and of their impact on nuclear power plant s~ructures.
Research in area B deals with the three main stages of
an·unconfined gas cloud explosion scenario: cloud for-
mation and spreading at ground level, explosion devel-
opment after ignition, propagation in air and inter-
action with plant structures of the pressure wave
genera ted in the explosion.
The scope of work in the 12 research projects of area B
is presented. Work covers experiments as weIl as model-
ling and code development. Abrief account of principal
results and main conclusions is given.
INTRODUCTION
During 1979 the Commission of the European Communities (CEC)
ini tiated a "Cost Sharing Programme" of research \qork in the area
of LWR safety. Through this programme the CEC pays 20-50 % of
the costs of a number of individual projects carried out in
various national laboratories of the member countries of the
European Community. The five years programme is intended to
improve communication and to encourage collaboration between
member countries and to avoid duplication of effort. Three sub-
ject areas are covered by the present programme:
A. LOCA/ECCS
B. Gas cloud explosion (external to containment)
C. Fission product dispersion (to environment)
*) acting on behalf of the Commission of the European
Communities (CEC) and of the project leaders in the
sub-area
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The total CEC budget is 6.3 M.ECU's with about 5.5 M.ECU's
for allocation to contracts, 50 % of which is devoted to
LOCA/ECCS, the other 50 % being divided about equally between
areas Band C. In each of the subject areas work progress in
the research projects is monitored during project meetings of
all contractors every six months, with the assistance of national
experts groups. The programme was completed during the first
half of 1984 when the bulk of the results became available.
A special meeting "The results of the Indirect Action Re-
search Programme, Safety of Thermal Water Reactors (1979-1983)"
will be organized by the Commission of the European Communities
during the time October 1-3, 1984, in Brussels. At this meeting
a detailed account will be given of the work performed and of
the results achieved in each of the three subject areas.
In the following the scope of work in subject area B, i.e.
gas cloud explosion, will be outlined, followed by abrief account
of principal results and main conclusions.
SCOPE QF WORK IN SUBJECT AREA B
Subject area B is devoted to the study of external explo-
sions of combustible heavy gas clouds, due to accidental releases
of hydrocarbons during transportation, and of their impact on
nuclear power plant structures. It deals more specifically with
the three main sequential stages of an unconfined gas cloud ex-
plosion scenario which determine the load on the plant:
1) cloud formation and spreading at ground level
2) explosion development after ignition (flame
propagation and pressure wave generation)
3) pressure wave propagation in air and interaction
with plant structures
12 different research projects were allocated in area B,
4 projects respectively in each of the three fields. In Table I
the titles of the projects and the laboratories in charge of
the investigations are given.
Clearly, the explosion history will depend significantly on
the dimensions of the cloud and the concentration distribution at
the time of ignition. Because the vapour formed by evaporation of
accidentally released liquefied hydrocarbons is heavier than air
the spreading of the vapour cloud and its dilution by entrainment
of air is significantly influenced by gravitational forces. In-
vestigations in the field of vapour cloud dispersion appeared to
be indispensable because the available experimental data were
scanty while the predictions of existing models differed widely.
Among the four projects in this field project 2B is by far
the largest, in fact the largest of area B. In this project field
tests were performed of the formation and spreading of heavy gas
clouds at different meteorological conditions in order to gener-
ate reliable experimental data with which the various existing
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Table I: Projects in area B,
Protection of nuclear power plants against external
gas cloud explosions
neid lltle of research projeet Projeet laboratory Project leader
Ho.
Cloud large-scale Held trials on dense vapeur Z B Health and Safety J. Me OUAlD
formation dispersion: Phase I trials; Phase II trials Executi ve, London
and (subcontractor:
spreading National Mari time
lnsti tute, Hythe)
Computer processing of visual records from 1\ B losti tut Von Karman M. L. RlETHMULLER
the Thorney Island large scale gas trials da Oynamique des
fluides, Rhode St
Genese
Aspects _af the dispersion cf heavier-than-air 3 B Uni ted Kingdom C.J. WHEATLEY
vapours that are of relevance to gas cloud Atomic tnergy
explosion (study cf mechanisms which cause Autarithy,
dUution of the eloud to levels below the S.R.D. Culcheth
lower flammable limi t)
Veri fication of various models tor the expan- 9 B Battelle-lnsti tut, G. SCHtlA 11
si on aod dispersion of heavy gas clouds on frankfurt/t1ain
the basis of large-scale experiments
Explosion Characteriza'tion of the pressure Held in- 10 B Commissariat a J. L. GARNIER
devel- duced by the explosions in air of a hydro- I' Energie Atomique
opment carbon-air mixture, vi th slow deflagration C. E. H. fontenay-
or fast deflagration (pseudo-detonation) aux-Rosas
Validation of 1-dimensional codes for the 1Z B National Oefense J.P. ZEEUWEtI
computation of pressure waves caused by Research Or9a-
spherically symmetrie unconfined vapour eloud nization TNO,
explosions, evaluation of the use of 1-dimen- Prins Maurits
sional codes as an approximation for compu- laboratory
tation cf pressure waves caused by non-spheri-
cal unconfined vapour cloud explosions and ex-
perimental~ determination of the behaviour of
flarnes in the presence of obstac1es
Transition from slow deflagration to 6 B Kraftwerk Union AG, W. DRENCKHAHN
detonation Erlangen
Experimental investigation of the aceel- 8 B Rheinisch-l..les tfäli- G. ADOflEIT
eraUon of deflagration in wake flow sehe Hochschule,
'Aachen
Pressure Gas cloud explosions and their effed on 1 B Uni ted Kingdom S.f. HALL
..ave nuelear power plants , phase -I:' Sasic Atomic Ener9Y
prop- development of explosion codes Authori tYI
agation l S.R.D. Culeheth
Inter- Gas explosion charaeterization, 11 B Risp Hational S.l. AHDERSEN
action wave
with propaga Uon laboratory
struc- Calculation of the wall pressure Held 7 B Commis saria t ci C. BERRlAUD
tu res generated on a group cf buildings by an 1'Energie Atomique
externat explosion C. E. H. - S,clay
Modelllng and calculation of overpressure 13 B laboratoire National A. WARLUZEl
on the building of a plant due to the d'Hydraulique,
passage of a shock \lave caused by an Oirection des (tudes
accidental explosion et Recherches de
l'Electricite de
france
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computer codes can be validated. The test site chosen was a
former landing ground on Thorney Island at the south coast of
England. In each of the tests 2000 m3 of gas at ambient pressure
and temperature were released instantaneously from a plastic bag
13 m high and 14 m in diameter. The gas used was a mixture of
refrigerant-12 and nitrogen allowing to select initial densities
relative to air up to 4.2. By releasing dense gas at ambient
temperature instead of liquefied gas thermal effects are avoided
which reduces the complexity of the dispersion process. The in-
strumentation of the field allowed to determine the development
with time of the cloud dimensions and the concentration distri-
bution in the cloud, as weIl as additional quantities relevant
for model validation, in particular the turbulence structure
within the cloud and in the ambient atmosphere. In the majority
of the tests the cloud was released over uniform, unobstructed
ground, but in several tests also the effect of simple types of
obstructions (permeable fence, impermeable fence, cubical build-
ing) was investigated.
Within project 14B an advanced image processing method has
been applied in order to refine the visual records of the Thorney
Island tests.
Within project 3B the principal differences and restrietions
of the various existing models were analysed with the intention
to improve the understanding of the dispersion mechanisms and
to reduce the uncertainties in prediction. In addition, a refined
computer model was developed.
Within project 9B, after implementation of some 10 gas
cloud dispersion models of different type and refinement on
a computer, computations were performed with the boundary and
initial conditions of the experimental tests to allow for valida-
dation of the models and for an assessment of their respective
domains of application.
The pressure wave which is generated during explosion after
ignition of the cloud can be evaluated by gasdynamic relations if
the time history of the flame front propagating through the cloud
is known. Accordingly, the main objective of the experimental
work in the field of explosion development has been to obtain
information about the acceleration mechanisms and the resulting
flame speed in special configurations of unconfined and partially
confined clouds. Certainly, only a limited number of configura-
tions could be investigated within the scope of the program. The
theoretical work was mainly directed to the development of ex-
plosion codes which enable to compute the genera ted pressure wave
if the time history of the flame front (flame path) is known.
The aim of project lOB, the largest in the field of explosion
development, was to determine experimentally the deflagration
properties of unconfined hydrocarbon-air mixtures in spherical
symmetry (balloon experiments). Main emphasis was placed on the
question how much the flame is accelerated and the explosion
pressure accordingly is enhanced in clouds with discontinuities
in concentration. The arrangement used for studying this problem
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consisted of two concentric balloons containing mixtures of
different concentration. Furthermore, the influence of ignition
energy on flame speed was investigated. This was done by reinfor-
cing the electrical igniter by a variable mass of explosive up
to a value inducing detonation.
Work within project 12B was partly theoretical, partly ex-
perimental. The theoretical work was concerned with the valida-
tion of one-dimensional codes for the computation of the genera-
ted pressure wave (based on measurements of flame path and pres-
sure wave in the explosion experiments of project lOB) and with
the evaluation of the suitability of one-dimensional methods
to model multidimensional explosions, in particular flat cloud
explosions. In the experimental part of work flame acceleration
in special configurations with repeated obstacles was investigat-
ed.
In project 6B available experimental and theoretical results
on fast deflagrations, in particular the results of the German
PNP safety program, were analysed in order to find out the con-
ditions for a transition from deflagration to detonation.
In project BB deflagration in a special situation, the wake
flow behind obstacles, was studied experimentally. For this
situation large flame acceleration is expected due to the pres-
ence of large-scale turbulence.
For evaluation of the structural response of a nuclear power
plant to gas cloud explosion loading the pressure field resulting
from interaction of the free-field pressure wave with the struc-
tures is needed as input. Accordingly, methods have to be provided
which allow to evaluate possible modifications of the free-field
pressure wave during its propagation from the gas cloud to the
power plant .and, in particular, the enhancement of peak pressure
due to interaction of the free-field wave with the structures.
In project lB existing one-dimensional computer models were
used to conduct parametric studies of the factors which influence
the pressure and velocity fields generated by gas cloud explo-
sions. Herewith the range of possible overpressures produced by
gas cloud explosions and the interaction of the pressure field
with rigid boundaries was explored. In addition a two-dimensional
code capable of modelling the pressure wave interaction with
structures was developed.
In project llB experimental investigations were carried
out on the influence of uneven terrain and of inhomogeneous
atmosphere on the propagation of the pressure'wave.
Finally, in projects 7B and l]B methods were developed which
allow to determine the loading pressure field resulting from the
interaction of the free-field pressure wave with the power plant
structures. In each of the two projects a three-dimensional com-
puter code based on the acoustic approximation of the wave equa-
tion was developed. Moreover, an experimental method for two-
dimensional simulation of the interaction, based on the analogy
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between free surface hydraulic shock waves and shock waves in
gases, was developed.
PRINCIPAL RESULTS
In the Thorney Island large scale tests a large body of ex-
perimental data on the dispersion of heavy gas clouds at differ-
ent meteorological conditions and different initial gas densities
has been obtained. Altogether 26 tests have been performed (16
releases over uniform, unobstructed ground, 10 releases with ob-
structions present). The initial density of the heavy gas relative
to air ranged from 1.4 up to 4.2, the wind speed from 1.4 m/s
up to 9 m/s, and the atmospheric stability from category B to
category F on the Pasquill scale. The acquired data comprise
global data, such as the time-dependent dimensions of the flam-
mable part of the cloud in downwind, upwind and transverse dire.c-
tion, as weIl as local data, such as the distribution of concen-
tration, flow velocity and level of turbulence within the cloud.
Only a minor part of the Thorney Island data has been ex-
ploited so far. The validation of analytical models within project
9B using the experimental data has led to a classification of
these models with respect to their performance in predicting dis-
persion. Satisfactory agreement between predictions and measured
values over the whole range of meteorological conditions can ob-
viously be attributed to only a few of the models.
The dispersion models that have been assessed within project
3B range from simpler analytical models ("box" models) by which
only the overall behaviour of the dispersing cloud is predicted,
to complex three-dimensional hydrodynamic models. The comparison
of the models exhibits that the predictions of cloud dispersion
for a given scenario differ widely. The reasons for the large
differences in prediction have been identified, the main reason
being the different treatment of turbulence and of its effect on
dilution rate. Apparently, for the three-dimensional hydrodynamic
codes the uncertainty of predictions is of the same order of
magnitude as for the simple box models.
The ballon experiments on the deflagration properties of un-
confined hydrocarbon-air mixtures within project lOB have shown
that discontinuities in gas concentration give rise to consider-
able flame acceleration. On the average an increase of flame
speed by a factor of 1.5 and of explosion pressure by a factor
between 2 and 3 was observed. Even small disturbance~ like the
turbulence genera ted in the mixture by the removal of the balloon
envelopes, may lead to flame acceleration. The increase of ignition
energy by means of an explosive charge up to a value at which
detonation is induced has been shown to result in an increase of
flame speed by a factor of about 2.5. The maximum va lues of flame
speed and overpressure observed in the experiments of project lOB
were 30 m/s and 20 mbar. Accordingly, although the relative
increase of flame speed and overpressure appears to be quite
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large the absolute values of flame speed and overpressure that
may be attained through these effects in unconfined clouds remain
far below those which could be hazardous to a nuclear power plant.
The same statement (large relative increase of flame speed
and overpre~sure, but absolute values still rather low) holds
also for the effects of repeated obstacles present in the cloud.
This has been demonstrated by the experiments of project 12B
where an increase of flame speed up to 50 m/s was observed,
with a maximum overpressure of about 25 mbar. On the other hand,
when a closed plate was placed over the array of obstacles the
flame speed increased up to 420 m/s, with a peak overpressure
of 750 mbar. It may be inferred from these findings that overpres-
sures which would constitute a hazard to nuclear power plants,
i.e. overpressures of the order of 0.1 bar or more, will be
generated only if the cloud is partially confined.
Large-scale turbulence in the wake flow behind obstacles as
investigated in project 8B also leads to significant flame accel-
eration. However, this requires large initial flow velocities in
the unburned mixture, which is conceivable only for very special
situations.
The assessment of experimental and theoretical results on
fast deflagrations within project 6B has produced a set of crite-
ria by which the susceptibility of gas cloud scenarios to a
transition from deflagration to detonation can be estimated.
The validation of explosion codes in project 12B using the
experimental data obtained in project 10B has demonstrated the
suitability of the codes for modelling the explosion of spherical
clouds and of flat clouds. It must be kept in mind, however, that
compution of the genera ted pressure wave by these codes requires
that the time his tory of the flame front is known.
By the parametric studies conducted in project 1B with
available codes the influence of material properties (reaction
energy, density and expansion ratio of the gas) and of flame
speed on pressure generation has been elucidated. Certainly,
the problem remains which figures are, in practical cases, to
be assigned to the flame speed as this parameter depends strongly
on the structure of turbulence in the particular configuration.
The investigations in project 11B have shown that the propa-
gation of the pressure wave in air is, within the experimental
error, not influenced by uneven terrain and by inhomogeneous
atmosphere.
The loading pressure field at the reactor building due to
interaction of the incident pressure wave with the assembly of
plant buildings may be very complex. Considerable enhancement
of peak overpressure may occur in corners, yards or lanes bet-
ween buildings due to wave focusing and multiple reflections.
The three-dimensional computer codes for the loading pressure
field developed in projects 7B and 1]B have been validated in
the following way: by comparison with analytical solutions for
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simple cases, by use of experimental data from tests in which
models of the reactor building and the fuel building of a French
nuclear reactor were impacted by the pressure wave genera ted
by a high explosive charge (project 7B), and by use of data
obtained with the method developed for experimental simulation
of the interaction process (project 13B). The predictions of
the codes are in fair agreement with the data used for validation.
Because the codes are based on the linear wave equation, applica-
tion is restricted to pressure levels of the incident wave up
to about 0.2 bar. For complicated geometry the costs for running
the codes may be considerable, hence the main field of application
of the codes will be the evaluation of the pressure field for few
selected cases. The experimental simula~ion method developed in
project 13B is suitable in particular if the dependence of the
pressure field on various parameters (e.g. shape of the incident
wave, angle of incidence, arrangement of buildings) is to be
explored.
MAIN CONCLUSIONS
Significant progress has been made in the overall problem of
estimating the possible impact of gas cloud explosions on a
nuclear power plant. The main conclusions may be summarized as
folIows:
Heavy gas dispersion is distinctively different from passive
dispersion, even for small density differences. The explosive
cloud formed by a large release of hydrocarbons will be very
flat and will accordingly have large horizontal dimensions.
Existing models differ significantly, which means that the
uncertainty of predictions for large-scale releases is still
considerable. The effect of obstructions has scarcely been
attached so far.
- In situations where the cloud is unconfined or only slightly
confined the overpressure genera ted in the explosion will be
small (below 0.1 bar). This statement holds for homogeneous
clouds as weIl as for clouds with discontinuities in concen-
tration.
- Fast ~eflagrations with flame speeds above 100 m/s and over-
pressures above 0.1 bar will result only if during explosion
the cloud is in a highly turbulent state. This requires that
either the initial turbulence is large (e.g. due to jet release
from pressurized containers or due to jet ignition) or that
the configuration is favourable for large production of turbu-
lence during the explosion process itself. The latter will
be the case in particular if repeated obstacles and, in addition,
structures which provide partial confinement are present in
the cloud. Of course, the sensitivity for the appearance of
a fast deflagration will also depend on gas concentration
in the cloud.
Predictions of explosion development in configurations with
obstacles and partial confinement are, at the time being, far
more uncertain than predictions of gas cloud dispersion. This
is due to principal difficulties in modelling the strong coup-
ling between the gasdynamic flow field and the burning rate
(turbulent flame velocity, flame areal in fast deflagrations.
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Only a rough classification of hazardous configurations which
may occur in practice can be given at present. There is a
need for additional research in this field in order to improve
the existing methods for explosion hazard evaluation.
- The loading pressure field which results from interaction of
the incident pressure wave with the power plant structures can
be predicted satisfactorily, at least up to overpressures of
0.2 bar, by use of the computer codes and the experimental
simulation method developed. Considerable enhancement of peak
overpressure may occur at specific locations of the nuclear
power plant due to wave focusing and multiple reflections.
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ABSTRACT
With reference to Loss of Coolant Accidents in LWR's, and partieularly Small-Break LOCAs,
a pieture of the issuing two-phase jets is given.
Experimental data and evaluations concerning critieal flows of subcooled and saturated
liquid, together with saturated steam data are shown.
The analysis refers to the unbounded region of the discharge, considering:
a) the jet external shape;
b) the internal pressure and temperature distribution;
c) the phases distribution.
Experimental data are obtained, employing two facUities of different scale, JF.1 and JF.2,
by means of:
a) photographie deviees;
b) amovable pressure and temperature gauge travellinginside the issuingjet;
c) an X-rays deviee.
INTRODUCTION
The work described in the present paper deals with a research program developped in the frame
of ENEA - A.l. Association Contract related to the problems of jet impingements following a higjl
energy pipe break. Such a work is part of a wider research program still in progress at Heat Transfer
Laboratory, ENEA, Casaccia, devoted to the improvement of the knowledge in the field of two-phase
critieal flows, particularly from the viewpoint of flow pattern and thermal-fluid-dynamie behaviour
inside the discharge channel and in the unboundedjet /1, 6/.
The object of the present paper deals with the analysis of the issuingjet due to a pipe break in a
pressurized system, mainly aimed to structures design of safety feature to be employed in Italian
nuclear power plants. The full vessel blowdown has been examined:
two-phase jets of initially subcooled water;
two-phase jets of initially saturated water;
single-phase jets of saturated steam.
The issuing unbounded jets have been investigated in their external shape by means of photho-
graphie devices, and inside them by measuring the pressure and temperature profiles both radially
and axially by means of a movable pitot equipped with a thermocouple.
Besides the aim of the above mentioned investigations is also the formulation of a computer
code, whieh turns out to be of general validity. The code, regarding to three well defined stages of
644
the research, should enable the prediction of the full evolution of the fluid, and exactly /8, 11/:
a) modeling of two-phase critical flow discharge through tubes (prediction of critical mass flowrate,
pressure and temperature promes along the discharge channel);
b) modeling of unbounded jet expansion region (predicition of jet external width, pressure and
temperature promes inside the jet, density and phase distribution);
c) modeling of two-phase flow jet impingement forces against external objects.
THE EXPERIMENTAL APPARATUS
The experimental apparatus consists of two facilities each completely independent from the
other, with different scale, geometry and philosophy: JF.l and JF.2.
The JF.l plant, in smaller scale, is schematically represented in fig. 1. The capacity of each of the
two vessel is about 100 litres, and the heating power is 10 kW. The liquid containment is made up by
the two vessels, one of which, SI, is mIed to capacity with degased water simulating the reactor pres-
sure vessel.
The second one, S2 , is partially mIed with cold water and connected, as a pressurizer, to SI in
order to allow subcooled discharges from the vessel SI'
During the test, the heated water flows from the top of the vessel SI, while the cold water of the
pressurizer S2, enters the bottom of SI, through a turbine flow rate transducer. In the case of satura-
ted liquid or steam discharge, the flow rate measurements are obtained by collecting the issuing fluid
with an ice mIed container, and by weighing the fluid discharged in a given time.
The employed test sections consist of straight tubes instrurnented with pressure taps and thermo-
coupIes. Their geometry varies both in inner diameter (D = 1.63 mm and 4.61 mm) and the ratio
L/D (10,100,300).
The JF. 2 loop is represented in fig. 2. The capacity of the vessel is 160 litres and the heating po-
wer is 20 kW. The critical mass flowrate is measured, in the case of liquid discharge, by means of a
special turbine flow-meter placed on the connection tube to the test section downstream the quick
opening valve.
The employed test sections consist of straight tubes instrurnented with pressure taps and ther-
mocouples. Their geometry replies the previous ones concerning the L/D values, while the inner dia-
meter is 12.5 mm.
EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS AND DATA ANALYSIS
Two-phase Jets ofInitially Subcooled Water
Photographic recording of the two-phase jets shape, as well as the detection of pressure and tem-
perature distribution within the issuing jets, are considered in connection with the current stagnation
condition. The analysis of the issuing two-phase jet shape has been particularly aimed at the study of
the inlet subcooling and the discharging channel geometry influence on the jets characteristics.
In fig. 3 the non dimensional jet's width (Ii /D) is plotted versus inlet subcooling for different
diameters and ratio L/D. The diagrams show that, starting from the saturated condition and increa-
sing the inlet subcooling, the jet first enlarges up to a maximum width, them becomes tighter and
thigter, at values smaller than those corresponding to saturation conditions.
That behaviour is a general trend \Jf all the experimental tests. An explanation may be attemped
taking into account the ratio between the radial and the axial depressurization rate, and the conse-
quent flashing of the issuing two-phase jet, essentially due to the tri-dimensional vaporization taking
place in the unbounded region.
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The emerging fluid partides have different exit velocities and enthalpies according to the subcoo-
ling conditions in the vessel, and undergo a strong acceleration both radially and axially. A rough esti-
mation of the order of magnitude of radial and axial velocity components in the issuingjet is provi-
ded by the sketch in Hg. 4, from which it appears that the radial velocity component may exceed the
axial one. The evaluation of the outlet steam quality versus the inlet subcooling is shown in Hg. 5.
Decreasing the inlet subcooling, the thermal energy spent in the discharging channel owing to vapori-
zation increases according to a more than a linear trend. The velocity of the mixture is higher for the
saturated discharge as well as the critical pressure, but the mass flowrate is lower, and it increases
with the inlet subcooling (Hg. 6). The two opposite trends may be the responsible of the resulting jet
shape and of the maximum jet width. Besides, for short test sections (LID< 30), in which, because
of non-equilibrium effects, very little or no vaporization takes place, the trend of the jet external
width versus inlet subcooling does not exhibit any maximum amplitude in the silouette.
Referring to Hg. 3, the channellength effect seems to be negligible while the channel inner dia-
meter seems to show a more signiHcant influence.
Typical pressure distribution proHles within the jets, detected at various distances from the outlet
section are reported in Hg. 7, together with the jet external width, as measured from jets' silouette.
Comparing the photographed jet diameter with that obtained with pressure transducers, it appears
that only a fraction of the jet total area (dose to one half) contributes practically to a jet force
against external objects.
To allow an actual formulation of the jet expansion model", further information about the phases'
distribution inside the jet are needed. To have a look inside the non-transparent cone of condensing
steam, aseries of pietures are taken employing an X-rays device. The research, in progress, will give
densities distribution by means of X-rays attenuation measurements. In Hg. 7a) it is possible to re-
mark the big difference between the low density quick enlargement in comparison with the small sha-
pe of the central high density core.
In Hg. 8 a comparison between JF.l and JF.2 results is shown, as far as the pressure reliefs inside
the jets, are concerned for LID = 10 and 100, with D = 4.6 mm (JF.l) and 12.5 mm (JF.2). The
scale effect looks almost negligible.
Two-Phase Jets ofInitially Saturated Water
The two-phase jet of saturated water is analyzed in the Hgs. 9 through 11. In Hg. 9 typieal pictu-
res of a saturated liquid jet are reported. The size of the jet width depends, of course, on the stagna-
tion pressure.
In the following Hg. 10 typical pressure and temperature profiles within the jet, detected at
various distances from the outlet section, are represented. They show the pressure and temperature
decay inside the jet against the distance from the exit section.
In fig. 11 it is plotted a comparison between JF.l and JF.2 results, with regard to the pressure
peaks within the jets, for LID = 100 and 300, with D = 4.6 mm and 12.5 mm. In this case too, the
scale effect turns out to be completely negligible.
Jets of Saturated Steam
The behaviour of the issuing jets of saturated steam is shown in the Hgs. 12 through 14. In Hg. 12
typieal pietures of saturated steam jet are reported. It is possible to notiee that the saturated steam
jet does not exhibit the strong enlargement typieal of the two-phase jets. Such behaviour is essential-
ly due to the quiek vaporization taking place ~s soon as the two-phase mixture comes out from the
break.
In Hg. 13 typieal temperature and pressure proHles within the jet, detected at various distances
from the outlet section, are shown. Although the presence of two lateral peaks is not easily explaina-
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ble, it can be said that such behaviour seems to be typical of gas jets. Experimetal data with gas jets,
carried out at the Aeronautical Research Associates of Princeton, NU, /7/, are very similar to those
presented in this papaer, also as far as the pressure peak decay along the jet axis is concerned (fig.
i4).
CONCLUSIONS
With the aim of developping a computer code enabling the prediction of the unbounded jet
expansion region in a two-phase critical flow discharge, an experimental investigation on two-phase
critical discharges, with particular regard to the issuing jet, has been performed.
Some of the results, obtained with two loops of different scale are shown, while the computer
code development is in progress.
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CRITICAL FLOW THRU SAFETY VALVES
A. Singh
Electric Power Research Institute, Palo Alto, California 94303, U.S.A.
D. Abdollahian
S. Levy Incorporated, Campbell, California 95008, U.S.A.
ABSTRACT
Full scale data for critical mass flow thru safety valves have been
correlated using simplified choked flow models. The test data
covered a wide range of operating and accident conditions including
single phase steam, water and two-phase flow. Flow data for five
different valves of various types and sizes has been analyzed to
determine flow discharge coefficients and appropriate critical flow
models to predict valve discharge capacity. For the steam flow con-
ditions, both the HEM and the Modified Napier's method, which inclu-
des a correction for the high pressures (>1500 psia) agrees
reasonably weIl with the data. Comparisons against limited amount of
applicable data available for subcooled water flow conditions indica-
tes the importance of ability to predict the actual valve lift which
directly affects the choke flow area and the resulting mass flow.
I NTRODUCT ION
High pressure vessels in nuclear and other industries are protected
against overpressure by spring-loaded safety valves and power operated relief
valves. The safety valves are designed to open when the system pressure
exceeds a specified value called the set pressure. Fluid discharge following
the valve opening causes the system pressure to fall which subsequently reduces
the upward forces acting on the valve disc to keep it open. The valve is
expected to close when the pressure falls below a certain minimum value called
the blowdown. The safety valves are designed for steam discharge, but under
certain transient situations they may be exposed to liquid upstream conditions
with a varying degree o'f subcooling.
The system depressurization following the valve opening is dictated by the
discharge capacity of tpe valve. The flow through the valve will be choked or
critical for a majority of the operating conditions involving single phase
steam flow and generally this flow ,rate is determined from simple empirical
relations along with a manufacturer provided discharge coefficient. However,
during off normal conditions following an accident or plant transient, sub-
cooled water or two phase conditions may exist upstream of the valve. In
general, flow capacity of safety valves is not known under these off normal
conditions. Aseries of full scale tests on a number of safety valves repre-
senting the valve population in PWR plants have been performed at the C.E./EPRI
test facility [11.
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The EPRI tests demonstrated that for most of the steam tests the valves
popped open when the tank pressure was within ±3% of the valve set pressure and
operated under stable conditions. Only a few steam tests with long inlet con-
figurations resulted in unstable valve operation. Most of the saturated water
tests were stable and only under subcooled upstream conditions some chatter was
observed. Since the measured inlet fluid conditions and the valve choking area
cannot be accurately specified during the valve unstable behavior, only the
tests which showed stable valve operation were used for correlating the
discharge flow versus upstream conditions in the present study.
Six of the seven safety valve designs tested at the Combustion Engineering
facility, were spring-loaded safety valves. Two of the safety valve designs
were identical except for the material used for the internals (Crosby 3K6 valve
with steam 01' loop seal internals). No measurement of flow was made for the
Crosby 6N8 valve, hence it was not included in the present analysis. The
Target Rock 69C is actually a pilot operated safety valve and the main disc
stem position for this valve was not measured. The set pressure, stamped rated
flow and lift, and the orifice area for these valves are listed in Table 1.
In the present study, the data from these tests were used to eva1uate the
common methods for determining the va1ve dis charge capacity under a wide range
of conditions and a discharge coefficient was established for every va1ve using
the most appropriate ca1cu1ational scheme.
Tab1e 1
SAFETY VALVE DESCRIPTION
Safety Valve Orifice Area Design Set Pressure Rated Flow Rated Lift
(inl ) (Psig) (lb/hr) (in)
Dresser 31739A 2.545 2500 297,845 0.45
Dresser 31709NA 4.340 2500 507,918 0.588
Crosby 3K6 1.841 2485 212,182 0.382
Crosby 6M6 3.644 2485 420,006 0.538
Target Rock 69C 3.513 2485 345,000 Not applicab1e
CRITICAL FLOW MODELS SELECTED FOR COMPARISON WITH THE VALVE DATA
a) Single-Phase Critical F10w Relations
Given the stagnation pressure and temperature, Po and To ' and assuming an
isentropic flow between the stagnation and the choked plane, the critica1 mass
flow is obtained from the app1ication of acoustic velocity relation at the
throat, Le.,
G =Vi (~)K+1 K+1K-1 (1)
where K is the isentropic exponent and R is the universal gas constant. There
are some approximate models for critica1 steam flow which are discussed be10w:
Napier' s Formu1a, [21: This is an approximate equation for critical
discharge of saturated steam expressed as:
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Napier's Formula (2)
where Po is in psi, Ac is in square inches, and W is in Lbm/sec. This relation
was originally intended as a rough check for critical flow of saturated steam
through orifices but has been widely used for different conditions.
Grashof's and Rateau's Formulas [2]: These are also approximations for
critical flow of saturated steam but are supposed to be applicable to weIl
rounded convergent orifices:
W
W
0.0165 Ac poO.97
Ac po (16.367 - 0.96 log po) /1000
Grashof's formula
Rateau' s formula
(3)
(4)
Where Po is in psia, the choking area, Ac' in square inch, and W in Lbm/hr.
The ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code [31 uses Napier's equation in the
following form for the capacity rating of the pressure relief valves:
WT 51.5 Ac P
W 0.9 CD WT (5)
Ac Valve nozzle area (in2)
P (1.03 x set pressure) + 14.7 (psia)
CD is the coefficient of discharge and W is in Lbm/hr in the above equation.
The procedure for specifying the discharge coefficient, CD; requires testing
model valves with three different sizes and carrying at least three tests for
every size. The resulting discharge coefficients are to be averaged to give CD
for the above equation. Note that the theoretical mass flow rate, WT, is the
same as Napier's equation (with the coefficient of 51.5 instead of 51.43) and
the pressure is a specified function of the valve set pressure.
Among the above relations, Napier's equation is widely used in the
industry and certain correction factors [4,51 have been developed recently
which improve the predictive capability of Napier' s relation. Thompson and
Buxton' s [41 correction factor for high pressure is included in the present
ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code and will be discussed later.
It should be noted that the single-phase models will be valid as long as
the expansion from stagnation to throat results in single-phase condition at
the throat. Otherwise, a two-phase critical flow model should be used for pre-
dicting the discharge flow rate through the valve.
b) Two-Phase Critical Flow Models
Previous studies of flow through power operated relief valves [6,71 have
shown that for liquid upstream conditions the nonequilibrium models of
Henry-Fauske [8] and Burnell [91 resulted in good agreement with data if used
along with the single-phase liquid discharge coefficient. The Burnell model was
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recommended since it has a closed form relation and does not require any itera-
tion. For steam upstream conditions when expansion to exit resulted in two-
phase flow, the homogeneous-equilibrium model [10] is used. These models are
well known and will not be further discussed.
CRITICAL FLOW PREDICTIONS THROUGH SAFETY VALVES
a) Steam Upstream Conditions
As mentioned earlier, the safety valves are primarily designed for over-
pressure protection under steam upstream conditions. Since, the safety valves
are generally designed to open full under these conditions, the predictive
capability of the critical flow models at full open position is of importance.
Therefore the valve flow rate has been correlated for the full open period of
the tests when choking occurs at the valve nozzle.
The single-phase equations apply as long as the isentropic expansion from
the stagnation to choked plane does not result in steam condensation. During
the expansion from stagnation to throat, the fluid conditions change and an
accurate critical mass flux using equation (1) is obtained only if the
variation of isentropic exponent is accounted for. If the expansion results in
two-phase conditions at the throat, the single-phase equations are no longer
valid and a two-phase critical flow model is required to accurately predict the
flow rate.
There are some approximate models for the single-phase critical flow rela-
tion which have been proposed for the discharge of saturated steam. These are
Napier's, Grashof's and Rateau's formulas, which were discussed in the previous
section. Napier' s equation is an empirical correlation for critical flow of
dry saturated steam and was developed from aseries of experiments on con-
verging nozzles. Due to its simple formulation, it has been widely used in the
industry and, as mentioned earlier, it is used for the capacity rating of the
safety relief valves in the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code [3].
Thompson and Buxton [4] have compared the predictions from Napier's rela-
tion to the isentropic maximum flow results. It has been shown that the
Napier' s equation overpredicts the maximum isentropic flow between 100 and
1500 psia and underpredicts the same for upstream pressures over 1500 psia. In
order to improve the predictions by the Napier's relation apressure correction
factor has been proposed as follows:
A P
W K c 0 , where (6)
n 70
0.1906 Po - 1000Kn 0.2292 Po - 1061
1500 < Po < 3200 psia
In the present study a calculational scheme (described later in this section)
was used to predict the critical flow rate and to calculate the discharge coef-
ficient by averaging the ratio of the measured to predicted flow rates during
the valve full open period. The discharge coefficient accounts for the dif-
ferences between the valve nozzle area and the actual choking area (Vena
Contracta), and the frictional losses.
Theoretically, the pressure disturbances downstream of the choking plane
should not travel upstream and affect the critical flow rate. However, the
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experiments with nozzles of varying converging angles downstream of the throat
have shown an effect of receiver pressure on the critical flow rates except for
nozzles with specific shapes and angles. For the complex geometry of the
valves, multiple flow separation points and multiple choking is possible. The
critical flow is determined by the pressure at the first choking but since the
valve geometries are far from the ideal nozzle situation, the back pressure may
have some effect on the discharge flow rates. This phenomenon has been
observed in the experiments on a model of the safety valve [llJ where the cri-
tical pressure and flow rate were influenced, although only slightly, by the
receiver pressure. The effect of downstream or back pressure on flow rate was
observed to be insignificant during the full scale EPRI value tests. The eva-
luated discharge coefficients for one of the safety valves tested in the EPRI
program showed a variation with the upper guide ring position which demonstra-
tes the effect of internal flow distribution and pressure drop on the critical
flow rates.
The calculational scheme used in the present study is discussed in detail
in Ref. [71. It consists of using ideal gas equations when isentropic expan-
sion to throat results in superheated vapor and flow maximization technique if
the expansion results in two-phase conditions at the choking section. For the
tests performed with saturated steam conditions, the stagnation pressure was
input to the model used. The losses between the vessel and the valve were
neglected and the vessel pressure was used as the stagnation pressure upstream
of the valve. The effect of using the stagnation pressure calculated from the
measured velocity and static pressure just upstream of the valve on the pre-
dicted flow rates was less than 5% when compared to the predicted flow rates
based on the vessel pressure. The average" discharge coefficients for the
tested safety valves are listed below.
Safety Valve
Dresser 31709NA
Dresser 31739A
Crosby 3K6
Crosby 6M6
Target Rock 69C
Average
Discharge Coefficient
l.0
0.98
0.85
0.84
0.86
The discharge coefficients calculated for the Crosby 3K6 valve showed a
dependency to the valve ring position. This points to the possibility that the
choking may not have occurred at the nozzle throat as the effective flow area
at the rings may be slightly smaller than the throat area. Since only two
discrete ring positions were included in the test matrix, an average discharge
coefficent was used for the calculation of ma,ss flow rates (average discharge
coefficients calculated for the two guide ring positions of -55 and -115
notches were 0.95 and 0.76 respectively).
As mentioned earlier, the stem position for the Target Rock valve was not
directly measured and the valve full open period had to be inferred from the
measured pressure and flow rate histories. Of the four steam tests performed
with the Target rock valve, one had multiple openings with sharp peaks and
drops in pressure and flow, and the mass flow history of one other test was not
representative of full open valve. Therefore only two steam tests which pro-
vided stable steam flow under fully open conditions were used for the specifi-
cation of the discharge coefficient of the Target Rock valve.
Figures 1 to 5 show the rated flows at 3% overpressure and the flow.rates
calculated from the ASME equation (5) for the range of pressures observed in the
660
tests. Also shown are the predictions by the proposed calculational scheme and
mOdified Napier's equation (6) using the calculated average discharge coef-
ficients. The rated flows given in Table 1 were used to back out the manufac-
turer determined discharge coefficient which was used in conjunction with the
ASME capacity rating method.
Figures 1 and 2 show that if the manufacturer recommended dis charge coef-
ficients and the ASME capacity rating method are used, the data for the tested
Dresser valves is underpredicted by approximately 10%. This method is
generally employed for the valve capacity specification at 3% accumulation over
the set pressure and is used to give a conservative measure of the relieving
capacity of the valve. The data for the Target Rock valve is also underpre-
dicted by approximately 14% as shown in Figure 3.
The specified discharge coefficients for the Crosby valves did not always
result in a conservative flow prediction as shown in Figures 4 and 5. The pre-
dicted flow rates fall between the data points and it is apparent that the
manufacturer recommended discharge coefficients are larger than the calculated
average values. As noted earlier, the position of the upper ring for the
tested Crosby 3K6 valve affected the flow rates and, as shown in Figure 4. A
different discharge coefficient may be calculated for each of the tested ring
positions but an average value was used since only two settings were tested.
The pressure correction factor K for Napier's equation was evaluated in
Ref. [4] by fitting the predictions tonthe results of HEM. Therefore, the flow
rates obtained from the modified Napier's relation match closely with the HEM
results. This relation, along with the average discharge coefficients, thus
provides a simple method for calculating the critical flow rates through the
tested or other valves with similar geometries.
b) Liquid Upstream Conditions
In the EPRI test program, the safety valves were tested under liquid
upstream conditions with varying degrees of subcooling. Most of the tests with
saturated or subcooled water with subcooling less than 50°F were stable. The
tests with larger subcooling resulted in valve chatter and the data were not
useful for the present analysis. During most of the water tests the valves did
not open to a stable full lift and hence stable mass flow data could not be
obtained. The reason for the smaller lift is the expansion past the valve
nozzle. For steam upstream conditions, the fluid expands upon entering the
huddle chamber which results in an upward force on the disc, causing the valve
to pop open. For subcooled lquid upstream conditions, sufficient flashing into
steam is needed so that the resulting compressible mixture can exert the
necessary upward force on the disc when it expands in the huddle chamber.
Apparently, for highly subcooled upstream conditions, the pressure drop is not
enough to make sufficient steam for this process.
Among all the safety valves tested at the Combustion Engineering facility,
only the Dresser 31709 and 31739 had a sufficient number of stable water tests
to establish a discharge coefficient. The measured stagnation conditions and
dis charge flow rates were used to calculate discharge coefficients using homo-
geneous equilibrium and Burnell models. Study of the fluid flow path within
the safety valves shows that the choking location will not be at the valve
nozzle for all stem positions. For small lifts when the area downstream of the
nozzle gets smaller than the throat area, the choking is expected to occurr at
some location along the valve seat. The seat inner radius location repre-
senting the smallest flow area was selected as the choking area under this con-
dition. A logic was provided in the computer model to select the smaller of
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the valve nozzle area and the flow area at the inner seat loeation as the
ehoking area. For a major portion of the stable water tests, the valve lift
was observed to be small enough that the ehoking oeeurred at the seat loeation.
The diseharge eoeffieients using homogeneous equilibrium and Burnell
models at different times during five water and/or transition tests for Dresser
31739 and four tests with Dresser 31709 were ealeulated. The average diseharge
eoeffieient for both valves using the HEM and Burnell model was found to be 1.
Figures 6 and 7 show the eomparison between the predieted and measured
mass flow rates for two tests. Predietions were obtained by using the Burnell
model and the annular area between the seat and dise at the inner seat loeation
as the ehoking area. Also shown are the predietions using the Burnell model
with the nozzle area as the ehoking area. Obviously, the method of predieting
the diseharge rate with the annular area between valve dise and seat is pre-
ferable during valve elosing period. Sinee suffieient data for valve full open
period was not available, the reported diseharge eoeffieient of 1.0 will only
be valid for portions of the elosing transient when nozzle area is larger than
the annular area at the seat loeation.
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CHUGGING-RELATED LOAD REDUCTION FOR PRESSURE SUPPRESSION SYSTEMS
E. Aust, H.-R. Niemann; H.D. Fürst, G.F. Schultheiss
GKSS-Forschungszentrum Geesthacht GnmH
Institut für Anlagentechnik
2054 Geesthacht, Federal Republic of Germany
ABSTRACT
Experimental research of the loss-of-coolant-accident (LOCA)-
behaviour of pressure suppression systems of BWR's has indicated at
lower mass f lO~1 rate strong, cyclic pressure pulses resulting in
dYnamic loads. World-wide this phenomenon is called chugging.
Correlated evaluation of digital and visual data from our large
scale test facility with e.g. original vent pipe diameter resulted
in a substantial progress of understanding the essential physical
mechanisms of this phenomenon. Based on these results, a successful
chugging-related load reduction has been obtained by various simple
geometrical changes at the vent pipe exit.
The raper contains a summerazing presentation of the developed
mitigator constructions to completely avoid chugging and/or the
induced dynamic loads.
INTRODUCTION
GKSS has conducted an experimental research program focussed on the
function of apressure su:r;pression system (PSS) during a postulated
loss-of-coola'nt accident (LOCA). This research work was performed in a large
scale three vent pipe test facility modelling main features of German and
United States BWR-pressure containment design. Fig. 1 shows schematically the
general arrangement of the PSS test facility.
About 40 experiments have been conducted, which gave quantified under-
standing of PSS-phenomena, research data for advanced code developnent and
varification and led to the developnent of simple mitigators for dynamic load
reduction in the case of low steam flow rates.
Fig. 2 shows, that in the PSS LOCA-behaviour can be serarated into three
distinct stages, which are called:
- vent clearing and air carry over,
- condensation oscillation (CO) with weak cyclic pressure oscillations,
- chugging with periodic, strong pressures pulses.
Because of the impulsive nature of chugging, the basic mechanism of this
phenomenon and the mitigation of the produced dynamic loads were main research
subjects in the GKSS experimental program.
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CHUGGING PHENOMENON
Time correlation of optical data, obtained from 1000 frames/s high speed
camera-records and TV-movies, with pressure and temperature data evidences the
basic mechanism of chugging (Fig. 3):
Chugging events occur late in the LOCA at a steam flow rate of about
10 kg/m 2 s and air content less than 5 % Vol. At the vent pipe exit a steam
front intrudes into the pool about half a pipe diameter with cylindrical or
conical shape (stage 1). This emerged steam volume condenses smoothly, some-
times by enveloping the vent pipe edge, producing a low frequency pressure
oscillation near the acoustic frequency of the steam-filled ven~ pipe, which
is in the GKSS facility 12 and 17 Hz with respect to the different vent pipe
length. The high speed and TV-movies show, that outside-pipe-condensation is
plume-like, a smooth steam condensation process without a true inpool steam
"bubble". During outside-pipe-condensation (stage 2) pool water rapidly
reenters the hollow core of the steam-filled vent pipe which acts with a sharp
edge of its outlet as a BORDA-mouth (stage 3). High speed records indicate a
steam annulus formation at the vent pipe wall within the stagnant space of the
BORDA-constriction. This steam annulus remains stable for milliseconds and
then suddenly condenses. The resulting rarefaction is followed by a strong
positive pressure pulse which produces a ringdown frequency characteristic of
the fundamental frequency of the pool-boundary system. After the collapse of
the steam annulus, the submerged end of the vent pipe is entirely filled with
water and the pressure in the drywell increases until it once again becomes
sufficiently high for the steam to reenter the pool and to reinitiate the
chugging process /1, 2/.
CHUGGING-RELATED LOAD REDUCTION
The experimental result about the steam annulus formation inside the vent
pipe exit led to two mitigator constructions, which are fooused on a
geometrical change of the vent pipe out let • Main idea ,~as to influence the
thermal hydraulics of the condensation process at the pipe exit in order to
smooth the dynamic chugging loads. The developed mitigators are described as
followed.
OUTLET COLLAR-MITIGATOR
The findings about the BORDA-constriction at the end of the outside
chugging process let to the idea, to initiate attached back flow of the pool
water into the vent pipe in order to avoid the steam annulus stage with its
resulting sharp pressure pulse. The radius of the collar was roughly taken
from the annulus radius, which could be clearly observed in the TV-movies.
Fig. 4 shows a p,oto of the 3 vent pipes with outlet collars.
The construction was tested very succ essfully as shown in Fig. 6. This
figure shows in comparison to the standard condition test Ml-S with the same
mass and energy release into the dry well the obtained load reduction in the
wetwell pressure history by the developed mitigators.
It is important to note, that by this design only the chugging produced
pressure pulses have been avoided but not the chugging phenomenon itself.
Water periodically reentered the vent pipe exit and initiated the well-known
mixing effect of cold and hot water in the pool.
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45 o-OUTLET CUT-MITIGATOR
A second geometrical mitigator construction was also tested very success-
fully. The basic idea of this construction was to provide a continuous steam
flow path from the vent pipe to the pool to avoid the periodic steam release
of a conventional pipe during chugging and to get a partial steam flow
stabilisation. The pipe construction worked with a 45 O-exit cut. A photo of
this mitigator is given in Fig. 5. The static pressure difference along the
diagonal exit cut causes a cross flow of water and steam with a very intensive
steam condensation and mixture of condensate and pool water. During the
expected time of the chugging stage with relatively low mass flow rates this
construction showed a very distinct self-regulating effect: less steam flow
through the vent pipe, less steam flow area at the vent pipe exit. It should
be noted, that in test Ml-B. 45 the cut was only arranged at one of the three
vent pipes. So only the cutted vent pipe was loaded, while the other two pipes
received no exitation from the process and remained onloaded and worked as
tube condensers. In test Ml-ABC.45 the three vent pipes were cutted to 45 ° at
the exit. In the pool the dynamic pressure load reduction was clearly
obtained, while in the dry\~ell atmosphere some cyclic pressure drops of about
0.2 bar occured at the beginning of chugging.
For all mitigation tests a complete replication of experimental results
could be demonstrated.
Finally it should be mentioned, that dynamic load reduction by process
engineering methods is possible. An increase in initial pool temperature or
final pool back-pressure was found ro reduce the dynamic loads. A distinct
attenuation of pressure amplitudes during chugging was also obtained by
injecting air into the vent pipe, in the range of 1 % of the steam mass flow
/3, 4/.
CONCLUSIONS
The insights into the basic [hysics of chugging let to the idea to
develop a simple mitigator to reduce dynamic chugging loads. The first step
was to avoid the sharp edge of the vent pipe outlet, in order to get attached
back flow into the vent pipe without any constriction and a steam annulus
stage. The successful tests with the collar mitigator indicated the correct
interpretation of the physical character of chugging.
The second step was to srnooth the steam flow in order to avoid the
periodic steam flow with chugging events. The 45°-cut let to the successful
mitigator described obove.
It can
outlet cut
suppression
of pressure
be concluded, that a mitigator constr·uction with the collar or an
can be simple awlied in present and future BWR-pressure
systems. Both constructions can help to enhance the safety margin
suppression containments.
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Fig. 4: PHOTO OF THE 3 VENT PIPES WITH
OUTLET COLLAR-MITIGATORS
Fig. 5: PHOTO OF THE 3 VENT PIPES WITH A 45°-0UTLET CUT-
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IMPROVED FUEL CYCLE FLEXIBILITY AND ECONOMY:
VERIFICATION TESTS WITH BWR COOLANT FLOW RANGE EXTENSION
S A Andersson, S Helmersson and L-E Johansson
ASEA-ATOM
Box 53, S-721 04 Västeräs, SWEDEN
ABSTRACT
All Swedish and Finnish BWRs have been relicensed to permit operation at
lower recirculation flow at rated power than the original design, which
corresponded to a 10 % "flow window". This gives a number of advantages,
among which lower fuel costs through spectral shift operation and increased
core operation flexibility are the most important. The reduced coolant flow has
been made possible by improvements in the core steady state operation leading
to lower power peaking. Dynamic reactor characteristics are, however, of vital
importance at low flow operation. A thorough theoretical analysis and experi-
mental verification of reactor transients and stability thus form the basis for
the applicability of the extended recirculation flow range concept.
INTRODUCTION
In order to mlmmlze the costs for electricity generation and also to conserve the
available uranium resources, the most efficient use of reactors is desirable. New fuel
designs, for example designs with a more even moderator distribution in the BWR, Iike the
SVEA water-cross fuel, make considerable savings possible as compared to traditional fuel
designs.
Other means to improve the fuel economy are also available,l Among these, the so-
called spectral shift operation strategy is an important contribution to optimize BWR fuel
utilization. By running the reactor with high void contents in the core during the major part
of the year, conversion of U-238 is improved. At the end of the operating season, the void
contents are reduced to increase the reacthoity. Compared to operation at constant void
contents, fuel savings of the order of several percent may be obtained, the exact figure of
course depending on the magnitude of \Oariations in void contents that can be achieved.
The easiest way to achieve a \Oariation in void contents in the BWR is by varying the
recirculation flow. Net fuel savings of the order I % per 10 % flow variation is achieved in
current practice. Possible flow variation at full power is bounded by operating limits
referred to as the power/flow operating range. The minimum flow is determined, from
those margins with respect to dryout or dynamic instability that are considered necessary.
However, limits of this kind are usually constructed to be conservative under the Iicensing
process of the plant. Considering recent achievements in power shaping and increased
knowledge with respect to reactor instability limits, extension of the power/flow operating
range has been found to be possible in aJl 9 BWRs now in operation in the Nordic countries:
7 reactors in Sweden and 2 in Finland. These include five different designs. Three designs
have external recirculation pumps and two have internal pumps. The Asea-Atom fuel design
with its low pressure drop spacer and excellent dryout performance also contributes to the
margins that can be utilized for flow window extension.
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The reactors were originally designed for a 10 % flow range at full power. By
reducing the minimum permissible recirculation flow at full power and also taking
advantage of pump overcapacity, the "flow window" has been considerably increased in all
plants. As an example, the situation in the Oskarshamn 2 external pump plant is shown in
fig 1.
Extension of the recirculation flow range mayaiso be consideted as a first step to
power uprating, if there is overcapacity available in the plant's turbine and auxiliary
systems. Such power increases have been put into effect in the Swedish Oskarshamn 2
reactor by 6 %, permanently from 1982, as shown in fig I, and from 1984 also in the Finnish
TVO reactors, by 8 %. Such upratings are also considered for other reactors.
THE BWR POWER/FLOW OPERATING RANGE
The power level and the reactivity of the BWR are controlled by basically two
mechanisms:
i) control rod movements
ii) adjustment of recirculation pump flow
In Asea-Atom BWRs both mechanisms are available for either of these tasks: fine
motion control rod drives make small power variations possible and, on the other hand, the
large available range in recirculation pump speed enables fast and precise power adjust-
ments by flow control.
In recent years, in addition, a third option takes care of most of the need for
reactivity compensation due to burnup, i.e.
iii) burnable absorber in the fuel
Usually, control rod manoeuvering is used for power control at start-up, in the power
range up to 60 %, whereas above 60 % power changes are preferably carried out by means
of recirculation flow contro!. This strategy minimizes the need for control rod movements
at high power operation. Only when the available flow interval cannot accomodate
reactivity changes due to burnup is control rod manoeU\·ering requested. Since use of
burnable absorber has reached a high degree of maturity, only very few control rod
manoeuvers are required at baseload operation and control rod sequences may be designed
with very few rods inserted in the core. This is an important aspect for efficient fuel
utilization and also means that the core can be operated with one single control rod
sequence during one whole operating season, monoseqllence operation, MSO, thus elimina-
ting the previous needs for time-consuming control rod shuffling in sequence changes.
Recirculation flow control is carried out by means of frequency converters that
gO\·ern the speed of the recirculation pumps. In older Asea-Atom plants hydro-coupli~
converters were used, while in modern plants static (thyristor) converters are employed •
The latter permit very fast variation of pump speed, a feature which is used for very quick
power reduction when called upon in order, for example, to avoid reactor scram due to
disturbancies or to reinforce the initial negative reactivity at scram with all control rods
initially withdrawn.
At normal high power operation the frequency converters are controlled in paralleIl
by a common plant power controller that regulates the plant output to agree with its set-
point. The power controller also utilizes the reactor power as meaured by the neutron flux
monitoring system. The reactor power is used in an "inner control loop", which enables very
fast and accurate changes in power level without violating stability requirements.
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Plant power control by recirculation pump speed adjustment may be utilized in the
power range from 20-100 % of rated power. In the range of approximately 60-100 % of
rated power, flow control without additional control rod mo,oements is used.
The allowable range of reactor power and flow (fig 1) is determined by several
restrictions
the low flow limit corresponds to minimum allowed speed of the recirculation pumps.
Operation with stopped pumps, i.e. at natural circulation, is not inc1uded as anormal
operating condition in Asea-Atom BWRs.
the upper flow limit corresponds to the maximum permissible coolant flow with
respect to channel creep deformation etc. Usually the recirculation pump drives are
designed with some overcapacity so that, especially for stretch-out operation during
a smaller part of the operating season, operation with escalated coolant flow is
possible. This overcapacity is valuable in order to achieve the full merits of spectral
shift operation.
at low power, .the upper flow limit may be lower in order to conserve the NPSH
margin of the recirculation pumps when an uneven feedwater flow distribution may
occur.
the upper left limit of the diagram is in some BWRs simply a flow control line, i.e.
the power versus flow line assuming Xenon concentration etc. to be constant.
However, what actually limits the power ·at a given coolant flow is either the
minimum allowed critical power ratio (margin to dryout) or criteria concerning the
stability margin of the reactor. In recent Asea-Atom reactors the ppwer/flow range
has usually been designed with an upper-Ieft power/flow-limit that corresponds
approximately to constant critical power ratio. Stable operation at all points of this
flow map has been demonstrated. This somewhat extended power range at low flow
permits more flexible operation, allowing, for example, faster Xenon build-up at
plant start-up.
IMPROVEMENTS IN FUEL ECONOMY BY MONOSEQUENCE AND
SPECTRAL SHIFT OPERAnON
The void content control capability at full power enables a neutron spectrum shift by
operating at low core flow, i.e. with a high void content and a hard spectrum during most
of the cyc1e, when excess reactivity is available. Use of monosequence operation, MSO,
combined with burnable absorber in the fuel has made it possible to operate about 85-90 %
of the cyc1e length at nearly constant recirculation flow in the left part of the flow range
with high core void contents. The excess plutonium generated will provide extended cyc1e
life time, when core flow is increased to its maximum and thus the average void content
decreases at the end of the cyc1e. A decrease ·in average void content leads to an improved
moderation, which utilizes the reactivity potential of the excess plutonium generated. The
simultaneous upward tilting of the power distribution also contri~utes to the gain in cyc1e
length.
In the long run net fuel savings of about I % per 10 % flow increase is achieved in
consistent practice. Two-thirds of this can be attributed to the void effect on the neutron
spectrum and the remainder to the resulting power tilt. The benefit of spectral shift in
equilibrium cyc1es is rather independent of both cyc1e length and enrichment level of
reload fuel.
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The ASEA-ATOM MSO application is closely linked to advanced use of burnable
absorber (gadolinia), In an advanced concept, axially distributed gadolinia is employed and
in amounts thilt necessitate only a minor control rod inventory at full power. The concept
with burnable absorber and MSO combined with a low core flow within the thermal limits
provides good possibilities to establish a downward displaced axial power shape during the
first part of the cycle. This leads to a downward displaced burnup distribution, which both
amplifies the spectral shift effect (i.e, increases the contents of "oid and plutonium) and
the tilting upwards of the power shape at the end of the cycle.
Monosequence operation (MSO) has been in routine use in Swedish and Finnish
reactors since 1977. During 1984 the forty-third successful MSO cycle was completed. The
MSO concept is thus very weil proven in Nordic practice3,
The energy generation losses due to PCI-restrictions have been reduced from about 1
% to about 0,4 % thanks to the MSO-concept combined with a wide flow range at full
power and an advanced burnable absorber design.
EXTENDED POWER/FLOW RANGE
Extension of the allowable recirculation flow range at full power would be beneficial
since this would increase the fuel savings from "spectral shift" operation. Other advantages
from an extended operating range, in particular one that permits a lower recirculation
flow, are
increased operational flexibility at load follow
reduced number of control rod mO"ements at high power, which mitigates PCI
restrictions
reduced long-term fuel channel pressure drop
reduced recirculation pump power requirement
Extension of the recirculation flow range may be necessary, if power uprating is
planned. The power increases by 6 and 8 %, respectively, in Oskarshamn 2 and TVO land II
were made possible - from a core operation point of view - by the extended flow range at
the original full power level. In Oskarshamn 2 no hardware changes were needed to
accomplish the increased power. In the TVO plants, some modifications in the high pressure
turbine were made and one extra relief valve per plant was installed. The costs of these
modifications are, however, very small as compared to the increased production capacity.
Introduction of extended power/flow range
Introduction of reduced recirculation flow at full power in Swedish and Finnish BWRs
was started in 1976, when operation with reduced flow was demonstrated in Oskarshamn 1.
This plant is the first plant designed by Asea-Atom and was put into full power operation
for the first time in 1972. The original flow window at full power was as in all other Asea-
Atom BWRs designed to be 10 % of rated flow with an additional 12 % overcapacity to be
used at stretch-out operation. Extension of the minimum flow from 90 % to 65 % was
shown possible, thereby increasing the allowable flow range at full power to 65-112 % of
rated flow, i.e. permitting a variation in flow by almost a factor of 2.
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In Ringhals I, the second Asea-Atom plant, an extended flow range was introduced in
1980. In this plant the available flow range is 7000-11500 kg/s at full power, i.e. flow
increase by more than a factor of 1.6 is a\·ailable. In Oskarshamn 2 and Barsebäck land 2 a
similar flow range was introduced, starting in 1978, cf fig 1.
In later plant designs the design margins with respect to static and transient dryout
margin limits are tighter and the possibilities for flow reduction thus somewhat smaller.
However, in Forsmark land 2 and in TVO land II the permissible flow range has also been
extended. In TVO land II the original flow window of 90 to 105 % of rated flow was
extended down to 79 %. This extended flow range made possible the 8 % increase in rated
power, still maintaining a sufficient flow window at the new full power.
The basis for BWR operation at a reduced recirculation flow level is formed by
several contributing achievements in core operation and design margins. The major
contributions are
a fuel design with a \'ery efficient, low pressure drop spacer combined with thin
corner rods in the 8x8 fuel bundles
refined load patterns and extensive use of burnable absorber, which lead to reduced
macroscopic power peaking
detailed core tracking methods providing accurate on-line estimation of the thermal
margins of the fuel
impro\'ed fuel design with lower internal power peaking
large inherent stability margins at high power and minimum flow
select rods scram, i.e. hydraulic insertion of one scram group of control rods,
comprising 6-10 control rods, being used in conjunction with flow reduction to
amplify the power reduction capability for transients like turbine trip or load
rejection, when full reactor scram should be avoided.
Evaluation of thermal margins of the fuel
The power distribution in the BWR is controlled on one hand by the balanced
distribution of emichment levels and contents of burnable absorber in the fresh fuel, and on
the other hand by proper choice of the control rod withdrawal sequence. Among all possible
power distributions only those that satisfy the core thermal limits are allowed. These limits
relate to evaluated values at steady state operation for
J) minimum dryout margin, i.e. minimum critical heat flux ratio, in the fuel bundles
2} maximum surface heat flux on the fuel cladding
3} maximum linear heat generation rate due to the maximum calculated fuel cladding
temperature at LOCA (limiting only in external pump reactors)
In Asea-Atom BWRs, the thermal margins of the core are continuously supervised by
the use of a 3D on-line core simulator, POLCAIi, coupled to an interpolating scheme
correcting for deviations between actual and calculated power distribution as observed in
detector readings.
At reduced recirculation flow the dryout margin limit is bounding for the power
distribution. It poses a maximum limit on the radial power peaking, i.e. limits the maximum
bundle power. This can very weIl be controlled by proper reload fuel design. To some
extent, howe\'er,the economic benefits of recirculation flow reduction are counteracted by
the need for a somewhat flatter power distribution. The optimum fueleconomy is thus
obtained as a rather delicate balance of different parameters within the restrictions posed
by the thermal limits.
680
Stability margins
At low flow conditions the power of the BWR is known to be limited by restrictions
due to either dryout or inherent instability. By proper design and adequate choice of limits
on power and flow, sufficient stability margins can, however, be acquired. In the "upper
left" corner of the power/flow-map, in particular, proper stability margins must be assured.
In Asea-Atom BWRs, measurements of reactor stability at low flow conditions have
been performed for all plant designs, with an emphasis on later designs, which utilize a
larger power le,oel at minimum flow5, Starting with Barsebäck 2 in 1977, all the latest
BWRs to be commissioned have been demonstrated to have large stability margins at all
points in the permissible power/flow range. One plant, Ringhals 1, has been tested with
larger burnup.
In order to investigate reactor stability also under ,oery low flow conditions, tests
with natural circulation have also been performed, starting with Barsebäck 2 in 1977.
Natural circulation conditions are not considered to be an expected plant condition, so
these tests are set up merely as an experimental procedure to reach the most unstable
conditions for BWR operation6.The tests performed have shown repeatedly that a con-
trolled power increase up to and e,oen above the threshold of instability can be achieved
and that, in spite of large power oscillations, safe operation of the plant is still possible.
One other important finding is that the power and flow level, at which instability occurs,
is not possible to reach from the normal power/flow range without additional reactivity,
since the core and bypass ,ooids are effective means for limiting the power. This fact can
also be expressed as an increasing slope of the power/flow control line at ,oery low flow
conditions.
ANALYSES ANO VERIFICATION TESTS WITH EXTENOEO FLOW RANGES
The introduction of extended power/flow ranges in the BWRs in Sweden and Finland
was carried out in a set of analyses and tests that was repeated for each reactor design.
The analyses form amendments to the Safety Analysis Reports of the plants. They cover
static and transient conditions and show the calculated influence of the new proposed
power/flow conditions. After approval by the national nuclear inspectorates, the proposed
new flow ranges were demonstrated in a test series. The tests included ,oerification of the
static and dynamic reactor performance.
Analyses of impact on transients and accidents
Transient and accident analyses for the Safety Analysis Report are carried out with
computer programs that have been developed by Asea-Atom. The main tools are BISON for
transient analyses and GOBLIN for LOCA analyses4•
BISON has a 10 thermal-hydraulic model for the coolant loop in the reactor vessel
coupled to a 10 (axial) neutron kinetics model and a 10 (radial) model for heat transfer in
the fuel rods. The central reactor model is complemented with models for other parts of
the plant, e.g. steam lines, turbine, feedwater-and condensate systems, control systems,
safety systems, etc. Altogether, the code is able to simulate a large variety of transients,
ranging from detailed analyses of reactivity .and heat transfer in the core under safety-
related, postulated transients to realistic analyses of plant characteristics.
For analyses of accident conditions, where a 10 core model is unsatisfactory, a 30
transient core simulator, ANOYCAP, is also available. ANOYCAP has been used for
control rod drop analyses in safety reports.
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The GOBLIN code can be used for thermal hydraulic analyses of almost 'any flow
system, but is primarily devoted to analysis of loss of coolant accidents in BWRs. The code
uses a ID thermal-hydraulic four-equation thermal equilibrium madel to simulate the
various flow paths in the BWR. This model is complemented with a ID heat conduction
model for the fuel rods as well as models for pumps, safety systems etc needed to perform
a complete LOCA analysis.
The analyses performed for the different plant designs have shown that the impact of
an extended power/flow range for most transients and at LOCA conditions is small. Design
basis transients like large LOCAs in external pump reactors or pressurization transients at
postulated loss of heat sink are hardly affected at all by the relatively small change in
initial conditions. This is also true for the transient that produces the largest reduction in
dryout margin in an internal pump reactor, i.e. pump trip caused by an auxiliary power
disturbance, provided that the operationallimit to the static dryout margin is unchanged at
the new minimum permissible core flow.
Verification tests
The verification tests with extended flow range have included verification of
core thermal margins
c;ore stability margins
power control system characteristics
as well as an o\'erall verification of the plant performance with the modified operating
conditions.
The tests comprised reduction of the recirculation flow at full power and power
reduction along the flow control line in the new part of the operating map. Both at full
power and at maximum permissible power at minimum flow the reactor stability was
evaluated by sinusoidal pressure perturbations. The thermal margins of the fuel were
continuously evaluated by routine procedures. The capability and stability of the power
control system were demonstrated by introducing fast ramps in the power set-point.
The test results show that the behaviour of the plants is well in line with pre-test
analyses:
the thermal margins of the fuel are kept well below the thermal limits and can be
predicted in a consistent way
the stabili ty margins at full power are only very slightly affected by the flow
reduction. At minimum flow, the least stable conditions of normal operation are fully
acceptable
the capability of fast and precise power control by means of pump speed adjustment
is unaffected by the reduced core flow
In summary, the extended flow range has a very small impact on the stationary
operation, providing that relevant incore fuel management is maintained. Also under
transient conditions the impact is small, as shown by the analyses performed, and by the
continued, very satisfactory operating records of the Asea-Atom reactors.
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ABSTRACT
presented are two blowdown calculations for an 80 cm 2 reactor ves-
sel leak and an 1/40 area (i.e. 17.68 cm2 ) emergency core cooling
pipe break in a boiling water reactor of the modern Gerrnan 1300 MW
el
series. The calculations were perforrned using the RLEAP4/MOD6 re-
actor analysis code in order to analyze the effect of the emergency
core cooling. For the investigation the plant is presumed working
at 106 % power level and there is only one of three emergency core
cooling injection systems available. The results presented are on
system behavior, reactor safety system actions and pressure, mix-
ture level and cladding temperature development. The results prove,
that even under conservative assumptions, the safety system holds
the plant in a safe state and no severe core damages are to be ex-
pected.
INTRODUCTION
Nuclear reactors have a much higher risk potential thah conventional
power plants. In the case of a loss of coolant accident (LOCA), special care
has to be taken that no long term core uncovering and in consequence severe
core heatup takes place. To avoid such forbidden conditions, boiling water
reactors (BWR) of the modern 1300 MW
el series have among others three redun-dant emergency core cooling systems (ECCS). They have to provide enough
water to hold the core covered and to ensure the removal of the radioactive
decay heat. In the work presented here, it is investigated, if the emergency
system of a BWR is able to hold the reactor in a secure state in the cases
of medium and small leaks, such as 80 cm 2 reactor vessel leak and 1/40 area
emergency core cooling pipe break, using conservative assurnptions and me-
thods. The calculations were perforrned with the RELAP4/MOD6 reactor analysis
code.
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DESCRIPTION OF THE PLANT
Table 1 shows some characteristic data of a BWR of the 1300 MW
el se-
ries. For this analysis the interesting part of the plant consists of the
reactor pressure vessel (RPV) including its installations,'four steam pipes
and four feedwater pipes. From the RPV installations, especially the reactor
core with its container, the steam separators and the steam dryers have to
be mentioned. Eight axial pumps provide for the internal circulation of the
coolant.
The core consists of 784 fuel assemblies, each of them containing 8 x 8
fuel rods. The active core length is 3.71 m and its diameter is about 5 m.
The cross shaped control rods are inserted from the bottom into the core.
The most important parts of the reactor safety system are the reactor
shutdown system, system isolation, and emergency core cooling system (ECCS).
The ECCS consists of three parts: The pressure limiter valves, three redun-
dant high (HP) and low pressure (LP) emergency cooling injection systems
and in addition one system for slow (SAD) and one for fast (FAD) automatie
depressurization.
For reactor shut down, 193 control rods are available, providing a shut
down reactivity of about -40 $. The pressure limiter system consists of
three groups of relief valves, which are activated at different pressures
and they are closed with a hystereses of 5 bar. The automatie depressuriza-
tion system consists of two groups of valves, one group for slow (SAD) and
the other one for fast depressurization (FAD), which are opened depending on
the course of the accident (see Table 2).
PLANT MODELING FOR RELAP4/MOD6
For the analysis the system was modeled by 14 control volumes and 25
junctions as shown in Fig. 1. The parts of the RPV are represented by con-
trol volumes as follows:
Volume 1:
Volume 2:
Volume 3:
Volume 4:
Volume 5:
Volume 6:
Volume 7:
Volume 8:
Volume 9:
Volume 10,11,12:
Volume 13,
Volume 14:
Water steam mixture space
Steam separators
Steam dome
Steam outlet volume
Upper part of the downcomer
Lower part of the downcomer (annulus)
Pump plenum
Lower plenum
Core bypass
Reactor core
stagnation volume (space within the control rod tubesl
Volume to simulate boundary conditions (depressurization
chamber).
The junctions connecting the adjacent volumes can be seen in Fig. 1,
too. The feedwater and steam lines are simulated by time dependent fills
until the pressure limitation and depressurization system is modeled by leak
or normal junctions which are to be opened or closed by valves. Pressure de-
pendent fill junctions connected to Volume 6 provide for the high and the
low pressure ECC injection.
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The power generation during the transient is calculated by a reactor
point kinetics model using 6 groups of delayed neutrons. For the radioactive
decay heat the ANS Standard 1.5 is used with 20 % error additioning. The
energy generated in the core is added to the coolant by three core heatslabs
and the heat stored in RPV components is taken into consideration by 5 addi-
tional heatslabs.
Out of the program options, available in RELAP4!MOD6, the following
ones are applied:
The wilson phase separation model in all volumes except those, repre-
senting pumps, lower plenum and space inside the control rod tubes. The
vertical slip model is used in the lower part of the RPV, which is usually
filled with water or water steam mixture. Within the reactor core volumes,
the water steam mixture room and the steam separator volume the single mix-
ture level calculation model is applied.
The homogeneous equilibrium critical flow model (HEM) is used to calcu-
late the leakage mass flow.
BOUNDARY CONDITIONS
At the start of the accident the thermal power of the reactor is
4070 MW. For the reactor safety system, the most important signal is the
pressure in the depressurization chamber (p ~ 1.25 bar). This criterion is
met after about 0.5 s. In the presented analysis it is used for scram,
system isolation and to activate ECC injection.
For the reactor scram it is presumed, that the control rods are inser-
ted within 3 sand the shut down reactivity nf -40 $ is on effect linear
with time. Out of three ECC injetion systems only one should be availab1e,
this means, that in the case of the ECCS leak on1y the low pressure
injection can work, for in a conservative manner the high pressure system is
assumed to feed into the broken line. Concerning the automatic
depressurization system; the assumption is taken, that out of 6 va1ves 2
will fail, this means, that for SAD only one and for FAD on1y 3 valves are
availab1e.
The criterion for activating the va1ves is pressure in the depressuri-
zation chamber higher than 1.25 bar. The FAD valve is opened then with a
delay time of 60 sand the SAD is initiated when the system press ure falls
be10w 30 bar.
RESULTS
system Depressurization
Comparing the results (Figs. 2 and 3) it turns out, that the courses of the
accidents are very similar. However, an important difference is, that the 80
cm2 RPV leak runs about 1.4 times faster than the 1!40-F-ECCS pipe break.
The first few seconds after leak opening, there is almost no effect on
the system pressure because of the relative low leakage mass flow and of the
low energy of the escaping flow. Just when the system isolation has closed,
fast changes take place in the system after 3 s. There is no more energy
removed by the steam lines but the reactor still works at 20 % of its nomi-
nal power level. Therefore a fast pressure rise in the RPV is the consequen-
ce and the pressure relief valves of Group 1 and Group 2 open. By this, the
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pressure rise is limited to 78.5 bars. Now the pressure decreases within a
few seconds below 72 bars and the relief valves of Group 2 close again. From
now on, besides the leakage mass flow, one valve of Group 1 is the only
energy sink, therefore causing the pressure to rise again until 30 s when
the power' generation is low enough to allow continuous depressurization.
After about 60 s, the valves of the SAD open. But because of the clos-
ing of the Group 1 relief valve 10 s later, there is only a short period of
increased pressure drop. There is no accelerated pressure drop until the
system pressure decreases below 30 bars (1050 s, see Figs. 2 and 3) when the
valves of the FAD open. After nearly 790 s in the case of the RPV leak
(1150 s for the ECCS leak), the pressure falls below 15 bars and the low
pressure injection starts to deliver coolant into the RPV.
Mixture Level Evaluation
In the case of the RPV leak (Fig. 4), immediately after starting, the mixtu-
re level in the annulus begins to drop continuously. Inside the core contai-
ner it beg ins to fall not before 140 sand the top of the core is reached
after approx. 590 s. Then the mixture level drops into the upper core
region, shortly thereafter. When the SAD causes flashing, it rises above the
top of the core so that the core is covered again. On long term, the mixture
level is rising in the whole RPV when the low pressure injection is achieved
(p C 15 bars).
For the ECCS leak the mixture level developes similar to the RPV leak
(Figs. 5 and 6). Caused by the different location of the leak and by the
slower transient, the mixture level drop beg ins later, the core uncovery
lasts considerably longer and a greater part of the core becomes uncovered.
Fuel Rod Temperatures
As shown by Figs. 7 and 8, the cladding temperatures strictly follow the
temperature of the saturated coolant, which itself is determined by the
system pressure. In the case of the RPV leak, the short term uncovery of the
upper core region has no effect on the cladding temperatures. Because of the
longer lasting core uncovery in the case of the ECCS leak, the fuel rods are
heated up temporarily in the upper core region. But even in this case the
temperature rise is limited and the temperatures stay below the degree of
normal operating,
CONCLUSION
The investigation shows in both cases, that the emergency system of the
1300 MW
el boiling water reactor is able to control the LOCA and to protect
the core from severe damage. This remains true even under such conservative
restrietions like availability of only one of three ECC systems.
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Table 1: Data of the Analysed 1300 ME
el Boiling Water Reactor
3840 MW
4
70 BAR
2078 kg/s
286 °C-
215 °C
12580 k9/s
6.5
8
784
50176
193
-40 jl
3 HP 3 LP
22.35 m
6.62 m
3.71 m
5 m
11 mm
Number of recirculation pumps
Number of fuel assemblies
Number of fuel rods
Number of control rads
Shut down reactivity
Number-of ECC injection systems
RPV inner height
RPV inner diameter
Heated core length
Diameter of Core
Fuel r~d diameter
r------------------------,r-----------;
Nominal thermal power
Number of loops
Normal operating pressure
steam generation rate
Saturated steam temperature
Feed water temperature
Core mass flow
Recirculation number
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Table 2: Data of the Automatie Depressurization System and Pressure
Limi ter Valves
Automatie Depressurization System
Number of Valves
Flow Area
Opening Time
Delay Time
Initiation Criterion
Relief Valves
Number of Valves
Opening pressure (bar)
Closing Pressure (bar)
Flow Area
Opening Time
Closing Time
Delay for opening
Delay for Closing
SAD FAD
2 4
158.3 cm
.3 s
.0 s
P DC > 1.25 bar
and
PSYS < 30 bar
or
ML < 11 m
Group Group 2 Group 3
1 6 4
75 77 79
70 72 74
1. 58
.3 s
.7 s
.438 s
.7 s
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SAFETY CONCEPT AND EVALUATION OF THE
745 MW KWU-PRESSURIZED HEAVY WATER REACTOR (PHWR)
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ABSTRACT
In parallel to the light water reactors KWU follows the
line of heavy water reactors of the pressure vessel type.
A 745 MWe-PHWR is actually under construction in Atucha,
Argentina.
Part I
The safety concept of the PHWR is principally based on
the same safety features as the light water PWR, e.g.
reactor building consisting of a spherical steel contain-
ment and an outer concrete building with vented annulus
inbetween. However, there are some specialities adherent
to the heavy water reactor. Safety related systems are
designed to be both, diverse and redundant. The moderator
cooling system can be used as a high pressure heat re-
moval system and thus is an addition to the heat removal
via the steam generators. For reactor shut-down a control
rod system and a boron injection system exist indepen-
dently.
Part 11
A safety evaluation has been performed via a probabilistic
risk analysis (PRA). The assessed core damage frequency
shows the same safety level as for light water reactors.
The contribution of the different accidents proves the
balance of the safety concept. The environmental dose re-
sulting from accidents is beyond a given dose frequency
criterion.
INTRODUCTION
The design of the recent .KWU heavy water (D 2 0) moderated and
led pressurized water reactor (PHWR) bases on the 57 MWe-
ti-purpose research reactor (MZFR) at the nuclear research cen-
, Karlsruhe, which went into operation in 1966 and on the first
mercial PHWR of KWU design, Atucha I (Argentina), which was
ded over in 1974. The concept of this 340 MWe-PHWR (1977 in-
ased to 367 MWe) was confirmed by the excellent availability
80% since start of operation. At the moment the advanced 745 MWe-
R Atucha 11 is under construction. The design of this plant
ves here as reference. Part I of this paper describes the safety
cept of this plant. Part 11 deals with the results of the pro-
ilistic safety evaluation.
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PART I: SAFETY CONCEPT OF THE 745 MWe PHWR ATUCHA II
The KWU PHWRs are press ure vessel type reactors and thus there
exist many common design features between this PHWR and ~he pres-
surized light water reactor (PWR). See Fig. 1.
Main Similarities to KWU-PWR
• Reactof Pressure Vessel
• Main Coolant loops
• Pressurizer System
• Spherical Sieel contajMleflt
• Secorxlary Concrete Shielding
• Annulus
• Aclive Enghleered Safeguards
• J&C Coocepl
ATUCHA 11 PHWR 745 MW Fig. 1
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Nuclear Power Plant wilh Heavy Water Reaclor (750 MW Class)
Reaclor Building
Moreover, the 150
years operating ex-
perience with KWU's
LWRs can be used.
The components of
the reactor coolant
system are fully
comparable with a
PWR in their design
and their arrange-
ment inside the reac-
tor building, also
similar to the PWR is
the layout of the
reactor building with
the leak-tight spheri-
cal steel containment,
the conßrete shield
building including
the valve compartment
for external impact
protection and the
vented"annulus in-
between for the ar-
rangement of safety
related systems and
components. See Fig. 2.
Fig. 2
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Filler Pieces
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Contral Element
Positions
Section A-B
CJ Coolant
o Moderator
c:J Fuel Failure Detection
CJ Safetylnjection
The reactor pressure vessel
(RPV) is somewhat larger than
that of a PWR at equal ther-
mal output. All connections
are arranged above the area
of the active core. The noz-
zles for the cooling channels
and control rods are arranged
around the periphery of the
cover in order to allow room
for the on-load refueling ma-
chine. The control rods are
inser ted into the reactor
core at angles of about 20°
(see Figs. 3 and 4).
Nuelear Power Plant with Heavy Water Reaelor
Reaelor Pressure Vessel wilh Internals
Fig. 3
Nuclear Power Plant with Heavy Water ReactOf
Arrangement 01 Control Rads
Fig. 4
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Cl BlackElements
D Grey Elements
o Grey Elements
o Reflector
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Due to the considerably lon-
ger moderation length of D2 0,
the fuel elements can be ar-
ranged in discrete cooling
channels with a grid pitch
of 272 mm. In total, the core
contains 451 channels, each
with one fuel element (37 rod
bundles) .
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The coolant channels pass through the moderator tank inside the
reactor pressure vessel (RPV). The moderator tank is connected
to separate moderator loops.
The pressure between the D2 0 coolant and the D2 0 moderator
is equalized through pressure equalization openings in the mode-
rator tank head, so that there are no significant pressure dif-
ferentials acting on the internals of the RPV.
The moderator temperature can be varied within certain
limits and serves besides the control rods and the normal opera-
tion borating system for reactivity control. For safety purposes
there is also a fast boron injection system as a second indepen-
dent and diverse shut-down system.
The reactor coolant system of the PHWR is built up analogous
to that of the PWR and consists of two identical loops, each with
steam generator and reactor coolant pump, and a common pressurizer,
see Fig. 5.
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KWU - PHWR Reactor Coolant and Moderator System, Safety Related Systems
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The moderator system consists of 4 identical loops, each with a
moderator cooler, a moderator pump, and the associated connecting
systems. This system has to per form a number of functions. During
normal operation it has to keep the moderator temperature lower
than that of the coolant (Fig. 5 left). In order to increase plant
efficiency, the heat extracted from the moderator in the moderator
cooler is used to pre-heat the feedwater. In the residual heat
removal mode (RHR), the system is re-configurated by changeover of
some valves so that the residual heat is removed via 4 independent
residual heat removal chains, see Fig. 5 (right). In the emergency
cooling mode the system serves as a high~pressure injection system.
In addition to the residual heat removal mode, the core can be
flooded and cooled in this mode by water injection from the sump
via the safety injection system.
In its function as a primary-side high pressure residual
heat removal system, the moderator system represents one of the
characteristic features of KWU's PHWR.
In parallel to primary-side RHR, heat can also be removed
via the secondary side in the same way as in the PWR, either with
the aid of the main heat sink (main condenser) or by dumping main
steam to the atmosphere via the main steam relief station, which
is designed to withstand external impacts. The steam generators
are supplied with feedwater by the main feedwater system or, de-
pending on the plant operating mode, by the start-up and shut-down
system, which is connected to the emergency power supply. Due to
the primary side and therefore secured high-pressure cooling sys-
tem, there is no need for aseparate emergency feedwater system.
Thus, KWU's PHWR plant is equipped with two independent and re-
dundant high-pressure heat sinks.
The connection be-
tween primary and
secondary systems
is shown princi-
pally in'the sim-
plified flow dia-
gram, Fig. 6.
Fig. 6
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Nuclear Power Plant with Heavy Water Reaclor
Simplified Flow Diagram
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The design of the engineered safety features is based on the same
safety philosophy as applied to the PWR, especially since the re-
sponsible licensing authority requires that applicable German codes
and standards have to be met. Design lays primary emphasis on pre-
ventive measures to mitigate accidents, in particular quality-
assurance measures, on the conservative design of the components
ahd high reliability of active safety features. For instance, the
instrumentation and control systems are built up in accordance
with the same hierarchical principle that has proved effective
in the PWR, and with the same quality standards:
- process-related instrumentation and control
- limitation systems
- reactor protection system
The active engineered safeguard features are required to func-
tion within the short term « 30 min) following a malfunction. They
are automatically initiated and controlled by the reactor protec-
tion system. These systems are of four train redundancy (n+2) to
cope with single failure and simultaneous repair case. The redun-
dant trains are physically separated to prevent consequential fail-
ure, see Fig. 7.
Apart from these active engineered safeguard features the
PHWR also· incorporates the passive measures against release of
radioactive materials according to the barrier principle as applied
in the PWR.
Emergency power and
chilled water supply building
90"
RPS 1 SPl
RPS2 SP2
RPS3 SP3
RPS4 SP4
270"
Nuclear Power Plant with Heavy Water Reactor
Layout 01 Active En!lineered Saleauard SYStems
RPV ~ Reactor pressure vessel
RCP = Reactor cooIant pump
SG = Steam generator
MOC = Modarator cooler
RHR = Residual heat removal
intermediate cooling system
CCS = Component cooling system
ECCS ~ Emergancy core cooling
systam
SCS ~ Servica cooling water system
SP = Switchplant
SCP = Service cooling pump
SCL = Service cooling line
Cl ~ Containment
RB = Reaclor building
RPS ~ Reactor protection system
EPS ~ Emergency power system
Fig. 7
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The principles and measures involved in
reactor safety are summarized in Fig. 8
I Reactor Safety I
.....
1. Protective barriers agairlSt the escape of radiations and radioactive substances
·
Crystallatticeoffuel
·
Fuel e1adding
·
ReactOl' primary system pressure boundary
·
COOCfeie shielding around eomponent.s
·
5tH! containment
·
Shiekl building with groundwater lsolation
.....
2. Principles and Measures ror maintaining the integrity of the barriers:
-+ ....
Plinciples Measures
2.1 Accident prevention ~ '"1st level:
·
Conservative and careful design
with adequale safety lTultgins
·
Quality '$$Ur.nee aod conlrot
·
Reliable instrumentation of operating equipment
·
Monitoring of operating ~pment
·
Inservice inspectability
·
Periodical inspection and maintenance
·
Training 01 operating persoonel ~ · Periodieal tests of operating personnel2nd level:
·
InherenUy safe optrational characleristics
·
A1armannuncialion
·
Automatie coonteone&$Ule$ lor limitation
01 ""'" panmeteR '" pnvent tbem
• from developing imo aedaent values
..... .....
2.2 Mitigation 01 accident consequences ~ Aclive engiDffied safeguard measwes by theJrdlevel: • Reactortrip system
·
Design!mis taking imo aceount the
·
Reaclortrip
Iollowingaccldents: by rod drop andlor
• Intemal: bylast l«on irlectioo
·
Reactivity disturoanees in the reactor core • Engineered safety fahnS actuation system
·
lO$$ of cootant and moderator
·
Residual heat removal by the moder.Itor system
·
lO$$ of feedwater
·
IJjection 01 H20 by the safely lJjeclion synem
·
Break of feedwaler or mainsteam Uoe
·
f!edwaler~ by the~ and sOOt-
outside the reactor building down syslem
• Ertemal:
·
Isolation cf maimteam and leedwater Iines
·
Earthquake
·
Containment lsolatlon
• Mitigation will be adlieved by
·
Mainsteam ptessure reUel via relief station
·
Multiple-redundant design of active
engineered safety leatures
·
Pfrrsical separation
·
Fail-safeprineiple
·
Automation
Principles and Measures
involved in Reactor Safety
Fig. 8
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Special Safety Related Features
f!I Shutdown Systems
- Controls Rod.
- fllt Boron Injeclion
- 8oron Acid DOlification
• Heat Removal Systems
- Steam Generltor Feed Ind Bleed
- Cloltd High PreSlure Re.idual Hell RemoYl1
• (n + 2) - Concept lor Design 01 Salety Systems
• Actlvily Confinment
- Full Preuure Steel Containment
- Conerete Shleld Buildlns
Fig. 9 gives abrief over-
look over the most important
special safety related fea-
tures of the Atucha PHWR
745 MW.
This brief description
would be incomplete without
mentioning the on-load re-
fueling, which is a special
feature of heavy water reac-
tors. The PHWR refueling
system is shown in Fig. 10.
• Hierarchiall &CConcept
- Pro.... Related I& C
- Condition limitation System
- Reaclor Prot.ctlon System
Atucha 11 PHWR 745 MW Fig. 9
3
--.
B
4
sectionC-O 1 Refuelling machine
2 Shroud tube pit
3 Function testing position
for refuelling machine
4 Tilting flask
5 Transfer tube
6 Tilting device
7 Spent fuel pool
8 Spent fuel pool bridge
Heavy Water ReactorRefuelling System (Example Atucha I) Fig. 10
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C, On-load refueling is a rou-
tine operation in KWU-PHWRs since
1966. It has been demonstrated
that this relatively complicated
process can be performed safely
and without major perturbancies,
thus increasing the plant availa-
bility.
Refueling of the PHWR is carried
out during normal operation of
the reactor by one refueling ma- c,,,,,,~..
chine. The refueling machine with-
draws a fuel bundle column with a
spent fuel assembly from the cool-
ant channel and transports it to
a reclinable container, called
tilter, where the exchange of the
cooling medium from D2 0 to H2 0 is
performed. The fuel bundle column
(see Fig. 11) is tilted from the
vertical to the horizontal posi-
tion and transported to the trans-
fer tube, which leads through the
steel containment by way of locks
to the fuel pool building. The
refueling procedures are per-
formed fully automatically. They
are monitored from the control
room.
---Wrthout DItpocaI CoItI
------ D1_ICOItI:l500DMllqjU
The PHWR is designed for
natural uranium fuel.
However, several dif-
ferent fuel cycles are
possible without major
modifications on the
plant. Those alternatives
increase the fuel burnup,
increase the uranium ex-
ploitation and finally
result in lower fuel
cycle costs, as shown in
Fig. 12.
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Table I shows a comparison of the main technical data of the
nuclear power plants Atucha 1 (CNA 1) and Atucha 2 (CNA 2)
QKWU
Dimension CNA1 CNA2
Overall Plant
Reaetor Type
Gross Generator Output
Thermal Reaetor Output
Heavy Water Moderated and Cooled Pressurized
Reaetor with natural Uranium
MW 367 744,7
MW 1179 2160
451
5300
7500
232
1B
mm
MWo/Mg
W/em
Sintered Pelletized natural Uranium Dioxide, 37 Rod
Cluster Elements
on Load
253
5300
6000
232
29
Relueling
Number 01 Fuel Elements
Aetive Length
Burnup
Mean Fuel·Rod Power
Number 01 Control Rods
Reactor Core
Type 01 Fuel
Main Circuits
Number/Main Coolant Loops
Number/Moderator Cool. Cire.
Flow Rate per Coolant Loop
Moderator Flow Rate
Operating Pressure
Coolant Temperature
Average Moderator Temperature
kg/s
kg/s
bar
°c
°c
2
2
30BO
445
113
262/296
140-210
2
4
5150
BB9
115
277.9/312,3
170-220
Reactor Pressure Vessel
Internal Diameter
Weight 01 Bottom Portion
mm
Mg
5360
320
736B
670
Main Data of Nuclear Power Plants Atucha Table I
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PART 11: SAFETY EVALUATION OF THE 745 MWe PHWR ATUCHA 11
The PHWR plant Atucha 11 had to be evaluated via a probabilistic
risk assessment (PRA) by KWU. This part of the paper describes the
objective, the performance and the results of the analysis as well
as the evaluation of the safety concept of' the 745 MWe PHWR of KWU.
Objective
The responsible licensing authority in Argentina requires for the
PHWR-plant Atucha 11, supplementary to the deterministic safety
analysis which had to be performed in accordance with the interna-
tional practice, as additional information an probabilistic risk
assessement for the evaluation of the plant and safety concept. Be-
fore construction of the plant was permitted a preliminary PRA had
to be presented and was handed over in December 1980, the final
analysis must be prepared for the operation permit.
The PRA has been performed to verify the following main objectives:
- The risk resulting from accidents in the Atucha 11 plant fulfills
the risk criterion valid in Argentina. The assaciated dose-fre-
quency correlation is shown in figure 18.
- The plant and systems design is adequately selected and the sa-
fety concept is balanced in itself.
The risk level of the PHWR plant Atucha 11 is in agreement with
the state of the art in the country by which the plant is sup-
plied.
Performance
The analysis was ta be performed with respect to the methodology,
data and modelling in analogy to the German Risk Study, Phase A
(GRS) /2/ which represents the state of the art in the PRA tech-
nique. The results of the GRS have also to serve as reference PWR-
values far the comparative evaluation of the PHWR safety concept.
The PHWR study is performed in three steps:
- accident sequence analysis to determine the frequency of the
core damage, which means in reality, due to the efficiency condi-
tions used, the frequency of design limits being exceeded
- valuation of the radioactivity release into the containment and
containment behaviour conservatively starting from a core melt-
down
- determination of the consequences of that release to the environ-
ment with respect to the dose and corresponding frequency for a
given critical group.
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Results
~~~~9~~~_~~9~~~~~_~~~~Y~~~
All potential accidents to be considered in the safety analysis
report are identified with respect to the risk relevance and
grouped to the following four event classes:
- LOCA
- Transients
- Fuel Handling Accidents
- External Impacts
As representative LOCA events the large, medium and small breaks
in the primary circuit are analysed in detail. Emergency Power Mode,
Loss of Main Feedwater and Main Steam Line Break are valuated from
the category of Transients. The site relevant External Impacts are
also valuated and possible failures in Fuel Handling are estimated.
Due to the lack of specifically risk oriented accident sequence
calculations using best-estimate boundary conditions, the valua-
tion of the systems engineering was based on conservative boundary
conditions and postulates as specified for the deterministic li-
censing procedure, such as for instance 2-out-of 4 efficiency con-
ditions for safety systems in accordance with the (n+2)-redundancy
concept.
Thus the preliminary analysis results for the PHWR Atucha 11 on
basis of conservati~5 assumptions in an integral core damage fre-
quency of f ~ 2 x 10 /a, as summarized in table 11. In accordance
with the GRS the thus valuated plant state is conservatively de-
fined as core meltdown and used for further calculations.
Q)KWU
Evenl Sequence Frequency of
Core Melldown [1/a]
LOCAt...rge < 0.1 x 10-6
LOCÄMedium 0.2 x 10-6
LOCASmaIl 0.6 x 10-6
Emergency Power Mode 10 x 10-6
Other Transienls -10 x 10-6
Fuel Handling Accidenls _} No Relevant
External Evenls _ Contribution 10Ri.k E.ptcted
E - 20 x 10-6
Gennan Risk Sludy 40 x 10-6
US-Reaclor Safety Sludy 60 x 10-6
Summary of Resulls of Accldanl Sequence AnalysIs for
PHWR Alucha 11 (Median Values) Table Ir
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The integral core damage frequency of the PHWR is lower than that
obtained for PWR plants in the GRS or US-Reactor Safety Study /3/
as shown in table 11, but within the same order of magnitude with
respect to the uncertainties.
LOCA events do not make any dominant contribution to the integral
frequency of core damage. The valuation of the large LOCA is based
on a multi-stage analysis concerning the pipe break behaviour of
a primary coolant line. A fracture mechanics analysis shows that,
with respect tO,the clearly ductile material selected, the pipe
design, the catalogue of loads and the high level of non-destruc-
tive examination, a spontaneous failure of a coolant line can be
precluded, which is in accordance with the German PWR technique
and stated in the guidelines of the reactor safety commission.
Figure 13 shows that for the PHWR primary coolant line there exists
a considerable safety margin between the allowable crack after
acceptance test and the critical through-wall crack length even
taking into account the crack propagation.
Break
Crackaftar
40Yaare
Crack Depth amal Thickness I
r
Leak-&lcxe-Break
1,0 Crack Propagation
-........
" (lhrough-Wal CracIc)
f ...........
I ............. _
, --
I,
,
I,
I
I,
I Crack PropagationI (part ThrOllll"-WaHI Crack)
I,
,
I,
,
AIIowabIo Crack
altar Acceptance Test
__ Crack length 20
Leak-Before-Break (Scheme) Figure 13
With the help of the highly sensitive and reliable leak detection
equipment at the Atucha plant even the smallest possible leak will
be immediately measured and indicated.
The occurence frequency of a large LOCA is calculated both relative
to the value used in the GRS (and RSS) only by quantifying the in-
fluence of the low stress level and an additional ultrasonic inspec-
tion - compare figure 14 ,- and by an absolute valuation in analogy
to an investigation ordered by the US-NRC /4/ for a primary coolant
loop of a PWR plant (the calculation scheme is shown in figure 15).
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Both analayses result in an extrernely low occurence frequency. Thus
it 9an be concluded that the large LOCA is less frequent than
10- ja, which is underlined by the results of the deterrninistic
approach.
Freqoeocy 10-'
a-'
I
lOCAu...:
• German Risk Study (GRS)
• US-Reactor Saf.ty Study (RSS)
(Median Value)
OuantifJed:
.low Stress Level
• Additional
lAtrasonic Inspection
10-7
Frequency 01 LOCA-large
Relative Comparison 10 Gennan Risk Study
Unquantifi<d:
.Impcovement to
Re!erence Plant RSS ..... GRS
.Ouality: - Forged Piping
- Automatie
Welding of Cladding
•Design: - WI1hooI Kardn Weld
_ Grouod Rool Weld
Figure 14
Frequency 01 LOCA-large
Calculation by Probabilistic Fracture Mechanics Figure 15
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Medium and small LOCA have been valuated just as the transients via
an event tree/fault tree analysis. The small LOCA in the KWU PHWR
is less dominant than in the PWR because the PHWR is designed with
two diverse high-pressure heat removal systems. The event tree far
small LOCA in figure 16 shows the residual heat removal performed
via secondary side systems or via the moderator circuit. The short
term safety injection and heat removal is highly reliable because
the moderator system is used which is already in operation and only
some valves have to be switohed and operated. The reactor shutdown
function is ensured in diverse modes, by the trip system or the
fast boron injection system, both highly redundant, so that the
unabailability of this function is low.
Unavailibility of Safety Functions
Frequeocy of Initiating Event
Frequency of Exceeding Design limits
Valuation 01 "LOCA-Snnall" lor PHWR Atucha 11
ControUed
5,10-'
5,2,10-'
10-5
6'10-'
10-'1.
Figure 16
The main contribution is accounted for by the transients. The 'Emer-
gency Power Mode' was analysed in detail, because this event makes
severe demands on the systems engineering both by its relatively
high frequency of occurrence compared to the LOCA events and be-
cause of the restrictions in power supply; the corresponding event
tree is shown in figure 17. Applying the restrictive approach of
common mode failure used in the GRS reference study for the quant i-
fication of the emergency power diesel system this fault makes a
contribution of about 70 % to the system'sunavailability. The neces-
sary safety functions shutdown and heat removal are performed by
above mentioned diverse systems, so that their unavailability is low
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Controlled
ControUed
2·10-'
7'10-'
Una'allabilityolSaf,tyFIIlCIions
Frequency oIlriäting Event
Frequency 01 E,ce<ding Design Umits
ValuatiOll 01 "Emergency Power Mode" for PHWR Atucha 11
-10·10-'
10-",
-10.10-6,.
Figure 17
The further transients are taken into ~ccount with respect to the
core damage frequency as 'Other Transients' by a contribution to
be of the same order of magnitude as the 'Emergency Power Mode',
see table 11. The explicitly valuated events 'Loss of Main Feed-
water' and 'Main Steam Line Break' underline the~8nservativeness
of this estimation by being slightly more than 10 /a each.
'Fuel Handling Accidents' do not contribute significantly to the
risk due to the activity inventory, the handling procedure and the
equipment design.
Because of the low occurrence frequency and the plant design, no
relevant contribution to the risk is estimated also from 'External
Events' .
~~9!~~~~!~!~l_~~!~~~~
A complete core meltdown analysis has been performed for a repre-
sentative meltdown accident using, due to the similarity in systems
and plant design between the PHWR and PWR of KWU and with respect
to the comparability of both the frequency and the amounts of the
radioactivity release into the containment and from there into the
environment, the same approach and the same modelling as in the
reference GRS taking into account the PHWR specifica, e.g. the
core and reactor pressure vessel structure. Thus the release cate-
gories (Re) used are the same as those selected iQ the GRS, see
table III.
The frequency of the different release categories has been esti-
mated by an analysis of the containment response basing on a pres-
sure - time his tory calculation and a reliability assessment for
the containment isolation.
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RC Descriplion Frequencyof Release (1/a)
1 Core Meltdown. Steam Explosioo 2 X10-7
2 COI. Meltdown. larye Containmentl.ak 2.3 X10-7(<il300mm)
3 COI. Meltdown. Medium Containmentleal< <2.3 X10-7(<il60mm)
Care Mehdown.SmaIl Contaimnendeak
4 (<il2Smm) <2.3 X10-7
lal. Ov<rpressur. F.n...
5 Core Meltdown.lal. Containment 4.5 X10-'Overpressure Faihe,Failure of Filtersystems
6 Core Meltdown.late Coolainment 1.5 X10-5Overpressure Failure
Release Calegories (RC) lor Core Meltdown Accidents and
Occurence Frequency lor PHWR Alucha 11 (RC ace. 10 Gennan Risk Sludy) Table 111
The most significant failure of the containment due to overpres-
sure (RC 5 and 6) is to be expected not earlier than 7 days after
the onset of an accident,because of the favorable relationship be-
tween the volume of the containment (same as 1300 MWe PWR) and the
reactor power. In this case, most of the radioactivity is released
in the conservatively quantified leakage outflow.
The distribution of aerosols including iodine in the containment
atmosphere has been calculated with the NAUA-code /5/.
The PHWR analysis does not yet include the recent findings of reac-
tor safety research concerning in the valuation of the accident
consequences, e.g. the sedimentation of radioactivity especially
in the annulus and the binding and retention of iodine in the liquid
phase or the reduction of the probability of steam explosion /6/.
Thus the accident consequences will be reduced considerably.
~~~~~9~~~~~~_~~_~~9~~~~~~~~~l_~~!~~~~
The valuation of the consequences of the release of radioactivity
to the environment refers to a given critical group of persons in
the realistic position relative to the Atucha plant, which nearly
corresponds with the point of the maximum dose. The amount and fre-
quency of the dose is influenced by the weather conditions at the
time of release. The radiation dose is determined with respect to
the German recommendations for dose calculation taking into account
dose factors ace. to ICRP 30.
The results of the analysis are summarized in figure 18 where the
ealeulated dose and corresponding frequeney for eaeh release cate-
gory are shown.
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Evaluation
The comparison of the dose-frequency values for the various re-
lease categories (RC) for the PHWR plant Atucha 11 with the appli-
cable Argentine limit criterion appropriate to figure 18 shows
that the risk resulting from accidents is well below the given
limit. Even if uncertainty bands of one order of magnitude in each
direction are conservatively assumed as demonstrated for RC 5, the
limit line is not reached. Thus the valid risk ctiterion is ful-
filled by the 745 MWe PHWR Atucha 11.
The analysis confirms that the plant and systems design of the
PHWR Atucha 11 have been adequately selected. The safety concept
is well balanced, there is ho dominant contributor from accident
sequences or safety functions to the core damage frequency. The
accident consequences are considerably mitigated by the contain-
ment function.
A comparison of results achieved for the PHWR with the correspon-
ding results calculated for the reference PWR (1300 MWe) in the
GRS with respect to the core damage frequency and arelease cate-
gory that is equally representative of both types of plant permits
the conclusion to be drawn that the risk level of the KWU 745 MWe
PHWR is comparable with that of a KWU PWR. Thus from the probabi-
listic point of view the KWU 745 MWe PHWR would be licensable in
the country of the supplier.
Frequency
I 1O-~
1/a
10-4
10-5
10-6
10-7
10-8
Argenline
Umil Crilerion
,
I 0
RC 6 -I (GRS/RC5)
"---G---..
RC 51
I
I
l
(OComparison Value from
German Risk SIudy wilh
1300 MW Reference Planl)
0.1 10 10 3 rem 10 4
Dose
Dose/Frequency-Values for various Release Categories (RC) for the
PHWR Atucha 11 in Comparison with the Argentine Limit Criterion Figure 18
711
Literature
/1/ Building a 745 MWe pressure-vessel PHWR in Argentine
Nuclear Engineering International
Vol. 27, No. 332, Sept. 1982
/2/ Gesellschaft für Reaktorsicherheit
"Deutsche Risikostudie Kernkraftwerke"
Verlag TÜV-Rheinland, Köln 1979
/3/ Rasmussen N.C.
US-Reactor Safety Study
US-NRC, Wash 1400 (NUREG-75/014), Oct. 1975
/4/ Probability of Pipe Fracture in the Primary Coolant Loop
of a PWR Plant
NUREG/CR-2189, Vol. 1-9
Lawrence Livermore Laboratory, Sept. 1981
/5/ A. Bunz, W. Schock
Aerosol Behaviour in the Condensing Steam Atmosphere of a
Postaccident LWR-Containment
ENS/ANS - Int. Topical Meeting on NPP safety,
Brüssel, 1978
/6/ K. Haßmann, J.P. Hosemann
Consequences of degraded core accidents
SMIRT 83, Chicago
712
SURVEY OF KWU'S SAFETY RELATED CONTAINMENT
WORK FOR AMERICAN BOILING WATER REACTORS
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Berliner Straße 295 - 303, D-6050 Offenbach/M.
Federal Republic of Germany
ABSTRACT
KWU's experimental and analytical work on the
safety relief system and on the pressure supression
system performed for American BWR's during the last
few years is presented. For the safety relief system,
loads were measured during the Kar1stein Quencher
Verification Tests and applied to Mark 11 contain-
ments. The loads due to air clearing were corrected
analytically for amplitude and frequency according
to the different plant conditions. For the pressure
suppression system, LOCA-loads were measured in a
test facility at the Großkraftwerk Mannheim. The
application to the plants for design verification
was performed using hydrodynamic point sources com-
bined with probabilistic amplitude factors accounting
for multi-vent effects.
INTRODUCTION
In 1976 KWU's first boiling water (BWR) reactor of
product line 69 started for operation. During the licensing
period be fore much experimental and analytical work had to
be done to meet the German safety requirements. An important
part of this work was the solution of containment problems
concerning the loads in the pressure suppression system due
to safety relief valve (SRV) actuations and loss of coolant
accidents (LOCA) as well /1/ . After 1976, KWU performed
safety related containment work also for American boiling
water reactors with Mark 11 containments (Fig. 1). The
methods were improved taking advantage of the experience of
the work already done for the KWU type plants. Of course
also some adjustments had to be made according to the
acceptance criteria in US licensing procedures.
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2 SAFETY ~ELIEF SYSTEM
The safety relief system consists of the safety relief
valve, the discharge pipe and a quencher device. The quencher
is situated at the end of the discharge pipe and is submerged
in the wetwell water pool (Fig. 2).
One pur pose of the quencher is to re~uce the loads in the
wetwell pool due to air bubble pulsations following air clear-
ing and the loads due to steam condensation. Another one is to
condense the steam up to the boiling temperature in the pool.
2.1 QUENCHER DESIGN AND VERIFICATION TESTS
KWU has designed a two-leg type quencher 2 for ten Mark 11
plants in the USA including the corresponding load definitions.
The design had to be tested in an extensive test program
(Karlstein Quencher Verification Tests) because of significant
differences with respect to the German devices (mass flux, valve
opening time, pipe length, etc.).
In the test facility a single quencher was installed in a
tank. The tank geometry was designed such that its walls simu-
late the neighbouring quenchers in one of the Mark 11 plants in
case of all valve actuation.
The loads measured were forces, moments and temperatures
acting on the quencher, the discharge pipe and the supports,
loads on other submerged structures in the pool and pool
pressures.
2.2 CONTAINMENT APPLICATION
Most of measured loads could be immediately applied to
the plants without major corrections. For the pool pressures
due to air clearing this was possible only for the particular
plant geometry and operating conditions simulated. In cases
with a smaller number of quenchers actuated, different operat-
ing conditions or cases of other plants the loads must be
modified.
For that purpose an analytical model was used which ac-
counts for the hydrodynamic interaction between the pulsating
quencher air bubble and the pool boundaries quantitatively 3
An increase of the pool size for example causes an in-
crease of the pulsation frequency and the strength of the
equivalent hydrodynamic source accompanied by a decrease of
the pool boundary pressure. A decrease of the bubble pulsation
frequency is caused by an increase of the bubble volume. Fig. 2
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shows an example of the frequency dependence together with
experimental verification.
All such effects were quantitatively taken into account
for various load cases and for different power plants by
multiplying the measured pressure traces with corresponding
amplitude and frequency factors.
Furthermore pool mixing with respect to water temperature
was considered. The analyses yielded relatively good tempera-
ture mixing for the present two-leg quenchers designed for
Mark 11 containments.
3 LOSS OF COOLANT ACCIDENT
The containment work with respect to LOCA-loads consists
of a new test series in the modified GKM test facility /1/ and
the corresponding evaluations for the plants using further de-
veloped analytical methods.
3.1 TESTS
The test facility represented a single cell of the pres-
sure suppression system of a Mark 11 plant (Fig. 3). The
LOCA's simulated were main steam line and recirculation line
breaks under various conditions (break size, pool tempera-
ture, back pressure etc.) which cover the plant operation
fields.
The instrumentation allowed for comprehensive measure-
ments of pool pressures, lateral loads on the vent pipe and
loads on submerged structures and the measurement of the
various physical quantities and conditions during the blow-
downs (Temperature, steam flux, air content, phase boundaries
etc. ) .
The measurements revealed the characteristic phenomena
like pool accoustics, vent accoustics and their exitation
mechanismus. The resulting pool boundary loads could be cate-
gorized as pressure-time histories (Fig. 4) being quasi-har-
monie pressure oscillations ("condensation oscillations", CO)
or being pressure events with oscillatory ringout behaviour
("chugging"). During the tests thousands of pressure events
were registrated having large stochastic amplitude variations.
3.2 CONTAINMENT APPLICATION
Extensive analytical work has been done to convert the
various test results into loads for the plants. The most
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interesting loads were those which affect the dynamic response
of relevant components within the reactor building. For the
corresponding load definitions the existing analytical tools
had to be improved, and new one had to be developed.
The containment load definition lead to asymmetrie and
an asymmetrie pressure distribution at the wetwell pool boun-
daries. Its generation methodology contained a probabilistic
and a deterministic part.
A number of representative events was selected such that
they cover the governing frequencies with their mean amplitu-
des during the various blowdowns. The selection criteria based
on band pass filtered pressure traces of overlapping frequency
ranges and power spectral densities as weIl.
The mean events were corrected by certain multipliers
according to adequate exceedance criteria.
The computation of the multipliers was subject to proba-
bilistic methods. To each of the different vents in the pres-
sure suppression system stochastic pool pressure amplitudes
were assigned having a probability density distribution deri-
ved from the tests. The analysis then yielded amplitude multi-
pliers for symmetrie and asymmetrie loads as functions of an
exceedance probability. The numerical values for the load
defin!~ion were taken according to a permissible exceedance
of 10 per LOCA.
The deterministic part was the conversion of the measured
press ure time histories into pressure time histories at plant's
pool boundaries. Two methods were investigated, the direct
application of measured press ure traces to the pool boundaries,
and the application of hydrodynamic point sources /4/ at the
vent exits followed by analytical calculation of the pressure
(Fig. 5). Both methods gave similar results with respect to
the dynamic containment response (Fig. 6). The second one was
used in the case being because it is less conservative.
~s observed in several multi-vent tests the events at
different downcomers are synchronisized only within a time
window of at least 50 ms. This has been accounted for by in-
troducing adequate desynchronisation of the source functions.
The load defintion was verified by application to the JAERI-
multiveht tests /5/.
For the lateral loads on the downcomers a similar proba-
bilistic load definition was performed.
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